B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
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			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
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			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
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			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
)
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ORDER

1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
)
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4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
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		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed :

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			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'b-narayanappa-ors-vs-state-karnataka',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '371020',
		(int) 1 => 'b-narayanappa-ors-vs-state-karnataka'
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$title_for_layout = 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '371020',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
)
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'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him.

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			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows :

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
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		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is :

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			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'b-narayanappa-ors-vs-state-karnataka',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '371020',
		(int) 1 => 'b-narayanappa-ors-vs-state-karnataka'
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$title_for_layout = 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '371020',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
)
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View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

(1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence -

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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(i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or

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			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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(ii)(a) appears, or

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
)
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(b) is brought before the Court; and

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
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		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'b-narayanappa-ors-vs-state-karnataka',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '371020',
		(int) 1 => 'b-narayanappa-ors-vs-state-karnataka'
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$title_for_layout = 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '371020',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
)
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(a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
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			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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(b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court,

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			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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to give bail such person shall be released on bail.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
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			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
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		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :-

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			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'b-narayanappa-ors-vs-state-karnataka',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '371020',
		(int) 1 => 'b-narayanappa-ors-vs-state-karnataka'
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$title_for_layout = 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '371020',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
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			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
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		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
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		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.'

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			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
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			'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
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		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
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			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
)
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11. Petition allowed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '371020',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
			'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
			'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
			'court' => 'Karnataka',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Petition allowed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
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$title_for_layout = 'B Narayanappa and ors Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 371020 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '371020',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 436 and 496; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982',
		'appellant' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka',
		'casenote' => ' - COMPANIES ACT, 1956 [C.A. No. 1/1956]. Sections 529 & 529A & State Financial Corporation Act 1951, Section 29:  [S.R. Bannurmath & A.N. Venugopala Gowda, JJ] Proceedings under   Taking over of assets of the industrial concern  in realisation of dues  Sale of assets - Applicability of provisions of Section 529 and 529A  Held, The Corporation cannot exercise its rights if the assets of the industrial concern, has already vested in the Company Court or if the Official Liquidator had been put in charge of the assets of the industrial concern. If the winding up proceedings are not set in motion, then, there is no legal impediment to the Corporation to take action under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act, 1951 and permission of Company Court is not required to be obtained. In the absence of commencement of winding up proceedings, the provision of Section 529 and 529A of the Companies Act cannot be made applicable. The action of the Corporation under Section 29 of the S.F.C. Act is lawful. Further, the Corporation took over only the assets and not the management. The money realised by effecting sale under Sub-Section (2) of Section 29, cannot be apportioned or ordered to be paid to the workmen of the industrial concern, when the industrial concern is not under the winding up proceedings, in terms of the provisions under the Companies Act.  The Corporation cannot be held liable either jointly or severally to pay the closure compensation or other claims of the workmen. The industry is liable to pay the wages of the lockout period and the closure compensation to the workmen. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Power of the Corporation under  Taking over the assets of the industrial concern to realise the dues -Justification of the action of the Corporation  Held, The Corporation is empowered to effect recovery of its dues, by resorting to the measures, both under Section 29 and 31 of the Act. Since the industry which was under a liability to the corporation in terms of the agreements executed by it, defaulted in repayment of the loan and failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreements executed by it, the Corporation took over the assets of the industry, with the right to transfer by way of sale and realise the dues, from sale of the assets. Further, The Corporation took over possession of the assets of the industry and admittedly did not take over the management, to run the industry by itself. Had it taken over the management, then it should have run the industry, in which event the provisions contained under Sections 32A to 32G of the Act would have come into operation.  -  But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'W.K. Joshi, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader',
		'court' => 'Karnataka',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1982-02-05',
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		'judge' => 'M.S. Patil, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. </p><p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. </p><p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. </p><p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. </p><p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : </p><p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' </p><p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. </p><p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : </p><p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'</p><p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : </p><p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - </p><p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or </p><p> (ii)(a) appears, or </p><p> (b) is brought before the Court; and </p><p> (2) Is prepared :- </p><p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or </p><p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, </p><p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. </p><p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. </p><p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- </p><p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. </p><p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' </p><p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. </p><p>11. Petition allowed.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Karnataka',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. This revision is directed against the order dated 13th January, 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chintamani, whereby he has rejected the application of bail made by the petitioners. ',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Sidlaghatta Police having registered a case in Crime No. 195/81 against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 353, 142, 153 and 324 IPC sent F.I.R. to the Court. The petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and made the application for bail as provided under Section 436 Cr.P.C. All the offences were bailable. But the Magistrate refused to entertain the application of bail and rejected it on the ground that the applicants were neither arrested by the police nor they had been summoned by the Court nor they appeared in response to any process of the Court and as such they could as well be released on bail in the police station and any grant of bail would amount to exercising power not vested in the Court. The petitioners have therefore approached this Court questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Magistrate. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The contention of Mr. W. K. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that when the accused appeared and surrendered before the Court they placed themselves in the custody of the Court and the word 'appears' used in Section 436, Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include voluntary appearance and therefore the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application made by the petitioner. ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. K. H. N. Kuranga, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, on the other hand submitted that the accused-petitioners had merely appeared before the Court but they had not surrendered and, therefore, mere physical presence of the accused in the Court was not sufficient to grant bail unless they had surrendered themselves, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting the application. ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The learned Magistrate has referred to certain decisions in reaching the particular conclusion and observed : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'In my opinion, on the basis of the above decisions the word 'appears' appearing in Section 436 Cr.P.C. will not mean the voluntary appearance of the accused at his instance. When he appears through some process of law like summons or otherwise, his application for bail can be considered. If the present application is entertained under Section 436 Cr.P.C. it amounts to granting of anticipatory bail which this Court has no powers.' ',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. There is no doubt, that there has been divergent opinion regarding the expression 'appears' as used in Section 436 Cr.P.C. (Section 496 of Cr.P.C. 1898). One view is that the word 'appears' in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word 'appears' is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of the person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Sub-section (1) of Section 436 Cr.P.C. 1973, which is relevant for our purpose reads as follows : ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>'Where any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.'',
	(int) 9 => '<p> If it is properly split up and analysed, what emerges out is : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p> (1) When any person other than a person accused of non-bailable offence - ',
	(int) 11 => '<p> (i) is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or ',
	(int) 12 => '<p> (ii)(a) appears, or ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> (b) is brought before the Court; and ',
	(int) 14 => '<p> (2) Is prepared :- ',
	(int) 15 => '<p> (a) at any time while in custody of such Officer, or ',
	(int) 16 => '<p> (b) at any stage of the proceeding before such Court, ',
	(int) 17 => '<p> to give bail such person shall be released on bail. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>8. In other words, in case of a bailable offence, a police officer, at the time, of arrest or while in his custody, shall release such person accused of bailable offence on bail, if such person is prepared to give bail; or when such person appears or is brought before the Court and he is prepared to give bail, the Court shall release him on bail. ',
	(int) 19 => '<p>9. There is nothing in the Section either to exclude voluntary appearance or to suggest that the appearance of the accused must be in obedience to a process issued by the Court. No doubt the other expressions used in the section as 'is brought before Court' have reference to prior arrest and bringing of such person before Court by the police either in pursuance of a process issued by the Court otherwise on account of the inability of such person arrested to give bail immediately on being arrested and detained by an officer in charge of the police station. The word 'appears' as used in the section to me, it appears, is wide enough to include the voluntary appearance. Such a question did arise for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Baswarnath Rao, (1965 (1) Mys LJ 365 : (1966 Cri LJ 267)) and this Court did not consider it necessary to resolve that question, but proceeded on the basis that the word 'appear' includes voluntary appearance of the accused and dealing with the expression used in the section 'released on bail', concluded that the words 'bail' and 'released on bail' imply the accused already being in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. The concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint and the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. Hence, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested or for whose arrest no warrant had been issued. But, it appears, that is no longer good law in view of recent decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote : 1980CriLJ426 . That was the case where the accused having surrendered before the Court asked for bail, for non-bailalble offence. Dealing with the expression 'custody' used in Section 439 Cr.P.C. his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., observed thus (Paras 8 and 9) :- ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>'Custody, in the context of Section 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. ',
	(int) 21 => '<p> He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before the Magistrate, and gets ar remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when be surrenders before the Court and submits to its directions.' ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>10. In the present case also the accused having appeared before the Court had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and asked for bail. As enunciated in the above decision, if the surrender and the physical presence of the accused with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court is judicial custody then the accused-petitioner herein having appeared before the Court and asked for bail, they were under restraint and they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Magistrate was not right in saying that he is not in a position to understand the meaning of the word 'appears' within the meaning of the expression 'custody' as used in Section 439 as discussed in the said decision with the meaning of Section 436 Cr.P.C. When the mere physical presence before the Court with a request to grant bail amounts to custody it is more than appearance. The order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the application, therefore, cannot be sustained and it is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to reconsider the application of the accused on their appearing before him. ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>11. Petition allowed.<p>',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'
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Subject	Criminal
Court	Karnataka High Court
Decided On	Feb-05-1982
Case Number	Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 41 of 1982
Judge	M.S. Patil, J.
Reported in	1982CriLJ1334; ILR1982KAR474; 1982(1)KarLJ369
Acts	Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973 - Sections 436 and 496; Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 142, 152, 324 and 353
Appellant	B. Narayanappa and ors.
Respondent	State of Karnataka
Appellant Advocate	W.K. Joshi, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	K.H.N. Kuranga, Govt. Pleader

B. Narayanappa and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka - Court Judgment