Sanjay Sampatrao Gaikwad Vs. Union of India (Uoi) - Court Judgment

R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

1. Since common questions of law and facts arise in both these appeals, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. Heard the learned Advocates for the parties. Perused the records.

3. In both these appeals the Railway Claims Tribunal by its order dated 25th and 26th of July, 2001 had allowed the applications filed by the appellants herein and had been awarded with the compensation for the injuries suffered by them on account of violent attack in the form of stone-throwing by the strangers towards the moving trains through which they were travelling as the passengers. The compensation was awarded holding that the incident to be an untoward incident within the meaning of the said expression under Section 24A read with Section 123(C ) of the Railways Act, 1989, hereinafter called as 'the said Act'. The Tribunal had also awarded interest at the rate of 9% from the date of the applications, besides the costs. The Orders of the Tribunal were carried in appeals before the learned single Judge being First Appeal Nos. 177 and 180 of 2002, and came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment dated 27-2-2002 whereby while allowing the appeals, the orders of the Tribunal were set aside holding that the acts of stone-throwing by strangers are exception to the doctrine of strict liability of the owner, and therefore, the railway administration cannot be held responsible for the injury sustained by its passengers, and therefore, is not liable to pay compensation to the passengers suffering injuries from such acts as they do not fall within the meaning of the expression 'untoward incident' under Section 123(c) of the said Act.

4. While challenging the impugned judgment, the learned Advocates for the appellants, drawing attention to various provisions of the said Act, submitted that the broad principle of tortuous liability could not have been applied ignoring the statutory provisions relating to the liability of the railways in case of injuries suffered by the passengers travelling through the trains. The Chapter XIII of the said Act elaborately describes the liability of the railway administration in case of injuries suffered by the passengers as also the procedure for claiming such compensation and therefore it was necessary for the learned single Judge to consider those provisions and ascertain whether the Tribunal was justified in granting compensation and whether such grant of compensation was within the parameters of the provisions of law prescribed under Chapter XIII of the said Act. The learned single Judge erred in Ignoring the same and in setting aside the order of the Tribunal on the ground of absence of applicability of principle of strict liability under torts.

5. The learned Advocate appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that considering the provisions of Section 124A read with Section 123(c) of the said Act when the claim is based on the accusation of violent attack, the source of such an attack has to be within the train itself or in any other place within the precincts of a railway station, and therefore, when the train is moving from one point to another, if, on the way, the strangers throw stones standing in the area beyond the railway precincts and incidentally the same struck the passengers, it cannot fasten the liability upon the railway administration to compensate the passengers suffering injuries from such acts. Such incident is not covered by the provisions of law comprised under Section 123(C)(1)(ii) of the said Act. He has further submitted that in case of the appellant in LPA No. 74 of 2003, he was not a bona fide passenger. Placing reliance in the decision in the matter of P.A. Narayanan v. Union of India reported in : [1998]1SCR899 the learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that in the absence of sufficient evidence regarding liability of the railway administration to compensate the appellants for the alleged loss, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment passed by the learned single Judge of this Court. Considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 1993, the expression 'untoward incident' with reference to a violent attack should not be interpreted to include an incident of pelting of stones by the strangers located in an area outside the railway precincts.

6. Upon hearing the learned advocates and on perusal of records, the first point for consideration relates to the meaning of the expression 'untoward incident' and the nature of the incidents those are covered by the said expression.

7. The Section 125(1) of the said Act provides that an application for compensation under Section 124 or under Section 124A may be made to the Claims Tribunal by any person who has sustained injury or suffered loss. The Sections 124 and 124A speak of the extent of liability and the compensation on account of any untoward incident. Accordingly, if the passenger gets injured while travelling through a train on account of any accident or wrongful act or neglect or default on the part of the railway administration or suffers loss on account of any action attributed to the railway administration, such a passenger would be entitled to be compensated by the railways in view of the provisions regarding its liability under Section 124. The Section 124A, which speaks of compensation on account of any untoward incidents, provides that when in the course of working of a railway, an untoward accident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident, provided that no compensation shall be payable under the said Section by the railway administration if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to Suicide or attempted suicide by him, self-inflicted injury, his own criminal act, any act committed by him in a state of intoxication or insanity, any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to Injury caused by the said untoward incident.

16th June, 2005.

8. Section 123(c) of the said Act defines the expression ' untoward incident'. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 123(c) of the said Act, the said expression has been defined to mean the commission of a terrorist act within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or making of a violent attack or the commission of robbery or dacoity or indulging in rioting, shoot-out or arson by any person in or on any train carrying passengers, or in a waiting hall, cloak room or reservation or booking office or on any platform or in any other place within the precincts of a railway station, and under Sub-section (2) thereof, it is defined to mean that the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passenger.

9. On plain reading of the said definition, it is clear that it specifically enumerates incidents of various nature which could be called as 'untoward incidents' and the same include an incident of 'a violent attack'. The term 'violent attack' has not been defined anywhere in the said Act. Obviously, therefore, it will have to be understood, as it is being understood commonly, bearing in mind that the provisions comprised under Section 124A of the said Act, is a piece of the beneficial legislation under the said Act. The provisions comprised under Section 124A of the said Act are essentially meant to enable the passengers to get compensation for any loss suffered in the course of their journey through a train or while being within the precincts of railway station. Undoubtedly the proviso to Section 124A enumerates the incidents where no such liability could be fastened upon the railway administration for the injury or loss suffered by such person or persons. Whether the cause for such injury or loss is either directly attributable to the person concerned or the same being on account of natural cause or disease, or on account of medical or surgical treatment, it is a settled principle of law that a statutory provision which is made in public interest and which is essentially a piece of beneficial legislation, the same is required to be liberally construed so as to advance very object of the provision of law and to fulfill the aim sought to be advanced by such provision vide: State of Madhya Pradesh v. The Galla Tilhan Vyapari Sangh reported in : [1977]2SCR619 . Even while dealing with the case relating to a person illegally occupying the portion of the railway station, the Apex Court, in Union of India v. B.N. Prasad, reported in : 1978CriLJ494 had held that 'as the provision is in public interest meant to avoid inconvenience and expense for the travelling public and gear up the efficiency of the railway administration, it must be constructed liberally, broadly and meaningfully, so as to advance the object sought to be achieved by the Railways Act.'

10. The Apex Court in M/s. New India Sugar Mills Ltd v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, reported in : AIR1963SC1207 had held that 'It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning, the Court would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which renders the exercise of its powers invalid. 'Undoubtedly,' the rule of liberal construction does not give a free hand to the court to stretch and strain the statutory language to accord with abstract notions of justice and fair play. If the statutory language is susceptible of two constructions, the rule of liberal construction should incline the Court to prefer the one which accomplishes the legislative purpose.' That was the law laid down by the Apex Court in Prem Raj v. Ram Charan, reported in : [1974]3SCR494 .

11. In relation to the Act of 1993 by which, Section 124A was introduced along with the Section 123(c) in the said Act, the Statement of Objects and Reasons reads thus: -

'At present Section 124 of the Railways Act, 1989 provides for payment of compensation to bona fide passengers who get injured or to the dependants of those who die on account of passenger train accidents. However, incidents like terrorist acts, robberies, dacoities. violent attacks, rioting, shoot-outs, arson, etc, in trains or in waiting halls, cloak rooms, booking offices or on platforms or on platforms or other places with in the precincts of any railway station are not covered by that section for the purpose of payment of compensation.

2. There have been pressing demands in both the houses of Parliament and from the public that the bona fide railway passengers who become victims of the aforesaid incidents should also be compensated for injuries or loss of life. It is therefore, proposed to introduce the Railway Passenger Insurance Scheme for valid ticket and pass holders so as to compensate them for injuries or death caused by the aforesaid incidents in trains or the aforesaid places. No compensation will, however, be payable by the railway administration in cases of death or injury due to suicide or attempted suicide, self-inflicted injuries, criminal acts of the passenger, acts committed by the passenger in a state of intoxication or insanity, natural cause or disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to Injury caused by any of the aforesaid incidents.' (Emphasis supplied.)

It was with the aforesaid objects and reasons that the provisions comprised under Section 124A along with definition of the expression ' untoward incident' under Section 123(C) came to be incorporated in the said Act. Undoubtedly, the said amended provision was very much in force when the incident in the case in hand had occurred.

12. Considering the law relating to the interpretation of statute and bearing in mind the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is difficult to accept the contention on behalf of the respondent that the expression 'violent attack' under Section 123(c)(ii) should be given a restricted meaning. Considering the fact that the provision regarding entitlement to claim compensation on account of injuries suffered from violent attack, while being in journey or even otherwise in the precincts of a railway station, being in the form of assurance to the train passengers suffering loss in their journey, and the statutory provision being a piece of beneficial legislation with no restrictions imposed nor defining any limit but specifically excluding particular and specified type of attack from the expression 'violent attack' under the said provision of law, the same will have to be construed liberally. Undoubtedly, it is also to be noted that, as already observed above, Section 124A itself enumerates the incidents wherein the railway administration cannot be fastened with the liability even in relation to some of the untoward incidents. In other words, the incidents narrated under the proviso to Section 124A of the said Act are specifically excluded from the expression 'untoward incident' though the said incidents are also of the nature of untoward incidents. When such an elaborate provision is made in the statute enumerating the incidents in which the railway administration will have to compensate the passengers, the expression 'violent attack', which defines as being one of the ingredients of untoward incident, the same cannot be construed narrowly. Undoubtedly, in certain cases where the passenger himself is responsible for the injuries suffered by him, it is clearly excluded under the proviso to Section 124A and it would disentitle him to claim compensation. Being so, the apprehension on behalf of the respondent that liberal interpretation of the expression 'violent attack' could be misused by the passengers cannot be a justification to deny the right to the passengers with bona fide claim. Certainly, nothing forbids the railway administration from pointing out to the Tribunal and establishing the fact that the injuries suffered by a passenger are on account of his own mischief or on account of his own illegal act. However, injuries suffered by the train passengers on account of throwing of stones by the strangers or even by the persons in the precincts of the railway station could hardly be excluded from being called as 'untoward incidents' within the meaning of the said expression under the said statutory provision, unless of course the railway administration is able to establish that throwing of stones was either provoked by the passenger himself, or the passengers themselves, as the case may be, or the act is entirely attributable to the acts of such passenger or passengers.

13. The next point which is sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent is that the source of attack causing untoward incident must originate within the train itself or in an area with the precincts of a railway station. The definition of 'untoward incident' encompasses an act by any person not only in the train taut even by the person in an area within the precincts of railway station. It is not disputed that the railway tracks form precincts of railway station. However, the Section no where prescribes that the source of attack causing untoward incident has to be from any particular distance, though the Section specifically provides that an injury must have been resulted on account of untoward incident having taken place within certain areas, i.e. either in or on any train carrying passengers or within the precincts of a railway station. In other words, once the passenger is able to show that the injury had occurred due to an untoward incident while the passenger was either in the train or on the train or within the precincts of a railway station, it would entitled him to claim compensation in terms of Section 124A read with Section 123(c)(1) of the said Act. Being so, the contention that throwing of stones by the strangers from a particular distance would exclude the liability of the railway administration to compensate the passengers suffering injuries from such an incident of throwing the stones cannot be accepted. The distance in that regard is immaterial. What is material is that the passenger must suffer injuries while in or on any train carrying passengers or in any other place within the precincts of a railway station, or those places, which are specifically enumerated under the said provisions of law.

14. Perusal of the impugned judgment discloses that the learned single Judge has merely proceeded on the basis of the principle of strict liability for tortuous act. While applying the said principle, without proper application of the relevant provisions of law, the learned single Judge has rejected the claim of the appellants. Indeed, as rightly submitted by the learned Advocates for the appellants, the provisions of Sections 124A and 125 read with Section 123(c) of the said Act clearly deal with the situation like those in the case in hand wherein the passengers suffer injuries on account of throwing of stones at the train. Not only the substantial provisions regarding liability to be fixed are comprised under Section 124A of the said Act but even the procedural aspect relating to claim of compensation in exercise of such right has been covered by Section 125 of the said Act. When the statutory provisions clearly and elaborately prescribes the rights of the parties and the procedure to be followed to exercise those rights, merely by applying theory of strict liability of tortuous act, the learned single Judge was not justified in setting aside the decisions given by the Tribunal upholding the claim of the appellants.

15. Though it was sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent that the appellants have not established the fact that they themselves were not responsible for such violent attack, it is to be seen that the fact of throwing of the stones at the trains by which the appellants were travelling was never in dispute. The fact that the appellants suffered injuries on account of such throwing of the stones was also not in dispute. Being so, the burden to establish the factum of injuries having suffered on account of violent attack, i.e. untoward incident in order to justify the claim under Section 124A of the said Act was clearly discharged by the appellants. The onus, therefore, had shifted upon the respondent-railway administration to establish that' the claim was not in accordance with the provisions comprised under Section 124A of the said Act or that it was covered by the specific exclusion under the proviso to the said Section 124A of the said Act. Neither there was any attempt on the part of the respondent to discharge its onus nor it was establishment that the claim of the appellants was bogus or without any substance.

16. It was also sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent that the passenger -- Sanjay Gaikwad, who is the appellant in L.P.A. No. 74 of 2003, was not a bona fide passenger. In this regard, it is to be noted that, undoubtedly, there was a specific issue framed by the Tribunal i.e. whether Sanjay Gaikwad was a bona fide passenger of the train in question, and on the basis of the evidence placed on record by the parties, the Tribunal had held thus:-

'The main thrust of argument about the pass being invalid at the time of incident is that as per Rules and law, the pass was required to be signed by the applicant before the commencement of his journey, the date of commencement of the journey on outward as well as return stages should be entered on the face of the pass, the location and date of break journey and its recommencement should also be entered into on the face of the pass. It was also contended by the respondents that the break of journey was done at an unauthorized place, which was not indicated on the top of the pass. While these short-comings on the part of the applicant can be seen from the records, no records or evidence whatsoever has been produced by the respondents to show that these render the pass invalid for the purpose of journey. These short-comings may render the applicant for disciplinary action by his employers but these do not render him as a ticket less passenger nor these infirmities can cause him to cease to be a bona fide passenger for the purpose of Section 124A.'

At the outset, it is to be mentioned that though the matter was carried in First Appeal by the respondent, the said finding remained undisturbed and unaltered by the first appellate Court. On the contrary the learned single Judge in the impugned judgment has clearly observed that:

'The Tribunal has held in the case of the break journey that any breach of such condition would only attract a disciplinary action against the pass holder and Railway cannot avoid payment of compensation on that ground. As I have already mentioned that I am not entering into that controversy and therefore, I am not making any comments on the findings made by the Tribunal in this respect.'

Obviously, the learned single Judge has not interfered with the finding arrived at by the Tribunal that the respondent has not been able to establish that the appellant Sanjay Gaikwad was not a bona fide passenger for the purpose of Section 124A of the said Act. Being so, the finding regarding the appellant-Gaikwad being a bona fide passenger has attained finality for all purposes and it is too late for the respondent to agitate the same in the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant, and that too, without any material on record to substantiate the said contention.

17. The next point which arises for consideration pertains to the liability of the railway administration for payment of interest on the amount of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. It is not in dispute that the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder nowhere provide any specific date from which the liability by the railway administration for payment of interest on the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal would commence. The learned Advocates for the appellants have sought to rely upon the various decisions submitting that in those cases, the various High Courts including the learned single Judge of this Court had awarded the interest from the date of application filed under Section 125 of the said Act. The attention was also drawn to the decision of the Apex Court in N. Parmeswaran Filial v. Union of India, reported in : AIR2002SC1834 contending that the grant of interest on the date of the application by the- Tribunal was confirmed by the Apex Court in the said case, and therefore, in the case in hand also, the interest has to be granted from the date of the application filed by the appellants. The learned Advocate for the respondent, how-'ever, has submitted that the question of liability to pay interest does not arise unless quantification of the liability is ascertained and occasion for such liability would arise only after the date of the judgment and, therefore, the liability to pay interest cannot be from the date of filing of the application but it can be only from the date of judgment of the Tribunal.

18. As already observed above, there is no statutory provision in this regard. The provisions comprised under the said act or the Rules framed thereunder, nowhere provides that the liability of the railway administration to pay interest would be from the date of the application under Section 125 of the said Act. The Apex court in N. Parameswaran Pillai's Case (supra) : AIR2002SC1834 was dealing with a matter wherein the High Court while confirming the amount awarded by the Tribunal had reduced the rate of interest to 12 per cent and allowed it from the date of the application. The Railway claims Tribunal in that case had awarded the compensation for the untoward incident along with interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum from the date of default.-The facts of the said case, as revealed from . the decision of the Apex Court, are that while travelling from Thiruvalla to Jamnagar in a train on valid ticket, the deceased was accidentally thrown out of the train on account of overcrowding in an area between Chakarapalli and Penukonda Railway Stations. On account of fall, the deceased suffered injuries all over his body and ultimately died. The appellants in the matter before the-Apex Court had filed an application for compensation which was allowed by the Tribunal and Rs. 2,00,000/- were awarded along with interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum from the date of default. In an appeal before the Division Bench of Kerala High Court, the order of the Tribunal awarding compensation was upheld but the interest was lowered down to 12 per cent per annum to be paid from the date of filing of the application. Being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, the matter was carried in appeal before the Apex Court by the claimants. While allowing the appeal, compensation was enhanced to Rs. 4,00,000/- instead of Rs. 2,00,000/-. Apart from that, there was no interference in the order of the High Court by the Apex Court. However, while enhancing the compensation, the Apex Court nowhere laid down the proposition of law that invariably the claimants would be entitled for interest either from the date of accident or from the date of filing of the application or even from the date of the judgment. On the contrary, the Apex Court had held that the Tribunal must have regard to the provisions of law in that respect and accordingly should pass an appropriate order.

19. The Rules framed under Section 82A of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 being the Railway Accident (Compensation) Rules, 1989, and particularly the Rule 3 thereof, provides that the amount of compensation payable in respect of death or injuries shall be as specified in the Schedule. The Schedule enumerates various injuries and corresponding compensation for those injuries, such as, for loss of hand and a foot, compensation is fixed at Rs. 1,00,000/-, for absolute deafness, compensation is fixed at Rs. l.00.000/-, amputation through shoulder joint, compensation is fixed at Rs. 90.000/-; for loss of thumb, compensation is fixed at Rs. 30.000/-; and likewise. It is, however, to be noted that though the quantification with reference to each type of injuries has been enumerated under the Schedule, it cannot be disputed that there can be some injuries which are not enlisted in the Schedule for which compensation will have to be fixed depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case by the Tribunal. At the same time, it is also to be noted even in relation to the injuries which are enumerated in the Schedule, the fact that the claimants have suffered particular type of injury has to be established before the Tribunal and the Tribunal on being satisfied about the said fact, will have to fix the liability of the railway administration in that regard, based on the provisions comprised under Rule 3 read with the Schedule of the said Rules and the evidence led by the parties. Certainly, therefore, mere enumeration of the injuries and quantification of compensation payable for those injuries in the Schedule to the Rules, it cannot be said that moment the passenger claims to have suffered a particular injury, the railway administration would be liable to be pay compensation to that passenger, even without properly ascertaining the claim of a claimant in that regard. Undisputedly, the procedure for ascertaining the veracity of the claim of a passenger in that regard is prescribed under the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and the adjudication in that regard has to be done by the Railway Claims Tribunal. Only after such adjudication, the liability of the railway administration for payment of compensation can be said to have been determined. Being so, the amount of compensation In terms of the Schedule read with the Rule 3 of the said Rules would become due and payable by the railway ad ministration immediately on pronouncement of an order in that regard by the Tribunal. Undoubtedly, some time would be consumed in the process, which is unavoidable. However, the occasion to discharge liability for payment of compensation by the railway administration would arise only after the pronouncement of an order by the Tribunal in that regard and not prior to that. Being so, merely because the Schedule enumerates compensation with reference to each type of injuries, it cannot be said that moment the passenger suffers injuries, that would be a day to be considered for the purpose of fixation of quantum of the liability by the railway administration or that it. could be the day on which particular amount of compensation would be due and payable by the railway administration for the purpose of calculation of interest. The liability to pay interest would arise either in terms of the agreement between the parties or in case when somebody withholds the amount due and payable to some other person or under statutory provision in that regard. Considering the provisions of law under the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder, therefore, though the cause of action for the claim of compensation on account of injuries suffered in the train travel would arise on the date such injuries are suffered, the liability to discharge such obligation of the railway administration by way of disbursement of the compensation to such claimants would become 'due and payable' on the day when the Tribunal quantifies the liability and pronounces its order in that regard, and therefore, that would be the day from which the liability to pay interest on the amount of compensation by the railway administration would commence and not prior to that. Being so, the respondent is justified in contending that the Tribunal could not have awarded the interest from the date of filing of application or any day prior to the date of pronouncement of its order.

20. Undoubtedly, the appellants are justified in contending that in a given case there can be inordinate delay on the part of Tribunal in disposing the case and thereby claimants may be prejudiced by not getting compensation immediately and in time. In that regard, it is to be noted that Section 126 provides for an interim relief by the railway administration. -Sub-section (1) thereof provides that 'where a person who has made an application for compensation under Section 125 desires to be paid interim relief, he may apply to the railway administration for payment of interim relief along with a copy of the application made under that section.' Sub-section (2) thereof provides that 'where, on the receipt of an application made under Sub-section (1) and after making such inquiry as it may deem fit, the railway administration is satisfied that circumstances exist which require relief to be afforded to the applicant immediately, it may, pending determination by the Claims Tribunal of the actual amount of compensation payable under Section 124 (or Section 124A) pay to any person who has sustained the injury or suffered any loss, or where death has resulted from the accident, to any dependant of the deceased, such sum as it considers reasonable for affording such relief, so however, that the sum paid shall not exceed the amount of compensation payable at such rates as may be prescribed.' Sub-section (3) provides that 'the railway administration shall, as soon as may be, after making an order regarding payment of interim relief under Sub-section ( 2), send a copy thereof to the Claims Tribunal.' Sub-section (4) provides that 'any sum paid by the railway administration under Sub-section (2) shall be taken into account by the Claims Tribunal while determining the amount of compensation payable.' In other words, the interest of the claimant to get immediate compensation is sufficiently safeguarded under Section 126 of the said Act. We can also take a judicial notice of the fact that many of the accidents, the railway administration announces interim relief to the victims immediately after the accident. Being so, it cannot be said that the railway administration is totally unconcerned about the welfare of the passengers travelling through their trains, or that it is totally reluctant in awarding necessary monetary relief to the injured persons. In the background of these facts, therefore, when the statutory provisions specifically provide that the Tribunal has to award rates of compensation bearing in mind the Rules framed in that regard and when the Rules prescribed certain compensation, there can be no scope for contention that the payment of interest on the amount of compensation should be from a date 'other than or prior to the date of judgment. Undoubtedly, once the compensation is fixed and the liability in that regard is pronounced, and the railway administration would be liable to pay interest therefrom but not prior to that date.

21. For the reasons stated above, therefore, the Letters Patent Appeals partly succeed. The impugned judgment is therefore to be set aside while allowing the appeals to the extent that the compensation as was awarded by the Railway Tribunal along with interest on the said compensation amount in both the matters. However, payment of interest on the compensation amount shall be from the date of decision of the tribunal.

22. In the result, therefore, the impugned judgment is hereby set aside. The judgments delivered by the Railway Claims Tribunal are hereby restored, subject to modification that the interest payable on the compensation amount shall be from the date of judgments of the Railway Claims Tribunal. There shall be no order as to costs.

23. At this stage, the learned Advocate for the respondent has prayed for stay of the judgment passed today. The same has been objected to by the learned Advocates for the appellant. However, we are inclined to grant stay, as prayed for. The judgment delivered today shall not be executable for a period of six weeks from today.