Kiran Gokuldas Kalantry Vs. Dr. Prithi Paul Singh Sethi - Court Judgment

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criminal - investigation - order of -nsections 362 and 401 of criminal procedure code (cr.pc) - order of investigation passed against applicant in writ petition - hence , present application - applicant contended that said order passed under revisional power of court under section 401 of cr.pc - also contended no opportunity to defend given to him - order should be recalled under section 362 of cr.pc - held, no right vested in accused to be heard before issuance of process - order under writ petition meant only for proper investigation - application dismissed - section 34: [d.k. deshmukh, s.j. vazifdar & j.p. devadhar, jj] court fee on petition under section 34 of the act bombay court fees act (36 of 1959), schedule i, article 3, schedule ii, article 1(f)(iii) held, according to article 3 of schedule i, on any plaint, application or petition or memorandum of appeal for setting aside or modifying an award, same court fee is payable as is payable on a plaint or memorandum of appeal under article 1. thus, when an award is challenged by a plaint, application, petition or memorandum of appeal, court fee is payable on ad valorem basis. but from this requirement of payment of court fee on ad valorem basis, article 3 excludes an application or petition or memorandum of appeal filed in civil or revenue court challenging any award made under the arbitration act, 1940.thus, the provisions of article 3 of schedule 1 do not apply when an application is filed or appeal is filed challenging an award made under the arbitration act, 1940. thus the provisions of article 3 of schedule i do not apply when an application is filed challenging an award made under the arbitration act, 1940. the question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether reference to the provisions of 1940 act found in article 3 of schedule i of the bombay court fees act can be said to include reference to the 1996 act. perusal of the provisions of section 8 of general clauses act shows that where by a central enactment any provision of a former enactment is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification then reference in any other enactment to the provisions so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provisions so re-enacted. in the present case, it is common ground that the former enactment is the 1940 act, the new enactment is the 1996 act and any other enactment is the bombay court fees act, the only provision of the 1940 act referred to in article 3 of schedule 1 of the bombay court fees act is the provisions of section 33 of the 1940act and bare comparison of that provision with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 34 of the 1996 act shows that the provision of section 33 of 1940 act is repealed and re-enacted in sub-section (1) of section 34 of the 1996 act with slight modification. therefore, reference to the provisions of section 33 of the 1940 act in article 3 of schedule-i of the bombay court fees act has to be construed, in view of the provisions of section 8 of the general clauses act, as reference to the provisions of section 34 of the 1996 act. so far as an appeal filed under section 37 of the 1996 act is concerned, perusal of section 37 shows that an appeal is provided to the appellate court against an order setting aside an arbitral award or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. thus, as the provisions of article 3 of schedule-i do not apply to an application or petition filed under section 34 of the 1996 act, they will also not apply to the memorandum of appeal filed to set aside or modify an award made by the arbitrator under the 1996 act. in other words nothing contained in article 3 of schedule-i of the bombay court fees act applies to an application, petition or memorandum of appeal to set aside or modify any award made under the 1996 act as it does not apply to an application or petition or memorandum of appeal to set aside or modify an award made under the arbitration act, 1940. perusal of the provisions of section 8 of the general clauses act shows that references in any other enactment to a provision in a former enactment is to be construed as reference to re-enacted provision in the new enactment unless a different intention appears. the different intention may appear either in the new enactment or in the other enactment. nothing was pointed out either in the 1996 act or in the bombay court fees act which can be construed as a different intention or which will show that it was not the intention of the maharashtra legislature to exclude an application or petition or memorandum of appeal filed in court to set aside or modify an award made under the 1996 act, from the provisions of article 3 of schedule-i of the bombay court fees act. it appears that the intention behind excluding an application made, challenging the award made under the 1940 act, from requirement of payment of ad valorem court fee which is required to be paid if the same litigant filed a suit on the same subject matter, was to encourage a litigant to go for arbitration instead of filing a suit. nothing has been pointed out to show that ther4e is any change in that legislative policy. on the contrary, from the preamble of the 1996 act it is clear that the policy of the legislature is to encourage people to adopt the mode of arbitration for resolving disputes. article 3 of schedule-i of the bombay court fees act does not apply to a petition, application or memorandum of appeal filed for challenging an award made under the 1996 act, and court fee on a petition filed under section 34 of the 1996 act challenging an award in high court is payable according to article 1(f)(iii) of schedule ii. section 37: [d.k. deshmukh, s.j. vazifdar & j.p. devadhar, jj] court fee on appeal under section 37 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 - held, court fee is payable according to article 13 of schedule ii of the bombay court fees act. schedule i, article 3 & schedule ii, article 1(f)(iii): [d.k. deshmukh, s.j. vazifdar & j.p. devadhar, jj] court fee on petition under section 34 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 - held, when a petition under section 34 is to be filed before a principal civil court of original jurisdiction which is not a high court, the question arises which article of either first schedule or second schedule would apply. in so far as the challenge to an award made under the 1940 act is concerned, an application under section 33 of that act could be made to a civil court and therefore, payment of court fee was governed by article 1(a) of schedule ii. this was so because the application was to be presented to the court of civil judge which was not a principal civil court of original jurisdiction. but now because of change of definition of term court in the 1996 act, a petition has to be presented, challenging an award made under the 1996 act in terms of the provisions of section 34 thereof, before the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. no entry either in the first schedule or in the second schedule was pointed out which applies to an application or petition to be made before the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, and therefore, when a litigant wants to file petition before a principal civil court having original jurisdiction which is not high court, challenging an award made under the 1996 act, no court fee under bombay court fees act is payable because of absence of a general or specific provision. therefore, it can be said that no court fee under the bombay court fees act is payable when a petition under section 34 challenging an award is filed before any principal civil court of original jurisdiction which is not high court. schedule ii, article 13: [d.k. deshmukh, s.j. vazifdar & j.p. devadhar, jj] court fee on appeal under section 37 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 - held, court fee is payable according to article 13 of schedule ii of the bombay court fees act. - the matter was carried to the supreme court without any success as the apex court dismissed the slp by its order dated 13th march, 2007 making it clear that the observations made by the learned single judge in his judgment in paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof shall not affect the trial of the criminal matter in any manner. reported in 2006 all mr (cri) 3035, submitted that the provisions of law comprised under section 401 of the code of criminal procedure clearly require an opportunity of being heard to every person who can be affected by the order to be passed in the revision application. however, it is undisputed fact that the said order was sought to be challenged by the applicants before the apex court without any success as the permission to file slp by the applicants against the said order was rejected by the apex court on 3rd january 2008. it is settled law that mere rejection of slp does not amount to merger of the order of this court in the order of apex court and being so, the jurisdiction of this court to review its order remains unaffected in case the applicant is able to make out a case for review of such order. certainly a case of failure on the part of the court to hear necessary party to the proceedings or a person, who could be affected by the order to be passed, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be a clerical or arithmetical mistake. the sole ground in the present application to seek relief in the nature of recalling of the judgment dated 10th july 2007 in the said writ petition being alleged failure on the part of the court to hear the applicants before passing the said judgment, the question of exercising the powers under section 362 cannot arise. it cannot be forgotten that the law is well settled to the effect that prior to issuance of process, the accused person has no right to be heard in the matter nor he is entitled to lead any evidence in the matter. 14. as already seen above, the law on the point that the accused is not entitled to be heard before issuing the process is well settled. 16533 of 2007 which was preferred by the applicants against the judgment dated 10th july 2007 without any success. it has been clearly held by the apex court in state of rajasthan v. according to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. 22. in chandra deo singh case [1964]1scr639 ,the apex court had clearly ruled that, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of chapter xvi of the code of criminal procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. reported in (1990)2scc437a ,it was clearly ruled that inherent power of the high court under section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice and such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the code. therefore there being no right assured to the accused of being heard before issuance of process, the question of accused persons insisting for hearing at the stage of revision application prior to the stage of issuance of process cannot arise, unless albeit as exceptional case is made out for exercise of writ jurisdiction even in such a case.r.m.s. khandeparkar, j.1. heard. rule. by consent the rule is made returnable forthwith.2. by the present application, the applicants are seeking to get the judgment and order dated 10-07-2007 passed in writ petition no. 1148 of 2007 recalled and to intervene in the said writ petition as the party respondents thereto.3. the few facts relevant for the decision are that respondent no. 1 herein is the original petitioner in writ petition no. 1148 of 2007, whereas respondent nos. 2 and 3 are the respondents therein. the said writ petition was filed seeking directions relating to investigation concerning m.e.c.r. no. 02 of 2005 which was lodged at vakola police station. mumbai and for transfer of investigation to some other investigating agency. the said mecr was registered pursuant to the magistrate's order under section 156(3) of the code of criminal procedure and it was registered against the applicants herein by the respondent no. 1 herein alleging commission of offence by the three applicants under sections 409, 419, 420, 201. 506 (ii) r/w section 34 of the indian penal code.4. the investigating officer on submission of a negative report, based on which, the order dated 18th april 2007 was passed by the magistrate accepting the said report and dismissing the complaint of the respondent no. 1 herein. after hearing the matter in the said writ petition, this court recorded in its judgment that in view of the fact the investigating machinery itself had found that the matter required further investigation, the petition could be disposed of by consent and, in fact it was disposed of by consent of the parties to the said writ petition and, thereby order dated 18th april 2007 accepting the negative report filed by the police was set side and the police authorities were directed to complete the investigation as expeditiously as possible. simultaneously, it was observed that in case the investigating agency required to arrest any of the applicants herein, who were accused persons, then concerned person or persons should be given 72 hours prior notice. the said judgment and order was passed on 10th july 2007.5. it is the case of the applicants that they came to know about the said order in october 2007 and being aggrieved, preferred a special leave petition before the apex court. permission to file slp came to be rejected by an order dated 3rd january 2008 by the apex court. thereupon the present application came to be filed on 2nd february 2008.6. at this stage, it is also necessary to note that there is a dispute pending between the parties on account of certain agreements and transactions since 2003 onwards. consequent to filing of the fir by respondent no. 1 against the applicants on 15th september 2005 at vakola police station, mumbai, the applicants had approached the sessions court for grant of anticipatory bail and the same was granted to the applicants by the sessions court by its order dated 21st november 2005. challenge to the said order before this court was rejected by the learned single judge of this court. the matter was carried to the supreme court without any success as the apex court dismissed the slp by its order dated 13th march, 2007 making it clear that the observations made by the learned single judge in his judgment in paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof shall not affect the trial of the criminal matter in any manner.7. by the present application, the applicants are seeking to recall the judgment and order dated 10th july 2007 passed in the said writ petition in exercise of the powers under section 362 of the code of criminal procedure while contending that the said judgment came to be passed in revisional jurisdiction without hearing the applicants in spite of the fact that the consequences of the said judgment were prejudicial to the interest of the applicants. it is the case of the applicants that the revisional powers under section 401 of the code of criminal procedure cannot be exercised unless the person against whom any order is to be passed or the order to be passed is prejudicial to anyone then such a person should have sufficient opportunity of being heard in the matter and, undoubtedly in the said writ petition, the applicants were not heard even though the effect of the said order has been to initiate investigation in relation to the offences alleged to have been committed by the applicants and further that investigating agency were permitted to arrest the applicants or any of them, however, with the advance notice of 72 hours ignoring the fact that the order of grant of anticipatory ball to the applicants was confirmed by this court and was not interfered with by the apex court.8. the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants, drawing our attention to sections 362 and 401 of the code of criminal procedure and placing reliance in the decisions of the apex court in a.k. subbaiah and ors. v. state of karnataka and ors. reported in : [1987]3scr1128 ; p. sundarrajan and ors. v. r. vidhya sekar reported in (2004) 13 scc 472 and, the decisions of learned single judges of this court in bomab rustom irani v. state of maharastra and anr reported in 2007 all mr (cri) 1930 : (2007) 4 air bom r 697; shriram s/o nagordhar mahajan v. state of maharastra and anr. reported in 2006 all mr (cri) 1311 : (2006) 3 air bom r 252; wajidulla s/o ibadulla and ors. v. alamkhan s/o raufkhan and ors. reported in 2006 all mr (cri) 3035, submitted that the provisions of law comprised under section 401 of the code of criminal procedure clearly require an opportunity of being heard to every person who can be affected by the order to be passed in the revision application. drawing attention to the judgment dated 10th july 2007, passed in the said writ petition, he submitted that the effect of the order is to commence investigation for the offences alleged to have been committed by the applicants which could warrant the arrest of the applicants and, therefore, the order is apparently prejudicial to the interest of the applicants and, yet there was no opportunity to the applicants of being heard in the matter before passing the said judgment. according to the learned senior counsel, therefore, the impugned judgment ex facie discloses contravention of the provisions of law comprised under section 401 of the code of criminal procedure which would justify recalling of the said judgment in exercise of the powers under section 362 of the code of criminal procedure. he further submitted that it has been consistent view taken by the learned single judges of this court that even in cases where the order rejecting issue of process is challenged by way of revision application by complainant, such an order of the magistrate is not to be interfered with unless the person named as the accused in such a complaint is heard in the matter. the learned advocate appearing for the applicants also sought to rely upon two additional decisions, one is of the apex court in bhagirath v. kana ram and anr. reported in 2001 cri lj 122 and another is the unreported decision of the learned single judge of this court in the matter of criminal writ petition no. 462 of 2005 delivered on 1-3-2006.9. the learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the provisions of law comprised under section 362 of cr.p.c. are not meant for review of the order but are merely in relation to clerical mistakes and similar such corrections in a judgment. he further submitted that at the stage of issuance of process, there is no right vested in the accused person to be heard in the matter. that being the case, the question of accused person insisting for right to hear at the revisional stage against the order of the magistrate accepting a negative report filed by the police authorities or the order directing investigation in the nature of order under section 156(3) of the code of criminal procedure does not arise. attention was drawn to the decision in the matter of simrikhia v. dolley mukherjee and chhabi mukherjee and anr. reported in : (1990)2scc437a and chandra deo singh v. prokash chandra bose alias chabi bose and anr. reported in : [1964]1scr639 .10. at the outset it is to be noted that it is a fact that writ petition no. 1148 of 2007 was disposed of by the judgment dated 10th july 2007 directing proper investigation in relation to mecr no. 02 of 2005 which was registered at vakola police station. mumbai, while setting aside negative report submitted earlier by the police to the metropolitan magistrate which was accepted by the said magistrate under order dated 18th april 2007 and, simultaneously the investigating agency was directed to give 72 hours advance notice to the applicants in case any one of them or all of them were required to be arrested. equally it is true that none of the applicants was party to the said writ petition nor they were heard in the matter. however, it is undisputed fact that the said order was sought to be challenged by the applicants before the apex court without any success as the permission to file slp by the applicants against the said order was rejected by the apex court on 3rd january 2008. it is settled law that mere rejection of slp does not amount to merger of the order of this court in the order of apex court and being so, the jurisdiction of this court to review its order remains unaffected in case the applicant is able to make out a case for review of such order.11. section 401 of the code of criminal procedure deals with the revisional powers of the high court and, sub-section (2) thereof provides that no order under the said section should be passed to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. it cannot be disputed nor it is disputed before us that exercise of powers under article 226 of the constitution of india while dealing with the matters on criminal side, the courts will have to have due regard to the provisions of section 401 of the code of criminal procedure. in other words, it cannot also be disputed that any order which can be passed in exercise of the powers either in writ jurisdiction or in revisional jurisdiction, same should not be without giving sufficient opportunity of being heard to all persons who can be affected by an order to be passed therein.12. section 362 of the code of criminal procedure provides that save as otherwise provided by this code or by any other law for the time being in force, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. certainly a case of failure on the part of the court to hear necessary party to the proceedings or a person, who could be affected by the order to be passed, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be a clerical or arithmetical mistake. the sole ground in the present application to seek relief in the nature of recalling of the judgment dated 10th july 2007 in the said writ petition being alleged failure on the part of the court to hear the applicants before passing the said judgment, the question of exercising the powers under section 362 cannot arise. this, however, does not mean that this court cannot exercise its inherent power to review or recall any such order in a justifiable case.13. as already stated above, the judgment dated 10th july 2007 was passed in writ petition no. 1148 of 2007 merely directing proper investigation in relation to mecr no. 02 of 2005 and further setting aside negative report submitted by the police pursuant to its earlier investigation. undoubtedly, it is also observed in the said judgment that 72 hours advance notice should be given in case the investigating officer requires the accused persons or any one of them to be taken into their custody. apart from making wild claim that such an order is prejudicial to the interest of the applicants, neither in the application nor in the course of arguments, the applicants have been able to elaborate as to how or in what way or the manner in which such an order can be said to be prejudicial to the interest of the applicants. it cannot be forgotten that the law is well settled to the effect that prior to issuance of process, the accused person has no right to be heard in the matter nor he is entitled to lead any evidence in the matter. in other words, till and until the process is issued, there is no occasion for the accused to contend that the order issuing process would be prejudicial order to him and, therefore, the accused must be heard before issuing the process. indeed, this proposition of law is not disputed in the present matter. whole stress has been laid on the expression, 'to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard' in section 401 of the code of criminal procedure.14. as already seen above, the law on the point that the accused is not entitled to be heard before issuing the process is well settled. the order dated 10th july 2007 in the writ petition ex facie discloses reference to the stage much prior to the order relating to issue of process. it is also pertinent to note that in cases where the order is passed by the magistrate under section 156(3) of the code of criminal procedure, there is no right in favour of the accused person to be heard before issuing such order. from these provisions of law and the stage at which the order dated 10th july 2007 came to be passed by this court, it cannot be said that the said order is prejudicial to the applicants or any one of them in any manner.15. it is true that apart from setting aside the negative report and directing investigation in the matter, the order dated 10th july 2007 also observes requirement of 72 hours prior notice to the applicants in case they are required to be taken in custody by the investigating agency. it was sought to be contended that by the said observation this court has virtually nullified the effect of the order of grant of anticipatory bail which was confirmed by the learned single judge of this court and was not interfered with by the apex court. we find no substance in this contention. the said observation nowhere relates to the subject which was dealt with in the order of the sessions court in anticipatory bail proceedings, confirmed by the learned single judge of this court and which was not interfered with by the apex court in slp no. 3817 of 2006. besides, it is an undisputed fact that similar ground of challenge was raised before the apex court in slp no. 16533 of 2007 which was preferred by the applicants against the judgment dated 10th july 2007 without any success. and the apex court did not entertain the slp even on the said ground. though, therefore, there is no merger of the order dated 10th july 2007 in the order passed by the apex court rejecting the slp, the fact remains that the observation in the order of 10th july 2007 were not found to be necessary to be interfered with by the apex court while rejecting the slp. it can, therefore, safely be, said that the order of learned single judge in relation to anticipatory ball stood modified by the order dated 10-7-2007 of the division bench with the approval thereof by the apex court.16. there being no prejudicial order as such passed in the judgment dated 10th july 2007 to the interest of the applicants or any one of them, and hence, the question of recalling of the said order does not arise at all.17. the apex court in a.k. subbaiah case while dealing with the provisions of law comprised under section 401(2). of the code of criminal procedure has held that the said section talks of a situation where an order is being passed against any person. it was observed that:apparently this sub-section contemplates a situation where a person may not be an accused person before the court below but one who might have been discharged and therefore if the revisional court after exercising jurisdiction under section 401 wants to pass an order to the prejudice of such a person, it is necessary that, that person should be given an opportunity of hearing but it does not contemplate any contingency of hearing of any person who is neither part in the proceedings in the court below nor is expected at any stage even after the revision to be joined as party.referring to the last part of the above quoted sentence from the judgment of the supreme court, it was strenuously argued that even if the applicants are to be joined subsequently on issuance of process, it would be requirement of section 401(2) of the code of criminal procedure that the applicants ought to be heard in writ petition no. 1148 of 2007. the contention is totally devoid of substance. the apex court has in clear terms observed that a person who is neither party to the proceedings in the court below nor is expected at any stage even after the revision to be joined as the party would be necessary to be heard in the matter. the expression 'expected at any stage even after the revision' refers to the stage immediately after disposal of revision either at the original stage i.e. before the magistrate court or before the sessions court. it does not contemplate a situation where joining of the party requires further adjudication and application of mind by the judicial authority and order to that effect before the such party to be joined as the party to the proceedings. in other words, in a case where investigation is yet to be completed, the report is yet to be filed, the magistrate is yet to apply his mind about necessity of issuing process, in such a case, it cannot be said that the expression in the judgment 'expected at any stage even after the revision' would also include such stages. undisputedly, till the stage of issuance of process, there is no requirement of joining of the applicants or any one of them as the parties or party to the proceedings. being so, by no stretch of imagination, the said expression in the said judgment can be construed to mean that it would include even the stage of issuance of process. the decision in the a.k. subbaiah case does not help the applicants to contend that in writ petition no. 1148 of 2007 they were required to be heard before passing the order dated 10th july 2007. every observation in the judgment has to be understood with reference to the facts of the case. it has been clearly held by the apex court in state of rajasthan v. ganesh lal reported in : (2008)illj670sc that:a decision is a precedent on its own facts. each case presents its own features. it is not everything said by a judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. the only thing in a judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. according to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. an inferential finding of facts is the inference which the judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. a decision is an authority for what it actually decides. what is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. the enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. see : state of orissa v. sudhansu sekhar misra and ors. : (1970)illj662sc and union of india and ors. v. dhanwanti devi and ors. : (1996)6scc44 . a case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. the words used by judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in act of parliament.18. the apex court in a.k. subbaiah case was dealing with a matter wherein the accused had challenged the process issued by the trial court by filing a revision application before the high court. in the revision petition, in addition to the state government, the accused had joined certain other parties and the high court had admitted the petition and ordered issuance of notice to the respondents but had directed deletion of certain parties on the ground that they were not necessary parties to the proceedings, which order was sought to be challenged by way of appeal before the apex court. the question was of proprietary and correctness of the order of deletion of those parties. that was a case where the process was already issued wherein certain parties, while dealing with the revision application, were ordered to be deleted. in the background of those facts, the above quoted observations were made while dealing with section 401(2) of the code of criminal procedure.19. in p. sundarrajan case, the apex court held that the high court had erred in not giving an opportunity to the party of being heard in the matter and, therefore, there was violation of principles of natural justice before passing adverse order against the party. in that case, a complaint was filed against the appellants before the apex court for an offence punishable under section 420 of the indian penal code. the complaint was dismissed in the appeal as the order of dismissal was sought to be challenged by the complainant without issuing any notice to the accused who were appellants before the apex court. the high court passed an order in favour of the complainant on the basis of materials produced by the complainant and without taking into consideration the defence that was available to the accused who were the appellants before the apex court. in those facts, the apex court held that the appellants were entitled for being heard as the high court had passed adverse order against them. it was a case where the dismissal of the complaint was after issuance of the process. being so, the said decision is of no help to the applicants.20. in bomab irani case (2007) 4 bom r 697 the learned single judge of this high court undisputedly had held that section 401(2) of the code of criminal procedure requires revisional court to hear the accused or any other person if the court proposes to make any order adverse to such persons. as already held above, the judgment dated 10th july 2007 does not contain any order adverse to the interest of the applicants and in any case, before the stage of issue of process, question of hearing the accused even in revlslonal jurisdiction does not arise.21. in shriram mahajan case (2006) 3 air bom r 252 the learned single judge had placed reliance in the decision of apex court in the case of a.k. subbaiah (supra) and in the case of suresh s/o latari ramteke v. state of maharashtra reported in 2002 all mr (cri) 2230 and had held that the accused therein was required to be heard while disposing the revision petition. similar is the case in the matter of wajidulla s/o ibadulla (supra). in none of these cases, the learned single judges have considered as to whether even in a case where revision application is filed at the stage prior to issuance of process, whether it would be necessary for the court to hear the accused or not. being so, the said decisions are of no help to the applicants.22. in chandra deo singh case : [1964]1scr639 , the apex court had clearly ruled that,it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of chapter xvi of the code of criminal procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. this does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a magistrate. he may remain present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. but since the very question for consideration being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation, he has not right to take part in the proceedings nor has the magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. it would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to the magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person.it was also held therein:it is the bounden duty of the magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interests of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of the material placed before him by the complainant. whatever defence the accused may have can only be enquired into at the trial. an enquiry under section 202 can in no sense be characterized as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry.same principle would apply in a case at the stage of investigation by the police. any interference by the accused in the investigation can definitely prejudice the investigation itself and, therefore, the question of hearing the accused at the stage of investigation cannot arise.23. in simrikhia case 362 of cr.p.c. are not meant for review of the order but are merely in relation to clerical mistakes and similar such corrections in a judgment. he further submitted that at the stage of issuance of process, there is no right vested in the accused person to be heard in the matter. that being the case, the question of accused person insisting for right to hear at the revisional stage against the order of the magistrate accepting a negative report filed by the police authorities or the order directing investigation in the nature of order under section 156(3) of the code of criminal procedure does not arise. attention was drawn to the decision in the matter of simrikhia v. dolley mukherjee and chhabi mukherjee and anr. reported in : (1990)2scc437a , it was clearly ruled that inherent power of the high court under section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice and such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the code. therefore there being no right assured to the accused of being heard before issuance of process, the question of accused persons insisting for hearing at the stage of revision application prior to the stage of issuance of process cannot arise, unless albeit as exceptional case is made out for exercise of writ jurisdiction even in such a case.24. hence, there is no substance in the contentions sought to be raised in the matter and, therefore, the application falls.25. for the reasons stated above, the application is hereby dismissed with costs.