Bakulabai Vithoba Palampalle Vs. Rajnabai Prabhodchandra Muchala and ors. - Court Judgment

T.D. Sugla, J.

1.This appeal is by the appellant, the original applicant, who is the mother of the deceased Govinda Vithoba Palampalle. On the ground that the deceased died during the course of and out of employment with respondent No. 2, original opponent No. 2, a partnership firm of two partners who are respondent Nos. 1 and 3 herein, the applicant filed a claim for Rs. 23,100/- as compensation. The deceased, it may be stated, was a driver of truck bearing No. MRL 2652 which belonged to the opponents. While the truck was parked in front of the deceased's room on 19th July, 1981, some dacoits threw explosives on him which resulted in a fatal injury and the deceased died in hospital on 21st July, 1981.

2. However, the Commissioner has not gone into the merits of the claim for compensation as he was of the view that the claim could be disposed of on a short point. The short point, according to him, was that the applicant was the mother of the deceased and the question was whether she was or was not 'dependant' of the deceased within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Referring to the evidence of the applicant in which she had admitted that her husband was also doing manual work, the Commissioner held that she was no 'dependant' within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (d) (i) and was, therefore, not entitled to any compensation on that technical ground.

3. Mrs. Doshi, the learned counsel for the applicant, referred to Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act for the proposition that parents would be dependent on the deceased even if he or she was part-dependent on the earnings of the workman. Of course if she was a widowed mother, then even dependency was not the requirement of the Section.

4. None appears on behalf of the respondents. In fact none had appeared on behalf of the opponents before the Commissioner also.

5. Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act, which defines the expression 'dependant', reads as under:

2 (1) In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

(d) 'dependant' means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely-

(i) a widow, a minor legitimate son, an unmarried legitimate daughter, or a widowed mother; and

(ii) if wholly dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, a son or a daughter who has attained the age of 18 years and who is infirm;

(iii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death,-

(a) XXX XXX XXX(b) a parent other than a widowed mother.

Sub-clause (i) provides that a widow, a minor legitimate son and unmarried legitimate daughter or a widowed mother are dependants without any other condition. Sub-clause (iii) provides that persons mentioned in that sub-clause would be dependants if they are fully or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death. Under (b) of Sub-clause (iii) is mentioned 'a parent other than a widowed mother'. The applicant is admittedly the mother of the deceased and is, thus, a parent other than a widowed mother as her husband is alive. The only question to be considered, therefore, is whether she was wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death. As stated earlier, none has appeared on behalf of the opponents before the Commissioner or before this court. Therefore, whatever evidence was produced before the Commissioner on behalf of the applicant has remained unchallenged. This evidence is in the shape of the affidavit of the applicant and her statement before the court. On perusal of the affidavit and her evidence, it is seen that her family has been dependent on the earnings of her deceased son though her husband is also doing some manual job. In my judgment, the inference drawn by the Commissioner from this statement that she was not a 'dependant' and, therefore, not entitled to claim compensation was clearly unjustified. As a natural corollary, it will have to be held that the Commissioner was not justified in rejecting her claim application in limine. The impugned order is accordingly set aside. As the mother is very old, the accident having taken place on 19th July, 1981, it is in the fitness of things that the claim application is heard and disposed of afresh by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of this judgment. Needless to mention that the Commissioner will consider, along with the quantum of compensation, the question of interest and penalty etc. and decide the whole matter according to law.

6. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. The matter is remanded back to the court below with the above directions for decision afresh.