National Advertisers Vs. Mysore State Road Transport Corporation - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- designs act, 2000 -- section 22(4): [n.kumar, j] transfer of suit - suit for declaration that defendants are not entitled to manufacture, sell pvc pipes which infringes rights - defendant contending that under section 19 that design registered in favour of plaintiff was not registrable -held, civil court has not been vested with jurisdiction to cancel registration of a design made under act. said power vests only with controller and high court . refusal to transfer suit to high court is therefore improper. indian designs act,2000 -- section 19 & 22: [n. kumar,j] remedies under sub-section (4) of section 22 defence set out by the defendant under section 19 trial court refusing to transfer the suit to the high court finding of the trial court, provisions of section 22(4) is not attracted held, though the civil court has been vested with the power and jurisdiction to decide the question of infringement, payment of damages and other reliefs, it has not been vested with the jurisdiction to cancel the registration of a design made under the act. the said power vests only with the controller and the high court. therefore, in a proceedings initiated by the registered proprietor for any of the reliefs to which he is entitled to under sub-section (2) of section 22 or in any suit claiming other reliefs to which he is entitled to in law, if the defendant set-up a defence and urges in addition to other grounds, grounds mentioned in section 19 for cancellation of a registered design, then the civil court shall transfer the suit or other proceeding for relief under sub-section (2) to the high court for decision. further, no discretion is left to the civil court in this matter, once the ground set-out in section 19 of the act is urged as a ground of defence. as the civil court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the said grounds and has no jurisdiction to order for cancellation of a registered design, it shall transfer the suit or such other proceeding pending before it to the high court for decision. section 22 (2): [n. kumar, j] statutory remedy available under interpretation of the wordings in any suit or any other proceedings appearing in sub-section (2) of section 22 held, these are the legal proceedings provided under sub-section (2) of section 22. use of words any other proceeding for the relief under sub-section (2) referred to in sub-section necessarily refers to the aforesaid two types of remedies provided under the said sub-section. that is the statutory remedies. no other remedy is provided under the statute for such contraventions. further, the words any suit referred thereto refer to proceedings other than under sub-clause (b) which also include a suit. any suit referred to a suit other than the suit instituted under the act to enforce the statutory remedies provided under the act. it is a suit to enforce the common law remedies. therefore, the words in any suit or any other proceeding for relief under sub-section (2) has to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively, otherwise it leads to absurdity. when the legislature has consciously used the aforesaid two different phrases , they cannot be read to mean one and the same. each phrase has to be given its due weight and meaning. between the two phrases, all the remedies to which a registered proprietor would be entitled to is covered. in includes both the statutory remedies contained in section 22(2) of the act as well as the common law remedies. 1. the short question arising in this appeal is whether the injunction which was granted to the appellant was wrongly vacated.2. the appellant made an application under section 20 of the arbitration act, and, the direction he sought in that application was that there should be a reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties or any other suitable order which could be made under its provisions. when the application was first presented there was an order of temporary injunction restraining the respondent from securing advertisements to be displayed on the transport vehicles belonging to the respondent except through the instrumentality of the appellant. that injunction was granted by the court but when the respondent sought the cancellation of that injunction, it was cancelled.3. mr. srinivasan for the appellant urges that the injunction should have continued. he depends upon an agreement entered into between the appellant and the respondent under the terms of which, according to mr. srinivasan, the respondent cannot secure advertisements through any other agency than the appellant. the complaint made by mr. srinivasan is that there was a breach of that agreement by the respondent-corporation. according to mr. srinivasan, the agreement between the parties contains stipulation for arbitration in the event of there being a dispute between the parties, and, since the respondent did not agree to such arbitration, the appellant was obliged to seek the intervention of the court.4. it may be as contended by mr. srinivasan, that he has got a prima facie case. but the existence of a prima facie case is not really the sole criterion governing the issue of an order of temporary injunction. the facts of each case must be examined for the purpose of deciding whether an injunction should or should not issue.5. now, in this case, no one can say chat unless the temporary injunction is issued restraining the respondent from securing advertisements through any other agency, a situation will arise in which the appellant will not be able to get adequate redress even if he should succeed in the arbitration which he now seeks. the appellant can always obtain damages for breach of the agreement if there has been breach on its part.6. in that view of the matter, i do not consider this case to be a fit one for interference with the order made by the court below. i dismiss this appeal. but, there will be no direction in regard to costs.7. appeal dismissed.