Thayamma Vs. Giriyamma and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act, 1988 [c.a. no. 59/1988]section 168; [ram mohan reddy, j] quantum of compensation bodily injury - held, bodily injury is to be treated as deprivation entitling the claimant to damages, the amount of which varies according to the gravity of the injury. deprivation due to injuries brings with it there consequences, viz., (i) loss of earning and earning capacity; (ii) expenses to pay others for what otherwise he would do for himself; (iii) loss or diminution in full pleasures and joys of living. further, although it is not possible to equate money with human suffering or personal deprivation, the court has duty to make an attempt to award damages so far as money can compensate the loss. while considering deprivation, the court should have regard to the gravity and degree of deprivation as well as degree of awareness of the deprivation. in awarding damages in personal injury cases, the compensation awarded by the court should be substantial and it should not be merely a token. section 168; quantum of compensation held, while deciding the quantum of compensation to be paid to a person for personal injury suffered by him, the court is bound to ascertain all considerations which will make good to the sufferer of the injuries as far as money can do, the loss which he has suffered as a natural consequence of the wrong done to him. further, in granting compensation for personal injury, the injured has to be compensated for (i) pain and suffering;(ii) loss of amenities; (iii) shortened expectation of life, if any; (iv) loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity or in some cases for both; and (v) medical treatment and other special damages. in personal injury actions, the two main elements are the personal loss and pecuniary loss. section 168; [ram mohan reddy, j] compensation speeding motor vehicle coming from opposite direction at a high speed and in a rash and negligent manner dashed against a maruti car causing grievous injuries to the occupants and death of one person elbow joint of the right hand of the appellant was grievously injured mact awarded rs.10,000/- towards pain, shock and sufferings; rs.20,000/- towards grievous injuries; rs.4,000/- towards conveyance and attendant charges; rs.36,500/- towards medical expenses and rs.8,000/- towards loss of earnings for 2 months totalling to rs.78,500/- - appeal for enhancement held, the tribunal practiced miserliness in awarding compensation of rs.78,500/- under various heads, and the non-award of compensation towards disability, amenities of life, loss of future earning due to disability; marriage prospects tantamounts to denial of justice. the joys of life will have gone from the appellant, he cannot perhaps ride a bicycle and if he can kick a football, cannot catch one and deprived of the usual forms of recreation which appeal to the ordinary healthy man. the impairment to the right upper arm causing disability of 35% naturally interferes with normal conduct of life or prevents sexual relation, warranting substantial damage on that ground. in fact, the appellant, young and energetic with great ambitions and expectations in life wanting to earn more money, due to the impairment, has occasioned loss of an enjoyable or interesting career too. the disfigurement in the form of a scar as notice by the doctor in his testimony is more serious when the appellant becomes very conscious of the disfigurement and avoids social occasions. the elbow joint in the upper limb in a human frame is of utmost importance, not that the other bones constituting the frame are not. with the partial permanent injury to the upper limb of the appellant, he will have to endure the disability for the rest of his life. in the result, the compensation was enhanced to rs.3,40,420/- with interest at 6% p.a. (rs.50,000/- towards loss of amenities of life, happiness, frustration; rs.35,000/- towards loss of marriage prospects; rs.15,000/- towards conveyance, attendant charges, food and nourishment; rs.50,000/- towards pain, shock , suffering and two fractures to the right upper arm; rs.97,920/- towards loss of future earning due to disability; rs.16,000/- towards loss of earning during laid off period; rs.15,000/- towards future medical expenses; rs.25,000/- towards loss of expectation of life and rs.36,500/- towards medical expenses). - ' (4) even if we had been satisfied that the contention advanced by sri v.(1) the facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the point of law argued are:(2) one hanumanthaboyi and his brother sannaboyi died leaving behind them their mother, the first defendant and two sisters, who were originally plaintiffs in the suit. the suit properties belonged to hanumanthaboyi and sannaboyi. the first defendant (1st respondent in this appeal) had taken a second husband after the death of her previous husband, the father of hanumanthaboyi and sannaboyi. subsequent to the death of the last owners disputes arose between the mother and daughters as regards the succession to the properties of the deceased hanumanthaboyi and sannaboyi.the courts below have come to the conclusion that the respondent (1st defendant) had succeeded to the properties of her deceased sons. but it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the 1st defendant (respondent) is not entitled to succeed to her sons as he had taken a second husband. the right of a mother who had taken a second husband to the estate of her deceased son or daughter has been considered by several high courts and they have uniformly come to the conclusion that notwithstanding her remarriage she is entitled to succeed as heir to the estate of her son or daughter by her first husband, the son having died after remarriage. this question came up before a full bench of the bombay high court in basappa v. rayava, ilr 29 bom 91. in that case, the full bench held that:'a re-married hindu widow is entitled to succeed to the property left by her son by her first husband, the son having died after the re-marriage'. the bombay high court had to consider this question again in the case of bhiku krishna v. keshav ramji, air 1924 bom 360, macleod, c. j. who delivered the judgment of the court observed: 'a hindu widow can after her re-marriage succeed to the estate of her daughter by her former husband where the daughter dies after he re-marriage.'the same view was taken by the madras high court in the case of lakshmana sasamallo v. siva sasamallayani, ilr 28 mad 425, the calcutta high court in the case of faguniswari dasi v. dhum lal pal, air 1951 cal 260 and the hyderabad high court in pannalal v. harna bai, air 1950 hyd 37.(3) sri v. krishna murthy, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has not invited our attention to any decision which has taken a contrary view. but, he tried to seek support from the observations found in mayne's treatise on hindu law and usage. xith edition, by sri n. chandrasekhara aiyar. the relevant observations are found in paragraph 533 and they are as follows:'it has been held that a hindu widow notwithstanding her re-marriage is entitled to succeed as heir to the estate of a son or daughter by her first marriage who dies after her second marriage. this view is assailable. in fact, the bombay high court has held that a hindu widow who has re-married is not entitled to succeed as gotraja sapinda in the family of her first husband. the ground of decision was that she must be deemed to be dead with regard to her first husband. the ground of decision was that she must be deemed to be dead with regard to her first husband and cannot be considered his gotraja sapinda. obviously, the widow on her re-marriage loses not only her husband's gotra but also the sapinda relation which she acquired by becoming a wife. both could be retained by her only while she retained her status as his patni (wedded wife) with the meaning of yagnavalkya's text. a widow cannot continue to be the patni of her former husband when she has become the patni of her former husband when she has become the patni of her second husband. therefore the estate which a patni takes as such, being a limited estate, can endure only so long as she is a patni.'we are unable to accept the above view as correct. a mother does not claim a right to her son's property on the basis that she was the wife of her deceased son's father. she succeeds to his property as his mother. she does not cease to be his mother because she has taken a second husband. she need not trace her right through her husband. the footnote appended by the learned author to the aforesaid paragraph 533 is of much significance. it is as follows:'the translation of 'patni' into widow is responsible for part of the confusion. the widow after her re-marriage may be a sapinda to sons or daughters born of her or their descendants though she cannot be a sapinda to any other relation of her first husband's family. the sapinda relationship by marriage is only by legal construction and is destroyed when that relationship is destroyed. it is only the sapinda relationship is due to real consanguinity that can continue.'(4) even if we had been satisfied that the contention advanced by sri v. krishnamurthy is correct, we would have declined to disturb a position of law which has held the field ever since the decision in akora suth v. boreani, 2 beng lr ac 199, law has intimate relationship with life and it is not correct to think that it has no finality.(5) in the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.(6) appeal dismissed.