M.C. Lakshminarasappa and Another Vs. the Asst. Commissioner, Chikkaballapur and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- income tax act,1961[c.a.no.43/1961] -- sections 21 (1) & 31(1): [k.l. manjunath & a.s. bopanna, jj] change of sound system in a theater whether to be treated as capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure? held, it has to be seen that whether the change of sound system has increased the revenue or not. admittedly the old sound system was in existence for several years and due to use of the very same sound system for several years, the old system was worn out. if the assessee has provided certain amenities to its customers by replacing the old system with a better sound system, it cannot be said that the assessee has increased its income. instead of repairing the old stereo system, the assessee has installed the dolby stereo system. this has not benefited the assessee in any way with regard to its total income since there is no change in the seating capacity of the theatre or increase in the tariff rate of the ticket. it is a revenue expenditure and not a capital expenditure. - hence, it is contended that the findings arrived at by the respondents 1 and 2 are bad in law. further contended that the action of the respondents-1 and 2 in not regularising the sale transaction in favour of the petitioner as being bad in law. there is no good reason which would lead us to take a different view, nor can it be said that the view taken is in any manner unjust and unfair. 43 of the transfer of property act would apply and the title he subsequently acquired on such re-grant of that land would enure to the benefit of his alienee who would get a good title to such land after such re-grant to his alienor. there is also no good reason why the benefit of s. the full bench in the impugned judgment clearly went wrong in holding that the two judge bench of this court referred to by it had brought about a total change in the position and on the basis of those two judgments, krishnaji's case would be no more good law. seenappa, ilr 1992 (2) kar 2177, while confirming the decision in lakshman gowda's case has clearly stated at paragraph-3 :in our view, this interpretation placed by the division bench of the karnataka high court on the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 5 (before its amendment) appears to be a fair and just interpretation. there is no good reason which would lead us to take a different view, nor can it be said that the view taken is in any manner unjust and unfair. in view of the proposition of law laid down by this court as well as by the supreme court, i am of the view that circumstances do not warrant any further interference with the order passed by theassistant commissioner, declaring the transactions as being invalid.order1. sri m. siddagangaiah, learned government pleader is directed to take notice for respondents.2. this writ petition is directed challenging the legality of the order dated 31-10-78 passed by the assistant commissioner, chikkaballapur sub-division, chikkaballapur, in no. hoa (r) tal. 159/71-72. the petitioner has sought the following reliefs in the writ petition.issue a writ of mandamus or order or direction or any other appropriate writ,directing the respondents 1 and 2 to regularise the sale transaction and further change the khatha in favour of the petitioners and pass such orders including the cost etc.3. the 1st petitioner purchased the land bearing sy. no. 35 to an extent of 14 yards east to west and 24 yards from north to south, situated at malligurki village, bagepalli taluk, kolar district, bounded on east by m. s. narayanaswamy land, west of m. s. narayanaswamy site, north and sourth by 4th respondent. the 2nd petitioner has purchased the land, in land bearing sy. no. 35, to an extent of 20 x 70 yards, situated in malligurki village, bagepalli taluk, bounded by east by m. s. narayanaswamy land, west by p. w.d. road, north by m. s. narayanaswamy's site and south by 1st petitioner's house and m. s. narayanaswamy sites.4. it is an admitted fact that sy. no. 35 situated in malligurki village, bagepalli taluk comprised an extent of 2 acres 38 guntas and is an talari inam land. one venkatamma is the holder of the village office, and same was managed by one talari narayanappa s/o avalappa. the 1st petitioner in this writ petition has purchased an extent of 14 yards east to west and 24 yards from north to south on 9-10-1967 from out of the abovesaid sy. no. 35. the 2nd petitioner has purchased to an extent of 20 x 70 yards from talari narayanappa in the same sy. no, 35 situated in malligurki village, evidenced by registered sale deed dated 30-3-1970. consequently, this talari narayanappa applied for re-grant of the land comprising sy. no. 35. it is also an admitted fact that the authorities have passed a re-grant order in favour of talari narayanappa on 31-10-78 evidenced in annexure-e. considering the contentions advanced by ex-holder of the village office, the assistant commissioner passed the following order. the operative portion of the order reads thus :'in these circumstances, i. p. vijayana, i.a.s. assistant commissioner, chikkaballapur sub-division in exercise of powers vested in me under s. 5(4) of the karnataka village offices abolition act, 1961 do hereby declare the above transaction of lands in question as null and void. the lands so transferred are forfeited to government as penalty free from all encumbrances. the unauthorised holders i.e., vendees shall be evicted summarily from the lands.further i also do hereby re-grant the occupancy of lands under s. 7(3) of (a) of the amended act 1978 as described below : name of the sy. no. kind extent asst. to whom the land village is granted a.g. rs. ps. mathinappali 41 dry 3-10 6-37 talari narayanappa 82 ' 3-30 7-35 malligurki 35 ' 2-38 6-37the land re-granted under section 5(1) of the karnataka village offices abolition act, 1961 shall not be transferred otherwise than by partition among the members of the hindu joint family for a period of 15 years.any transfer of land re-granted in contravention of this condition shall be null and void. the land as so transferred shall as penalty be forfeited to and vest in the state government. this re-grant is without prejudice to the tenancy right in the lands. breach of these conditions will entail cancellation of the grant and forfeiture of the lands to the government.' aggrieved against the order passed by the assistant commissioner, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.5. the main contentions advanced by the petitioner are that the (1) impugned action of the respondents-1 and 2 is illegal, contrary to the provisions of the karnataka village offices and inam abolition act and the law declared by this hon'ble court in lakshman gowda's case. hence, the same is liable to be set aside;(2) the action of the authorities in not regularising the sale transactions made in favour of the petitioners by not imposing penalty of 15 times assessment even though re-grant order was made in favour of the 4th respondent under the provisions of the karnataka village offices inam abolition act as being not legally sustainable. hence, it is contended that the findings arrived at by the respondents 1 and 2 are bad in law. in paragraph-11 of the grounds of memorandum of writ petition the petitioners have stated that the action of the respondents 1 and 2 in not considering the case of the petitioners for regularisation of their sale transaction in pursuance of the re-grant order made in favour of the 4th respondent, as being not in accordance with the law declared by this hon'ble court in a case reported in 1981 (1) kant lj 1 i.e. lakshman gowda v. state of karnataka, which has been upheld by the hon'ble supreme court of india, in state of karnataka v. seenappa which is reported in : air1992sc1531 . it is submitted that the respondents 1 and 2 should have considered the facts entitling the petitioners to the benefit of re-grant made in favour of the 4th respondent and that the sale transaction in favour of the petitioner's should have been declared as valid. further contended that the action of the respondents-1 and 2 in not regularising the sale transaction in favour of the petitioner as being bad in law.6. the petitioner's counsel contends that in view of the decision rendered in lakshman gowda v. state of karnataka reported in 1981 (1) lj 1, it was 'the bounden duty of the authorities concerned to have declared the sale transaction effected in favour of the petitioners as valid'. further, he invited the ratio decidendi of the case decided by the supreme court, in state of karnataka v. seenappa reported in : air1992sc1531 , which affirmed the decision of laxman goudas case.7. the government pleader invites this court's attention to the ratio decidendi of the case in chikka narasimhaiah v. tirupataiah reported in : ilr1989kar1520 .8. the only question that arises in the case is that whether the alienation that took place between 1-2-63 and 7-8-78 could be declared as valid by virtue of the re-grant made subsequent to amendment act, 1978 coming into force, that is re-grant made subsequent to 7-8-78.9. the petitioner's counsel also invites this court's attention to paragraph 2 of the judgment of the supreme court reported in state of karnataka v. seenappa : air1992sc1531 , which reads thus :2. 'the karnataka village officers abolition act, 1961 (for short the 'said act') came into effect from february 1, 1963. it is common ground that under the said act the lands given to the village officers were resumed and then re-granted to them. the re-grants were made at different periods. subsection (3) of section 5 of the said act placed a restriction on transfer of land re-granted. it runs as follows.'(3) the occupancy of the ryotwari patta of the land, as the case may be, re-granted under sub-section (1) shall not be transferable otherwise than by partition among members of hindu joint family without the previous sanction of the deputy commissioner and such sanction shall be granted only on payment of an amount equal to fifteen times the amount of full assessment of the land.'subsequently, this sub-sec. (3) of s. 5 of the said act was amended by the karnataka offices abolition (amendment) act, 1978. after the said amendment the said subsection reads as follows:--'(3) the occupancy or the ryotwari patta of the land, as the case may be, re-granted under sub-section (1) shall not be transferable otherwise than by partition among members of hindu joint family for a period of 15 years from the date of section 1 of the karnataka village offices abolition (amendment) act, 1978'although several questions have been answered by the high court in the said judgments, the arguments before us were confined to the decision on questions nos, (vi) and (vii) as formulated in the aforesaid judgment. the said questions run as follows :--'(vi) did a transferee of a service inam land from its holder or authorised holder after its re-grant under s. 5 or 6 of the principal act, get title to or interest in, such land, if such transfer had taken place without the previous sanction of the deputy commissioner under the unamended sub-section (3) of s. 5 of the principal act? (vii) is sub-section (4) of s. 5 of the principal act attracted to :-- (a) a transfer of a service inam land in contravention of unamended sub-section (3) of that section or (b) a transfer of such land in contravention of amended sub-section (3) of that section; or (c) both of them'. the high court has taken the view that omission to obtain the previous sanction of the deputy commissioner under original sub-sec. (3) of s. 5 of the said act did not render void a transfer of a land re-granted effected prior to the coming into force of the aforesaid amendment of sub-sec. (3) of s. 5 but that such transfer can be regularised by payment to the government an amount equal to fifteen times of full assessment of that land.(3) in our view, this interpretation placed by the division bench of the karnataka high court on the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of s. 5 (before its amendment) appears to be a fair and just interpretation. the only condition laid down for the grant of previous sanction appears to be payment of an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the land. there is no indication as to the principles on which the sanction was to be granted or refused and hence the interpretation placed by the karnataka high court that the onlycondition of sanction was the payment of an amount equal to fifteen times of full assessment of the land appears to be a just construction. that construction has stood for the last more than ten years and transactions must have been effected on the basis of the view of the land laid down by the karnataka high court. there is no good reason which would lead us to take a different view, nor can it be said that the view taken is in any manner unjust and unfair.(4) in these circumstances, we uphold the interpretation placed by the karnataka high court on the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of s. 5 of the said act. the question no. (vi), therefore, must be answered against the state. as we have upheld the view of the karnataka high court on question no. (vi), no decision is called for on question no. (vii). in the result, the special leave petitions and appeals preferred by the state of karnataka are dismissed. the petitioner's counsel sri gopal gowda submits that in view of the pronouncement, it is not open for the authorities to declare the alienation subsequent to 1-2-63 as invalid. further, it is contended by the petitioners that even after amendment act coming into force, the ratio decidendi by this court in lakshman gowda v. state of karnataka, 1981 (1) klj1 which was later on affirmed by the supreme court has to be followed.10. the petitioners's counsel further invites this court's attention to the decision rendered in adiveppa shivappa matur v. tahasildar reported in 1990 (1) klj 879 and contends that if authorities had considered petitioners' application seeking re-grant before amendment act 1978 came into force, then law laid down by the supreme court would have been made applicable but due to laches in not considering the application expeditiously and merely because re-grant was made subsequent to amendment act 1978 coming into force rigors of law regarding non alienation clause as envisaged under the amendment act should not be made applicable. it is to be stated that question canvassed before this court were not advanced before the authorities.11. there is a division bench decision of this court decided in chikka narasimhaiah v. tirupataiah reported in : ilr1989kar1520 which has discussed the effect of the amended act (act no. 13/78) and also the scope of ss. 5(3) and 7 of the karnataka village offices abolition act 1961 (act 14/61). in the above decision, similar contentions were advanced and reliance was placed on the ratio decidendi in lakshman gowda v. state of karnataka. at paragraph 6, court has observed thus :--'the principal act came into force with effect from 1-2-1963. it was amended in the year 1978. the act abolished the hereditary village offices. it is a historical fact that in several cases, government lands were attached to these offices and they were meant, essentially, as part of the remuneration payable to the holder of the respective village office. they were alienable, except with the permission and subject to the conditions, in force, at the relevant time.at paragraph-11 -- the act covers three different situations under ss. 5, 6 and 7. the cases involving the claims of an office holder or of a valid alienee coming under s. 5 and s. 6 respectively as against the claim of an unauthorised holder has to be examined in the manner provided by the statute, because these claims could arise only by virtue of the resumption of lands by the government and the provisions governing the re-grant thereafter.questions 2 and 3 posed in lakshmana gowda's case were :--(ii) 'did the holder or the authorised holder of a service inam land get title to it when that land stood resumed to the government under sub-sec. (3) of s. 4 of the principal act or did he get such title to that land only when it was re-granted to him under s. 5 or 6 as the case may be, of the principal act?'(iii) 'did an alienee of a service inam land from its holder or the authorised holder, acquire title to such land, if the alienation had taken place between the date of the coming into force of the principal act and the date ofthe re-grant, after its re-grant to its holder or the authorised holder under s. 5 or 6, as the case may be, of the principal act?'.these were answered at page 913. on question (ii) the answer is found at para 64 thus :'hence, our answer to the question is that the holder or the authorised holder of a service inam land did not get title to it when that land stood resumed to the government under sub-sec. (3) of s. 4 of the principal act, but he got title to it only when it was regranted to him under s. 5 or 6, as the case may be, of the principal act.'thereafter, the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel and s. 43 of the transfer of property act were applied to hold that the alienees obtained valid title to the granted lands, in answer to question no. (iii), at para 65 :we have already held that though the holder or the authorised holder of a service inam land got title to such land only when it was actually re-granted to him under s. 5 or 6 of the principal act, such title related back to the date of coming into force of that act. from this, it would follow that if he purported to alienate such land before it was re-granted to him, but after the principal act came into force, the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel embodied in s. 43 of the transfer of property act would apply and the title he subsequently acquired on such re-grant of that land would enure to the benefit of his alienee who would get a good title to such land after such re-grant to his alienor. there is also no good reason why the benefit of s. 43 should be denied to such an alienee when the principal act did not prohibit the holder or the authorised holder of a service inam land from transferring his interest or right therein after it was resumed and before it was re-granted to him.'12. these observations were sought to be relied to contend that even if the lands were re-granted after the coming into force of the amendment act of 1978, the said grants enured to the benefits of prior alienees from the grantees. the emphasis of the writ petitioner's contention is that the grant made subsequently in favour of the grantee (his alienor) enured to his benefit for conferring title even though the grant was after the relevant provisions were amended, which prohibited alienation for a period of 15 years.13. it is to be seen that at paragraph 12 it observed that s. 5(3) stood amended with effect from 7-8-1978, thereby imposing a complete bar against alienation for a period of 15 years from the date of the amendment act. hence, while considering the principles stated in para 65 of lakshmana gowda's case, it has to be examined whether, the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel can be extended, so as to override the bar imposed by the amended s. 5(3).14. when a person purports to transfer a property without title, the transferee gets title only when the alienor acquires a valid title; in such a case, the moment the alienor gets a valid title, (underlined by me) the estate would pass on to the transferee by the application of the doctrine of feeding the estoppel. but here, that is not possible because at the very instant of the grant, the bar against alienation imposed by the statute operates.15. at paragraph-14 it is observed, that in the year 1978, principal act was amended. s. 5 (3) as amended came into force with effect from 7-8-1978. s. 5(4) as introduced by the amendment act was read down in lakshmana gowda's case as having only prospective operation from 7-8-1978. s. 7 was substituted with effect from 24-12-1975 and a new s. 7a was introduced with effect from 7-8-1978. there is a total bar to alienate the granted lands for a period of 15 years from 7-8-1978 if the land is granted either under s. 5 or s. 6. if the land is granted under s. 7, it shall not be transferred similarly, as per s. 7a. therefore, if a land is granted after the amendment act became effective, the reading down of s. 5(3) or s. 5(4) in lakshmana gowda's case, would in no way benefit the transferees from the grantees. the grant is subject to the restrictions and these specific statutory restrictions cannot be overridden by an equitable doctrine of estoppel, or by applying s. 43 of the transfer of property act.16. coming to the above conclusion, this court placed reliance on hanumaiah v. state of karnataka reported in : ilr1987kar550 . the facts of the case fairly come within the purview of ratio decidendi in chikka narasimhaiah v. thirupataiah, as stated above. the petitioner's counsel invites this court's attention to the ratio decidendi reported in sundarjas kanyalal bhathija v. the collector, thane, maharashtra, wherein at paragraph 17 it reads thus :--'it would be difficult for us to appreciate the judgment of the high court. one must remember that pursuit of the law, however glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the bench. in a multi-judge court, the judges are bound by precedents and procedure. they could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. the judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned single judge or a division bench does not agree with the decision of a bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger bench. it is a subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure.'further, sri gopal gowda the petitioner's advocate placed reliance on the observation made by the supreme court in shyamaraju hegde v. venkatesha bhat reported in : [1988]1scr340 which reads thus :--'as against the two authorities of this court, namely, the cases of visvesh kumar, : [1980]3scr32 and aundal animal : [1987]1scr485 dealing with provisions of different statutes, there is a direct decision of this court in the case of krishnadas bhatija which has already been quoted. this court was dealing with the very provision after its amendment in 1975 and the very question which now falls for consideration was before this court. in krishnaji's case the decision of this court had been relied upon as a binding authority and it was concluded that the high court has powers to entertain a revision under s. 115, cpc, against the revisional order of a district court. it is conceded that the impugned provision which was being considered by this court in krishnadas bhatija's case continued to be the same. though the decision rendered in bhatija's case (supra) by this court is not a detailed one, the conclusion on the point is clear and admits of no ambiguity. the full bench in the impugned judgment clearly went wrong in holding that the two judge bench of this court referred to by it had brought about a total change in the position and on the basis of those two judgments, krishnaji's case would be no more good law. the decision of a full bench consisting of three judges rendered in krishnaji's case was binding on a bench of equal strength unless that decision had directly been overruled by this court or by necessary implication became unsustainable. admittedly there is no overruling of krishnaji's decision b'y this court and on the analysis indicated above it cannot also be said that by necessary implication the ratio therein supported by the direct authority of this court stood superseded. judicial propriety warrants that decisions of this court must be taken as wholly binding on the high courts. that is the necessary outcome of the tier system. we may briefly refer to the observations of the lord chancellor in cn broom v. cassell & co., (cassell & co., v. broom), (1972) f aer 801, where the lord chancellor administered a warning by saying : 'i hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the court of appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers'. this has been approved by this court on more than one occasion. added to the above is the provision of art. 141 of the constitution which unequivocally states that the law declared by this court shall be binding on all courts with the territory of india. in the facts and circumstances of the case, the high court should not have taken on to itself, the responsibility of saying that its earlier full bench judgment based upon a decision of this court in the circumstances indicated above had lost its binding authority in view of two other judgments rendered in different situations and setting. we are really not in aposition to appreciate the manner in which a coordinate bench of the high court has chosen to override an earlier judgment of that court. so placing reliance on the above two decisions of the supreme court, counsel for the petitioner contends that the bench which decided the matter in chikka narasimhaiah v. tirupataiah, : ilr1989kar1520 should have referred the matter to a larger bench and the observations made by the bench in the abovesaid decisions could virtually overrule the ratio decidendi of lakshmana gowda's case. what is to be noted in the instant case is that the decision rendered in chikka narasimhaiah v. tirupataiah court did not overrule the decision laid down in lakshman gowda's case, in view of the fact that the question of effect of re-grant subsequent to 7-8-78 was not there before the courts in those cases. it only reiterated the propositions laid down in lakshman gowda's case, and distinguished the same from the facts of the case in chikkanarasimhaiah v. tirupataiah and as such it cannot be said that the the proposition laid down in chikka narasimhaiah v. tirupataiah having overruled the decision of coordinate jurisdiction of the earlier bench. it is to be noted that the case in chikkanarasimhaiah v. tirupataiah has adverted its mind to the ratio dividend of lakshman gowda's case. it is also to be noted that even the supreme court in state of karnataka v. seenappa, ilr 1992 (2) kar 2177, while confirming the decision in lakshman gowda's case has clearly stated at paragraph-3 : 'in our view, this interpretation placed by the division bench of the karnataka high court on the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 5 (before its amendment) appears to be a fair and just interpretation. the only condition laid down for the grant of previous sanction appears to be a fair and just interpretation. the only condition laid down for the grant of previous sanction appears to be payment of an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the land, there is no indication as to the principles on which the sanction was to be granted or refused and hence the interpretation placed by the karnataka high court that the only condition of sanction was the payment of an amount equal to fifteen times of full assessment of the land appears to be a just construction. that construction has stood for the last more than ten years and transactions must have been effected on the basis of the view of the law laid down by the karnataka high court. there is no good reason which would lead us to take a different view, nor can it be said that the view taken is in any manner unjust and unfair.' 17. as such the point that has been canvassed by the petitioner's counsel to the effect that even in cases, where, the re-grant is made subsequent to 7-8-78 the law that is declared in lakshman gowda's case and later on affirmed by the supreme court has to be made applicable and not the ratio decidendi of the case in chikkanarasimhaiah v. tirupataiah, i am of the view that the facts in the instant case cannot be said to lead to any ambiguity. the sale transactions have been effected on 9-10-67 and 13-3-70 subsequent to 1-2-63 the principal act (karnataka village offices abolition act) coming into force. but actually re-grant has been made on 31-10-78. as such the ratio decidendi of the case chikkanarasimhaiah v. tirupataiah, : ilr1989kar1520 is squarely applicable to the facts of the case.18. the petitioner's counsel also invites court's attention to the decision rendered in n. p. krishna reddy v. state of karnataka on 25-1-89 reported in : ilr1989kar1869 . it is argued, placing reliance on n. p. krishna reddy's case, that this court has declared alienations valid subsequent to the re-grant made under amendment act 1978. whereas it is to be noted that, subsequent to the decision rendered by single judge in n. p. krishna reddy's case the bench of this court consisting of two judges on 22-3-89 in chikkanarasimhaiah v. tirupataiah have discussed the same issues. as such, i follow the decision rendered by the bench in chikkanarasimhaiah's case. in view of the proposition of law laid down by this court as well as by the supreme court, i am of the view that circumstances do not warrant any further interference with the order passed by theassistant commissioner, declaring the transactions as being invalid.18a. writ petition is dismissed accordingly.19. sri m. siddagangaiah, learned high court government pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks.20. petitions dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. Sri M. Siddagangaiah, learned Government Pleader is directed to take notice for respondents.

2. This Writ Petition is directed challenging the legality of the order dated 31-10-78 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Chikkaballapur Sub-Division, Chikkaballapur, in No. HOA (R) TAL. 159/71-72. The petitioner has sought the following reliefs in the writ petition.

Issue a Writ of Mandamus or order or direction or any other appropriate writ,directing the respondents 1 and 2 to regularise the sale transaction and further change the khatha in favour of the petitioners and pass such orders including the cost etc.

3. The 1st petitioner purchased the land bearing Sy. No. 35 to an extent of 14 Yards East to West and 24 yards from North to South, situated at Malligurki village, Bagepalli Taluk, Kolar District, bounded on East by M. S. Narayanaswamy land, West of M. S. Narayanaswamy site, North and Sourth by 4th respondent. The 2nd petitioner has purchased the land, in land bearing Sy. No. 35, to an extent of 20 x 70 Yards, situated in Malligurki village, Bagepalli Taluk, bounded by East by M. S. Narayanaswamy land, West by P. W.D. Road, North by M. S. Narayanaswamy's site and South by 1st Petitioner's house and M. S. Narayanaswamy sites.

4. It is an admitted fact that Sy. No. 35 situated in Malligurki village, Bagepalli Taluk comprised an extent of 2 acres 38 guntas and is an Talari inam land. One Venkatamma is the holder of the village office, and same was managed by one Talari Narayanappa s/o Avalappa. The 1st petitioner in this writ petition has purchased an extent of 14 yards East to West and 24 yards from North to South on 9-10-1967 from out of the abovesaid Sy. No. 35. The 2nd petitioner has purchased to an extent of 20 x 70 yards from Talari Narayanappa in the same Sy. No, 35 situated in Malligurki village, evidenced by registered sale deed dated 30-3-1970. Consequently, this Talari Narayanappa applied for re-grant of the land comprising Sy. No. 35. It is also an admitted fact that the authorities have passed a re-grant order in favour of Talari Narayanappa on 31-10-78 evidenced in Annexure-E. Considering the contentions advanced by ex-holder of the village office, the Assistant Commissioner passed the following order. The operative portion of the order reads thus :

'In these circumstances, I. P. Vijayana, I.A.S. Assistant Commissioner, Chikkaballapur Sub-Division in exercise of powers vested in me under S. 5(4) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 do hereby declare the above transaction of lands in question as null and void. The lands so transferred are forfeited to Government as penalty free from all encumbrances. The unauthorised holders i.e., vendees shall be evicted summarily from the lands.

Further I also do hereby re-grant the occupancy of lands under S. 7(3) of (a) of the amended Act 1978 as described below :

Name of the Sy. No. Kind Extent Asst. To whom the land

Village is granted

A.G. Rs. Ps.

Mathinappali 41 Dry 3-10 6-37 Talari Narayanappa

82 ' 3-30 7-35

Malligurki 35 ' 2-38 6-37

The land re-granted under Section 5(1) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 shall not be transferred otherwise than by partition among the members of the Hindu Joint Family for a period of 15 years.

Any transfer of land re-granted in contravention of this condition shall be null and void. The land as so transferred shall as penalty be forfeited to and vest in the State Government. This re-grant is without prejudice to the tenancy right in the lands. Breach of these conditions will entail cancellation of the grant and forfeiture of the lands to the Government.' Aggrieved against the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.

5. The main contentions advanced by the petitioner are that the (1) impugned action of the respondents-1 and 2 is illegal, contrary to the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices and Inam Abolition Act and the law declared by this Hon'ble Court in Lakshman Gowda's Case. Hence, the same is liable to be set aside;

(2) The action of the authorities in not regularising the sale transactions made in favour of the petitioners by not imposing penalty of 15 times assessment even though re-grant order was made in favour of the 4th respondent under the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Inam Abolition Act as being not legally sustainable. Hence, it is contended that the findings arrived at by the respondents 1 and 2 are bad in law. In paragraph-11 of the grounds of Memorandum of Writ Petition the petitioners have stated that the action of the respondents 1 and 2 in not considering the case of the petitioners for regularisation of their sale transaction in pursuance of the re-grant order made in favour of the 4th respondent, as being not in accordance with the law declared by this Hon'ble Court in a case reported in 1981 (1) Kant LJ 1 i.e. Lakshman Gowda v. State of Karnataka, which has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in State of Karnataka v. Seenappa which is reported in : AIR1992SC1531 . It is submitted that the respondents 1 and 2 should have considered the facts entitling the petitioners to the benefit of re-grant made in favour of the 4th respondent and that the sale transaction in favour of the petitioner's should have been declared as valid. Further contended that the action of the respondents-1 and 2 in not regularising the sale transaction in favour of the petitioner as being bad in law.

6. The petitioner's counsel contends that in view of the decision rendered in Lakshman Gowda v. State of Karnataka reported in 1981 (1) LJ 1, it was 'the bounden duty of the authorities concerned to have declared the sale transaction effected in favour of the petitioners as valid'. Further, he invited the ratio decidendi of the case decided by the Supreme Court, in State of Karnataka v. Seenappa reported in : AIR1992SC1531 , which affirmed the decision of Laxman Goudas Case.

7. The Government Pleader invites this Court's attention to the ratio decidendi of the case in Chikka Narasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah reported in : ILR1989KAR1520 .

8. The only question that arises in the case is that whether the alienation that took place between 1-2-63 and 7-8-78 could be declared as valid by virtue of the re-grant made subsequent to Amendment Act, 1978 coming into force, that is re-grant made subsequent to 7-8-78.

9. The petitioner's counsel also invites this Court's attention to paragraph 2 of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of Karnataka v. Seenappa : AIR1992SC1531 , which reads thus :

2. 'The Karnataka Village Officers Abolition Act, 1961 (for short the 'said Act') came into effect from February 1, 1963. It is common ground that under the said Act the lands given to the village officers were resumed and then re-granted to them. The re-grants were made at different periods. Subsection (3) of Section 5 of the said Act placed a restriction on transfer of land re-granted. It runs as follows.

'(3) The occupancy of the ryotwari patta of the land, as the case may be, re-granted under sub-section (1) shall not be transferable otherwise than by partition among members of Hindu Joint Family without the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner and such sanction shall be granted only on payment of an amount equal to fifteen times the amount of full assessment of the land.'

Subsequently, this Sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 of the said Act was amended by the Karnataka Offices Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1978. After the said amendment the said Subsection reads as follows:--

'(3) The occupancy or the ryotwari patta of the land, as the case may be, re-granted under Sub-section (1) shall not be transferable otherwise than by partition among members of Hindu joint family for a period of 15 years from the date of Section 1 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1978'

Although several questions have been answered by the High Court in the said judgments, the arguments before us were confined to the Decision on questions Nos, (vi) and (vii) as formulated in the aforesaid judgment. The said questions run as follows :--

'(vi) Did a transferee of a Service Inam Land from its holder or authorised holder after its re-grant under S. 5 or 6 of the Principal Act, get title to or interest in, such land, if such transfer had taken place without the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner under the unamended Sub-section (3) of S. 5 of the Principal Act?

(vii) Is sub-section (4) of S. 5 of the Principal Act attracted to :--

(a) a transfer of a Service Inam Land in contravention of unamended sub-section (3) of that Section or

(b) a transfer of such land in contravention of amended sub-section (3) of that Section; or

(c) both of them'.

The High Court has taken the view that omission to obtain the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner under original sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 of the said Act did not render void a transfer of a land re-granted effected prior to the coming into force of the aforesaid amendment of sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 but that such transfer can be regularised by payment to the Government an amount equal to fifteen times of full assessment of that land.

(3) In our view, this interpretation placed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court on the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 (before its amendment) appears to be a fair and just interpretation. The only condition laid down for the grant of previous sanction appears to be payment of an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the land. There is no indication as to the principles on which the sanction was to be granted or refused and hence the interpretation placed by the Karnataka High Court that the onlycondition of sanction was the payment of an amount equal to fifteen times of full assessment of the land appears to be a just construction. That construction has stood for the last more than ten years and transactions must have been effected on the basis of the view of the land laid down by the Karnataka High Court. There is no good reason which would lead us to take a different view, nor can it be said that the view taken is in any manner unjust and unfair.

(4) In these circumstances, we uphold the interpretation placed by the Karnataka High Court on the provisions of Sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 of the said Act. The question No. (vi), therefore, must be answered against the State. As we have upheld the view of the Karnataka High Court on question No. (vi), no decision is called for on question No. (vii). In the result, the Special Leave Petitions and Appeals preferred by the State of Karnataka are dismissed. The petitioner's counsel Sri Gopal Gowda submits that in view of the pronouncement, it is not open for the authorities to declare the alienation subsequent to 1-2-63 as invalid. Further, it is contended by the petitioners that even after Amendment Act coming into force, the ratio decidendi by this Court in Lakshman Gowda v. State of Karnataka, 1981 (1) KLJ1 which was later on affirmed by the Supreme Court has to be followed.

10. The petitioners's counsel further invites this Court's attention to the decision rendered in Adiveppa Shivappa Matur v. Tahasildar reported in 1990 (1) KLJ 879 and contends that if authorities had considered petitioners' application seeking re-grant before Amendment Act 1978 came into force, then law laid down by the Supreme Court would have been made applicable but due to laches in not considering the application expeditiously and merely because re-grant was made subsequent to Amendment Act 1978 coming into force rigors of law regarding non alienation clause as envisaged under the Amendment Act should not be made applicable. It is to be stated that question canvassed before this Court were not advanced before the authorities.

11. There is a Division Bench decision of this Court decided in Chikka Narasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah reported in : ILR1989KAR1520 which has discussed the effect of the amended Act (Act No. 13/78) and also the scope of Ss. 5(3) and 7 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act 1961 (Act 14/61). In the above decision, similar contentions were advanced and reliance was placed on the ratio decidendi in Lakshman Gowda v. State of Karnataka. At paragraph 6, Court has observed thus :--

'The Principal Act came into force with effect from 1-2-1963. It was amended in the year 1978. The Act abolished the hereditary Village Offices. It is a historical fact that in several cases, Government lands were attached to these offices and they were meant, essentially, as part of the remuneration payable to the holder of the respective village office. They were alienable, except with the permission and subject to the conditions, in force, at the relevant time.

At paragraph-11 -- The Act covers three different situations under Ss. 5, 6 and 7. The cases involving the claims of an office holder or of a valid alienee coming under S. 5 and S. 6 respectively as against the claim of an unauthorised holder has to be examined in the manner provided by the statute, because these claims could arise only by virtue of the resumption of lands by the Government and the provisions governing the re-grant thereafter.

Questions 2 and 3 posed in Lakshmana Gowda's case were :--

(ii) 'Did the holder or the authorised holder of a service Inam Land get title to it when that land stood resumed to the Government under sub-sec. (3) of S. 4 of the Principal Act or did he get such title to that land only when it was re-granted to him under S. 5 or 6 as the case may be, of the Principal Act?'

(iii) 'Did an alienee of a service Inam Land from its holder or the authorised holder, acquire title to such land, if the alienation had taken place between the date of the coming into force of the Principal Act and the date ofthe re-grant, after its re-grant to its holder or the authorised holder under S. 5 or 6, as the case may be, of the Principal Act?'.

These were answered at page 913. On question (ii) the answer is found at para 64 thus :

'Hence, our answer to the question is that the holder or the authorised holder of a Service Inam Land did not get title to it when that land stood resumed to the Government under sub-sec. (3) of S. 4 of the Principal Act, but he got title to it only when it was regranted to him under S. 5 or 6, as the case may be, of the Principal Act.'

Thereafter, the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel and S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act were applied to hold that the alienees obtained valid title to the granted lands, in answer to question No. (iii), at para 65 :

We have already held that though the holder or the authorised holder of a service Inam Land got title to such land only when it was actually re-granted to him under S. 5 or 6 of the Principal Act, such title related back to the date of coming into force of that Act. From this, it would follow that if he purported to alienate such land before it was re-granted to him, but after the Principal Act came into force, the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel embodied in S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply and the title he subsequently acquired on such re-grant of that land would enure to the benefit of his alienee who would get a good title to such land after such re-grant to his alienor. There is also no good reason why the benefit of S. 43 should be denied to such an alienee when the Principal Act did not prohibit the holder or the authorised holder of a Service Inam Land from transferring his interest or right therein after it was resumed and before it was re-granted to him.'

12. These observations were sought to be relied to contend that even if the lands were re-granted after the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1978, the said grants enured to the benefits of prior alienees from the grantees. The emphasis of the Writ Petitioner's contention is that the grant made subsequently in favour of the grantee (his alienor) enured to his benefit for conferring title even though the grant was after the relevant provisions were amended, which prohibited alienation for a period of 15 years.

13. It is to be seen that at paragraph 12 it observed that S. 5(3) stood amended with effect from 7-8-1978, thereby imposing a complete bar against alienation for a period of 15 years from the date of the Amendment Act. Hence, while considering the principles stated in para 65 of Lakshmana Gowda's case, it has to be examined whether, the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel can be extended, so as to override the bar imposed by the amended S. 5(3).

14. When a person purports to transfer a property without title, the transferee gets title only when the alienor acquires a valid title; in such a case, the moment the alienor gets a valid title, (underlined by me) the estate would pass on to the transferee by the application of the doctrine of feeding the estoppel. But here, that is not possible because at the very instant of the grant, the bar against alienation imposed by the statute operates.

15. At paragraph-14 it is observed, that in the year 1978, Principal Act was amended. S. 5 (3) as amended came into force with effect from 7-8-1978. S. 5(4) as introduced by the Amendment Act was read down in Lakshmana Gowda's case as having only prospective operation from 7-8-1978. S. 7 was substituted with effect from 24-12-1975 and a new S. 7A was introduced with effect from 7-8-1978. There is a total bar to alienate the granted lands for a period of 15 years from 7-8-1978 if the land is granted either under S. 5 or S. 6. If the land is granted under S. 7, it shall not be transferred similarly, as per S. 7A. Therefore, if a land is granted after the Amendment Act became effective, the reading down of S. 5(3) or S. 5(4) in Lakshmana Gowda's Case, would in no way benefit the transferees from the grantees. The grant is subject to the restrictions and these specific statutory restrictions cannot be overridden by an equitable doctrine of estoppel, or by applying S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act.

16. Coming to the above conclusion, this Court placed reliance on Hanumaiah v. State of Karnataka reported in : ILR1987KAR550 . The facts of the case fairly come within the purview of ratio decidendi in Chikka Narasimhaiah v. Thirupataiah, as stated above. The petitioner's counsel invites this Court's attention to the ratio decidendi reported in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. The Collector, Thane, Maharashtra, wherein at paragraph 17 it reads thus :--

'It would be difficult for us to appreciate the judgment of the High Court. One must remember that pursuit of the law, however glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multi-Judge Court, the judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The Judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger Bench. It is a subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure.'

Further, Sri Gopal Gowda the petitioner's advocate placed reliance on the observation made by the Supreme Court in Shyamaraju Hegde v. Venkatesha Bhat reported in : [1988]1SCR340 which reads thus :--

'as against the two authorities of this Court, namely, the cases of Visvesh Kumar, : [1980]3SCR32 and Aundal Animal : [1987]1SCR485 dealing with provisions of different statutes, there is a direct decision of this Court in the case of Krishnadas Bhatija which has already been quoted. This Court was dealing with the very provision after its amendment in 1975 and the very question which now falls for consideration was before this Court. In Krishnaji's case the decision of this Court had been relied upon as a binding authority and it was concluded that the High Court has powers to entertain a revision under S. 115, CPC, against the revisional order of a District Court. It is conceded that the impugned provision which was being considered by this Court in Krishnadas Bhatija's case continued to be the same. Though the decision rendered in Bhatija's case (supra) by this Court is not a detailed one, the conclusion on the point is clear and admits of no ambiguity. The Full Bench in the impugned judgment clearly went wrong in holding that the two Judge Bench of this Court referred to by it had brought about a total change in the position and on the basis of those two judgments, Krishnaji's case would be no more good law. The decision of a Full Bench consisting of three judges rendered in Krishnaji's case was binding on a bench of equal strength unless that decision had directly been overruled by this Court or by necessary implication became unsustainable. Admittedly there is no overruling of Krishnaji's decision b'y this Court and on the analysis indicated above it cannot also be said that by necessary implication the ratio therein supported by the direct authority of this Court stood superseded. Judicial propriety warrants that decisions of this Court must be taken as wholly binding on the High Courts. That is the necessary outcome of the tier system. We may briefly refer to the observations of the Lord Chancellor in Cn Broom v. Cassell & Co., (Cassell & Co., v. Broom), (1972) f AER 801, where the Lord Chancellor administered a warning by saying :

'I hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers'. This has been approved by this Court on more than one occasion. Added to the above is the provision of Art. 141 of the Constitution which unequivocally states that the law declared by this Court shall be binding on all Courts with the territory of India. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court should not have taken on to itself, the responsibility of saying that its earlier Full Bench judgment based upon a decision of this Court in the circumstances indicated above had lost its binding authority in View of two other judgments rendered in different situations and setting. We are really not in aposition to appreciate the manner in which a coordinate Bench of the High Court has chosen to override an earlier judgment of that Court.

So placing reliance on the above two decisions of the Supreme Court, counsel for the petitioner contends that the Bench which decided the matter in Chikka Narasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah, : ILR1989KAR1520 should have referred the matter to a larger Bench and the observations made by the Bench in the abovesaid decisions could virtually overrule the ratio decidendi of Lakshmana Gowda's case. What is to be noted in the instant case is that the decision rendered in Chikka Narasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah Court did not overrule the decision laid down in Lakshman Gowda's case, in view of the fact that the question of effect of re-grant subsequent to 7-8-78 was not there before the courts in those cases. It only reiterated the propositions laid down in Lakshman Gowda's case, and distinguished the same from the facts of the case in Chikkanarasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah and as such it cannot be said that the the proposition laid down in Chikka Narasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah having overruled the decision of coordinate jurisdiction of the earlier Bench. It is to be noted that the case in Chikkanarasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah has adverted its mind to the ratio dividend of Lakshman Gowda's Case. It is also to be noted that even the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Seenappa, ILR 1992 (2) Kar 2177, while confirming the decision in Lakshman Gowda's case has clearly stated at paragraph-3 :

'In our view, this interpretation placed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court on the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 5 (before its amendment) appears to be a fair and just interpretation. The only condition laid down for the grant of previous sanction appears to be a fair and just interpretation. The only condition laid down for the grant of previous sanction appears to be payment of an amount equal to fifteen times the full assessment of the land, There is no indication as to the principles on which the sanction was to be granted or refused and hence the interpretation placed by the Karnataka High Court that the only condition of sanction was the payment of an amount equal to fifteen times of full assessment of the land appears to be a just construction. That construction has stood for the last more than ten years and transactions must have been effected on the basis of the view of the law laid down by the Karnataka High Court. There is no good reason which would lead us to take a different view, nor can it be said that the view taken is in any manner unjust and unfair.'

17. As such the point that has been canvassed by the petitioner's counsel to the effect that even in cases, where, the re-grant is made subsequent to 7-8-78 the law that is declared in Lakshman Gowda's case and later on affirmed by the Supreme Court has to be made applicable and not the ratio decidendi of the case in Chikkanarasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah, I am of the view that the facts in the instant case cannot be said to lead to any ambiguity. The sale transactions have been effected on 9-10-67 and 13-3-70 subsequent to 1-2-63 the Principal Act (Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act) coming into force. But actually re-grant has been made on 31-10-78. As such the ratio decidendi of the case Chikkanarasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah, : ILR1989KAR1520 is squarely applicable to the facts of the case.

18. The petitioner's Counsel also invites Court's attention to the decision rendered in N. P. Krishna Reddy v. State of Karnataka on 25-1-89 reported in : ILR1989KAR1869 . It is argued, placing reliance on N. P. Krishna Reddy's case, that this Court has declared alienations valid subsequent to the re-grant made under Amendment Act 1978. Whereas it is to be noted that, subsequent to the decision rendered by Single Judge in N. P. Krishna Reddy's case the Bench of this Court consisting of two Judges on 22-3-89 in Chikkanarasimhaiah v. Tirupataiah have discussed the same issues. As such, I follow the decision rendered by the Bench in Chikkanarasimhaiah's Case. In view of the proposition of law laid down by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court, I am of the view that circumstances do not warrant any further interference with the order passed by theAssistant Commissioner, declaring the transactions as being invalid.

18A. Writ petition is dismissed accordingly.

19. Sri M. Siddagangaiah, learned High Court Government Pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks.

20. Petitions dismissed.