| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/365207 |
| Subject | Labour and Industrial |
| Court | Mumbai High Court |
| Decided On | Sep-17-2007 |
| Case Number | W.P. No. 4627 of 2001 |
| Judge | Nishita Mhatre, J. |
| Reported in | 2007(6)ALLMR724; 2007(6)MhLj704 |
| Acts | Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act; Deccan Merchants Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Standing Orders, 1993 - Order 20(1), 21(1), 22 and 30 |
| Appellant | Avadhoot Maruti Rao Rane |
| Respondent | Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. and ors. |
| Appellant Advocate | Rajesh S. Datar, Adv. |
| Respondent Advocate | A.P. Purav, Adv. for respondent No. 1 |
| Disposition | Petition dismissed |
Excerpt:
- article 14: [r.m. lodha, s.a. bobde & s.b. deshmukh, jj] retiral benefit - classification between part time lecturers and full time teachers held, the part-time lecturers form a class by themselves and the said classification between part time lecturers and full-time teachers for purpose of granting retrial benefits cannot be said to be unconstitutional or bad in law -- consumer protection act, 1986 -- article 16; right to pension held, it is true that the pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer. however, the right of pension is always subject to the rules. it is not inherent in the employment. though pension is a payment for a past service rendered and it is a social welfare measure, but it is well settled that an employee is not entitled to pension de hors the rules. in the instant case the government resolution dated 21.7.1983 held that the said pension scheme is only applicable to the employees covered therein. a part time teacher, unfortunately, is not covered by the said scheme and, therefore, not entitled.
retirement benefit; differentiation between full time teachers and part-time lecturers government resolution providing for retrial benefits to full-time teaching staff part-time lecturer were not entitled to said benefit held, it is true that the pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer. however, the right of pension is always subject to the rules. it is not inherent in the employment. though pension is a payment for a past service rendered and it is a social welfare measure, but it is well settled that an employee is not entitled to pension de hors the rules. in the instant case the government resolution dated 21.7.1983 held that the said pension scheme is only applicable to the employees covered therein. a part time teacher, unfortunately, is not covered by the said scheme and, therefore, not entitled.
- on 13-10-1998, the respondent bank, not being satisfied with the objections raised by the petitioner about the enquiry officer's report accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and discharged the petitioner from service. the labour court therefore, held that the punishment of discharge was bad in law and set aside the punishment.nishita mhatre, j.1. the petition challenges the order passed by the labour court in complaint (ulp) no. 595 of 1998. the labour court had allowed the complaint and directed the respondent bank to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and full backwages. the industrial court has allowed the revision application filed by the respondent and set aside the order of the labour court.2. the petitioner was employed with the respondent bank for about 17 years as a cashier. on 25-2-1993 a showcause notice was issued to him alleging that he had misappropriated an amount of rs. 55000/- on 29-1-1993. admittedly, the petitioner was not on duty on 29-1-1993. however, when the bank manager opened the cash counter on that day i.e. on 29-1-1993 it was found that there was shortage of cash of rs. 55000/-. the bank manager visited the residence of the petitioner when he was not present. the relatives of the petitioner paid the amount to the bank manager immediately. on 1-3-1993, the general manager of the respondent bank obtained a letter of apology from the petitioner, admitting his guilt. according to the petitioner, this letter was obtained by misguiding him and taking undue advantage of his personal difficulties. the petitioner claims that an assurance was given to him that no action would be taken on the basis of the show-cause notice issued earlier on account of the letter of apology. on 4-3-1993 the petitioner replied to the showcause notice and stated that he was being made a scapegoat for the shortage of cash on 29-1-1993. the petitioner was then suspended from work on 16-3-1993 i.e. immediately after he resumed duty after sanctioned leave.3. the petitioner filed complaint (ulp) no. 454 of 1994 alleging that the respondent bank was indulged in unfair labour practices under item 1(a), (b), (d) and (g) of schedule iv of the mrtu & pulp act. this complaint was partly allowed by the labour court. it was declared that the bank had indulged in unfair labour practice as the report and findings of the enquiry officer were not furnished to the petitioner. the revision application preferred by the respondent bank was dismissed.4. thereafter the bank supplied copies of the report of the enquiry officer to the petitioner. the petitioner submitted his comments on the enquiry officer's report. on 13-10-1998, the respondent bank, not being satisfied with the objections raised by the petitioner about the enquiry officer's report accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and discharged the petitioner from service. complaint (ulp) no. 591 of 1998 was filed by the petitioner under item l(a), (b), (d) and (g) of schedule iv of the mrtu & pulp act. the issue in respect of the perversity of the findings of the enquiry officer was decided on 11-11-1989. the labour court found that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse. on 20-12-2000, the labour court on the basis of the evidence before it came to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed a misconduct. however, it held that the punishment of discharge imposed by the bank could not have awarded to the petitioner since under the standing orders applicable the employee could only be punished by way of dismissal or warning or censure or fine. the labour court therefore, held that the punishment of discharge was bad in law and set aside the punishment. the labour court directed the respondent bank to reinstate the workman with continuity of service and backwages.5. being aggrieved by the decision of the labour court, the respondent bank preferred a revision application (ulp) no. 16 of 2001. the industrial court held that the labour court had wrongly interpreted the provisions of the standing orders. it was held that the standing order 20(1) was in respect of termination of service by way of discharge. this was not a specific punishment which was included in standing order 22, under which the punishments for proven misconduct are enumerated. the industrial court concluded that termination of service by way of discharge was a lesser punishment which could be imposed. the industrial court came to the conclusion that it was always open for the respondent bank to award a lesser punishment rather than the harsh punishment of dismissal. according to the industrial court, the order of discharge was not stigmatic as is an order of dismissal. the industrial court observed that the respondent-bank had considered the past service record of the petitioner and had awarded a lesser punishment.6. the main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order of discharge by way of punishment is not justifiable as the standing orders do not enumerate discharge as a punishment which can be imposed when the misconduct is proved. he submits that the industrial court has erroneously interfered with the judgment of the labour court while concluding that the standing orders which were applicable permitted the bank to award punishment by way of discharge.7. the learned advocate for the respondent-bank submits that a lesser punishment can always be imposed by the bank although not so stipulated in the standing orders. according to him, the punishment of dismissal would encompass within itself the lesser punishment of discharge and therefore, the labour court had erred in allowing the complaint only on this aspect. she submits that the industrial court has committed no error by allowing the revision application. apart from this, she points out that the standing orders were amended and notified on 18-5-1993. the petitioner was discharged from service on 13-10-1998 by which time 1993 standing orders had become applicable to the respondent bank. under standing order 30 of these amended standing orders, 'discharge' under order 21(1) is one of the punishments enumerated for an act of misconduct. that being the position, it would not be necessary for me to consider whether a lesser punishment of discharge can be imposed when the standing orders stipulate such a punishment for misconduct. both the courts below have found that the misconduct had been proved. the respondent bank after considering the past service record of the petitioner has discharged the petitioner.8. in my view, the industrial court has committed no error in allowing the revision application and dismissing the complaint.9. petition dismissed. rule discharged. no costs.
Judgment:Nishita Mhatre, J.
1. The petition challenges the order passed by the Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 595 of 1998. The Labour Court had allowed the complaint and directed the respondent bank to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and full backwages. The Industrial Court has allowed the revision application filed by the respondent and set aside the order of the Labour Court.
2. The petitioner was employed with the respondent bank for about 17 years as a cashier. On 25-2-1993 a showcause notice was issued to him alleging that he had misappropriated an amount of Rs. 55000/- on 29-1-1993. Admittedly, the petitioner was not on duty on 29-1-1993. However, when the bank manager opened the cash counter on that day i.e. on 29-1-1993 it was found that there was shortage of cash of Rs. 55000/-. The bank manager visited the residence of the petitioner when he was not present. The relatives of the petitioner paid the amount to the bank manager immediately. On 1-3-1993, the General Manager of the respondent bank obtained a letter of apology from the petitioner, admitting his guilt. According to the petitioner, this letter was obtained by misguiding him and taking undue advantage of his personal difficulties. The petitioner claims that an assurance was given to him that no action would be taken on the basis of the show-cause notice issued earlier on account of the letter of apology. On 4-3-1993 the petitioner replied to the showcause notice and stated that he was being made a scapegoat for the shortage of cash on 29-1-1993. The petitioner was then suspended from work on 16-3-1993 i.e. immediately after he resumed duty after sanctioned leave.
3. The petitioner filed complaint (ULP) No. 454 of 1994 alleging that the respondent bank was indulged in unfair labour practices under Item 1(a), (b), (d) and (g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. This complaint was partly allowed by the Labour Court. It was declared that the bank had indulged in unfair labour practice as the report and findings of the enquiry officer were not furnished to the petitioner. The revision application preferred by the Respondent bank was dismissed.
4. Thereafter the bank supplied copies of the report of the enquiry officer to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his comments on the Enquiry Officer's report. On 13-10-1998, the respondent bank, not being satisfied with the objections raised by the petitioner about the enquiry officer's report accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and discharged the petitioner from service. Complaint (ULP) No. 591 of 1998 was filed by the petitioner under Item l(a), (b), (d) and (g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. The issue in respect of the perversity of the findings of the enquiry officer was decided on 11-11-1989. The Labour Court found that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse. On 20-12-2000, the Labour Court on the basis of the evidence before it came to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed a misconduct. However, it held that the punishment of discharge imposed by the bank could not have awarded to the petitioner since under the standing orders applicable the employee could only be punished by way of dismissal or warning or censure or fine. The Labour Court therefore, held that the punishment of discharge was bad in law and set aside the punishment. The Labour Court directed the respondent bank to reinstate the workman with continuity of service and backwages.
5. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Labour Court, the respondent bank preferred a Revision Application (ULP) No. 16 of 2001. The Industrial Court held that the Labour Court had wrongly interpreted the provisions of the Standing Orders. It was held that the standing Order 20(1) was in respect of termination of service by way of discharge. This was not a specific punishment which was included in Standing Order 22, under which the punishments for proven misconduct are enumerated. The Industrial Court concluded that termination of service by way of discharge was a lesser punishment which could be imposed. The Industrial Court came to the conclusion that it was always open for the respondent bank to award a lesser punishment rather than the harsh punishment of dismissal. According to the Industrial Court, the order of discharge was not stigmatic as is an order of dismissal. The Industrial Court observed that the respondent-bank had considered the past service record of the petitioner and had awarded a lesser punishment.
6. The main submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the order of discharge by way of punishment is not justifiable as the standing orders do not enumerate discharge as a punishment which can be imposed when the misconduct is proved. He submits that the Industrial Court has erroneously interfered with the judgment of the Labour Court while concluding that the standing orders which were applicable permitted the bank to award punishment by way of discharge.
7. The learned advocate for the respondent-bank submits that a lesser punishment can always be imposed by the bank although not so stipulated in the standing orders. According to him, the punishment of dismissal would encompass within itself the lesser punishment of discharge and therefore, the Labour Court had erred in allowing the complaint only on this aspect. She submits that the Industrial Court has committed no error by allowing the revision application. Apart from this, she points out that the standing orders were amended and notified on 18-5-1993. The petitioner was discharged from service on 13-10-1998 by which time 1993 standing orders had become applicable to the respondent bank. Under standing Order 30 of these amended standing orders, 'discharge' under Order 21(1) is one of the punishments enumerated for an act of misconduct. That being the position, it would not be necessary for me to consider whether a lesser punishment of discharge can be imposed when the standing orders stipulate such a punishment for misconduct. Both the Courts below have found that the misconduct had been proved. The Respondent bank after considering the past service record of the petitioner has discharged the petitioner.
8. In my view, the Industrial Court has committed no error in allowing the revision application and dismissing the complaint.
9. Petition dismissed. Rule discharged. No costs.