Radha Bai Vs. Smt. Shashikala and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act, 1988 [c.a. no. 59/1988]sections 168 & 173; [ram mohan reddy, j] compensation appeal against - claimant was an in-patient in the hospital for 13 days non-examination of the doctor who treated the claimant at the general hospital - uncorroborated medical certificate which certifies that the claimant sustained fractures of the 6th, 7th and 8th ribs held, tribunal fell in serious error and occasioned grave injustice to the appellant in not properly appreciating the evidence both oral and documentary before concluding that the claimant suffered from fractures of the 6th, 7th and 8th ribs in the accident that occurred. thus it goes without saying that disability cannot be believed and is unacceptable. compensation of rs. 1,49,000/- awarded by tribunal was reduced to rs. 20,000/- with interest at 8 & p.a. - 4. the petitioner's case is that the said 30 guntas of land was throughout in her actual possession and cultivation for better enjoyment of her said adjoining lands. her said application was favourably considered by the land grant committee in its meeting held on 12-10-1982 and it has recommended to the revenue authority for granting the land to her as per annexure-f. the concerned assistant commissioner also recommended the grant of the said land to the petitioner on the basis of the enquiry report of tahsildar. 5. r-l has filed her counters denying petitioner's case of the land in question being in her possession and cultivation and that it is required for better cultivation of her (petitioner's) adjoining lands. another ground of objection raised for r-l was that petitioner was not entitled to maintain the petition under article 226 of the constitution as she has /failed to first exhaust the remedy of appeal before the karnataka appellate tribunal against r-2's impugned order provided under section 49(c) of the land revenue act, 1964 ('the act') for short. grant of land under better cultivation insurvey no. for better cultivation of my land, please grant me the land which i have requested and oblige. r is that the same being situate adjacent to her lands, its grant to her is necessary for their better cultivation. therefore, sub-rule (2) of rule 4 is clearly attracted to her claim to the grant of land and hence the requirements stipulated in sub-clauses (iii) to (vi) in sub-rule (1) of rule 8 would be irrelevant to consider petitioner's claim to the grant of the land. therefore, there is no good ground to reject her petition on this score. the grant of governmental land cannot be a mere largesse to be granted as the authorities deem it fit, irrespective of the merits of the individual cases'.therefore, it is settled law that where there are more than one application made for grant of the same land, all the applications will have to be considered and disposed of together by the competent authority and failure to do so would render his order of grant illegal. indisputably, in the instant case petitioner's said application at annexure-r dated 4-8-1982 was pending consideration of the revenue authority and that the grant of the said land to petitioner on her said application was recommended by the land grant committee as required under rule 24, vide its recommendation at annexure-f dated 12-10-1982; and the concerned assistant commissioner also recommended the grant thereof to her under his letter at annexure-k bearing no. while opposing the petitions, one of the points contended for respondent-state before the supreme court was that petitioner was not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction under articles 226 and 32 of the constitution as an efficacious remedy by way of appeal and the second appeal under the sales tax act and in the event of failure to get relief in appeals to have the case stated to high court was available to him, all of which he failed to avail. in that case the provision of second appeal under section 50 would get defeated, such a construction on the statutory power of deputy commissioner under the act and the rules thereunder would be obviously impermissible since it is the duty of the court to see that the various provisions in an enactment should operate in harmony with each other and with full inter-play.order1. petitioner-smt. rudra bai prays for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of second respondent-deputy commissioner, shimoga ('r-2' for short) dated 4-4-1983, passed in case no. lnd-l-cr-1141/1982-83 and for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing him to consider together the applications of herself and respondent 1 cr-1' for short) both made for grant of the government land in question under the karnataka land grant rules, 1969 ('the rules' for short). the certified copy of the impugned order of r-2 is produced at annexure-a.2. the arguments of learned counsel on both sides were heard.3. a piece of government land measuring 30 guntas in survey no. 163 situate in h.k. grama of shimoga taluk is the bone ofcontention between the petitioner and r-l. the said extent of land is shown in the rough sketch produced along with petition, and also in the sketch produced by r-l at annexure-r7. it is specified in annexure-r 7 with letters 'a' and 'b'. the topography of the land in dispute depicted in these sketches establishes its identity beyond doubt, although the same is disputed by r-l in her statement of objections. the shape of the said extent of land shown in these sketches is somewhat rectangular with a small triangular piece projecting towards north-south from its northern corner. on either side of that land are situate the wet lands of petitioner bearing survey no. 163 (present survey no. 247) and survey no. 225. similarly, the lands of r-l bearing survey nos. 234 of 1997, 233 and 224 lie adjoining the petitioner's lands along their northern boundary line. the said tiny triangular portion of land in dispute is projected into r-l's land in survey nos. 197 and 233 while the major rectangular portion, thereof lies in between the petitioner's said survey nos. 163/1 and 225. a stream flows through these lands of petitioner and r-l along the western boundary of the disputed 30 guntas of land.4. the petitioner's case is that the said 30 guntas of land was throughout in her actual possession and cultivation for better enjoyment of her said adjoining lands. the revenue department had been collecting t.t. charges from her for her unauthorised cultivation of that land. therefore, she made her application to the court dated 4-8-1982 to r-2 for its grant to her. the certified copy of petitioner's said application dated 4-8-1982 is produced by r-l at annexure-r. her said application was favourably considered by the land grant committee in its meeting held on 12-10-1982 and it has recommended to the revenue authority for granting the land to her as per annexure-f. the concerned assistant commissioner also recommended the grant of the said land to the petitioner on the basis of the enquiry report of tahsildar. curiously, when her said application at annexure-r was under active consideration of the concerned authorities the said land was illegally granted by r-2 to r-l under its impugned order dated 4-4-1983 at annexure-a without the knowledge of petitioner. therefore, it is pleaded by her that the impugned order passed by r-2 which is illegal may be quashed allowing her petition as prayed.5. r-l has filed her counters denying petitioner's case of the land in question being in her possession and cultivation and that it is required for better cultivation of her (petitioner's) adjoining lands. on the other hand, she contends that r-2 was justified in granting the said land to her by his impugned order since that land is in her actual cultivation, and being a neighbouring cultivator she was entitled to grant thereof. besides, it was also contended for her that petitioner's application at ex.r was not a valid application as envisaged under rule 8 of the karnataka land grant rules, 1969 and, therefore, the concerned revenue authority could not have taken cognizance of the same. another ground of objection raised for r-l was that petitioner was not entitled to maintain the petition under article 226 of the constitution as she has /failed to first exhaust the remedy of appeal before the karnataka appellate tribunal against r-2's impugned order provided under section 49(c) of the land revenue act, 1964 ('the act') for short.6. first, adverting to first respondent's objection relating to validity of petitioner's application it is essential to refer to relevant sub-rule (1) of rule 8 which prescribes the requirements of application to be made by a person for grant of government land for agricultural purposes. it reads:'8. procedure for grant of lands for agricultural purposes.--(1) any person who under these rules is eligible for grant of lands for agricultural purposes shall make an application in writing to the tahsildar of the taluk in form 1 giving the following particulars.- (i) name, age and address of the applicant; (ii) the extent and particulars of the land asked for namely, survey number, village, taluk and sub-division in which the land is situated; (iii) the extent and details of the land if any already owned or of the land already owned by him or by any member of his family; (iv) whether he belongs to the scheduled caste or the scheduled tribe or is a displaced person, displaced holder, displaced tenant, an ex-serviceman, soldier or political sufferer; (v) whether he or any member of his family had previously applied for land, but if so, the particulars of the endorsement received thereon; (vi) the particulars of any land previously granted to him or any member of his family. sub-rules (2) to (7) lay down the manner in which an application made under sub-rule (1) should be dealt with by the tahsildar. petitioner's so-called application at ex.r is admittedly not in the prescribed form 1 but it is in the form of a letter addressed to r-2. it is as reproduced below: 'from: radha bai,w/o late sri dharama simha,1st cross, jayanagar,shimoga.to: the deputy commissioner,shimoga.sir,sub: grant of land under better cultivation insurvey no. 163 of hasudi village.-o- i am cultivating nearly 30 guntas of government land which is adjacent to my own land of 4 acres under survey no. 163 of hasudi village. i am cultivating the above said land since from 1960 and have paid t.t. on the same land. the said land is existing in between my own land, wet land to one side and dry land to the other. so, to cultivate my land i have to cross over the said land. for better cultivation of my land, please grant me the land which i have requested and oblige. thanking youdate: 4-8-1982yours faithfullysd/- radha bai'.7. mr. t.s. ramachandra rao, learned counsel for r-l, placed reliance on a decision of this court in sharma v mysorehousing board , to support his submission that petitioner's said letter dated 4-8-1982 could not be treated as a valid application under rule 8 since it is not in prescribed form as also it lacks necessary particulars. on the other hand mr. u.l. narayana rao, learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner relying on a decision of this court in chikkanna v hanumanthaiah and others, submitted that ex.r contains the requisite information for grant of the land to the petitioner on the ground of her being an adjoining cultivator and/or she being the unauthorised cultivator thereof. in the latter decision, cited supra, this court has held that an application by a person purporting to be one under section 48a of the karnataka land reforms act for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land described therein, need not necessarily be strictly in the prescribed form 7 and if the application contains all the material particulars prescribed in form 7 such an application should be regarded, in substance, as an application under sub-section (1) of section 48a thereof and it should be dealt with in accordance with law. in the case of sharma, supra, relied on by r-l, i do not find this court laying down any proposition striking a divergent view from what has been held in the case of chikkanna, supra. in the case of sharma, supra, it was observed that the petitioner therein-who was a private person and who was doing business and agriculture, had made an application to housing board for allotment of a house to him, was not entitled to the same as his application was defective in several respects inasmuch as it was not accompanied by the latest certificate of the income-tax officer, and the certificate of the tahsildar in regard to his agricultural income, the production whereof was a condition precedent for consideration of his application by the concerned authority under the relevant rules. therefore, what remains beyond dispute in regard to an application by a person seeking certain relief under any act or rules thereunder is that it is not its 'form' but the 'substance' thereof which is the material consideration. and if the substance of the application is found to be containing requisite information with sufficient particulars then the same cannot be rejected on the technical ground of it not being in the prescribed form. rule 4 of the rules lays downthe eligibility criteria for a person seeking grant of government land for agricultural purposes. they are:(i) he must have attained the age of 18; (ii) his gross annual income does not exceed rs. 8,000/-; (iii) 'who is either a bona fide agriculturist cultivating the land personally or has bona fide intention to take up personal cultivation; and(iv) who is not a sufficient holder. sub-rule (2) of rule 4 contemplates that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) any person may be granted the land adjacent or close to the land already held by him on collection of market value as on the date of grant to be determined by the authority granting the land. therefore, by virtue of sub-rule (2) of rule 4, of course subject to the limitation set out in its proviso, the requirements of sub-rule (1) in the instant case becomes unnecessary. rule 5 and 5(a) provide for category wise reservation of the land available for grant in any village; including the grant to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe to be not less than 50%. rule 6 sets out order of priority to the classes of persons stated therein. in the case in hand it is nobody's case that petitioner is a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe nor is it her case that she claimed grant of land on the ground that either she is a landless person or insufficient holder. one of the two grounds for grant urged in her application at ex.r is that the same being situate adjacent to her lands, its grant to her is necessary for their better cultivation. the second ground on which she lays claim to the land is that it has been under her unauthorised occupation and cultivation. therefore, sub-rule (2) of rule 4 is clearly attracted to her claim to the grant of land and hence the requirements stipulated in sub-clauses (iii) to (vi) in sub-rule (1) of rule 8 would be irrelevant to consider petitioner's claim to the grant of the land. in that view of the matter, her address and description of the land having been furnished in her application at ex. r and the grounds of the claim are also being set out therein, it is obvious that it contains the substantial information necessary for its effective consideration for grant or refusal of the land to her. in effect, therefore, there cannot be any valid reason not to treat her application as a valid one for the purpose of consideration and disposal thereof by the concerned authority, and the samecannot be rejected simply because it was not in the prescribed form 1 as sought to be made out by sri t.s. ramachandra rao, learned senior counsel for r-l. i find no substance in his objection to the validity of the application.8. another related objection raised by sri t. s. ramachandra rao was that the earlier application for grant of the same land made to the concerned authority by the petitioner's son named aniar singh having been rejected, as borne out by its endorsement dated 17-7-1982 at annexure r-ll, her application dated 4-8-1982 made to r-2 within three weeks thereafter was not tenable and was also not a bona fide application. mr. t.s. ramachandra rao elaborated this point submitting that petitioner's son amar singh had made the earlier application to the revenue authority as a member of petitioner's family. these' objections are based on questions of facts to be determined by the concerned authority in the course of its enquiry and the same cannot be gone into by this court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.9. another objection highlighted by sri t.s. ramachandra rao against maintainability of the petition was that admittedly, petitioner had moved the deputy commissioner under rule 25 of the rules praying to cancel the grant of land made to r-l. this objection looses its ground since indisputably the petitioner is stated to have withdrawn her objection petition that was lodged by her with r-2 seeking cancellation of the said grant.10. nextly, mr. t.s. ramachandra rao argued that petitioner is not entitled to maintain this petition under article 226 of the constitution without first exhausting the remedy of appeal that was available to her from the impugned order under section 49(c) of the act. substantiating this contention reliance was sought to be placed by him on an observation of supreme court in titaghur paper mills company limited v state of orissa and another. his further submission was that the petition filed on 4-2-1986 challenging second respondent's order dated 4-4-1983 is liable to be dismissed due to laches on petitioner's part as the same was filed about 3 years after the impugned order was passed by r-2. countering these objections, mr. u.l. narayana rao, learned senior counsel for petitioner, maintained that in the circumstances, the petition under article 226 ismaintainable and that the petitioner is not guilty or any laches or delay since she has approached the court within a reasonable time after she had acquired the knowledge of the grant of land to r-l under the impugned order.11. it is the definite case of petitioner pleaded at para 4 of her petition' that she had no knowledge, whatsoever, of first respondent's efforts to get the said land granted to her by the concerned authority and that she came to know of the impugned order for the first time on 21-1-1986 and immediately on 28-1-1986 she gave an application to r-2 to cancel the said grant under rule 25 of the rule since r-l had manoeuvred to get it granted to her fraudulently and on mis-representation. the fact pleaded by petitioner that she had no knowledge of the impugned order till 21-1-1986 is not seriously challenged by the other side and no material whatever is produced for respondents disclosing petitioner's knowledge thereof at any earlier point of time. it is also not the case of respondent that her application annexure-r was finally disposed of by r-2. the material placed on record, on the other hand, reveals that the same was under active consideration of r-2 all along. in that perspective of the matter no laches could be attributed to the petitioner in challenging the impugned order of r-2 about three years later. therefore, there is no good ground to reject her petition on this score.12. coming to the legality or otherwise of the impugned order dated 4-4-1983 of r-2, mr. narayana rao, learned counsel for petitioner, rightly assailed the validity thereof on the ground that r-2 deliberately acted illegally in passing the same without disposal of petitioner's application at ex. r simultaneously with it. in support of this legal position reliance was placed by him on two decisions of this court in ramaiah v state of karnataka and others and m.p. krishne gowda v a.r. lobo and others. the following material proposition on the point enunciated by the single bench in the case of ramaiah, supra, stands affirmed by the latter decision of the division bench in krishne gowda's case, supra:'the land grant rules specifically do not provide for the consideration of several applications simultaneously,the procedure to be followed by the authorities granting the land in this regard will have to be inferred having regard to the principles of equity and justice and the purpose of the land grant rules. the available lands are notified to afford an opportunity for the needy persons to file their application seeking the grant. in such a situation when the claimant files an application it is but most natural that his claim will have to be considered along with the claim of any other claimants. no useful purpose will be served by considering the claim of one of the claimants and granting the land to such a claimant, because the claim of the applicant whose application was not considered will be lost for want of land. the grant of governmental land cannot be a mere largesse to be granted as the authorities deem it fit, irrespective of the merits of the individual cases'.therefore, it is settled law that where there are more than one application made for grant of the same land, all the applications will have to be considered and disposed of together by the competent authority and failure to do so would render his order of grant illegal. indisputably, in the instant case petitioner's said application at annexure-r dated 4-8-1982 was pending consideration of the revenue authority and that the grant of the said land to petitioner on her said application was recommended by the land grant committee as required under rule 24, vide its recommendation at annexure-f dated 12-10-1982; and the concerned assistant commissioner also recommended the grant thereof to her under his letter at annexure-k bearing no. lnd-sr-37 i/dated 18-4-1984, submitted to r-2, on collection of its market value from her; and that the impugned order dated 4-4-1983 at annexure-a granting the land to r-l was passed by r-2 during pendency of petitioner's said application and without notice to her. therefore, without more, second respondent's order impugned is an illegal order passed by him in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. the concerned revenue authority was required in law to consider the applications of both petitioner and r-l for grant of land and decide them simultaneously by a speaking order.13. now i need advert to another objection raised for r-l by her learned counsel that petitioner was disentitled to maintainthe petition under article 226 of the constitution as the statutory remedy of appeal available under section 49(c) of the act to challenge the impugned order was not exhausted by her. it was submitted by him that the discretionary writ jurisdiction of this court cannot be extended to her. as indicated, support for this submission is sought to be drawn by him from the proposition enunciated by supreme court in titaghur paper mills' case, supra. that is a decision rendered by a three-judge bench of supreme court. the order challenged before it by the petitioner therein was the order of assessment made by sales tax officer under the orissa sales tax act. the writ petitions filed by him before the orissa high court challenging the same were dismissed in limine by the high court. then the petitioner made special leave petition before the supreme court challenging the order of high court and the order of sales tax officer. while opposing the petitions, one of the points contended for respondent-state before the supreme court was that petitioner was not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction under articles 226 and 32 of the constitution as an efficacious remedy by way of appeal and the second appeal under the sales tax act and in the event of failure to get relief in appeals to have the case stated to high court was available to him, all of which he failed to avail. while dealing with this point the supreme court referred with affirmation to its below-quoted observations made in an earlier decision in state of uttar pradesh v mohammad nook1.'if an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court's sense of fair-play, the superior count may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned'.with reference to the peculiar facts of the case before it the supreme court proceeded to observe that the sales tax officer who assessed the tax payable by the petitioner and passed the impugned order was not found to have acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or in any manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and which offends the superior court's sense of fair-play. it is in this perspective the court held that in view of the aforementioned efficacious remedies available to the petitioner therein under the sales tax act, he was not entitled to maintain the petition under article 226 of the constitution.14. in the case in hand, the impugned order is the one passed by the deputy commissioner. chapter v of the act provides for the remedies of appeal and revision to an aggrieved person from original orders of the revenue authorities passed under the act. section 49 under the chapter provides for appeal from original orders. clause (c) of section 49 provides for an appeal to the karnataka appellate tribunal from an order passed by the deputy commissioner. therefore, undoubtedly, there was the remedy of appeal to the tribunal available to the petitioner against the impugned order dated 4-4-1983. but the fact remains undisputed that by the time she acquired the knowledge thereof on or about 21-1-1986 the period of limitation of 60 days prescribed by section 51-a to appeal against the said order had already expired long back. the impugned order is found to have been passed by r-2 in violation of principles of natural justice and, therefore, it is an illegal order. these circumstances are peculiar to the instant case. the law enunciated in the case of mohammad nook, supra, which is extracted hereinabove, therefore, fully justify the maintainability of the petition by the petitioner herein even if an alternative remedy by way of appeal was available to her and she had not availed of the same. the above proposition of law also stands re-affirmed by the supreme court in its later decision in the case of a. v. venkateswaran, collector of customs, bombay v ramchand sobhraj wadhwani and another , rendered by a larger bench of five judges. therefore, the objection by mr. t.s. ramachandra rao, learned senior counsel for r-l, in regard to maintainability of the petition under article 226 is without legal force.15. another legal aspect of the matter which merits consideration is the objection of learned counsel for petitioner directed against competency of r-2, deputy commissioner to pass the impugned order. he submitted that it is rule 7 which confers power on the revenue officers to grant lands. sub-clauses (i) to (v) of rule 7(1) of the rules provide for grant of land upto certain extent by various revenue officers enumerated therein in the order of their hierarchy. sub-clause (i) confers powers on the tahsildar to make grant of dry land upto two hectares or one hectare of wet land or garden land. the extent of land to be granted by his respective superior revenue officers is to be found in clauses (ii) and (iii). a reading of the aforesaid clauses goes to show that assistant commissioner is empowered to grant land upto 4 acres if it is dry or two hectares of wet or garden land and the deputy commissioner of a district has the power to make grant of land not exceeding 6 hectares of dry land or 3 hectares of wet or garden land. mr. u.l. narayana rao, therefore, contended that the extent of land in question in the instant case being 30 guntas it was within the competence of tahsildar only to make grant of the same and, therefore, its grant made by the deputy commissioner was outside his authority. in support of this submission, reliance was placed by him on a division bench decision of this court in k.b. hanumanthappa and others v b.h. hanumanthappa and another and also on a single bench decision in visweswara v state of karnataka and others .16. countering this argument learned counsel for r-l, mr. t.s. ramachandra rao placing reliance on venkategowda v shambappa , submitted that r-2, deputy commissioner being the superior authority over the tahsildar invested with larger power to grant upto 6 hectares of dry land or 3 hectares of wet or garden land was certainly competent to grant the lesser extent of 30 guntas to r-2. that case of venkategowda, supra, is a decision of single bench wherein the learned judge has observed: though the land granted might be within the limit prescribed on the tahsildar, the assistant commissioner who is superior to the tahsildar could also grant the land subject to the maximum limit imposed on him. the rule does not state thatwhat is within the competence of the tahsildar shall be beyond the jurisdiction of the assistant commissioner'.17. in the case of k.b. hanumanthappa, supra, the government granted the land which according to the rules was within the power of the tahsildar to grant. that grant was struck down by a division bench of this court when the same was challenged before, it holding that:'where the tahsildar was the authority who had the power to grant a land (which did not exceed 4 acres of dry land) and the land was granted by government on an application made to it direct and no relaxation of the rules regarding the grant was made in exercise of the powers under rule 43-l, the grant made by government was not within its competence'.in visweswara's case, various applicants made applications to the concerned tahsildar for grant of land to the extent of 2 acres each. under rule 7 the tahsildar was competent to grant land of this extent. instead of himself considering and disposing of these applications, he sought instructions from the assistant commissioner who was his immediate superior officer. his act of seeking such instructions from assistant commissioner in the matter of said grants was challenged by the applicants before this court. allowing their writ petitions, a writ in the nature of mandamus was issued to the tahsildar directing him to consider the applications on their merits in exercise of his said power, observing:'an authority empowered under the statute to which a particular thing affecting a right of decision cannot in law seek instructions from his superior officer for discharging his statutory duty'.18. admittedly, under sub-clause (i) of rule 7(1) of the rules, the tahsildar is empowered to make grant of land in question, which was 30 guntas in extent. section 49 of the act, as indicated elsewhere hereinabove, provides for appeals from original orders. under this section an order passed by the tahsildar is made appealable to the assistant commissioner; an order passed by the assistant commissioner is appealable to the deputy commissioner; and an appeal to the tribunal is provided from an order passed by the deputy commissioner or the divisional commissioner. these are the revenue officers whoare empowered under rule 7 to make grant of various extents of lands stated therein. section 50 of the act provides for second appeal from an order of the assistant commissioner to the deputy commissioner; and from an order passed by the deputy commissioner to the tribunal. section 56 confers power on the tribunal, on any revenue officer not inferior in rank to an assistant commissioner, and on the survey officer stated therein, to call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate officer under the act to satisfy itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings and to pass such orders as deemed fit-modifying, annulling or reversing the order of that officer. in the context of these provisions viz, sections 49, 50 and 56, it becomes obvious that if the grant order in question had been passed by the concerned competent tahsildar, the petitioner or any person aggrieved by that order would have had the statutory remedy of first and second appeals under the respective provisions under sections 49(c) and 50 of the act. if the same were to be passed by the deputy commissioner, then remedy of only one appeal (to the tribunal) would be available to the aggrieved party thus depriving him of the statutory remedy of second appeal which otherwise would have been available to him under section 50 of the act. this apart, if deputy commissioner is also to be held competent to pass an order granting the extent of land within the limits which the tahsildar is empowered to make the grant such a construction on his power would rob him of the statutory empowerment as second appellate authority in relation to such grant on the one hand and, on the other, it would impinge on the power of the tahsildar. in that case the provision of second appeal under section 50 would get defeated, such a construction on the statutory power of deputy commissioner under the act and the rules thereunder would be obviously impermissible since it is the duty of the court to see that the various provisions in an enactment should operate in harmony with each other and with full inter-play. the pertinent observation of supreme court made in a.v. venkateswaran's case, supra, may be recalled with advantage in this behalf:'it should be the duty of the courts to see that the statutory provisions are observed and authorities are given the opportunity to decide the question which the statute requires them to decide'.19. therefore, the hierarchy of statutory authorities created under the act being invested with certain powers to decidecertain matters in a certain manner must be allowed to fully and independently exercise their respective statutory powers in relation to such matters without any of them either encroaching upon or ousting or affecting or limiting the power of one another in any manner whatsoever, lest such provisions of an enactment providing for smooth functioning of its machinery intended to secure its objective would get either constricted or hindered in their operation. therefore, i have my own reservation about the proposition stated by the learned judge in venkategowda's case, supra, to the effect that a superior revenue officer could also grant the extent of land falling within the limit which the tahsildar is empowered to grant under the rules. that observation has to be treated not as a precedent but as an obiter dictum limited to that particular case as it appears to have not been made in the context of the afore-mentioned material provisions of the act and the rules. therefore, it is clear that the impugned order is passed by r-2 in excess of his jurisdiction and, therefore, it is liable to be quashed.20. for the reasons aforesaid, the petition is allowed.the impugned order dated 4-4-1983 at annexure-a of r-2 is quashed. he is directed to send petitioner's application dated 4-8-1982, at annexure-r, and the application of r-l, sashikala, both made for grant of the same land, to the concern tahsildar for his enquiry and simultaneous disposal by a speaking order according to law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. the tahsildar shall give sufficient opportunity to both these applicants to present their respective cases before him at the enquiry.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. Petitioner-Smt. Rudra Bai prays for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of second respondent-Deputy Commissioner, Shimoga ('R-2' for short) dated 4-4-1983, passed in Case No. LND-l-CR-1141/1982-83 and for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing him to consider together the applications of herself and respondent 1 CR-1' for short) both made for grant of the Government land in question under the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 ('the Rules' for short). The certified copy of the impugned order of R-2 is produced at Annexure-A.

2. The arguments of learned Counsel on both sides were heard.

3. A piece of Government land measuring 30 guntas in Survey No. 163 situate in H.K. Grama of Shimoga Taluk is the bone ofcontention between the petitioner and R-l. The said extent of land is shown in the rough sketch produced along with petition, and also in the sketch produced by R-l at Annexure-R7. It is specified in Annexure-R 7 with letters 'A' and 'B'. The topography of the land in dispute depicted in these sketches establishes its identity beyond doubt, although the same is disputed by R-l in her statement of objections. The shape of the said extent of land shown in these sketches is somewhat rectangular with a small triangular piece projecting towards north-south from its northern corner. On either side of that land are situate the wet lands of petitioner bearing Survey No. 163 (present Survey No. 247) and Survey No. 225. Similarly, the lands of R-l bearing Survey Nos. 234 of 1997, 233 and 224 lie adjoining the petitioner's lands along their northern boundary line. The said tiny triangular portion of land in dispute is projected into R-l's land in Survey Nos. 197 and 233 while the major rectangular portion, thereof lies in between the petitioner's said Survey Nos. 163/1 and 225. A stream flows through these lands of petitioner and R-l along the western boundary of the disputed 30 guntas of land.

4. The petitioner's case is that the said 30 guntas of land was throughout in her actual possession and cultivation for better enjoyment of her said adjoining lands. The Revenue Department had been collecting T.T. charges from her for her unauthorised cultivation of that land. Therefore, she made her application to the Court dated 4-8-1982 to R-2 for its grant to her. The certified copy of petitioner's said application dated 4-8-1982 is produced by R-l at Annexure-R. Her said application was favourably considered by the Land Grant Committee in its meeting held on 12-10-1982 and it has recommended to the Revenue Authority for granting the land to her as per Annexure-F. The concerned Assistant Commissioner also recommended the grant of the said land to the petitioner on the basis of the enquiry report of Tahsildar. Curiously, when her said application at Annexure-R was under active consideration of the concerned authorities the said land was illegally granted by R-2 to R-l under its impugned order dated 4-4-1983 at Annexure-A without the knowledge of petitioner. Therefore, it is pleaded by her that the impugned order passed by R-2 which is illegal may be quashed allowing her petition as prayed.

5. R-l has filed her counters denying petitioner's case of the land in question being in her possession and cultivation and that it is required for better cultivation of her (petitioner's) adjoining lands. On the other hand, she contends that R-2 was justified in granting the said land to her by his impugned order since that land is in her actual cultivation, and being a neighbouring cultivator she was entitled to grant thereof. Besides, it was also contended for her that petitioner's application at Ex.R was not a valid application as envisaged under Rule 8 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 and, therefore, the concerned Revenue Authority could not have taken cognizance of the same. Another ground of objection raised for R-l was that petitioner was not entitled to maintain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as she has /failed to first exhaust the remedy of appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal against R-2's impugned order provided under Section 49(c) of the Land Revenue Act, 1964 ('the Act') for short.

6. First, adverting to first respondent's objection relating to validity of petitioner's application it is essential to refer to relevant sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 which prescribes the requirements of application to be made by a person for grant of Government land for agricultural purposes. It reads:

'8. Procedure for grant of lands for agricultural purposes.--(1) Any person who under these rules is eligible for grant of lands for agricultural purposes shall make an application in writing to the Tahsildar of the Taluk in Form 1 giving the following particulars.-

(i) name, age and address of the applicant;

(ii) the extent and particulars of the land asked for namely, Survey Number, Village, Taluk and Sub-Division in which the land is situated;

(iii) the extent and details of the land if any already owned or of the land already owned by him or by any member of his family;

(iv) whether he belongs to the Scheduled Caste or the Scheduled Tribe or is a displaced person, displaced holder, displaced tenant, an ex-serviceman, soldier or political sufferer;

(v) whether he or any member of his family had previously applied for land, but if so, the particulars of the endorsement received thereon;

(vi) the particulars of any land previously granted to him or any member of his family.

Sub-rules (2) to (7) lay down the manner in which an application made under sub-rule (1) should be dealt with by the Tahsildar. Petitioner's so-called application at Ex.R is admittedly not in the prescribed Form 1 but it is in the form of a letter addressed to R-2. It is as reproduced below:

'From: Radha Bai,W/o late Sri Dharama Simha,1st Cross, Jayanagar,Shimoga.To: The Deputy Commissioner,Shimoga.Sir,Sub: Grant of land under better cultivation inSurvey No. 163 of Hasudi village.-o-

I am cultivating nearly 30 guntas of Government land which is adjacent to my own land of 4 acres under Survey No. 163 of Hasudi village. I am cultivating the above said land since from 1960 and have paid T.T. on the same land. The said land is existing in between my own land, wet land to one side and dry land to the other.

So, to cultivate my land I have to cross over the said land. For better cultivation of my land, please grant me the land which I have requested and oblige.

Thanking you

Date: 4-8-1982

Yours faithfully

Sd/-

Radha Bai'.

7. Mr. T.S. Ramachandra Rao, learned Counsel for R-l, placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Sharma v MysoreHousing Board , to support his submission that petitioner's said letter dated 4-8-1982 could not be treated as a valid application under Rule 8 since it is not in prescribed form as also it lacks necessary particulars. On the other hand Mr. U.L. Narayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner relying on a decision of this Court in Chikkanna v Hanumanthaiah and Others, submitted that Ex.R contains the requisite information for grant of the land to the petitioner on the ground of her being an adjoining cultivator and/or she being the unauthorised cultivator thereof. In the latter decision, cited supra, this Court has held that an application by a person purporting to be one under Section 48A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land described therein, need not necessarily be strictly in the prescribed Form 7 and if the application contains all the material particulars prescribed in Form 7 such an application should be regarded, in substance, as an application under sub-section (1) of Section 48A thereof and it should be dealt with in accordance with law. In the case of Sharma, supra, relied on by R-l, I do not find this Court laying down any proposition striking a divergent view from what has been held in the case of Chikkanna, supra. In the case of Sharma, supra, it was observed that the petitioner therein-who was a private person and who was doing business and agriculture, had made an application to Housing Board for allotment of a house to him, was not entitled to the same as his application was defective in several respects inasmuch as it was not accompanied by the latest certificate of the Income-Tax Officer, and the certificate of the Tahsildar in regard to his agricultural income, the production whereof was a condition precedent for consideration of his application by the concerned Authority under the relevant rules. Therefore, what remains beyond dispute in regard to an application by a person seeking certain relief under any Act or Rules thereunder is that it is not its 'Form' but the 'substance' thereof which is the material consideration. And if the substance of the application is found to be containing requisite information with sufficient particulars then the same cannot be rejected on the technical ground of it not being in the prescribed form. Rule 4 of the Rules lays downthe eligibility criteria for a person seeking grant of Government land for agricultural purposes. They are:

(i) he must have attained the age of 18;

(ii) his gross annual income does not exceed Rs. 8,000/-;

(iii) 'who is either a bona fide agriculturist cultivating the land personally or has bona fide intention to take up personal cultivation; and

(iv) who is not a sufficient holder.

Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 contemplates that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) any person may be granted the land adjacent or close to the land already held by him on collection of market value as on the date of grant to be determined by the Authority granting the land. Therefore, by virtue of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4, of course subject to the limitation set out in its proviso, the requirements of sub-rule (1) in the instant case becomes unnecessary. Rule 5 and 5(a) provide for category wise reservation of the land available for grant in any village; including the grant to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe to be not less than 50%. Rule 6 sets out order of priority to the classes of persons stated therein. In the case in hand it is nobody's case that petitioner is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe nor is it her case that she claimed grant of land on the ground that either she is a landless person or insufficient holder. One of the two grounds for grant urged in her application at Ex.R is that the same being situate adjacent to her lands, its grant to her is necessary for their better cultivation. The second ground on which she lays claim to the land is that it has been under her unauthorised occupation and cultivation. Therefore, sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 is clearly attracted to her claim to the grant of land and hence the requirements stipulated in sub-clauses (iii) to (vi) in sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 would be irrelevant to consider petitioner's claim to the grant of the land. In that view of the matter, her address and description of the land having been furnished in her application at Ex. R and the grounds of the claim are also being set out therein, it is obvious that it contains the substantial information necessary for its effective consideration for grant or refusal of the land to her. In effect, therefore, there cannot be any valid reason not to treat her application as a valid one for the purpose of consideration and disposal thereof by the concerned Authority, and the samecannot be rejected simply because it was not in the prescribed Form 1 as sought to be made out by Sri T.S. Ramachandra Rao, learned Senior Counsel for R-l. I find no substance in his objection to the validity of the application.

8. Another related objection raised by Sri T. S. Ramachandra Rao was that the earlier application for grant of the same land made to the concerned Authority by the petitioner's son named Aniar Singh having been rejected, as borne out by its endorsement dated 17-7-1982 at Annexure R-ll, her application dated 4-8-1982 made to R-2 within three weeks thereafter was not tenable and was also not a bona fide application. Mr. T.S. Ramachandra Rao elaborated this point submitting that petitioner's son Amar Singh had made the earlier application to the Revenue Authority as a member of petitioner's family. These' objections are based on questions of facts to be determined by the concerned Authority in the course of its enquiry and the same cannot be gone into by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

9. Another objection highlighted by Sri T.S. Ramachandra Rao against maintainability of the petition was that admittedly, petitioner had moved the Deputy Commissioner under Rule 25 of the Rules praying to cancel the grant of land made to R-l. This objection looses its ground since indisputably the petitioner is stated to have withdrawn her objection petition that was lodged by her with R-2 seeking cancellation of the said grant.

10. Nextly, Mr. T.S. Ramachandra Rao argued that petitioner is not entitled to maintain this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without first exhausting the remedy of appeal that was available to her from the impugned order under Section 49(c) of the Act. Substantiating this contention reliance was sought to be placed by him on an observation of Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Company Limited v State of Orissa and Another. His further submission was that the petition filed on 4-2-1986 challenging second respondent's order dated 4-4-1983 is liable to be dismissed due to laches on petitioner's part as the same was filed about 3 years after the impugned order was passed by R-2. Countering these objections, Mr. U.L. Narayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel for petitioner, maintained that in the circumstances, the petition under Article 226 ismaintainable and that the petitioner is not guilty or any laches or delay since she has approached the Court within a reasonable time after she had acquired the knowledge of the grant of land to R-l under the impugned order.

11. It is the definite case of petitioner pleaded at para 4 of her petition' that she had no knowledge, whatsoever, of first respondent's efforts to get the said land granted to her by the concerned authority and that she came to know of the impugned order for the first time on 21-1-1986 and immediately on 28-1-1986 she gave an application to R-2 to cancel the said grant under Rule 25 of the Rule since R-l had manoeuvred to get it granted to her fraudulently and on mis-representation. The fact pleaded by petitioner that she had no knowledge of the impugned order till 21-1-1986 is not seriously challenged by the other side and no material whatever is produced for respondents disclosing petitioner's knowledge thereof at any earlier point of time. It is also not the case of respondent that her application Annexure-R was finally disposed of by R-2. The material placed on record, on the other hand, reveals that the same was under active consideration of R-2 all along. In that perspective of the matter no laches could be attributed to the petitioner in challenging the impugned order of R-2 about three years later. Therefore, there is no good ground to reject her petition on this score.

12. Coming to the legality or otherwise of the impugned order dated 4-4-1983 of R-2, Mr. Narayana Rao, learned Counsel for petitioner, rightly assailed the validity thereof on the ground that R-2 deliberately acted illegally in passing the same without disposal of petitioner's application at Ex. R simultaneously with it. In support of this legal position reliance was placed by him on two decisions of this Court in Ramaiah v State of Karnataka and Others and M.P. Krishne Gowda v A.R. Lobo and Others. The following material proposition on the point enunciated by the Single Bench in the case of Ramaiah, supra, stands affirmed by the latter decision of the Division Bench in Krishne Gowda's case, supra:

'The Land Grant Rules specifically do not provide for the consideration of several applications simultaneously,the procedure to be followed by the authorities granting the land in this regard will have to be inferred having regard to the principles of equity and justice and the purpose of the Land Grant Rules. The available lands are notified to afford an opportunity for the needy persons to file their application seeking the grant. In such a situation when the claimant files an application it is but most natural that his claim will have to be considered along with the claim of any other claimants. No useful purpose will be served by considering the claim of one of the claimants and granting the land to such a claimant, because the claim of the applicant whose application was not considered will be lost for want of land. The grant of Governmental land cannot be a mere largesse to be granted as the authorities deem it fit, irrespective of the merits of the individual cases'.

Therefore, it is settled law that where there are more than one application made for grant of the same land, all the applications will have to be considered and disposed of together by the Competent Authority and failure to do so would render his order of grant illegal. Indisputably, in the instant case petitioner's said application at Annexure-R dated 4-8-1982 was pending consideration of the Revenue Authority and that the grant of the said land to petitioner on her said application was recommended by the Land Grant Committee as required under Rule 24, vide its recommendation at Annexure-F dated 12-10-1982; and the concerned Assistant Commissioner also recommended the grant thereof to her under his letter at Annexure-K bearing No. LND-SR-37 I/dated 18-4-1984, submitted to R-2, on collection of its market value from her; and that the impugned order dated 4-4-1983 at Annexure-A granting the land to R-l was passed by R-2 during pendency of petitioner's said application and without notice to her. Therefore, without more, second respondent's order impugned is an illegal order passed by him in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The concerned Revenue Authority was required in law to consider the applications of both petitioner and R-l for grant of land and decide them simultaneously by a speaking order.

13. Now I need advert to another objection raised for R-l by her learned Counsel that petitioner was disentitled to maintainthe petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as the statutory remedy of appeal available under Section 49(c) of the Act to challenge the impugned order was not exhausted by her. It was submitted by him that the discretionary writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be extended to her. As indicated, support for this submission is sought to be drawn by him from the proposition enunciated by Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills' case, supra. That is a decision rendered by a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court. The order challenged before it by the petitioner therein was the order of assessment made by Sales Tax Officer under the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The writ petitions filed by him before the Orissa High Court challenging the same were dismissed in limine by the High Court. Then the petitioner made special leave petition before the Supreme Court challenging the order of High Court and the order of Sales Tax Officer. While opposing the petitions, one of the points contended for respondent-State before the Supreme Court was that petitioner was not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution as an efficacious remedy by way of appeal and the second appeal under the Sales Tax Act and in the event of failure to get relief in appeals to have the case stated to High Court was available to him, all of which he failed to avail. While dealing with this point the Supreme Court referred with affirmation to its below-quoted observations made in an earlier decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v Mohammad Nook1.

'If an inferior Court or Tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to tHe rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the Superior Court's sense of fair-play, the Superior Count may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or Tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or Tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned'.

With reference to the peculiar facts of the case before it the Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the Sales Tax Officer who assessed the tax payable by the petitioner and passed the impugned order was not found to have acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or in any manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and which offends the Superior Court's sense of fair-play. It is in this perspective the Court held that in view of the aforementioned efficacious remedies available to the petitioner therein under the Sales Tax Act, he was not entitled to maintain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

14. In the case in hand, the impugned order is the one passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Chapter V of the Act provides for the remedies of appeal and revision to an aggrieved person from original orders of the Revenue Authorities passed under the Act. Section 49 under the Chapter provides for appeal from original orders. Clause (c) of Section 49 provides for an appeal to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal from an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, undoubtedly, there was the remedy of appeal to the Tribunal available to the petitioner against the impugned order dated 4-4-1983. But the fact remains undisputed that by the time she acquired the knowledge thereof on or about 21-1-1986 the period of limitation of 60 days prescribed by Section 51-A to appeal against the said order had already expired long back. The impugned order is found to have been passed by R-2 in violation of principles of natural justice and, therefore, it is an illegal order. These circumstances are peculiar to the instant case. The law enunciated in the case of Mohammad Nook, supra, which is extracted hereinabove, therefore, fully justify the maintainability of the petition by the petitioner herein even if an alternative remedy by way of appeal was available to her and she had not availed of the same. The above proposition of law also stands re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in its later decision in the case of A. V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Another , rendered by a Larger Bench of five Judges. Therefore, the objection by Mr. T.S. Ramachandra Rao, learned Senior Counsel for R-l, in regard to maintainability of the petition under Article 226 is without legal force.

15. Another legal aspect of the matter which merits consideration is the objection of learned Counsel for petitioner directed against competency of R-2, Deputy Commissioner to pass the impugned order. He submitted that it is Rule 7 which confers power on the Revenue Officers to grant lands. Sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Rule 7(1) of the Rules provide for grant of land upto certain extent by various Revenue Officers enumerated therein in the order of their hierarchy. Sub-clause (i) confers powers on the Tahsildar to make grant of dry land upto two hectares or one hectare of wet land or garden land. The extent of land to be granted by his respective superior Revenue Officers is to be found in clauses (ii) and (iii). A reading of the aforesaid clauses goes to show that Assistant Commissioner is empowered to grant land upto 4 acres if it is dry or two hectares of wet or garden land and the Deputy Commissioner of a District has the power to make grant of land not exceeding 6 hectares of dry land or 3 hectares of wet or garden land. Mr. U.L. Narayana Rao, therefore, contended that the extent of land in question in the instant case being 30 guntas it was within the competence of Tahsildar only to make grant of the same and, therefore, its grant made by the Deputy Commissioner was outside his authority. In support of this submission, reliance was placed by him on a Division Bench decision of this Court in K.B. Hanumanthappa and Others v B.H. Hanumanthappa and Another and also on a Single Bench decision in Visweswara v State of Karnataka and Others .

16. Countering this argument learned Counsel for R-l, Mr. T.S. Ramachandra Rao placing reliance on Venkategowda v Shambappa , submitted that R-2, Deputy Commissioner being the Superior Authority over the Tahsildar invested with larger power to grant upto 6 hectares of dry land or 3 hectares of wet or garden land was certainly competent to grant the lesser extent of 30 guntas to R-2. That case of Venkategowda, supra, is a decision of Single Bench wherein the learned Judge has observed: Though the land granted might be within the limit prescribed on the Tahsildar, the Assistant Commissioner who is superior to the Tahsildar could also grant the land subject to the maximum limit imposed on him. The rule does not state thatwhat is within the competence of the Tahsildar shall be beyond the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner'.

17. In the case of K.B. Hanumanthappa, supra, the Government granted the land which according to the rules was within the power of the Tahsildar to grant. That grant was struck down by a Division Bench of this Court when the same was challenged before, it holding that:

'Where the Tahsildar was the authority who had the power to grant a land (which did not exceed 4 acres of dry land) and the land was granted by Government on an application made to it direct and no relaxation of the rules regarding the grant was made in exercise of the powers under Rule 43-L, the grant made by Government was not within its competence'.

In Visweswara's case, various applicants made applications to the concerned Tahsildar for grant of land to the extent of 2 acres each. Under Rule 7 the Tahsildar was competent to grant land of this extent. Instead of himself considering and disposing of these applications, he sought instructions from the Assistant Commissioner who was his immediate Superior Officer. His act of seeking such instructions from Assistant Commissioner in the matter of said grants was challenged by the applicants before this Court. Allowing their writ petitions, a writ in the nature of mandamus was issued to the Tahsildar directing him to consider the applications on their merits in exercise of his said power, observing:

'An authority empowered under the statute to which a particular thing affecting a right of decision cannot in law seek instructions from his Superior Officer for discharging his statutory duty'.

18. Admittedly, under sub-clause (i) of Rule 7(1) of the Rules, the Tahsildar is empowered to make grant of land in question, which was 30 guntas in extent. Section 49 of the Act, as indicated elsewhere hereinabove, provides for appeals from original orders. Under this section an order passed by the Tahsildar is made appealable to the Assistant Commissioner; an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner is appealable to the Deputy Commissioner; and an appeal to the Tribunal is provided from an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner or the Divisional Commissioner. These are the Revenue Officers whoare empowered under Rule 7 to make grant of various extents of lands stated therein. Section 50 of the Act provides for second appeal from an order of the Assistant Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner; and from an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner to the Tribunal. Section 56 confers power on the Tribunal, on any Revenue Officer not inferior in rank to an Assistant Commissioner, and on the Survey Officer stated therein, to call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any Subordinate Officer under the Act to satisfy itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings and to pass such orders as deemed fit-modifying, annulling or reversing the order of that Officer. In the context of these provisions viz, Sections 49, 50 and 56, it becomes obvious that if the grant order in question had been passed by the concerned competent Tahsildar, the petitioner or any person aggrieved by that order would have had the statutory remedy of first and second appeals under the respective provisions under Sections 49(c) and 50 of the Act. If the same were to be passed by the Deputy Commissioner, then remedy of only one appeal (to the Tribunal) would be available to the aggrieved party thus depriving him of the statutory remedy of second appeal which otherwise would have been available to him under Section 50 of the Act. This apart, if Deputy Commissioner is also to be held competent to pass an order granting the extent of land within the limits which the Tahsildar is empowered to make the grant such a construction on his power would rob him of the statutory empowerment as Second Appellate Authority in relation to such grant on the one hand and, on the other, it would impinge on the power of the Tahsildar. In that case the provision of second appeal under Section 50 would get defeated, such a construction on the statutory power of Deputy Commissioner under the Act and the Rules thereunder would be obviously impermissible since it is the duty of the Court to see that the various provisions in an enactment should operate in harmony with each other and with full inter-play. The pertinent observation of Supreme Court made in A.V. Venkateswaran's case, supra, may be recalled with advantage in this behalf:

'It should be the duty of the Courts to see that the statutory provisions are observed and authorities are given the opportunity to decide the question which the statute requires them to decide'.

19. Therefore, the hierarchy of statutory authorities created under the Act being invested with certain powers to decidecertain matters in a certain manner must be allowed to fully and independently exercise their respective statutory powers in relation to such matters without any of them either encroaching upon or ousting or affecting or limiting the power of one another in any manner whatsoever, lest such provisions of an enactment providing for smooth functioning of its machinery intended to secure its objective would get either constricted or hindered in their operation. Therefore, I have my own reservation about the proposition stated by the learned Judge in Venkategowda's case, supra, to the effect that a Superior Revenue Officer could also grant the extent of land falling within the limit which the Tahsildar is empowered to grant under the Rules. That observation has to be treated not as a precedent but as an obiter dictum limited to that particular case as it appears to have not been made in the context of the afore-mentioned material provisions of the Act and the Rules. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order is passed by R-2 in excess of his jurisdiction and, therefore, it is liable to be quashed.

20. For the reasons aforesaid, the petition is allowed.

The impugned order dated 4-4-1983 at Annexure-A of R-2 is quashed. He is directed to send petitioner's application dated 4-8-1982, at Annexure-R, and the application of R-l, Sashikala, both made for grant of the same land, to the concern Tahsildar for his enquiry and simultaneous disposal by a speaking order according to law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. The Tahsildar shall give sufficient opportunity to both these applicants to present their respective cases before him at the enquiry.