SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/363577 |
Subject | Tenancy |
Court | Mumbai High Court |
Decided On | Jun-22-2000 |
Case Number | Writ Petition No. 5000 of 1986 |
Judge | A.M. Khanwilkar, J. |
Reported in | 2000(4)ALLMR105; 2001(1)BomCR157 |
Acts | Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 - Sections 32F(1) and 32G |
Appellant | Shri Rangrao Nivritti Lad and ors. |
Respondent | Vishnu Joti Thorbole and anr. |
Advocates: | M.R. Katikar, Adv. |
Disposition | Writ petition allowed |
Excerpt:
bombay tenancy and agricultural lands act, 1948 - section 32-p(2) r/w section 32-f(1)(a) - eviction - no exercise of right to purchase the suit land within two years from the date of death of the landlady - tenant lost right to remain on suit land as a tenant - tenant liable to be evicted.;in view of the provisions under section 32-f(1)(a), it was incumbent upon the tenant to give intimation of his willingness to purchase the suit land to the successors of the deceased landlady within two years from her death. it is admitted position that such intimation has not been given by the tenant. in the circumstances, the tahsildar has rightly concluded that the tenant had lost his right to remain in the suit land as tenant. ;as per section 32-p it is the duty of the agricultural lands tribunal to evict such a person and dispose of the land in the manner provided by sub-section (2) of section 32-p. - section 10: [swatanter kumar, c.j., a.p. deshpande & smt. nishita mhatre, jj] admission to professional colleges - technical courses - publication of brochure on basis of which candidates seek admission to various institution keeping in mind their merit and preference of colleges held, for ensuring adherence to proper appreciation of an academic course, it is essential that the method of admission is just, fair and transparent. the first step in this direction would be publication of a brochure on the basis of which the applicants are supposed to aspire for admission to various institution keeping in mind their merit and preference of college. brochure, firstly has to be in conformity with law and the statutory scheme notified by the competent authority. it is a complete and composite document as it deals with the scheme for conducting their entrance examinations, declaration of results, general instructions and method of admission, etc. this brochure is binding on the applicants as well as the authorities. this brochure or admission notification issued by the state or other competent authority cannot be altered at a subsequent stage particularly once the process of admission has begun. there is hardly any exception to this accepted rule of law.
section 10: [swatanter kumar, c.j., a.p. deshpande & smt. nishita mhatre,jj] admission to professional colleges - technical courses - approval to additional seats or to start new course - cut off dates held, the settled principle of law is that merit of the applicant is the primary criteria which would determine his rank as well as the college where he would be entitled to admission. this rule should not be frustrated as it will tantamount to entirely upsetting the object of admissions based on merit oriented method and would cast cloud on the fairness and transparency of the method of admission. one of the ways in which merit can be defeated is allowing increase in the intake strength or commencement if new colleges beyond cut-off date and admissions beyond the last date specified in the notification/calendar issued by the concerned authorities. this can be illustrated by giving an example. college a which is running a professional course like engineering or mba etc. has an intake capacity of 60 seats which has duly been notified in the information brochure. however, after the cut-off date, approval is granted by the aicte and thereafter, the process is taken up by the state and the intake capacity of the college is increased by 30 more seats. these seats would obviously, not be notified in the information brochure and the candidate who are meritorious and for whom college a; be the college of reference could not get seats or give preference as the seats were limited. none had the proper knowledge about the increase in intake of seats though at a much subsequent stage and may be even after the last date of admission is over either by themselves or under the order of the court even it is put on the internet or given in the newspaper, the candidates of higher rank or meritorious candidates would not be able to avail of that benefit because they have already submitted the testimonial, have paid their fees and the courses have commenced. in that situation, for variety of reasons, they may not be able to take admission in the institution of their higher preference while the candidates of much lower merit will be admitted to that course. besides defeating the merit, it has been commonly noticed that the late admissions made by the colleges directly effect notified candidates who have questioned it more than often as their admission process is not so just, fair and transparent which has given rise to the litigation. it is also a kind of back door entry method. another serious consequence that result from such admissions is shortening of the academic courses in an undesirable manner. it is expected of other candidate selected to a professional course that he or she would complete the course in its entirety and not by missing more than a month or so in joining the said course. this results in lowering the excellence of education as well as harms the academic standard of professional education.
admission to professional colleges: [swatanter kumar, c.j., a.p. deshpande & smt. nishita mhatre, jj] technical courses - held, in process of admission to professional colleges relating to technical courses, primarily three institutional bodies are involved. (i) all india technical council for technical education, (ii) state of maharashtra through director of technical education and (iii) university to which such institution is affiliated the role of all these institutions in distinct and different but for a common object. primary of the rule of all india council for technical education (aicte) is now well settled but that certainly does not mean that role of the state government and for that matter the university is without any purpose or of no importance. the council is the authority constituted under the central act with the responsibility of maintaining education standards and judging upon the infra-structure and facilities available for imparting such professional education. its opinion is of utmost importance and shall take precedence over views of the state as well as that of the university. the concerned department of the state and the affiliating university has a role to pay but it is limited in its application. they cannot lay down any guidelines or policies which would be in conflict with the central statute or the students laid down a by the central body. state can frame its policy for admission to such professional courses but such policy again has to be in conformity with the directives issued by the central body. while the state grants its approval and university its affiliation for increased intake of seats or commencement for a new course/college, its directions should not offend and be repugnant to what has been laid down in the condition of approval granted by the central authority or council. what is most important is that all these authorities have to work ad idem as they all have a common object to achieve i.e. of proper imparting of education an ensuring maintenance of proper standards of education, examination and ensuring proper infrastructure for betterment of educational system. only if all these authorities work in a co-ordinated manner and with co-operation they would be able to achieve the very object for which all these entities exist
admission to professional courses: [swatanter kumar, c.j.,a.p. deshpande & smt. nishita mhatre, jj] admission schedule - interference by courts held, all the expert bodies viz. aicte as well as directorate of education in consultation with the departments of the state regulating the process of admission and maintenance of standards of education had notified a legal binding document specifying dates and schedule for various matters in relation to admission of students and commencement of courses. there has to be so compelling circumstances and grounds before the court to interfere with the prescribed schedule. it is neither so arbitrary nor so perverse, keeping in view the essential features relating to imparting education to professional courses that it should invite judicial chastisement to the extent of laying down entirely new schedule. merely because there has been some delay on the part of either of these authorities to timely grant of either of these authorities to timely grant or decline approval and permission to commence a course per se would not be sufficient ground for disturbing the notified schedule and timely commencement of courses. - 1 having failed to exercise the said option became liable to be evicted from the suit land under section 32-p(1) of the act. the appellate court took the view that failure of the respondent no. this conclusion is clearly contrary to the purport of section 32-p of the act. counsel for the petitioners i am of the view that the tribunal clearly misdirected itself in not adverting to the main issue, which according to the tahsildar went to the root of the matter. that the consequences of failure to give intimation by the tenant within the stipulated period is that the tenant becomes liable to be evicted from the land under section 32-p of the act. 7. accordingly, the decision of the appellate court as well as the tribunal is set aside and the conclusion reached by the tahsildar, tasgaon is restored.a.m. khanwilkar, j.1. this petition has been filed by the original defendants 1 to 10 land owners in respect of survey no. 743/2 situated at village kundal, taluka tasgaon. the suit land originally belonged to shri daulu nana thorbole who had four daughters. the suit land was bequeathed by him by executing a will as back as in the year 1919 in favour of one of the daughters smt. radhabai w/o bhau ghadage, the predecessor in title of the petitioner herein. the respondent no. 1 claims to be the tenant in respect of the said suit land.2. the petitioners herein filed a suit being suit no. 187 of 1970. another suit came to be filed by the respondent no. 2 herein being civil suit no. 1 of 1972. both the suits were filed for declaration and possession. in the said suits the respondent no. 1 raised a plea that he was the tenant of deceased radhabai ghadage; and therefore requested the civil court to frame issue as to whether he was the tenant in respect of the suit land, so that the said issue can be referred to the tenancy court for its decision in view of the provisions of the bombay tenancy act. accordingly issue no. 10 was framed by civil court which reads thus :'issue no. 10 : does defendant no. 11 prove that he is a tenant in respect of the suit land ?'3. the said reference was made before the tahsildar, tasgaon, who in turn, after considering the materials on record, answered the said issue in the negative and against the respondent no. 1. according to the tahsildar the said radhabai had died on 24-2-1970 and the respondent no. 1 was very much aware about her death and therefore it was incumbent upon him to give intimation for purchase of land before 24-2-1972 to all the successors of radhabai i.e. petitioners herein as required by section 32-f(1)(a) of the act. the tahsildar therefore held that the respondent no. 1 having failed to exercise the said option became liable to be evicted from the suit land under section 32-p(1) of the act. the tahsildar therefore concluded that the respondent no. 1 had lost his right to continue on the land as tenant, even assuming that he was inducted initially as tenant.4. the respondent no. 1 took up the matter in appeal before the deputy collector, sangli. the appellate court by its judgment and order dated 19-9-1981 was pleased to allow the appeal. according to the appellate court it was not open to the petitioners to challenge the status of respondent no. 1 as a tenant having regard to the previous proceedings under section 32-g of the act. moreover, with regard to the crucial question which found favour with the tahsildar to negative the claim of respondent no. 1, the appellate court totally misdirected itself. the appellate court took the view that failure of the respondent no. 1 to give intimation, as required under section 32-f(1)(a), did not visit him with the consequence of taking away his right to continue as a tenant in the suit land. this conclusion is clearly contrary to the purport of section 32-p of the act. the appellate court accordingly allowed the appeal and declared that the respondent no. 1 was a tenant in the suit land.5. the petitioners challenged the said decision of the appellate court before the maharashtra revenue tribunal, kolhapur. the tribunal, although referred to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, has not adverted to the main issue which had found favour with the tahsildar. naturally, the tribunal has not examined the correctness of the view taken by the appellate court on the said matter.6. after considering the arguments advanced by the ld. counsel for the petitioners i am of the view that the tribunal clearly misdirected itself in not adverting to the main issue, which according to the tahsildar went to the root of the matter. at the first blush i was inclined to remand the matter to the tribunal to consider the same afresh, however, since the proceedings are pending since year 1974, i thought it appropriate to decide the matter on merits as the issue involved is a pure question of law which could be decided on the basis of admitted facts. it is seen that the original owner radhabai died on 24-2-1970 and the respondent was fully aware of her death being her cousin brother. it is nobody's case that respondent no. 1 was not aware of the death of the said radhabai. since these facts are admitted, in view of the provisions under section 32f(1)(a), it was incumbent upon the respondent no. 1 to give intimation of his willingness to purchase the suit land to the successors of the deceased radhabai within two years from the death of radhabai i.e. before 24-6-1972. it is admitted position that such intimation has not been given by the respondent no. 1. in the circumstances, the tahsildar has rightly concluded that the respondent no. 1 had lost his right to remain in the suit land as tenant. in my view, both the appellate court as well as the tribunal, were clearly misdirected in not considering the matter from this perspective. that the consequences of failure to give intimation by the tenant within the stipulated period is that the tenant becomes liable to be evicted from the land under section 32-p of the act. in this case the respondent no. l became liable to be evicted on or after 25-6-1972. as per section 32-p it is the duty of the agricultural land tribunal to evict such a person and dispose of the land in the manner provided by sub-section (2) of section 32-p.7. accordingly, the decision of the appellate court as well as the tribunal is set aside and the conclusion reached by the tahsildar, tasgaon is restored. in other words, the issue which has been referred to the tenancy court by the civil court being issue no. 10 is answered in the negative.in the circumstances, writ petition is allowed with costs. rule is made absolute.parties to act on copy of this order duly authenticated by the sheristedar of this court.
Judgment:A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This petition has been filed by the original defendants 1 to 10 land owners in respect of Survey No. 743/2 situated at Village Kundal, Taluka Tasgaon. The suit land originally belonged to Shri Daulu Nana Thorbole who had four daughters. The suit land was bequeathed by him by executing a Will as back as in the year 1919 in favour of one of the daughters Smt. Radhabai w/o Bhau Ghadage, the predecessor in title of the petitioner herein. The respondent No. 1 claims to be the tenant in respect of the said suit land.
2. The petitioners herein filed a suit being Suit No. 187 of 1970. Another suit came to be filed by the respondent No. 2 herein being Civil Suit No. 1 of 1972. Both the suits were filed for declaration and possession. In the said suits the respondent No. 1 raised a plea that he was the tenant of deceased Radhabai Ghadage; and therefore requested the Civil Court to frame issue as to whether he was the tenant in respect of the suit land, so that the said issue can be referred to the Tenancy Court for its decision in view of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Accordingly Issue No. 10 was framed by Civil Court which reads thus :
'Issue No. 10 : Does defendant No. 11 prove that he is a tenant in respect of the suit land ?'
3. The said reference was made before the Tahsildar, Tasgaon, who in turn, after considering the materials on record, answered the said issue in the negative and against the respondent No. 1. According to the Tahsildar the said Radhabai had died on 24-2-1970 and the respondent No. 1 was very much aware about her death and therefore it was incumbent upon him to give intimation for purchase of land before 24-2-1972 to all the successors of Radhabai i.e. petitioners herein as required by section 32-F(1)(a) of the Act. The Tahsildar therefore held that the respondent No. 1 having failed to exercise the said option became liable to be evicted from the suit land under section 32-P(1) of the Act. The Tahsildar therefore concluded that the respondent No. 1 had lost his right to continue on the land as tenant, even assuming that he was inducted initially as tenant.
4. The respondent No. 1 took up the matter in appeal before the Deputy Collector, Sangli. The Appellate Court by its judgment and order dated 19-9-1981 was pleased to allow the appeal. According to the Appellate Court it was not open to the petitioners to challenge the status of respondent No. 1 as a tenant having regard to the previous proceedings under section 32-G of the Act. Moreover, with regard to the crucial question which found favour with the Tahsildar to negative the claim of respondent No. 1, the Appellate Court totally misdirected itself. The Appellate Court took the view that failure of the respondent No. 1 to give intimation, as required under section 32-F(1)(a), did not visit him with the consequence of taking away his right to continue as a tenant in the suit land. This conclusion is clearly contrary to the purport of section 32-P of the Act. The Appellate Court accordingly allowed the appeal and declared that the respondent No. 1 was a tenant in the suit land.
5. The petitioners challenged the said decision of the Appellate Court before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur. The Tribunal, although referred to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, has not adverted to the main issue which had found favour with the Tahsildar. Naturally, the Tribunal has not examined the correctness of the view taken by the Appellate Court on the said matter.
6. After considering the arguments advanced by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioners I am of the view that the Tribunal clearly misdirected itself in not adverting to the main issue, which according to the Tahsildar went to the root of the matter. At the first blush I was inclined to remand the matter to the Tribunal to consider the same afresh, however, since the proceedings are pending since year 1974, I thought it appropriate to decide the matter on merits as the issue involved is a pure question of law which could be decided on the basis of admitted facts. It is seen that the original owner Radhabai died on 24-2-1970 and the respondent was fully aware of her death being her cousin brother. It is nobody's case that respondent No. 1 was not aware of the death of the said Radhabai. Since these facts are admitted, in view of the provisions under section 32F(1)(a), it was incumbent upon the respondent No. 1 to give intimation of his willingness to purchase the suit land to the successors of the deceased Radhabai within two years from the death of Radhabai i.e. before 24-6-1972. It is admitted position that such intimation has not been given by the respondent No. 1. In the circumstances, the Tahsildar has rightly concluded that the respondent No. 1 had lost his right to remain in the suit land as tenant. In my view, both the Appellate Court as well as the Tribunal, were clearly misdirected in not considering the matter from this perspective. That the consequences of failure to give intimation by the tenant within the stipulated period is that the tenant becomes liable to be evicted from the land under section 32-P of the Act. In this case the respondent No. l became liable to be evicted on or after 25-6-1972. As per section 32-P it is the duty of the Agricultural Land Tribunal to evict such a person and dispose of the land in the manner provided by sub-section (2) of section 32-P.
7. Accordingly, the decision of the Appellate Court as well as the Tribunal is set aside and the conclusion reached by the Tahsildar, Tasgaon is restored. In other words, the issue which has been referred to the Tenancy Court by the Civil Court being Issue No. 10 is answered in the negative.
In the circumstances, writ petition is allowed with costs. Rule is made absolute.
Parties to act on copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar of this Court.