SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/367001 |
Subject | Tenancy |
Court | Mumbai High Court |
Decided On | Sep-27-2005 |
Case Number | W.P. NoS. 2350 and 2351 of 1998 |
Judge | R.M.S. Khandeparkar and ;V.M. Kanade, JJ. |
Reported in | 2006(3)ALLMR691; 2006(1)MhLj522 |
Acts | Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control, Bombay Land Requisition and Bombay Government Premises (Eviction)(Amendment) Act, 1997 |
Appellant | Kaiki Rustomji Alpaiwalla and ors. |
Respondent | State of Maharashtra and anr. |
Appellant Advocate | P. Chavhan, Adv., i/b., Madekar and Co. |
Respondent Advocate | None |
Disposition | Petition dismissed |
Excerpt:
- section 34: [d.k. deshmukh, s.j. vazifdar & j.p. devadhar, jj] court fee on petition under section 34 of the act bombay court fees act (36 of 1959), schedule i, article 3, schedule ii, article 1(f)(iii) held, according to article 3 of schedule i, on any plaint, application or petition or memorandum of appeal for setting aside or modifying an award, same court fee is payable as is payable on a plaint or memorandum of appeal under article 1. thus, when an award is challenged by a plaint, application, petition or memorandum of appeal, court fee is payable on ad valorem basis. but from this requirement of payment of court fee on ad valorem basis, article 3 excludes an application or petition or memorandum of appeal filed in civil or revenue court challenging any award made under the arbitration act, 1940.thus, the provisions of article 3 of schedule 1 do not apply when an application is filed or appeal is filed challenging an award made under the arbitration act, 1940. thus the provisions of article 3 of schedule i do not apply when an application is filed challenging an award made under the arbitration act, 1940. the question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether reference to the provisions of 1940 act found in article 3 of schedule i of the bombay court fees act can be said to include reference to the 1996 act. perusal of the provisions of section 8 of general clauses act shows that where by a central enactment any provision of a former enactment is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification then reference in any other enactment to the provisions so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provisions so re-enacted. in the present case, it is common ground that the former enactment is the 1940 act, the new enactment is the 1996 act and any other enactment is the bombay court fees act, the only provision of the 1940 act referred to in article 3 of schedule 1 of the bombay court fees act is the provisions of section 33 of the 1940act and bare comparison of that provision with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 34 of the 1996 act shows that the provision of section 33 of 1940 act is repealed and re-enacted in sub-section (1) of section 34 of the 1996 act with slight modification. therefore, reference to the provisions of section 33 of the 1940 act in article 3 of schedule-i of the bombay court fees act has to be construed, in view of the provisions of section 8 of the general clauses act, as reference to the provisions of section 34 of the 1996 act. so far as an appeal filed under section 37 of the 1996 act is concerned, perusal of section 37 shows that an appeal is provided to the appellate court against an order setting aside an arbitral award or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. thus, as the provisions of article 3 of schedule-i do not apply to an application or petition filed under section 34 of the 1996 act, they will also not apply to the memorandum of appeal filed to set aside or modify an award made by the arbitrator under the 1996 act. in other words nothing contained in article 3 of schedule-i of the bombay court fees act applies to an application, petition or memorandum of appeal to set aside or modify any award made under the 1996 act as it does not apply to an application or petition or memorandum of appeal to set aside or modify an award made under the arbitration act, 1940. perusal of the provisions of section 8 of the general clauses act shows that references in any other enactment to a provision in a former enactment is to be construed as reference to re-enacted provision in the new enactment unless a different intention appears. the different intention may appear either in the new enactment or in the other enactment. nothing was pointed out either in the 1996 act or in the bombay court fees act which can be construed as a different intention or which will show that it was not the intention of the maharashtra legislature to exclude an application or petition or memorandum of appeal filed in court to set aside or modify an award made under the 1996 act, from the provisions of article 3 of schedule-i of the bombay court fees act. it appears that the intention behind excluding an application made, challenging the award made under the 1940 act, from requirement of payment of ad valorem court fee which is required to be paid if the same litigant filed a suit on the same subject matter, was to encourage a litigant to go for arbitration instead of filing a suit. nothing has been pointed out to show that ther4e is any change in that legislative policy. on the contrary, from the preamble of the 1996 act it is clear that the policy of the legislature is to encourage people to adopt the mode of arbitration for resolving disputes. article 3 of schedule-i of the bombay court fees act does not apply to a petition, application or memorandum of appeal filed for challenging an award made under the 1996 act, and court fee on a petition filed under section 34 of the 1996 act challenging an award in high court is payable according to article 1(f)(iii) of schedule ii.
section 37: [d.k. deshmukh, s.j. vazifdar & j.p. devadhar, jj] court fee on appeal under section 37 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 - held, court fee is payable according to article 13 of schedule ii of the bombay court fees act.
schedule i, article 3 & schedule ii, article 1(f)(iii): [d.k. deshmukh, s.j. vazifdar & j.p. devadhar, jj] court fee on petition under section 34 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 - held, when a petition under section 34 is to be filed before a principal civil court of original jurisdiction which is not a high court, the question arises which article of either first schedule or second schedule would apply. in so far as the challenge to an award made under the 1940 act is concerned, an application under section 33 of that act could be made to a civil court and therefore, payment of court fee was governed by article 1(a) of schedule ii. this was so because the application was to be presented to the court of civil judge which was not a principal civil court of original jurisdiction. but now because of change of definition of term court in the 1996 act, a petition has to be presented, challenging an award made under the 1996 act in terms of the provisions of section 34 thereof, before the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. no entry either in the first schedule or in the second schedule was pointed out which applies to an application or petition to be made before the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, and therefore, when a litigant wants to file petition before a principal civil court having original jurisdiction which is not high court, challenging an award made under the 1996 act, no court fee under bombay court fees act is payable because of absence of a general or specific provision. therefore, it can be said that no court fee under the bombay court fees act is payable when a petition under section 34 challenging an award is filed before any principal civil court of original jurisdiction which is not high court.
schedule ii, article 13: [d.k. deshmukh, s.j. vazifdar & j.p. devadhar, jj] court fee on appeal under section 37 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 - held, court fee is payable according to article 13 of schedule ii of the bombay court fees act.v.m. kanade, j.1. both these writ petitions can be disposed of by common judgment since common question of law is involved in both the petitions.2. brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding the writ petitions are as under;two flats owned by the petitioners were requisitioned by order dated 14-6-1950 and they were allotted to respondent no. 2 in both the petitions by order dated 1-12-1959. pursuant to the said order of allotment, respondent no. 2 in each writ petition continued to occupy the said flats. the supreme court in the case of grahak sanstha manch and ors. v. state of maharashtra reported in : [1994]3scr746 , directed government to de-requisition the premises and hand over possession to the owners. in view of the said judgment of the supreme court the petitioners filed aforesaid two writ petitions for quashing the order of requisition passed by the respondent and also sought direction that the possession of the flats be restored. during the pendency of petition, the state government amended provisions of rent act and gave protection to all government allottees by declaring them as deemed tenants under the act. the validity of amendment was challenged in this court and this court struck down the said amendments which were made by the government. the supreme court, however, upheld the validity of the said amendments made to the rent act in case of welfare association, a.r.p. maharashtra and anr. v. ranjit p. gohil and ors. reported in : [2003]2scr139 . before the supreme court pronounced the decision in welfare association, a.r.p. maharashtra and anr. v. ranjit p. gohil and ors. case (supra), the petitioners amended the petition and challenged the validity of amendment act, 1997.3. in view of judgment of supreme court in welfare association, a.r.p. maharashtra and anr. v. ranjit p. gohil and ors. case (supra), challenge to the validity of amendment act of 1997 fails.4. by virtue of amendment to the rent act, respondent no. 2 are now deemed to be tenants under the rent act. in view of this submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners, cannot be accepted. both the writ petitions are accordingly, dismissed.
Judgment:V.M. Kanade, J.
1. Both these Writ Petitions can be disposed of by common Judgment since common question of law is involved in both the petitions.
2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding the Writ petitions are as under;
Two flats owned by the petitioners were requisitioned by Order dated 14-6-1950 and they were allotted to respondent No. 2 in both the petitions by order dated 1-12-1959. Pursuant to the said order of allotment, respondent No. 2 in each Writ Petition continued to occupy the said flats. The Supreme Court in the case of Grahak Sanstha Manch and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra reported in : [1994]3SCR746 , directed Government to de-requisition the premises and hand over possession to the owners. In view of the said judgment of the Supreme Court the petitioners filed aforesaid two Writ Petitions for quashing the order of requisition passed by the respondent and also sought direction that the possession of the flats be restored. During the pendency of petition, the State Government amended provisions of Rent Act and gave protection to all Government allottees by declaring them as deemed tenants under the Act. The validity of amendment was challenged in this court and this court struck down the said amendments which were made by the Government. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the validity of the said amendments made to the Rent Act in case of Welfare Association, A.R.P. Maharashtra and Anr. v. Ranjit P. Gohil and Ors. reported in : [2003]2SCR139 . Before the Supreme Court pronounced the decision in Welfare Association, A.R.P. Maharashtra and Anr. v. Ranjit P. Gohil and Ors. case (supra), the petitioners amended the petition and challenged the validity of Amendment Act, 1997.
3. In view of judgment of Supreme Court in Welfare Association, A.R.P. Maharashtra and Anr. v. Ranjit P. Gohil and Ors. case (supra), challenge to the validity of amendment Act of 1997 fails.
4. By virtue of Amendment to the Rent Act, respondent No. 2 are now deemed to be tenants under the Rent Act. In view of this submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners, cannot be accepted. Both the Writ Petitions are accordingly, dismissed.