S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '376940',
		(int) 1 => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
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criminal - abetment - section 306 of indian penal code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under section 306 - court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence. - constitution of india .article 26-a: [cyriac joseph cj, mrs. manjula chellur & n. kumar, jj] right to establish and maintain educational institution - held, the right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the nation, under article 26(a) of.....

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
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			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
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		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
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		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
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		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
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order1. the first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in s.c. no. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned sessions judge, chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. the second of the two appeals has been preferred by the state assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the trial court has acquitted them. the prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of imangala police station. an fir was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is ex. p. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered.....

Judgment:

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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ORDER

1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '376940',
		(int) 1 => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka'
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
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5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
		(int) 1 => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka'
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '376940',
		(int) 1 => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka'
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '376940',
		(int) 1 => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka'
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '376940',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
			'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 's-t-dayananda-reddy-vs-state-karnataka',
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		(int) 0 => '376940',
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$title_for_layout = 'S T Dayananda Reddy Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 376940 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '376940',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 34, 304-B, 306 and 498-A; <a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 3, 4 and 6',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 conntected with Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995',
		'appellant' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'S.T. Dayananda Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - abetment - Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - accused proved to had regularly inflicted cruelty on deceased whether time of infliction of cruelty relevant for establishing commission of offence under Section 306 - Court observed that in normal circumstances time do hold importance but in case as regular infliction of acts of cruelty established time of no consequence.


 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .Article 26-A: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Right to Establish and Maintain Educational Institution - Held, The right to establish and maintain educational institution is also conferred on every religious denomination or any section thereof, irrespective of the fact that they belong to majority or minority community in the Nation, under Article 26(a) of the Constitution. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore a right to establish and maintain institution for charitable purposes includes a right to establishment and administration of educational institution. However, it is a right not conferred on individuals but on a religious denomination or a section of such denomination. In other words, it is a collective right to citizens belonging to every religious denomination or section thereof. In so far as the rights conferred on religious denominations under Article 26 is concerned, the said right is always subject to public order, morality and health. 

Article 29(1) : Right of any section of the Citizens residing in India or any part thereof and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own, to conserve the same. Held, Article  29(1) applies to any section of the citizens. In other words, it applies to majority and minority, that is, to all citizens. All of them have a fundamental right to protect their language, script or culture and conserve the same. Article 29(1) do not control the rights conferred under Article 30(1) on minorities. Article 30(1) is an independent Article conferring on all religious and linguistic minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their languages only. What the Article says and means is, that the religious linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. Therefore, the educational institutions of their choice will also necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education. It also includes the right to choose the medium of instructions of their choice other than the mother tongue of the child or the language of the said linguistic minority. The words of their choice which qualify educational institutions shows the vast discretion and option which minorities have in selecting the type of the institution which they want to establish. The said type of institution includes the type of medium of instruction in which they want to impart education. The dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular community may make it. 

Article 30(1): Right of religion and language of minorities, a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice - Held, The right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. Though the right flowing under Article 30(1) is held to be absolute, the Apex Court has read into this Article the concept of the said right being subject to a regulation protecting national interest. However, the only limitation on the power of the Government while framing regulation is, that it cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer, a mere illusion. The regulation so framed must satisfy the dual test. The test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. The object of the said regulation should be to achieve excellence of standard of education and check mal-administration. If it is a restriction and negates the right conferred under Article 30(1) then the said restriction would be void ab initio and the restriction should yield to the said fundamental right. That is the essence of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution on the linguistic and  religious minority, thus protecting these minorities from the onslaught of the majority. 
Article 141; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Law declared by the Supreme Court - Binding nature of  Ratio decidendi - What constitutes - Held, The ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgement itself. The ratio decidendi of the judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. By reading a line here and there from the judgment one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the principle found out, upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. A decision is an authority on the question that is raised and decided by the Court, and it is an authority for what it decide and not what can logically be deduced thereupon. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. On facts, held, The full Bench struck down the earlier Government Order as there was compulsion to study Kannada and therefore violative of Article 19,21 and 30(1) which finding was upheld by the Supreme Court. For the same reason the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the subsequent Government Order dated 19.6.1989 as there was no compulsion to study any particular language from I to IV Standard, as is clear from Clause-I of the Government Order. Therefore, the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of the Apex court as well as the full Bench is If there is an element of compulsion in the Government policy, which infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country under the Indian Constitution, such policy is void and the fundamental rights have to prevail over such Governmental policy. In the absence of such compulsion the courts should not interfere with the policy decision of the Government.  The question whether a student, a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage other than mother tongue or regional language was not the subject matter of the aforesaid proceedings and the said question was not considered either by this court or by the apex court and no decision rendered in the aforesaid proceedings on the said point. Therefore the contention that the question involved in this Writ Petition are squarely covered by the earlier decisions of this court and Apex court is without any substance and accordingly it is rejected.-- Articles 19(1)(a) & (g) R/w Article 21(A): Freedom of the Children to have Primary Education in a language of their choice  Held, Article 19(1)(a) declares that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The medium of acquiring knowledge or information should be the choice of the person acquiring the knowledge. In what language the instructions are to be taken or imparted should be the choice of the student or the person imparting education. There cannot be any compulsion regarding the medium of instruction. If there is compulsion, then it would amount to the violation of a human right apart from the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Medium of instruction is a species of right to information. Therefore, the right to medium of instruction of their choice is implicit in this freedom of speech and expression. When right to education is a fundamental right and in particular by Article 21-A, a fundamental right is conferred on all children of the age of six to fourteen years to have free and compulsory education, which is popularly known as primary education.  The State has been conferred power under the said Article to provide for free education in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine. If this Article 21-A is read with Article 19(1)(a) all children have the freedom to have primary education in a  language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to study or get instruction in a language of their choice as it is implicit in the right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to have primary education is a medium of instruction of their choice is enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21-A of the Constitution. As this right is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1) (a), the said right is also that of the parents of the child, who are interested in educating their child and on whom a fundamental duty is cast under Article 51-A(k), which provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India, who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child between the age of six and fourteen years. Both these Articles, i.e., 21-A and 51-A(k) were introduced by way of Eighty Sixth amendment to the Constitution in the year 2002, conferring a right on the child and an obligation on the parent of the child regarding primary education. These two Articles along with 19(1)(a) confers on the child as well as the parent a fundamental right to choose the medium of instruction of their choice.-- Articles 19 (1) (a) & (g), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1): Right to choose medium of instructions, whether is a fundamental right -Interpretation of Articles 19(A) (G), 21,26,29(1) & 30(1) Held, Right to education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. The medium of instruction is one aspect of freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of speech and expression includes right to receive and acquire information and to disseminate it. It also includes right to educate, right to be educated, right to inform and right to be informed and entertained. The choice must be of the student and the parent. The States duty is only to provide and create an atmosphere, where the child can have education in a medium of its choice. It cannot compel the student to choose a particular medium  of instruction. The right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1) would include the right to have choice of medium of instruction in imparting education. The medium of instruction is to be entirely the choice of the management concerned. Therefore,  it can be declared that the right to choose a medium of instruction of their choice is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)(g), 21,26,29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 
Article 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph, CJ & Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ] Power of the State  to decide the language of the children in primary education-right of the parents to secure primary education in the mother tongue  Held, The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touch-stone of difference between democratic education and monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism. A child is not a mere creature of the State. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. No one can question the constitutional right of parents to discharge their fundamental duty to educate their children by sending them to schools or colleges so long as these schools and college meet the standards established for secular education. The medium of instructions is to be entirely the choice of the parents and the student. The parents have the right to decide as to whether their children should secure primary education in the mother tongue or not. The State cannot step in and arrogate to itself the power to decide as to the language in which the children should have their primary education. Therefore, it is a fundamental right of the parent and child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary school. The police power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to the fundamental right of the parent and the child. 
Articles 226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N. Kumar, JJ]  Government Orders dated 22.4.1994 and 29.4.1994 - Directions issued by the Government to several schools to change the medium of instructions  Challenge as to -Constitutional validity of  Grievance of the petitioner that the Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21,29(2) and 30(1)of the Constitution of India Challenge is mainly against element of compulsion found in Clause 6 of the Government Order under which mother tongue or Kannada language shall be the compulsory medium of instruction in I to IV Standards of Primary Schools - Held, Right to education is a fundamental right being a species of right to life flowing from Article 221 of the Constitution. By virtue of Article 21-A  right to free and compulsory primary education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. The right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in the right to education. It is a fundamental right of the parent and the child to choose the medium of instruction even in primary schools. Right to freedom of speech and expression includes the fright to choose a medium of instruction. Imparting education is an occupation and, therefore, the right to carry on any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to establish and administer and educational institution of ones choice -  Ones choice includes the choice of medium of instruction. Under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, every religious denomination has a right to establish and maintain an institution for charitable purposes which includes and educational institution. This is a right available to majority and minority religious denominations. Every section of the society which has a distinct language script or culture of its own has the fundamental right to conserve the same. This is a right which is conferred on both majority and minority, under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. All minorities, religious or linguistic, have a right to establish and administer education a institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution-Thus, every citizen, every religious denomination, and every linguistic and religious minority, have a right to establish, administer and maintain and educational institution of his/is choice under Articles 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction. citizen shall be denied admission to an educational institution only on the ground of language as stated in Article 29(2)of the Constitution of India. The Government policy introducing Kannada as first language to the children whose mother tongue is Kannada is valid., The policy that all children, whose mother tongue is not Kannada, the official language of the State, shall study Kannada language  as one if the subject is also valid. The Government policy to have mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction at the primary level is valid and legal, in the case of schools run or aided by the State. But, the Government policy compelling children studying in other Government recognized schools to have primary education only in the mother tongue or the regional language is violative of Article 19(1)(g), 26 and 30(1) if the Constitution of India. 
Articles  226 & 227: [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Majula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Government Policy  Scope of judicial review  Held, If the Government policy infringes upon or violates any fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country or is contrary to any statutory provisions or  which is opposed to principles of natural justice or actuated with mala fides, then, in exercise of its power of judicial review the Court can review the said policy. When a policy framed runs against the constitutional provisions, the Court must as a part of its constitutional duty interfere with the said policy. In doing so, the Court will be discharging its constitutional obligations, maintaining equilibrium between the three wings of the State and maintaining the rule of law. The State can formulate regulations and impose them on unaided educational institutions as a condition precedent for granting recognition to the school. Such an institution will of course be subject to regulatory measures aimed at securing excellence in education and maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and prevention of mal administration. However, under the guise of regulation, the State cannot prescribe a particular language as the sole language of medium of instruction, even if that language happens to be the mother tongue or the regional language. Then it ceases to be a regulation and becomes  an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right. Then it directly infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to linguistic minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, It cannot be treated as a restriction under Article 19(20) and (6) of the Constitution, firstly it is not a reasonable restriction, Secondly, it does not fall within any of the parameters expressly provided in those provisions. Any regulation which infringes a fundamental right it void ab initio. Therefore, if the Government policy infringes a fundamental right, by means of judicial review, the courts can restrain the unconstitutional exercise of power by the Government. Hence, Clauses (2)(3)(6) and (8) of the impugned order in its application to schools other than schools run or aided by the Government is quashed. All the orders, endorsements, circulars, issued giving effect to the aforesaid clauses (2) (3) (6) and (8) in the impugned order are also quashed. Rest of the Government Order is upheld.
Article 350A; [Cyriac Joseph CJ, Mrs. Manjula Chellur & N.Kumar, JJ] Facilities for Instructions in Mother Tongue at Primary Stage Importance of Mother Tongue in Primary Education- Held,  It is the mother tongue which is best suited, at the tender age, to acquire and develop literary skills, that enable fuller participation in learning activities.  Studies have shown that the students learn better through their mother tongue. It creates a positive, non-threatening learning environment. It helps them to express themselves with clarity and to think with precision and vigour. Therefore, the first energies of the child should be directed to the through mastering of mother tongue. A childs right from its birth grows amidst the atmosphere of its mother tongue. Learning in the mother tongue has cognitive and emotional value. Therefore, there is no two opinion worldwide regarding the utility and importance of the mother tongue being the medium of instruction at the primary level of education. The way Article 350-A is worded makes it very clear that it is not justifiable in a Court of law. It only deals with facility for primary education in mother tongue to children belonging to linguistic majority groups. It does not deal with or refer to the major group in the State. By this Article, an obligation was cast upon every State and every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups. The responsibility of securing such education was entrusted to the President of India. In other words, the said constitutional right was not made a justifiable right in a Court of law and the power to compel the State to perform its obligation was left to the discretion of the President of India. Therefore, the argument  that when the State is under an obligation to provide primary education in mother tongue under Article 350-A, it has the power to prescribe mother tongue as the only medium of instruction is without any substance. Such a power is not conferred either under Article 350-A or under any provision of the Constitution on the State. It is nothing to do with the Government Policy to have medium of instruction in the mother tongue. Therefore, Article 350-A of the Constitution confers a right only on the linguistic minorities only to insist on providing facilities for primary education in their mother tongue, but no right or power is conferred on the State to impose its policy on the linguistic minorities. The State cannot by virtue of this provision compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary school. No such right is conferred on the State by this provision and such a right do not flow from this Article.  -  The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. 15,000/-.Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened',the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Sri Subhash B. Adi, ;Sri Kaleemulla Shariff and ;Sri N.Y. Guruprakash, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' Sri G.M. Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-11-23',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.F. Saldanha and;N.S. Veerabhadraiah, JJ.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. </p><p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. </p><p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. </p><p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. </p><p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. </p><p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. </p><p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. </p><p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. </p><p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. </p><p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2000CriLJ2064; II(2000)DMC177; 2000(2)KarLJ466',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The first of these appeals has been preferred by the original accused 1 in S.C. No. 75 of 1993 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Chitradurga assailing the correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him. The second of the two appeals has been preferred by the State assailing the acquittal of original accused 1 to 3 on the remaining charges under which the Trial Court has acquitted them. The prosecution alleged that on 27-2-1993 the body of Shanthamma, the wife of accused 1 was found in a well in the land belonging to Venkatashivareddy within the jurisdiction of Imangala Police Station. An FIR was lodged on the same day at about 9.30 a.m. which is Ex. P. 11 whereby it was alleged that the death in question was dowry related and consequently, the police registered an offence and commenced investigation. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation it transpired that Shanthamma was married to accused 1 on 25-5-1989 and that pursuant to the negotiations that took place, a gold ring with initial was given to A-1, Rs. 15,000/- in cash was given to the father A-2 and that a chainwith locket, jumki, bendole, one pair of bangles, a watch and silver leg chain were given to the bride Shanthamma. The prosecution alleged that this was a case in which dowry had been demanded and accepted and consequently, the Trial Court had framed charges against the accused for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC in respect of the acts of cruelty to which Shanthamma had been subjected to as also in relation to the death of Shanthamma which was alleged to have been a result of dowry related cruelty. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused persons had originally demanded dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and it was agreed upon that the dowry was settled at Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The prosecution theory was that because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/- that Shanthamma was treated badly that she was assaulted and abused and that she was subjected to various forms of torture both physically and mentally over a period of time and that she was finally driven to suicide because of this cruelty and torture. It has come on record that in the course of the marriage Shanthamma delivered two children, the second one hardly three months before the incident and the allegation further is to the effect that the husband A-1 not only ill treated her but that he subjected her to further agony and anguish because he was given to playing cards and gambling, that he would spend all his time with his friends and in the company of others and the wife had reason to believe that he had also indulged in extramarital relationships and furthermore that he had even made certain imputations against her character as emerges from the letter Ex. P. 1. The further allegation against A-1 was to the effect that because of his gambling habits that he had even disposed of some of the ornaments that belonged to his wife Shanthamma. In sum and substance, this is one more of the cases where the charge is that because of the dowry related harassment and torture that the wife finally committed suicide. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. The learned Trial Judge on a careful examination of the record before him recorded the finding that the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act had not been substantiated but at the same time, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the acts of cruelty stood established as far as the husband A-1 is concerned and consequently convicted him of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- under this charge. The Trial Court also held A-1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and awarded a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2,000/- under this charge. It is against this conviction and sentence that the accused 1-Dayananda has preferred Crl. A. No. 214 of 1995 whereas the State has appealed by way of Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 against the acquittal under the remaining charges. We have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the State in Crl. A. No. 452 of 1995 is that the Trial Court was clearly in error in having acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the face of the clear cut evidence of Shanthamma's brother P.W. 1 and the mother who is P.W. 2. The learned Government Advocate submitted that these two persons who are family members have in terms recounted the fact that Rs. 40,000/- was originally demanded as dowry and because of the inability of the girl's side to meet with this demand that they ultimately agreed to reduce it to Rs. 30,000/- and 8 tolas of gold. The two witnesses have also indicated the items of jewellery that were given in lieu of the gold and the sources from where the amount of Rs. 15,000/- in cash was handed over to accused 2 who is the father of A-1. It was pointed out to us that even though this position has been seriously disputed that there was no ground on which the Trial Court could have rejected this evidence and the further contention raised was that even on the question of probabilities the Court ought to have accepted the evidence as far as these charges are concerned. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Adi who represents the respondent-accused pointed out to us that as far as the State's appeal against the acquittal is concerned, that the essential principle which this Court must follow is the well-settled position in law that applies to all such appeals against acquittals namely that where all the evidence has been considered and where the Trial Court has recorded findings that are logical and which proceeded on a fair and correct appreciation of the evidence and where the Trial Court has proceeded in consonance with the well-defined principles of law that merely because some other view may be canvassed in appeal that it is no ground for interference. As far as this head of charge is concerned, we did very carefully apply our minds to the well-defined position in law for purposes of assessing whether from the discussions and findings recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court any error or possible miscarriage of justice has occurred and having rechecked the position from the evidence, we need to record that as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the findings of the Trial Court require to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. The same position applies with regard to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC insofar as the learned Trial Judge has discussed the legal position and since this is a case where it was more than apparent that Shanthamma committed suicide, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that Section 306 of the IPC would be the appropriate and correct section to base a conviction and in this view of the matter, it would not really be correct to contend, as has been done by the State, that the Trial Court has recorded an acquittal for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. It is well-settled law that at the end of a criminal trial, the learned Judge is entitled to convict the accused for a lesser or slightly different offence from the one charged if the evidence led by the prosecution and the law so justifies it. Under these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with regard to the order of the Trial Court where under the accused have not been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Also, we need to record in passing that as far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned namely the parents of the husband A-1 that the evidence led does not make out acase for conviction of A-2 and A-3 under any of the heads of charge and the findings recorded by the Trial Court as far as these accused are concerned do not require any interference with. It is true that the learned Government Advocate advanced the submission before us that even if the Court were to refuse interference as far as the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act were concerned that these would have a fall out insofar as if the prosecution has established that if the death of Shanthamma was the overall result of harassment, torture and cruelty which emanated because of the non-payment of the balance dowry amount that this would be sufficient to fasten the criminal liability of A-2 and A-3. In our considered view, this submission cannot be upheld because the alleged liability is too remote and furthermore because of the principal fact that the evidence in this case with regard to the charges under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the further allegation that the cruelty inflicted was dowry related have both failed and this is the principal reason why the accused 2 and accused 3 will have to be exonerated of all charges. Also, though the prosecution has levelled various allegations against A-2 and A-3, the record does establish that the parents were not residing with the son Dayananda and this is an additional ground in their favour. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. Coming to the case of accused 1-Dayananda, learned Advocate Mr. Adi vehemently submitted before us that the conviction will have to be set aside because of the fact that the main plank of the prosecution evidence namely that this was a dowry death case has not been substantiated. He relied heavily on the findings of the Trial Court but more importantly, on the record of the case in support of his contention that the entire charge against accused 1 to 3 was that they harassed and tortured the wife Shanthamma only because her parents had not paid up the balance dowry amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Advocate submitted before us that once this evidence is held to be unsatisfactory that the remaining charges must automatically fail. We are not prepared to accept this submission as it has been propounded because this is a case of a slightly different complexion. It is not as though the entire prosecution case rests entirely on the non-payment of dowry and what transpired thereafter because there is other independent evidence alleging cruelty of considerable gravity which is capable of being sustained independently of the dowry related issues. While it is true that the prosecution alleged that everything that transpired subsequently namely the act of torture and cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma were the sequel to the non-receipt of the balance Rs. 15,000/- by the accused, we find on a careful scrutiny of the record that the position is not so. Also, what we need to indicate is that the allegations with regard to the demand and receipt of dowry have not been held to be substantial enough or strong enough to record a conviction but there is no finding to the effect that these allegations are groundless or that they are false. In other words, it is only because this head of evidence is relatively weak that the Court has refused to record a conviction under those charges. That is an important aspect of the matter which needs to be borne in mind. ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. Mr. Adi then submitted before us that if the evidence of the brother and the mother who are the principal witnesses namely P.Ws. 1 and 2 along with the evidence of P.W. 9 who is a neighbour is to be taken at face value, that at the highest it would indicate that there were some quarrels between the couple or that there were occasional altercations and from time to time, the relationships between the husband and wife did suffer some ups and downs. He pointed out to us that out of the two, the husband was essentially an agriculturist whereas the wife appeared to have had a slightly higher and better education and that as is inevitable, there was a difference of opinion on various matters and that taken generally, despite these ups and downs which are common to any married couple that there was nothing grave or serious enough to bring the case within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. His principal submission was that there is no clinching evidence to indicate that Shanthamma had been subjected to any severe physical assaults or that she had suffered injuries serious or otherwise at any time and furthermore that the incidents that have been recounted and the behaviour pattern that is attributed to A-1 may at the most amount to minor misconduct but that it is not of the gravity which qualifies for conviction in a Criminal Court. As against this, the learned Government Advocate emphasised that the evidence did very clearly indicate the substratum of the marriage which virtually got seriously eroded because of the fact that A-1 was given to gambling and moving with his friends and that this was the principal reason why the wife was seriously offended and neglected. He has drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W. 1 the brother wherein he has pointed out that the accused 1- Dayananda had on one occasion created an ugly scene at their house and that he had even pulled off the 'thali' worn by Shanthamma and thrown it and that this is probably the most serious affront that a young married wife could be subjected to. He has stated that they had desired to lodge a police complaint that the matter was reported to the panchas and that finally A-1 was persuaded to come back to their house and to retie the 'thali' around the neck of Shanthamma. He has also drawn our attention to the evidence of this witness which in turn has been corroborated by P.W. 2 the mother that Shanthamma was repeatedly complaining about the fact that her husband was subjecting her to a lot of torture and suffering. It is true that the defence has disputed this position but we do have on record one important document Ex. P. 1 which is a letter in the handwriting of the deceased Shanthamma which was found in the folds of her sari after her death and which has been heavily relied upon by the prosecution. This letter makes pathetic reading. Shanthamma has really poured out her feelings in this lengthy letter addressed to her husband in which she has among other things indicated how unhappy and deserted she was as a result of the treatment at his hands. She has referred to the neglect of the wife because of the husband's preoccupation with his friends circle and the fact that he was also obsessed with the vice of gambling. The letter is also in the form of a desperate appeal to him to try and save their marriage and to respond to the love and affection that she was offering and there is also a sad reference to thefact that he should not be led away by the charms of other women who would be no substitute for herself. There is no dispute about the fact that this letter is in the handwriting of Shanthamma and, in our considered view a Court is required to take very serious note of the contents of this letter. Mr. Adi submitted that the prosecution has laid over emphasis on this document. His contention was that even if A-1 was preoccupied with his friends and was not paying enough attention to his wife or even if he was involved in the act of gambling that the reading of the letter indicates that Shanthamma had overreacted, that she had portrayed an ultra sensitive approach and that his is the reason why she has written at length in that letter even resorting at times to poetry. Learned Advocate submitted that the Court must go by the rest of the record and not merely the statements in this letter because the accused had no opportunity to deal with the contents insofar as the writer is no more but he emphatically submitted that the evidence on record in the case does not present as gory a picture as has been made out by Shanthamma in the letter. His submission therefore was that even if the Court were to rely on that letter that it requires to be heavily watered down. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. While considering the validity of the conviction recorded against A-1 under Sections 498(A) and 306, Indian Penal Code, we need to examine the crucial issue as to whether the material before us justifies a conviction under these two heads. Even though the Trial Court has convicted A-1, having regard to the fact that the case is now in appeal an independent and complete review of that material is necessary. We would prefer to start by considering the implications of the evidence against A-1. The first of the incidents and one of some seriousness emanates from the fact that A-1 had created a scene at Shanthamma's mother's house and wrenched off the 'thali' and flung it off. The act of this type directed against an ordinary newly married Indian wife is an affront of the most heinous type because it is almost synonymous with the renunciation or total contemptuous destruction of the marriage. The fact that A-1 was subsequently forced, due to public pressure, to make amends does not really reduce the gravity of the incident because it is clear from Shanthamma's letter that he did not reform thereafter. The important aspect of this case is that Shanthamma's mother and brother were residing hardly 100 yards away and it has come in evidence of P.W. 1 that he used to regularly meet his sister almost on a daily basis while going to the fields and returning and that she used to incessantly complain to him about the harassment and torture that she has been subjected to. The fact that the parents were living close is an aspect of importance because this aspect inspires confidence in our mind with regard to the fact that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were close enough to observe what was going on between the couple from time to time. It is not like other cases where the situation had to be reported or relayed only when the parties met. Also, this, evidence is totally and fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 9-Hanumanthareddy who is a neighbour of the couple. This witness has unequivocally deposed to the fact that he overheard the quarrels and abuses on a regular basis and that from the reaction ofShanthamma it was very clear that she was also being assaulted and that he used to hear her cry out on an equally regular basis. The fact that Shanthamma was therefore being subjected to cruelty both physically and mentally is more than fully established. We have also referred to the fact that the situation did get aggravated because there were some imputations about her character to which she reacted strongly. What has then compounded the situation is the fact that accused 1 though he was an agriculturist was in the habit of gambling and this was a vice which was strongly resented to by Shanthamma. It is an inevitable outcome that such a vice has disastrous consequences and the reaction on the wife when some of her ornaments were disposed of because of the husband's habit of gambling was added to the already high degree of torture and unhappiness between the couple. It is on the basis of this evidence which we have very carefully evaluated that we did find that the conduct of accused 1 consistently and over a period of time contributed to a situation whereby the physical and mental well-being and welfare of the wife Shanthamma was not only affected but was seriously endangered. It is also clear to us that the torture was not of a minor nature nor was it just recurrent nor for that matter could it be categorised as the usual skirmishes that are part and parcel of marital life. This was a case in which the level of cruelty was sufficiently deep seated or sufficiently grave and was sufficiently recurring as to bring it squarely within the four corners as the definition envisaged under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. Having regard to this position, we have no hesitation in holding that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court against accused 1 for the offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is justified and will have to be confirmed. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>8. As regards the conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code Mr. Adi attacked the validity of the conviction principally on the ground that there is no evidence direct or circumstantial to indicate that accused 1 was in any way connected or concerned with the incident relating to Shanthamma landing in the well and losing her life. Mr. Adi submitted that the evidence is silent with regard to the exact 'point of time when this happened', the evidence does not allege that accused 1 was anywhere around or that he was remotely instrumental in Shan-thamma's ultimately losing her life in the well and he therefore submitted that the charge of abetment of suicide is misconceived and will have to be set aside. We need to record here that the facts of this case are unusual. It is true that there is nothing to indicate that accused 1 was physically instrumental in the act of Shanthamma landing in the well but at the same time, what we need to take cognizance of is that the evidence very clearly establishes that it was because of the cruelty inflicted on Shanthamma by accused 1 continuously, incessantly and over a period of time that she was driven to the act of suicide or in other words that it is because of what accused 1 did that Shanthamma was pushed to a suicide. Within the framework of law as far as Section 306, Indian Penal Code is concerned if it is demonstrated that the accused was in any manner instrumental in the act of suicide, then it would come within the framework of abetment. It is true that as far as otheroffences are concerned, the definition of abetment assumes a different complexion but as far as conduct because of which suicide is caused, if it can be clearly demonstrated that there is a nexus between the acts of the accused and that too a direct nexus with the acts of the accused that pushed the deceased to suicide and caused it, then a conviction under Section 306, Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide would be justified. In this background, we need to record that Sri Adi advanced an interesting submission insofar as he pointed out to us that even if certain acts of cruelty are ascribed to an accused that it must be demonstrated that these acts were committed in the immediate proximity in point of time to the suicide and that unless the prosecution demonstrates this, it cannot be alleged that the suicide was triggered off by the acts of the accused. His submission was that suicide is essentially an act of desperation and that if for a variety of reasons which one cannot really fathom a person commits suicide, that one cannot necessarily relate that act to something which the accused has done unless it can be established beyond all doubt that the suicide was caused because of the acts of the accused and nothing else. There is some justification in this submission and it is precisely for this reason that we have evaluated the record very carefully to ascertain as to whether the acts attributed to the accused were sporadic, whether they were very remote in point of time or whether they consistently continued in such a manner and with such regularity that they alone were responsible for the suicide in question. The record indicates that Shanthamma was a young healthy mother of two children that there did not appear to be anything wrong with her physically or mentally. The record does not indicate that she was faced with any forms of crisis nor had anything else happened that would compel her to suddenly end her life but on the other hand the record indicates that her entire life was centered around accused 1 and her marriage, that she was doubly disappointed that even though she was the mother of two children the situation had not improved but it continuously worsened and that it was the accused who was responsible for creating ugly and hurtful scenes, aggravating the situation and ultimately pushing her over the brink. It is for this reason and on the unusual facts and circumstances of this case that we hold that the finding of the Trial Court recording a conviction against accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code is justified. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>9. Lastly, on the question of sentence Mr. Adi advanced a strong plea that the accused 1 is a young person, that he is an agriculturist, that he is the father of two children and that having regard to all the other facts and circumstances on record, the Court should show utmost leniency to him. The learned Government Advocate submitted that it is necessary for the Court to take a very clear, realistic and correct view of this case and he even alluded to the fact that instances of this type are rampant and that consequently, it would be incorrect for any Court to adopt an over-sympathetic attitude having regard to the record before us. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides and we are also guided by the view expressed by different Courts including the Supreme Court from time to time wherein, therehas been a very strong and clear condemnation of all forms of atrocities against women and particularly instances of torture and cruelty. Under these circumstances, while we confirm the sentence awarded to the accused 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court as far as the second charge is concerned, in view of his age and status in life, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 306, Indian Penal Code to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default rigorous imprisonment for three months. It is directed that the sentences shall run concurrently and that accused 1 shall be entitled to set off for whatever period undergone by him in custody. The bail bond of accused 1 to stand cancelled. ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>10. In the result, the Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1995 partially succeeds. Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 1995 preferred by the State fails and stands dismissed. The accused is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks. <p>',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'
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