K.S. Chandrashekhar and Others Vs. the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- code of criminal procedure, 1973 [c.a. no. 2/1974]. section 468: [dr. k. bhakthavatsala, j] offence under section 406 of i.p.c., - bar to take cognizance, after lapse of more than 14 years on facts, held, the complainant is not claiming exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation under section 470 cr.p.c. further, the trial court has not passed any order under section 473 cr.p.c. regarding extension of period of limitation. hence, taking cognizance for the offence punishable under section 406 of ipc against the accused by the magistrate is bad in law. impugned order was quashed. - 4. thereafter, notices were served on the objectors and the same was also published in the local newspapers as well as in prajavani and indian express. on going through the order dated 26-12-1988 passed by the special land acquisition officer delegated with the power under subsection (3) of the section 28 of the act, we are satisfied that the order does not satisfy the requirements of sub-section (3) of section 28 of the act.order1. in these petitions under arts. 226 and 227 of the constitution the petitioners have sought for quashing the notification dated 20-4-1989 published in the official gazette of 9-11-1989 issued under sub-section (4) of section 28 of the karnataka industrial areas development act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the act).2. in writ petitions nos. 533 to 535 of 1990, the petitioners have also sought for quashing the notification dated 11-7-1980 issued under sub-section (1) of s. 28 of the act.3. under the notification dated 11-7-1980, several lands were proposed for acquisition for the purpose of auto complex. the owners and persons interested in the landsproposed for acquisition filed their objections. a notification under sub-section (4) of section 28 of the act was also issued. however, that was challenged in a batch of writ petitions before this court 15481 to 15483, 17985-17986, 15004-15008, 11916 and 5782 of 1985. this court allowed the writ petitions by the order dated 21-3-1986 and quashed the notification issued under subsection (4) of section 28 of the act and further directed to continue the proceeding from the stage at which it was interrupted by issuing fresh notices as contemplated under subsection (2) of section 28 of the act. thus the notification issued under sub-section (1) of s. 28 of the act was not disturbed.4. thereafter, notices were served on the objectors and the same was also published in the local newspapers as well as in prajavani and indian express. after hearing the objectors, the special land acquisition officer passed the order on 26-12-1988 under subsection (3) of section 28 of the act, pursuant to that, a declaration was made under subsection (4) of section 28 of the act as per notification dated 20-4-1989 bearing no. yq 67/spq 89 published in the official gazette of 9-11-1989.5. it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the notification issued under subsection (4) of section 28 of the act is vitiated because the order passed under sub-sec. (3) of section 28 of the act is not in accordance with law in as much as all the objections raised by the objectors have not been considered. reliance was placed on the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 28 of the act.6. it is also further contended that when vast extent of government land is available within the close vicinity (3 kms.) from the lands in question and on the earlier occasion, the land acquisition officer in his letter dated 10-10-1986 produced as annexure-h in w.p. no. 555 of 1990 opined that it would not be appropriate to acquire the lands in question when an extent of 400 acres belonging to the government is available within 3 kilo-meters from the lands in question and thenegotiations had been going on for transfer of the said land to the karnataka industrial area development board, and out of that, an extent of 50 acres could be allotted for auto complex.7. in addition to these contentions several other contentions are also urged. but we do not consider it necessary to consider those contentions because in our view the aforesaid two contentions are sufficient for deciding these writ petitions.8. sri narayanappa, learned counsel appearing for the board has made available the records.on going through the order dated 26-12-1988 passed by the special land acquisition officer delegated with the power under subsection (3) of the section 28 of the act, we are satisfied that the order does not satisfy the requirements of sub-section (3) of section 28 of the act. in the earlier portion of the order, the special land acquisition officer has stated about the proceedings relating to the previous writ petitions to which we have already made a reference, and publication of the notification in the various newspapers, and issuing of notices to objectors. in the second portion of the order, he has summarised the objections raised by the objectors. in the last two paragraphs, he has given his reasons for overruling the objections. before we reproduce the last two paragraphs of the order, it is also relevant to notice the objections of the objectors as summarised by him.'1. the land owners have formed residential sites and sold to various purchasers as residential site in the year 1964-66. many of the purchasers do not own any other sites other than the sites purchased in these sy. nos. hence formation of the auto complex and allotment of sites to few garages by dispossessing hundreds of own site holders is not social justice and also a ill conceived plan.2. the area available in this location will be around 20 acres only after deducting the lands belonging to church, saw-mills and the wakfs board property and the government land in sy. no. 6 is not completely available since the portion of this land has already been granted by the government in favour of'kumbara sangha'. as such the total availability will be to the tune of 35-40 acres and this will not be sufficient to locate all the garages situated in shimoga town at a common place. it will finally end up with the garage owners in shimoga city concerning a site in this proposed auto complex and also not shift from the existing place.3. instead, if the government is keen on establishing an auto complex it should be established in the government land situated 3 km. from this proposed site where hundreds of acres of government land is available.4. another main objection from the objectors is that the authorities concerned of the auto complex have not so far deposited the cost of acquisition with the kiadb and until they deposit the full cost of acquisition in advance, the acquisition proceedings should not be further continued.'9. after summarising the objections, he has given the following reasons for overruling the same.'all the objectors have raised purely technical objections with which we are not concerned. whether the board has obtained the funds from the authorities of the auto complex or not is up to the board to decide. once the acquisition proceedings are finalised it is the responsibility of the board to place the compensation amount payable to the land owners at the disposal of the land acquisition officer either out of funds collected from the auto complex authority or out of its own resources. likewise, whether full-fledged auto complex can be established in 30 acres or not cannot be decided by the objectors.the objectors have not adduced any evidence in support of their objections, and the objections raised were also in technical nature without any substantial cause for deleting the lands from the acquisition proceedings and as such they are rejected and it is hereby ordered to prepare the draft 28(4) notification and submit it to the government.'10. from the aforesaid portion of the order of the special land acquisition officerin which the objections are considered, it is clear that the objections as to the objectors being owners of small sites and having no other sites and the availability of government land within a distance of 3 km, have not been considered. it is nothing but a summary rejection of the objections raised by the objectors.11. sub-section (3) of section 28 reads thus :'after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the state government may pass such orders as it deems fit.'thus sub-section (3) of section 28 requires that the state government or the officer delegated with the power of the state government, as in this case, it is stated that the special land acquisition officer is delegated with the power of the state government is required to consider the objections raised and hear the objectors and decide the same. when a statute directs that the objections be called for, objector be afforded an opportunity of hearing and pass such order as it deems fit on considering the objections, it expects the authority exercising that power to decide the objections in a quasijudicial manner. the authority is required to decide the objections and give reasons for rejecting or overruling the same. no doubt, the acquisition proceeding is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but where a statute requires that the acquisition should be made in a particular manner and it prescribes the manner and method or mode the authority must adhere to it. the decision of the authority must satisfy the norms prescribed by the statute. in other words, it must conform to statutory standards or norms as prescribed by the statute. we must view these provisions in the context they appear. the context is acquisition of a private property of a citizens. therefore, in order to eliminate the possibility of arbitrary exercise of power to acquire a private property of a citizens, the law specifically provides that the objectors are to be heard and the objections arc to be considered before arriving at a decision thatthe property proposed for acquisition should be acquired. therefore for overruling the objections, the reasons are to be given. the objections, cannot be disposed of by stating that they are technical or that the objectors are not concerned as to whether the auto complex can be established in an extent of 30 acres. it is not possible to agree with the special land acquisition officer that the objections raised by the objectors are all purely technical in nature. when the objectors contend that an alternative land belonging to the state government is available, it becomes the duty of the special land acquisition officer to consider the same under subsection (3) of section 28 of the act and to find out whether the alternative land is available and if so whether it is suitable for the purpose for which the acquisition proceeding is initiated. whenever a government land is available and it is suitable for the purpose for which the acquisition is proposed there will be no justification for the special land acquisition officer to acquire the lands belonging to private citizens. therefore, it was all the more necessary for the special land acquisition officer to consider those objections. the other objection that the lands proposed for acquisition consist of small bits of sites purchased by the objectors for the purpose of putting up houses for their residence and they do not own any other house or site, is also a valid objection which was required to be considered. therefore, we are of the view that the order passed under sub-section (3) of section 28 of the act falls short of the requirement of section 28(3) of the act.in the view, we take, it follows that the notification issued under sub-section (4) of section 28 of the act cannot be sustained. all the other contentions of the petitioners are left open. 12. we may also refer to one another contention urged by shri subbaiah, learned counsel for the petitioners that the lands in question which are proposed for acquisition are reserved under the comprehensive development plan of the city of shimoga for residential purpose and acquisition of the same for auto complex is not permissible because the land cannot be used for any otherpurpose other than the purpose for which it is reserved under the comprehensive development plan. it is not necessary to consider this contention because no such contention is raised in the petitions. therefore, it is left open.13. for the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are allowed in part. the notification bearing no. yq 67/spq 89 dated 20-4-1989, published in the official gazette of 9-11-1989 and also the order dated 26-12-1988 passed under sub-section (3) of section 28 of the act in so far they relate to the lands pertaining to petitioners are quashed. liberty is reserved to the special land acquisition officer, and the state government to proceed with the acquisition, if need be from the stage of hearing of the objectors under section 28(3) of the act. it is also open to the objectors to produce such evidence as they deem it necessary to produce.14. it is submitted on behalf of the board and also the special land acquisition officer that to avoid delay in service of notice, the petitioners may be directed to appear before the land acquisition officer karnataka industrial areas development board on a stipulated date in the office of the district industries centre, nehru road, shimoga.accordingly, the petitioners are directed to appear before the special land acquisition officer, karnataka industrial areas development board at district industries centre, nehru road, shirnoga at 11 a.m. on 15-4-1991.communicate the order within a week.15. petition partly allowed.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. In these petitions under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution the petitioners have sought for quashing the notification dated 20-4-1989 published in the Official Gazette of 9-11-1989 issued under sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. In Writ Petitions Nos. 533 to 535 of 1990, the petitioners have also sought for quashing the notification dated 11-7-1980 issued under sub-section (1) of S. 28 of the Act.

3. Under the notification dated 11-7-1980, several lands were proposed for acquisition for the purpose of Auto Complex. The owners and persons interested in the landsproposed for acquisition filed their objections. A notification under sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Act was also issued. However, that was challenged in a batch of writ petitions before this Court 15481 to 15483, 17985-17986, 15004-15008, 11916 and 5782 of 1985. This court allowed the writ petitions by the order dated 21-3-1986 and quashed the notification issued under subsection (4) of Section 28 of the Act and further directed to continue the proceeding from the stage at which it was interrupted by issuing fresh notices as contemplated under subsection (2) of Section 28 of the Act. Thus the notification issued under sub-section (1) of S. 28 of the Act was not disturbed.

4. Thereafter, notices were served on the objectors and the same was also published in the local newspapers as well as in Prajavani and Indian Express. After hearing the objectors, the Special Land Acquisition Officer passed the order on 26-12-1988 under subsection (3) of Section 28 of the Act, Pursuant to that, a declaration was made under subsection (4) of Section 28 of the Act as per notification dated 20-4-1989 bearing No. YQ 67/SPQ 89 published in the Official Gazette of 9-11-1989.

5. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the notification issued under subsection (4) of Section 28 of the Act is vitiated because the order passed under sub-sec. (3) of Section 28 of the Act is not in accordance with law in as much as all the objections raised by the objectors have not been considered. Reliance was placed on the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the Act.

6. It is also further contended that when vast extent of Government Land is available within the close vicinity (3 Kms.) from the lands in question and on the earlier occasion, the Land Acquisition Officer in his letter dated 10-10-1986 produced as Annexure-H in W.P. No. 555 of 1990 opined that it would not be appropriate to acquire the lands in question when an extent of 400 acres belonging to the Government is available within 3 kilo-meters from the lands in question and thenegotiations had been going on for transfer of the said land to the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board, and out of that, an extent of 50 acres could be allotted for Auto Complex.

7. In addition to these contentions several other contentions are also urged. But we do not consider it necessary to consider those contentions because in our view the aforesaid two contentions are sufficient for deciding these writ petitions.

8. Sri Narayanappa, learned Counsel appearing for the Board has made available the records.

On going through the order dated 26-12-1988 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer delegated with the power under subsection (3) of the Section 28 of the Act, we are satisfied that the order does not satisfy the requirements of sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the Act. In the earlier portion of the order, the Special Land Acquisition Officer has stated about the proceedings relating to the previous writ petitions to which we have already made a reference, and publication of the notification in the various newspapers, and issuing of notices to objectors. In the second portion of the order, he has summarised the objections raised by the objectors. In the last two paragraphs, he has given his reasons for overruling the objections. Before we reproduce the last two paragraphs of the order, it is also relevant to notice the objections of the objectors as summarised by him.

'1. The land owners have formed residential sites and sold to various purchasers as residential site in the year 1964-66. Many of the purchasers do not own any other sites other than the sites purchased in these Sy. Nos. Hence formation of the Auto Complex and allotment of sites to few garages by dispossessing hundreds of own site holders is not social justice and also a ill conceived plan.

2. The area available in this location will be around 20 acres only after deducting the lands belonging to church, Saw-Mills and the Wakfs Board property and the Government land in Sy. No. 6 is not completely available since the portion of this land has already been granted by the Government in favour of'Kumbara Sangha'. As such the total availability will be to the tune of 35-40 acres and this will not be sufficient to locate all the garages situated in Shimoga town at a common place. It will finally end up with the garage owners in Shimoga city concerning a site in this proposed Auto Complex and also not shift from the existing place.

3. Instead, if the Government is keen on establishing an Auto Complex it should be established in the Government Land situated 3 Km. from this proposed site where hundreds of acres of Government land is available.

4. Another main objection from the objectors is that the authorities concerned of the Auto Complex have not so far deposited the cost of acquisition with the KIADB and until they deposit the full cost of acquisition in advance, the acquisition proceedings should not be further continued.'

9. After summarising the objections, he has given the following reasons for overruling the same.

'All the objectors have raised purely technical objections with which we are not concerned. Whether the Board has obtained the funds from the Authorities of the Auto Complex or not is up to the Board to decide. Once the acquisition proceedings are finalised it is the responsibility of the Board to place the compensation amount payable to the land owners at the disposal of the Land Acquisition Officer either out of funds collected from the Auto Complex Authority or out of its own resources. Likewise, whether full-fledged Auto Complex can be established in 30 acres or not cannot be decided by the objectors.

The objectors have not adduced any evidence in support of their objections, and the objections raised were also in technical nature without any substantial cause for deleting the lands from the acquisition proceedings and as such they are rejected and it is hereby ordered to prepare the draft 28(4) notification and submit it to the Government.'

10. From the aforesaid portion of the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officerin which the objections are considered, it is clear that the objections as to the objectors being owners of small sites and having no other sites and the availability of Government land within a distance of 3 Km, have not been considered. It is nothing but a summary rejection of the objections raised by the objectors.

11. Sub-section (3) of Section 28 reads thus :

'After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.'

Thus sub-section (3) of Section 28 requires that the State Government or the Officer delegated with the power of the State Government, as in this case, it is stated that the Special Land Acquisition Officer is delegated with the power of the State Government is required to consider the objections raised and hear the objectors and decide the same. When a statute directs that the objections be called for, objector be afforded an opportunity of hearing and pass such order as it deems fit on considering the objections, it expects the authority exercising that power to decide the objections in a quasijudicial manner. The authority is required to decide the objections and give reasons for rejecting or overruling the same. No doubt, the acquisition proceeding is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but where a statute requires that the acquisition should be made in a particular manner and it prescribes the manner and method or mode the authority must adhere to it. The decision of the authority must satisfy the norms prescribed by the statute. In other words, it must conform to statutory standards or norms as prescribed by the statute. We must view these provisions in the context they appear. The context is acquisition of a private property of a citizens. Therefore, in order to eliminate the possibility of arbitrary exercise of power to acquire a private property of a citizens, the law specifically provides that the objectors are to be heard and the objections arc to be considered before arriving at a decision thatthe property proposed for acquisition should be acquired. Therefore for overruling the objections, the reasons are to be given. The objections, cannot be disposed of by stating that they are technical or that the objectors are not concerned as to whether the auto complex can be established in an extent of 30 acres. It is not possible to agree with the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the objections raised by the objectors are all purely technical in nature. When the objectors contend that an alternative land belonging to the State Government is available, it becomes the duty of the Special Land Acquisition Officer to consider the same under subsection (3) of Section 28 of the Act and to find out whether the alternative land is available and if so whether it is suitable for the purpose for which the acquisition proceeding is initiated. Whenever a Government land is available and it is suitable for the purpose for which the acquisition is proposed there will be no justification for the Special Land Acquisition Officer to acquire the lands belonging to private citizens. Therefore, it was all the more necessary for the Special Land Acquisition Officer to consider those objections. The other objection that the lands proposed for acquisition consist of small bits of sites purchased by the objectors for the purpose of putting up houses for their residence and they do not own any other house or site, is also a valid objection which was required to be considered. Therefore, we are of the view that the order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the Act falls short of the requirement of Section 28(3) of the Act.

In the view, we take, it follows that the notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Act cannot be sustained. All the other contentions of the petitioners are left open.

12. We may also refer to one another contention urged by Shri Subbaiah, learned counsel for the petitioners that the lands in question which are proposed for acquisition are reserved under the Comprehensive Development Plan of the City of Shimoga for residential purpose and acquisition of the same for Auto Complex is not permissible because the land cannot be used for any otherpurpose other than the purpose for which it is reserved under the comprehensive development plan. It is not necessary to consider this contention because no such contention is raised in the petitions. Therefore, it is left open.

13. For the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are allowed in part. The notification bearing No. YQ 67/SPQ 89 dated 20-4-1989, published in the Official Gazette of 9-11-1989 and also the order dated 26-12-1988 passed under sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the Act in so far they relate to the lands pertaining to petitioners are quashed. Liberty is reserved to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, and the State Government to proceed with the acquisition, if need be from the stage of hearing of the objectors under Section 28(3) of the Act. It is also open to the objectors to produce such evidence as they deem it necessary to produce.

14. It is submitted on behalf of the Board and also the Special Land Acquisition Officer that to avoid delay in service of notice, the petitioners may be directed to appear before the Land Acquisition Officer Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board on a stipulated date in the office of the District Industries Centre, Nehru Road, Shimoga.

Accordingly, the petitioners are directed to appear before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board at District Industries Centre, Nehru Road, Shirnoga at 11 a.m. on 15-4-1991.

Communicate the order within a week.

15. Petition partly allowed.