Syed Mudir Agha Vs. State of Karnataka, Rep. by Principal Secretary and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/373248
SubjectConstitution
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided OnFeb-25-2008
Case NumberWrit Petition No. 16631 of 2007 (GM-Res)
JudgeMohan Shantanagoudar, J.
Reported inILR2008KAR1722; 2008(5)KarLJ378; 2008(3)KCCR1419; 2008(3)AIRKarR394
ActsKarnataka State Minorities Commission Act, 1994 - Sections 3, 4, 4(1), 5 and 12(2); United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916; Karnataka Government Business Rules, 2007 - Rules 4, 5, 6 and 7; Constitution of India - Articles 14, 15, 75(2), 76(1), 155, 156(1), 164(1), 166, 310, 310(1) and 356
AppellantSyed Mudir Agha
RespondentState of Karnataka, Rep. by Principal Secretary and ors.
Appellant AdvocateA.N. Jayaram, Sr. Counsel
Respondent AdvocateB.V. Acharya, Adv. General for ;Ramesh B. Annappanavar, G.A.
DispositionPetition dismissed
Excerpt:
karnataka state minorities commission act, 1994 - section 3 - constitution of commission - section 4 - appointment of petitioner as the chairman of the commission under - term of office - period of 3 years from the date of appointment, which is subject to the pleasure of the government - promulgation of president's rule - issue of proclamation under article 356 of the constitution of india - note issued by the chief secretary instructing all the principal secretaries to request the non-official chairman of all the bodies/corporation to resign and surrender the official vehicles - challenge to - the expression in section 4(1) 'subject to pleasure of the government' - constitutional validity of doctrine of pleasure found in section 4 of the act - held, the 'pleasure doctrine' found in.....ordermohan shantanagoudar, j.1. petitioner is the chairman of the karnataka state minorities commission, the second respondent herein. the said commission is constituted under section 3 of the karnataka state minorities commission act, 1994 (for short hereinafter referred to as the 'act'). he was appointed by the order dated 5.10.2007 passed under section 4 of the act. the term of office prescribed under the act is for a period of three years from the date of appointment, which is 'subject to the pleasure of the government'.2. on 9-10-2007, president of india promulgated president's rule by issuing proclamation under article 356 of constitution of india. after promulgation of president's rule, the chief secretary of the state of karnataka issued a note dated 12.10.2007 instructing all the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Mohan Shantanagoudar, J.

1. Petitioner is the Chairman of the Karnataka State Minorities Commission, the second respondent herein. The said Commission is constituted under Section 3 of the Karnataka State Minorities Commission Act, 1994 (for short hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). He was appointed by the order dated 5.10.2007 passed under Section 4 of the Act. The term of office prescribed under the Act is for a period of three years from the date of appointment, which is 'subject to the pleasure of the Government'.

2. On 9-10-2007, President of India promulgated President's rule by issuing proclamation under Article 356 of Constitution of India. After promulgation of President's Rule, the Chief Secretary of the State of Karnataka issued a Note dated 12.10.2007 instructing all the Principal Secretaries to Government to request the non-official Chairmen of all the Corporation/Bodies to resign and surrender the official vehicles attached to them immediately. Copy of the said Note is produced at Annexure-B to the writ petition. Subsequently, the letter dated 17.10.2007 is sent by the Secretary to Government, Minorities Welfare (Social Welfare) Department, Bangalore to the Secretary of the Karnataka State Minorities Commission (respondent No. 2 herein), as per Annexure-C to take action pursuant to the letter dated 12.10.2007. The petitioner has filed this writ petition questioning the Note of the Chief Secretary at Annexure-B, dated 12.10.2007 and the letter dated 17.10.2007 at Annexure-C. The petitioner has also prayed for declaration that Section 4(1) of the Act to the extent that incorporates the expression 'subject to pleasure of the Government' is void and unconstitutional and also to declare the said expression as invalid.

3. Sri A.N. Jayaram, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that petitioner is neither the Chairman of the Corporation or Board, but the Chairman of the Commission created under the statute and therefore, the Note of the Chief Secretary and the letter of the Secretary at Annexure-B and C respectively, cannot be executed against the petitioner; that under the President's Rule, the Governor cannot exercise powers more than that of the elected Government; that the pleasure doctrine is not found in similar statutes of other States; a person can be disqualified for being appointed or being continued member of the Commission only if he incurs disqualification as contained in Section 5 of the Act. According to him, as the pleasure doctrine is found under Article 310 of the Constitution, which is applicable to civil servants and military personnel, it should not be made applicable to other authorities. He heavily relied upon the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patil : (1985)IILLJ206SC , According to him, the transactions of business Rules dated 12.10.2007 issued after promulgation of the President's Rule are illegal and cannot be acted upon

4. The writ petition is opposed by Sri B.V. Acharya, learned Advocate General, appearing for the State. He argued that the appointment order of the petitioner itself indicates that the appointment is at the pleasure of the Government; that the petitioner cannot be equated to the civil servant; Section 4 of the Act does not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution and hence the same cannot be struck down; action of the Government in question is not punitive in nature inasmuch as, respondents have merely requested the petitioner to resign and mere request for resignation cannot be the subject matter of the writ petition. He relied upon the judgments in the case of S. Govindappa v. Chief Secretary to Government of Karnataka and Anr. 1992 (2) KLJ 296, and in the case of State of Gujarat and Anr. v. P.J. Kampavat and Ors. : (1993)IILLJ771SC , in support of his contention.

Regarding Validity of Doctrine of Pleasure found in Section. 4 of the Act:

5. The records disclose that the President's Rule was promulgated on 9.10.2007 in Karnataka State. On 12.10.2007, the then Chief Secretary of the Government issued a Note as per Annexure-B to all the Principal Secretaries to the Government/ Secretaries to Government, to in turn request non-official Members and Chairmen of the Corporations/Boards coming under their administrative control to resign and surrender the official vehicles attached to them immediately. Thereafter on 17.10.2007, the Secretary to Social Welfare Department (Minorities Welfare) has sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent No. 2-Commission to initiate action immediately in accordance with the Note dated 12.10.2007.

6. The Notification Annexure-A dated 5.10.2007, by which the petitioner is nominated/appointed as the Chairman of respondent No. 2-Commission is issued in exercise of power under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Thus, it is clear that the order of appointment of the petitioner to the post of Chairman of the Commission is subject to provisions of Section 4 of the Act. It is relevant to note at this stage Sections 4 & 5 of the Act, which read thus:

Section 4: Term of office & conditions of service of Chairman & Members:- (1) Subject to the pleasure of the Government, the Chairman and Members of the Commission shall hold office for a term of three years from the date they assume their offices.

(2) The Chairman or a Member of the Commission may resign from his office in writing under his signature addressed to the Government, but shall continue in office until his resignation is accepted.

(3) The Chairman and Members shall receive such salary and allowances as may be prescribed.

(4) The salary and allowances payable to the Chairman and Members shall be defrayed out of the grants referred to in Sub-section (2) of Section 12.

(5) A casual vacancy of a Member shall be filled up as soon as may be by the authority concerned and a Member so nominated shall hold office for the unexpired portion of the term of the office of his predecessor.

Section 5: Disqualifications for office of membership: (1) A person shall be qualified for being appointed and for being continued as the Chairman or a Member as the case may be if he:

(a) has been convicted and sentenced for imprisonment for an offence which in the opinion of the Government involves moral turpitude; or

(b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or

(c) is an un discharged insolvent; or

(d) has been removed or dismissed from service of the Central Government or a State Government or a body or corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or a State Government; or

(e) refused to act or becomes incapable of acting, or

(f) without obtaining leave of absence from the Commission absents from three consecutive meetings of the Commission; or

(g) has in the opinion of the Government, so abused the position of Chairperson or Member as to render that person's continuance in office detrimental to the interests of the Minorities or the public interest : Provided that no person shall be removed under this clause until that person has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.

(2). Any person who is disqualified under Sub-section (l) shall be removed by the Government.

From the provisions of Section 4 of the Act, it is clear that the Chairman and Members of the Commission shall hold office for a term of three years subject to the pleasure of Government. Hence, it is clear that the appointment or continuance of the petitioner in the office is subject to the pleasure of the Government.

7. Appointments at the pleasure of the Government are not the same as normal or ordinary appointments. The normal or ordinary principles of recruitment applicable to posts governed by Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution of India would not apply to the instant appointment being an appointment at the pleasure of the Government. The ordinary appointments in public service entail security of tenure which is an essential feature of such appointment. These characteristics are noticeably absent in the instant case.

8. In Tulasiram's Case, cited supra, which is heavily relied upon by the petitioner's counsel, it is observed thus:

In India, the pleasure doctrine has received constitutional sanction by being enacted in Article 310(1). Unlike in the United Kingdom, in India it is not subject to any law made by Parliament but is subject only to what is expressly provided by the Constitution.

(Emphasis supplied)

The 'pleasure doctrine' finds a place in several enactments of the Karnataka State including the Constitution of India. Under Article 75(2) of the Constitution of India, the Ministers of the Central Government hold office during the pleasure of the President. Under Article 164(1), the Ministers in the States will hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. Similarly, under Article 76(1), the President appoints Attorney-General of India and in view of Clause (4) of the said Article, the said office is held during the pleasure of the President. The Governors of the States are appointed by the President under Articles 155 and 156(1), and the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President.

From the aforementioned, it is clear that in India, the pleasure doctrine has received constitutional sanction.

9. Initial appointment of the petitioner itself depended on the pleasure and subject to satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointment made by nomination is based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution, in case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure. In other words, there is no prohibition under the Constitution to enact law with a pleasure doctrine embedded in it in the matter of appointment of the Chairman and members of a particular Board.

10. In my view, the 'pleasure doctrine' found in Section 4 of the Act, neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity of being heard to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in Section 4 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations. It is worthwhile to note that the pleasure doctrine incorporated in Section 4 of the Act does not, in any manner, take away the right of representation of the persons belonging to minorities in the Board, but it only permits the State Government to keep the nominated members of its own choice. The nominated members cannot claim equality with the elected members. They are of different class altogether.

11. The Court is not impressed with the argument that there would be a constant fear of removal at the will of the State Government and is bound to demoralise the nominated members in discharge of their duties as members in the Board. This Court does not find any justification for drawing such an inference, inasmuch as, such contingency usually arises with the change of ruling party in the Government. Even the highest functionaries in the Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney-General and the Advocate-General discharge their duties efficiently, though removable at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to become demoralised or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office.

12. The pleasure doctrine seems to have been inserted in the enactment because the public policy requires, public interest needs, and public good demands that there should be such a doctrine. In view of the same, this Court does not find any ground to strike down the doctrine of pleasure found in Section 4 of the Act.

It is by now well settled that a law made by the Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by Courts only on the following grounds:

i) Lack of legislative competence, i.e., the Court has to examine whether the Act is a law with respect to topic assigned to the particular legislature which enacted it;

ii) Violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-Ill of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions;

iii) If the operation of the Act passed by the legislature of the State extends beyond the boundaries of the State, i.e., the legislature of the State can only make a law for its territories or any part thereof and its laws cannot have any extra territorial operation.

13. These are the only grounds on which an Act can be struck down. There are no other grounds. In this matter, none of the aforesaid grounds are available for the petitioner. It is not shown by the petitioner as to how the pleasure doctrine found in Section 4 of the Act violates any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-Ill of the Constitution, or of any other constitutional provisions. More over, as aforementioned, the pleasure doctrine found in Section 4 of the Act does not offend any of the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as, the nominated members ought to go out in the manner they have come in. At the time of his nomination itself, the petitioner was made known about the pleasure doctrine as the nomination is made under Section 4 of the Act. Thus his appointment is subject to pleasure of Government. Therefore, he may also be asked to go out by exercising pleasure doctrine.

14. The Supreme Court in the case of Om Narain Agarwal and Ors. v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur and Ors. : [1993]2SCR34 , was dealing with the similar situation relating to pleasure doctrine found in the provisions of United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 (the State enactment of Uttara Pradesh). In the said matter, the High Court had held that the pleasure doctrine is in violation of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. But the Supreme Court set aside, the said judgment of the High Court and ruled that such a provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution.

15. The appointment of the petitioner is under the Karnataka State Minorities Commission Act, 1994 and as such the provisions of the enactments of other States cannot be read into it. It is not permissible to rely upon the provisions of other Acts to interpret the particular Act which makes a specific provision making the intention of the legislature clear. Validity of the provision having pleasure doctrine cannot be tested by resorting to provisions in other enactments. Express provision relating to pleasure doctrine is found in the Karnataka enactment, probably for eliminating the ambiguity.

16. The argument of Sri Jayaram that the removal of the petitioner from the post of Chairman of the Board casts stigma on him, also cannot be accepted. The removal of a particular person by using pleasure doctrine neither casts any stigma nor leads to any penal consequences. In any statute, expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or implicit. In the case on hand Section 4 of the Act reveals the doctrine of the pleasure openly and abundantly. If the person is removed by using the pleasure doctrine, the same would be removal without any stigma.

17. Once the doctrine pleasure is accepted, neither principles of natural justice would step in, nor any question of giving an opportunity before removal would arise. It is significant to note that if stigma is cast, then Section 5 of the Act provides for giving an opportunity to such incumbent before passing the order of removal, while there is no corresponding provision relating to providing opportunity of hearing in Section 4 of the Act. Therefore, the petitioner need not be heard before passing the order relating to his removal by using pleasure doctrine.

18. The contention of Sri Jayaram that the appointment is for three years under Section 4 of the Act and therefore the same cannot be curtailed or restricted for a smaller period, cannot be accepted.

The bare reading of Section 4 of the Act. makes it clear that the appointment and continuance of the petitioner is for three years subject to the pleasure of the Government, which means the petitioner can continue for three years only if the State Government does not decide to discontinue within the said period. Thus, the three years' period can be treated as maximum period and not the minimum period of holding the office.

19. The termination under Section 5 of the Act would be by following the principles of natural justice. If the State Government does not terminate the nominated Chairman or the Member of the Commission at its pleasure under Section 4 of the Act, then the concerned Member or the Chairman will continue in his office for a period of three years. If the nominated Member or the Chairman incurs any of the disqualifications contained in Section 5 of the Act during the period of three years, he may be discontinued from the said post after giving him an opportunity. Thus, the scope and ambit of Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act is entirely different and they are independent of each other inasmuch as they may be used in different circumstances altogether.

In view of the above, challenge to 'pleasure doctrine' found in Section 4 of the Act fails.

Re. validity of impugned circulars:

20. As aforementioned, the proclamation of President of India, was issued on 9.10.2007 initially. In the very proclamation, it is made clear that so much of Clause (3) of Article 166 relating to the allocation of the business among the Ministers of the State Government is suspended. Along with the President's proclamation an order is issued by the President of India on 9.10.2007 itself directing that all the functions of the Government of State of Karnataka and all the powers vested in and exercisable by the Governor of the State under the Constitution or under any law in force, subject to superintendence, direction or control of the President, be exercisable also by the Governor of the State. Thus, it is clear that the Governor will exercise all the functions of the State of Karnataka, subject to superintendence, direction and control of the President, after promulgation of President's Rule. Thereafter, the Governor of the Karnataka has issued the Karnataka Government Business Rules, 2007 in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 166 of the Constitution of India on 12.10.2007 for the purpose of more convenient transaction of business of the State Government. Hence, the Business Rules of 2007 are perfectly legal and justified. As per the said Rules, all matters which are required to be submitted to erstwhile cabinet (First Schedule), shall be submitted to the Executive Committee comprising of:

i) the Governor

ii) the Advisors - Members

iii) the Chief Secretary - Member Secretary

So also, the advisers shall dispose of all the matters listed in Second Schedule to the Rules of Business pertaining to the Departments allocated to them.

21. To verify the fact as to whether the then Chief Secretary of the State Government had authorization either from the Governor or from the President for issuing note at Annexure-B dated 12.10.2007, this Court summoned the records of the State Government. Learned Advocate General has made available the records. The records maintained by the State Government do not contain any such authorization either from the President or from the Governor. Thus, it can be said that the Note at Annexure-B issued by the Chief Secretary requesting the concerned Principal Secretaries to Government to obtain resignation is illegal and without any authority of law. Merely because the elected Government is not in existence and merely because the President's Rule is imposed in the State, the Chief Secretary cannot assume powers of every department of the State Government and issue such Note as per Annexure-B. Therefore, the Note at Annexure-B is illegal and it is hereby declared so.

May be, the Chief Secretary being the Member Secretary of the Executive Committee assigned with the work of Cabinet (as per Schedule-I) pursuant to the Karnataka Government Business Rules, 2007 dated 12.10.2007, seems to have issued the note under erroneous impression, as per Annexure-B. As the note Annexure-B is held to be illegal, the same is not binding on anybody. However, the Circular issued by the Secretary of the Department dated 17.10.2007 vide Annexure-C cannot be said to be illegal. If the three Schedules of Business Rules are meticulously perused, the appointment and removal of the Chairman and Members of Boards, Corporations and Commissions, do not fall within any of those three Schedules, which means, the function relating to appointment or removal of Chairman and Members of Boards, Corporations and Commissions etc., need not have to be mandatorily carried out by the Chief Minister (i.e., presently the Advisors) or the Governor or the Cabinet (i.e., presently the Executive Committee). If any function does not fall within the three Schedules specifically, then, the Minister of the particular department will have to perform the said function relating to his department.

22. It is relevant to note Rule-5 of Karnataka Government Business Rules, 2007, which reads thus:

Rule - 5: Superintendence, direction and control: Subject to the superintendence, direction and control of the Governor and the provisions of Rules 4, 6 and 7, all business allotted to a Secretariat Department shall be disposed of by the Secretary to the Government of that Department.

Provided that such cases or class of cases relating to the business allotted to a Secretariat Department may be disposed of by such Secretary of any other Department as the Governor may, by order specify in this behalf.

Provided further that the Secretary may with the approval of the Governor delegate such powers (other than powers which under the Rules of Business were exercisable by a Minister) to a Special Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a Joint Secretary, a Deputy Secretary or an Under Secretary, as he considers necessary, subject to compliance with these rules.

From the bare perusal of the said Rule, it is clear that all business allotted to the particular department shall be disposed of by the Secretary to the Government of that department, subject to the superintendence, direction and control of the Governor. Thus, the function which the Minister would have performed during the existence of the elected Government shall have to be performed by the Principal Secretary of that particular department subject to superintendence, direction and control of the Governor. As the appointment and removal of the Chairman and Members of the Boards, Corporations and Commissions do not fall within the three Schedules of the Business Rules, the same should have been performed by the Minister of the particular department during the regime of elected Government. As the Minister is not available in view of proclamation of President's rule, the said function has to be performed by the Secretary of the particular department in the place of Minister. In this matter, the concerned Secretary of the department has sent the Circular to the petitioner on 17.10.2007 requesting the petitioner to resign. Hence, the action of the Secretary of the department is legal, inasmuch as, the same is covered by Business Rules of 2007. Therefore, it cannot be said that the circular issued by Secretary vide Annexure-C dated 17.10.2007 is without any authority of law.

23. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the appointment of the Chairman or Member of the Boards, Corporations, Commissions etc., falls under Item-16 & 19 of the Second Schedule of Business Rules (cases which shall be submitted to Chief Minister) (the Advisors during President's rule). It is further argued that the same may also fall under Item-28 of First Schedule (cases which shall be brought before the Cabinet) (i.e., the Executive Committee during President's Rule).

The said submission cannot be accepted, inasmuch as, Item-28 of First Schedule deals with the ' proposals involving in important change of policy or practice'. Requesting the resignation of the Chairman and Members of Boards, Corporations, Commissions etc., cannot be termed as an important change of policy or practice of the Government. Therefore, Item-28 of First Schedule is not applicable. Item-16 of the Second Schedule deals with 'creation of and first appointment to any post in a statutory/non-statutory organisation, company, corporation etc., where such creation or appointment requires the approval of Government'. In this matter, there is neither creation of any statutory organisation nor is there any appointment made for the first time to any post in the statutory organisation. This is not a case of appointment of the Chairman for the first time. There have been already such appointments made to the Commission earlier. The State Minorities Commission Act has come into force in the year 1994 and since then, there have been many appointments to and removal from the post of the Chairman of the Commission. Only if the appointment is to be made for the first time to the statutory organisation, then, the file has to go to the Chief Minister (presently the Advisors). As the case on hand does not pertain to the first appointment or the first removal, the file need not go to the Advisor. Hence, the matter in question does not fall under Item-16 of Second Schedule. So also the subject does not fall under Item-19 of Second Schedule, inasmuch as, Item-19 deals with 'all proposals for the appointment of a non-official on any committee or in any other capacity'. As the case on hand does not relate to the appointment of non-official to any committee, the same would not come within Item-19 of Second Schedule. In this view of the matter, the file need not necessarily go to the Advisor having charge of particular department. Therefore, action of the Secretary cannot be held to be illegal and consequently, the Circular issued by the Secretary dated 17.10.2007 is just and proper.

24. Though the Note of Chief Secretary at Annexure-B discloses only the words 'Corporations and Boards', it cannot be said that only the non-official Chairmen of the Corporation/Boards were asked to resign. The intention of the Chief Secretary appears to be for getting resignation of all the nominated Chairmen and Members of the Boards, Commissions, Corporations, etc. Be that as it may, as aforementioned, the note at Annexure-B is illegal and hence the State cannot rely on it. The State has failed to support it. However, State has proceeded on the basis of subsequent circular at Annexure-C sent by Secretary of the particular department to the petitioner's office. Hence the wordings used in Chief Secretary's note at Annexure-B cannot be made use off or taken advantage of by both the parties. Thus, it cannot be said that the request of the Secretary of the Department for the petitioner's resignation is bad in the eye of law.

25. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is no active consideration by the Secretary, inasmuch as, he has not applied his mind to the facts of the case while issuing the circular inasmuch as no reasons are assigned. The said contention cannot be accepted. No reasons need be assigned while removing the petitioner from the post which is held by him during pleasure of Government. The scope for judicial interference in such matters would be very much limited, inasmuch as, it is for the State Government to decide as to whether the existing Chair persons of the Boards/ Corporations should be continued or not particularly when the appointments to such posts are at the pleasure of Government. It may be that even in the case of the exercise of power under doctrine of pleasure, there would be scope for judicial review if it is alleged and proved in a given case that the power was exercised mala fide, for, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab : (1966)ILLJ458SC , if it is found that a public functionary in exercise of an administrative/statutory power was actuated by mala fides, such action would be vitiated. In other words, such an action is no action at all in the eye of law. In the present case, there is no allegation that the power was exercised mala fide. Hence, this Court cannot substitute its opinion.

26. As aforementioned, the learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the last portion of Paragraph-73 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S.R. Bommai and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., etc. AIR 1994 SC 1960 to contend that the Governor could not have taken irreversible decision while the assembly was kept under suspended animation. In other words, he submits that it is only after the dissolution of the assembly, the Governor could have taken such a decision in question as per the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the case of S.R. Bommai (cited supra).

27. The said contention cannot be accepted, inasmuch as, requesting the Chairpersons of the Boards/Corporations cannot be said to be an irreversible decision. It can be termed as reversible decision, inasmuch as, the Governor may even choose to re-appoint the very persons as Chairpersons or members. A person whose tenure is determined by taking recourse to the 'pleasure doctrine', is eligible for re-appointment inasmuch as such determination is without any stigma. In S.R. Bommai's matter, the Apex Court has held that the dissolution of assembly is an irreversible decision which could not have been resorted to by the Governor till both the Houses of Parliament have approved of the proclamation issued by him under Clause (1) of Article 356 of Constitution of India. But the situation here is different. In the matter on hand, even if the appointments are revoked or cancelled, fresh appointments may be or will be made. Hence the decision on hand cannot be said to be irreversible decision. The observations of the Apex Court in the afore cited judgment of S.R. Bommai's case would not come in the way of the Governor to take decision in day-today matters. Moreover, as aforementioned, asking the Chairpersons to resign cannot be termed as an irreversible decision.

28. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and accordingly, the same is dismissed.