The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. Corn Products Company (India) Ltd. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
property - notice - sections 106 and 111 of transfer of property act, 1882 and articles 12 and 14 of constitution of india - appeal against notice under section 106 calling upon respondent to deliver vacant possession of property leased to him - entire property includes structures standing on land - notice to quit terminates lease in respect of land as well as building on land - alleged notice need not state grounds on which tenant is asked to vacate and deliver peaceful possession of demised premises - appellant terminated tenancy of respondent in respect of lease of property which was subject matter of lease - notice to quit describes property which is subject matter of notice and which is subject matter of lease - respondent neither pleaded nor proved facts which would invalidate action of appellant in terminating tenancy of respondent and filing suit for possession - appeal succeeds. - code of criminal procedure, 1973 [c.a. no. 2/1974]. section 41: [ swatanter kumar, cj, smt ranjana desai & d.b. bhosale, jj] arrest of accused - held, a police officer or a person empowered to arrest may arrest a person without intervention of the court subject to the limitations specified under the provisions of the code. the provisions of section 41 of the code provides for arrest by a police officer without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant. a distinct and different power under section 44 of the code empowers the magistrate to arrest or order any person to arrest the offender. under section 44 of the code, that power is vested in the court of the magistrate when an offence is committed in his presence. if the legislature has taken care of providing such specific power under section 44 of the code, then there could be no reason for such a power not to be specified under the provisions of chapter xii of the code. in terms of section 41, a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant or order from the magistrate for any or all of the conditions specified in that provision. language of this provision clearly suggested that the police officer can arrest a person without an order from the magistrate. thus, there appears to be no reason why on the strength of section 156(3) of the code, any restriction should be read into the power specifically granted by the legislature to the police officer. of course, freedom of investigation is the essence of these provisions but in order to suppress the mischief it is sufficiently indicated under different provisions of the code that the arresting officer should exercise his power or discretion judiciously and should be free of motive. some kind of inbuilt safeguard is available to the accused in the cases where the magistrate directs investigation under section 156 (3) of the code by taking recourse to the provisions of section 438 of the code by approaching the court of session or the high court for such relief. thus, during the course of investigation of a criminal case, an accused is not remediless and that would further buttress the above view. [jagannath singh v dr. ajay upadyay & anr 2006 cri lj 4274; 2006 (5) air bom r held per incuriam]. - (i) that the notice to quit while it determines the lease in respect of the land leased to the respondent, does not determine the lease in respect of the structure standing on the land and therefore such a notice which determines the lease only partially is bad in law, and (ii) the notice does not state the grounds on which the appellant has terminated the tenancy of the respondent, therefore also the notice is bad in law. sakhardande submitted that the appellant is a 'state' within the meaning of the expression as used in article 12 of the constitution of india, and therefore, it is bound to follow the mandate of article 14 of the constitution and even while determining the lease of its tenant, the appellant is bound to act in public good and not upon whims and caprices, and that it has acted in public good, should be evident in the notice itself. sakhardande, unless the appellant stated in the notice the reason for terminating the tenancy of the respondent, it could not be said to have acted in public good, and by necessary corollary, it must be said to have acted arbitrarily, in violation of article 14 of the constitution. therefore the notice to quit, as is given in the present case, is perfectly a valid notice even though it does not in so many words terminate the tenancy of the respondent in respect of the structure for no structure was the subject matter of the demise. the expression 'said premises' has been defined to mean and include the said land, the buildings, the works and everything comprised therein or enjoyed therewith and shall be construed in the widest sense. the definitions of various words and expressions given in the lease deed leave no room for doubt that when the appellant in the notice has used the word 'premises' in respect of which the notice is given, that word 'premises' has to be read in light of the expression 'the said premises' as defined in the lease deed to mean and include the said land, the buildings, works and everything comprised therein or enjoyed therewith and shall be construed in the widest sense. sakhardande, i think that also should fail. therefore it is bound to follow the mandates emanating from article 14 of the constitution and for so doing even while determining the lease, the appellant is bound to act in public good, and not upon whims and caprices and that, it has acted in public good should be evident in the notice to quit. sakhardande submitted that the body like the appellant, which admittedly is included within 'the state' under article 12 of the constitution, should, while determining the lease, specify in the notice to quit the ground on which it terminates the tenancy of its tenant, and if that is not done, the notice would be bad in law for the notice would become arbitrary and violative of article 14 of the constitution. it, therefore, follows that the public authorities which enjoy this benefit without being hidebound by the requirements of the rent act must act for public benefit. all exercise of discretion or power by public authorities (like bombay port trust), in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on the assumption that they would not act as private landlords must be judged by that standard. it is true that their lordships have clearly enunciated that even in the field of contractual relations between 'the state' on one hand and the private individual on the other, the dealing must answer the test of article 14 of the constitution. however at the same time, on the question of burden of proof, their lordships have in para 18 of the report clearly accepted as valid the argument of the learned additional solicitor general who contended that the onus was entirely on the appellant and the burden lay on the defendants to establish that the bombay port trust had terminated the tenancy or taken the proceedings in eviction not in public interest but for a collateral purpose or mala fide or that it had acted in a manner contrary to the provisions of article 14 of the constitution, by saying :he is right in so contending'.thus, their lordships have accepted as valid the proposition of law that even in such a case when the tenant contends, against the state, that the state (bombay port trust in that case) had terminated the tenancy of the appellant of that case or taken the proceedings in eviction not in public interest but for the collateral purpose or mala fide or that it had acted in the manner contrary to the provisi 22. in support of his argument that every state action, in order to meet the requirements of article 14 of the constitution, must be taken in public interest and public good, mr.k.g. shah, j.1. this is the plaintiff's appeal directed against the judgment and decree dated 31st march, 1987 passed by the learned judge, city civil court, bombay dismissing the appellant's suit with costs passed in s.c. suit no. 3384 of 1970.2. the appellant is the landlord of the respondent in respect of the suit premises. the provisions of the bombay rents, hotel & lodging house rates control act do not apply to the suit premises. the respondent is a tenant in the suit premises since prior to 1951. the appellant through its constituted attorney on 27th january, 1969 addressed to the respondent a notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act calling upon the respondent to quit, vacate and deliver vacant and peaceful possession of old r.r. no. 1727 admeasuring 2079 sq. yards equivalent to 1739.05 sq.meters at sassoon dock estate. the premises in respect of which this notice came to be given are more particularly described in the later part of the notice. in the notice it is stated that the premises are in occupation of the respondent.3. as the aforesaid notice was not complied with by the respondent, the appellant filed the suit for a decree for vacant and peaceful possession of the premises i.e. the suit property described in exhibit-a to the plaint. the appellant also prayed for a decree for arrears of compensation for use and occupation of the suit premises together with interest thereon.4. the respondent in its written statement inter alia contended that the notice to quit dated 27th january, 1969 served on behalf of the appellant to it (the respondent) is invalid. in the written statement, the respondent raised various other contentions. however, it is not necessary for me to refer the same for the simple reason that at the time of the hearing of this appeal the learned advocates for the parties had confined their arguments only to the validity of the notice.5. before the learned judge of the city civil court also the parties confined to the question of the validity of the notice. the respondent challenged the validity of the notice on two grounds, viz. (i) that the notice to quit while it determines the lease in respect of the land leased to the respondent, does not determine the lease in respect of the structure standing on the land and therefore such a notice which determines the lease only partially is bad in law, and (ii) the notice does not state the grounds on which the appellant has terminated the tenancy of the respondent, therefore also the notice is bad in law.6. the learned judge of the city civil court accepted both these contentions raised by the respondent against the validity of the notice to quit, and as a result thereof dismissed the appellants suit with costs.7. mr. makhija, the learned advocate for the appellant challenged both these findings of the learned judge. according to him, the notice to quit asks the respondent to quit, vacate and deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the entire property which has been leased out to the respondent, and that would naturally include the structures standing on the land which have also been leased out to the respondent. on the second question, mr. makhija submitted that a notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act, where the rent act is not applicable, need not state the grounds on which the tenant is asked to quit, vacate and deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the demised premises.8. mr. sakhardande, the learned advocate for the respondent very strenuously contended that the notice to quit while it determines the lease only in respect of the land, in no manner determines the lease in favour of the respondent in respect of the structure, buildings etc. standing on the land and therefore the notice determines the tenancy of the respondent only partially, and such a partial termination of tenancy is not in conformity with the provisions of section 106 of the transfer of property act. on the second question, mr. sakhardande submitted that the appellant is a 'state' within the meaning of the expression as used in article 12 of the constitution of india, and therefore, it is bound to follow the mandate of article 14 of the constitution and even while determining the lease of its tenant, the appellant is bound to act in public good and not upon whims and caprices, and that it has acted in public good, should be evident in the notice itself. according to mr. sakhardande, unless the appellant stated in the notice the reason for terminating the tenancy of the respondent, it could not be said to have acted in public good, and by necessary corollary, it must be said to have acted arbitrarily, in violation of article 14 of the constitution.9. having heard the learned advocates for the parties at length on the twin points in relation to the notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act, i think the appeal should succeed.10. in the trial court, the appellant, it appears, had at some stage tried to argue that what was leased to the respondent was only the land and no structure was the subject matter of the lease. therefore the notice to quit, as is given in the present case, is perfectly a valid notice even though it does not in so many words terminate the tenancy of the respondent in respect of the structure for no structure was the subject matter of the demise. this argument was obviously fallacious and before me at the time of hearing of this appeal mr. makhija fairly conceded that looking to the terms of the lease deed, and looking to the over all facts and circumstances of the case, it has got to be said that when the respondent was inducted as a tenant on the property, the property consisted not only of land but also of some structures. mr. sakhardande, the learned advocate for the respondent also canvassed for that proposition. therefore whatever be the case of the respondent in the trial court, before me, it was a common ground that when the respondent was inducted on it, the property consisted of some land and buildings. the question is, in such a situation is the landlord while giving a notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act required to terminate the tenancy of the land and the building separately and specifically or whether the termination in one breath of the lease of the premises, as is done in the present case, would be proper and legal.11. the notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act in the present case, insofar as is material, reads as follows.'on behalf of the trustees of the port of bombay, i have to give you this notice to call upon you to quit, vacate and deliver vacant and peaceful possession of old r.r. no.1727 admeasuring 2079 8/9 sq. yds or 1739.05 sq. mtrs. on sassoon dock estate, now in your occupation (and which premises are more particularly described overleaf) at the expiration of the month next following the current month of your tenancy i.e. on the 28th day of february, 1969).'on the reverse of the front page of the notice the description of the premises is given as follows.'bounded on or towards the north east by a road belonging to the said trustees. bounded on or towards the south east by other land of the said trustees. bounded on or towards the north west by other land of the said trustees. bounded on or towards the south west by compound wall belonging to the said trustees and beyond that by dumayne road.' 12. the lease deed under which the respondent was inducted as a tenant defines various words and expressions as used in the document. the expression 'the said land' is defined to mean as all the land demised under the deed. 'building' has been defined to mean any building from time to time standing on the said land. the expression 'said premises' has been defined to mean and include the said land, the buildings, the works and everything comprised therein or enjoyed therewith and shall be construed in the widest sense. a reference to the said land, building or works or to the said premises is to include any part thereof. the title of the deed is as follows.'lease of a piece of land and building on the sassoon dock estate containing an area of 2,079 8/9 square yards for the purpose of a printing press and godown.'13. thus, it will be clear that the description of the premises, of which the lease was sought to be terminated by the notice to quit, tallies with the description of the property which is the subject matter of the lease as per the lease deed. in other words, the boundaries in both are almost identical and the two properties tally. therefore it has got to be said that the appellant has terminated the tenancy of the respondent in respect of the lease of the property which was the subject matter of the lease under the lease deed.mr. sakhardande, the learned advocate for the respondent very strenuously contended that though by the notice to quit the lease in respect of the property as stated to be bounded by the boundaries has been determined, by the said notice the lease in respect of the buildings standing on the land being the subject matter of the lease has not been terminated. of course this argument has found favour with the learned judge of the city civil court. however, i think the argument has no merit. once the landlord terminates the tenancy in respect of the lease, implied therein is that he has terminated the lease in its entirety, he has terminated the lease in respect of every part of the premises and the landlord is not required to specify every inch of the property and every item of the property separately for saying that he terminates the tenancy in respect of that every inch of the property and every item of the property. section 106 of the transfer of property act speaks about the duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage. it provides that in absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy. thus, what this section provides is the duration of the lease and termination thereof. what is to be terminated is the lease and in the notice to terminate the lease, suffice it would be if the lessor gives the description of the property, the lease in respect of which he intends to determine. he has not to give a catalogue or a list of items of property standing on the land which is the subject matter of the lease and to say specifically in respect of each item that he terminates the lease with respect to that item or property. if a parcel of land is the subject matter of the lease, and at the time of the lease, on a portion of that land, there was a building and what was leased to the leasee was land together with the building, i think if the lessor terminated the lease of the land he must be held to have terminated the lease in respect of the building standing on the part of the land also. it is not necessary for him to terminate the lease areawise or structurewise. if the argument of mr. sakhardande is accepted, it would come to this; namely that if the land on a part of which the building stands is the subject matter of the lease, and the building is comprised of various rooms then the lessor would have to terminate the tenancy not only in respect of the land and building separately, but he would have to terminate the tenancy in respect of each room separately, and he would have to terminate the tenancy in respect of each pillar, each brick, each door and each of the items of property immovable on the land, and that would lead to absurd result.14. i think in the present case the notice to quit, which the appellant has given to the respondent, can in no manner, be faulted on the ground that it terminates the lease only in respect of the land and not in respect of the building standing on the land. the argument of mr. sakhardande has, in my opinion, no merit. the learned judge of the city civil court, with respect, was in error in accepting that submission. that submission on behalf of the respondent is rejected. as indicated hereinabove, the notice to quit describes the property which is the subject matter of the notice, and which is the subject matter of the lease, almost in the same terms as those found in the lease deed. the definitions of various words and expressions given in the lease deed leave no room for doubt that when the appellant in the notice has used the word 'premises' in respect of which the notice is given, that word 'premises' has to be read in light of the expression 'the said premises' as defined in the lease deed to mean and include the said land, the buildings, works and everything comprised therein or enjoyed therewith and shall be construed in the widest sense. now the word 'premises' as used in the notice for saying that the respondent is called upon to quit, vacate and deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the premises, that expression has to be understood in the widest sense as to include the land, the buildings and the works comprised therein. putting any other construction on the word 'premises' used in the notice would be doing violence to those words, read in light of the lease deed. the first submission of mr. sakhardande therefore fails.15. coming to second submission of mr. sakhardande, i think that also should fail.16. mr. sakhardande submitted that the appellant-plaintiff comes within the expression 'the state' within the meaning of article 12 of the constitution of india. therefore it is bound to follow the mandates emanating from article 14 of the constitution and for so doing even while determining the lease, the appellant is bound to act in public good, and not upon whims and caprices and that, it has acted in public good should be evident in the notice to quit. according to mr. sakhardande, unless the appellant stated in the notice the reason for terminating the tenancy, it could not be said to have acted in public interest and by necessary corollary it must be said to have acted arbitrarily in violation of article 14 of the constitution. mr. sakhardande submitted that the body like the appellant, which admittedly is included within 'the state' under article 12 of the constitution, should, while determining the lease, specify in the notice to quit the ground on which it terminates the tenancy of its tenant, and if that is not done, the notice would be bad in law for the notice would become arbitrary and violative of article 14 of the constitution.17. mr. sakhardande very heavily relied upon the decision in the case of m/s. dwarkadas marfatia and sons v. board of trustees of port of bombay, : [1989]2scr751 . it is noticed here that the appellant before me in the instant case was the respondent before the supreme court in the case referred to above. in that judgment, it has been posited that when the state, the local bodies and public authorities which are 'state' within the meaning of article 12 are exempted from purview of rent control legislation, the basis of exemption is that such bodies would not be actuated by any profit making motive so as to unduly enhance the rents or eject the tenants from their respective properties as private landlords are or are likely to be. they would not act for their own purpose as private landlords do, but must act for public purpose. it, therefore, follows that the public authorities which enjoy this benefit without being hidebound by the requirements of the rent act must act for public benefit.their lordships in the aforesaid judgment have further held as follows.'being a public body even in respect of its dealing with its tenant, it must act in public interest, and an infraction of that duty is amenable to examination either in civil suit or in writ jurisdiction.'it has also been held in the said judgment as follows.'where there is arbitrariness in state action, article 14 springs in and judicial review strikes such an action down. every action of the executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. so, whatever, be the activity of the public authority, it should meet the test of article 14.'further it has been held by their lordships of the supreme court as follows.'every activity of a public authority especially in the background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigours of the rent act, must be informed by reason and guided by the public interest. all exercise of discretion or power by public authorities (like bombay port trust), in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on the assumption that they would not act as private landlords must be judged by that standard. if a governmental policy or action even in contractual matters fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional.18. mr. sakhardande, the learned advocate for the respondent heavily relied upon the above observations and holdings of their lordships of the supreme court in the aforementioned case. however, in that very judgment their lordships have also held as follows.'there is always a presumption that a governmental action is reasonable and in public interest. it is for the party challenging its validity to show that the action is unreasonable, arbitrary or contrary to the professed norms or not informed by public interest, and the burden is a heavy one. the onus is entirely on the tenant and the burden lies on him to establish that the tenancy is terminated or the proceedings in eviction are taken not in public interest but for a collateral purpose or mala fide or that it had acted in a manner contrary to the provisions of article 14 of the constitution.19. as stated above, mr. sakhardande very heavily relied upon the observations and holdings of their lordships of the supreme court in the case of m/s. dwarkadas marfatia & sons. it is true that their lordships have clearly enunciated that even in the field of contractual relations between 'the state' on one hand and the private individual on the other, the dealing must answer the test of article 14 of the constitution. however at the same time, on the question of burden of proof, their lordships have in para 18 of the report clearly accepted as valid the argument of the learned additional solicitor general who contended that the onus was entirely on the appellant and the burden lay on the defendants to establish that the bombay port trust had terminated the tenancy or taken the proceedings in eviction not in public interest but for a collateral purpose or mala fide or that it had acted in a manner contrary to the provisions of article 14 of the constitution, by saying : 'he is right in so contending'. thus, their lordships have accepted as valid the proposition of law that even in such a case when the tenant contends, against the state, that the state (bombay port trust in that case) had terminated the tenancy of the appellant of that case or taken the proceedings in eviction not in public interest but for the collateral purpose or mala fide or that it had acted in the manner contrary to the provisions of article 14, the burden to prove that contention was entirely on the tenant. this, then, is the holding of their lordships of the supreme court in para 18 of the report.in para 28 of the report this is what their lordships have said :'it is true as learned additional solicitor general contended that there is always a presumption that a governmental action is reasonable and in public interest. it is for the party challenging its validity to show that the action is unreasonable, arbitrary or contrary to the professed norms or not informed by public interest, and the burden is a heavy one.'thus the supreme court has again accepted as valid the contention of the learned additional solicitor general that in such a case firstly there is a presumption that a governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and secondly it is for the party challenging its validity to show that the action is unreasonable, arbitrary or contrary to the professed norms or not informed by public interest. their lordships have thirdly held that the burden in such a case upon the party challenging the governmental action is a heavy burden.20. in the present case before me, except contending in para 9 of the written statement that the notice to quit dated 27th january, 1969 is not a valid notice and that the plaintiff had not passed any resolution to terminate the tenancy of the respondent or to file a suit for eviction against the respondent, no other details are given. no other factual foundation about the notice being arbitrary is pleaded. in the written statement, it is not the contention of the respondent that the termination of its tenancy by the appellant, by its notice dated 27th january, 1969, is not in public interest or that it is for a collateral purpose, or that it is mala fide or that the termination of tenancy has been effected in a manner contrary to the provisions of article 14 of the constitution. it is not the contention of the respondent in the written statement that the action of the appellant in terminating the tenancy of the respondent and filing the suit for possession is unreasonable, arbitrary or contrary to the professed norms or not informed by public interest. at the trial the parties have not led any oral evidence. the respondent has therefore not only not pleaded the necessary facts for making out a case about the infraction of article 14 of the constitution, but also it has not led any evidence on the point. merely by contending that the notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act is not valid, the tenant could not be said to have contended that the notice suffers from vices of arbitrariness and unreasonableness. as held by their lordships in the aforesaid case, there is always a presumption that a governmental action is reasonable and in public interest. in absence of any specific contention to the contrary and more so in absence of any proof of facts which would invalidate the action of the appellant in terminating the tenancy of the respondent and filing the suit for possession, the presumption as aforesaid would hold the field.21. in the present case as stated above, the respondent has neither pleaded nor proved facts which would invalidate the action of the appellant in terminating the tenancy of the respondent and filing the suit for possession. in abstract, even mr. makhija, the learned advocate for the appellant did not dispute the proposition of law that so far 'the state' is concerned, even in the matter of contractual relations and even in the matter of termination of tenancy the action should meet the test of article 14 of the constitution. however, mr. makhija argued, and in my opinion rightly, that in the present case the respondent has not laid any foundation for contending that the notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act given by the appellant to the respondent suffers from vices of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, mala fides, whims, caprices and absence of public interest. the respondent having not laid any foundation as aforesaid, the contention of mr. sakhardande that the notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act, in the instant case, should be held to be invalid for it does not disclose any reason why the appellant has sought to terminate the tenancy of the respondent, cannot succeed.22. in support of his argument that every state action, in order to meet the requirements of article 14 of the constitution, must be taken in public interest and public good, mr. sakhardande also relied upon some other judgments. however in abstract that proposition was not even disputed by mr. makhija, the learned advocate for the appellant. therefore i do not think any detailed reference is required to be made by me to these authorities. however, i would only mention that mr. sakhardande for the aforesaid purpose relied upon the decisions in the case of ramanna dayaram shetty v. international airport authority of india and others a.i.r. 1979 s.c. 1629 and kum. shrilekha vidyarthi association v. state of u. p. and others, : air1991sc537 .23. mr. sakhardande lastly took resort to the provisions of the public premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) act, 1971 (for short 'the public premises act') and submitted that just as the notice under section 4 of the public premises act is required to contain the ground on which the eviction of the person stated to be in unauthorised occupation is to be effected, a notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act issued by or on behalf of `the state' must also contain the ground on which the tenancy of the tenant is terminated. in other words, mr. sakhardande tried to draw an analogy in support of his submission from the provisions of the public premises act and more particularly section 4 of the public premises act. i think the argument of mr. sakhardande has no merit. the provisions of section 4 of the public premises act are materially different from the provisions of section 106 of the transfer of property act. whereas section 4 of the public premises act itself contemplates that the notice under that section shall specify the ground on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, no such requirement is to be found in relation to the notice to quit issued by the landlord under section 106 of the transfer of property act. the scheme of the public premises act itself shows that upon receipt of the notice under section 4 of the public premises act, the addressee would be entitled to show cause against the proposed order of eviction. in respect of notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act, the lessee is not given any such right to show cause why he should not be evicted from the premises leased to him. in a case where rent restriction is not applicable, what is required of a lessor, if he wants the possession of the premises leased by him to the lessee, is that he should issue to the lessee a notice terminating the lease. the provisions of the transfer of property act in general, and those of section 106 and 111 in particular, no where contemplate any right in favour of, or an opportunity to the lessee to show cause against the notice terminating his tenancy. under the public premises act there are clear provisions which entitle the person who is sought to be evicted from the public premises to receive a notice specifying the ground on which he is sought to be evicted from the premises in question and he is also entitled to show cause against the proposed eviction. the addressee of the notice under section 4 of the public premises act has a right to appear before the estate officer in response to the notice under section 4 of the public premises act and to adduce evidence which he intends to produce in support of the cause that he might intend to show against the proposed eviction and he has also been given a right of personal hearing if he so desired. nothing of this sort is to be found anywhere in the transfer of property act in general in relation to the lessor-lessee relationship, and under sections 106 and 111 of the transfer of property act in particular. in this view of the matter and on this clear distinction between the provisions of section 106 of the transfer of property act read with section 111(h) thereof, on the one hand and section 4 of the public premises act on the other, i think the decision in the case of minoo framroze balsara v. union of india, : air1992bom375 relied upon by mr. sakhardande cannot help his submission viz. that the notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act issued by a state or a body which is a state within article 14 of the constitution, unless it specifies the ground for eviction, it would not be a valid notice.24. in the aforesaid view of the matter, even the second submission of mr. sakhardande fails.25. in the result, the appeal succeed. the same is allowed. the trial court's judgment and decree are set aside. the appellant-plaintiff's suit is decreed in terms of prayers (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the plaint. the appellant shall also get the costs of this appeal from the respondent.26. mr. chitnis, the learned advocate for the respondent requests for the stay of the decree for possession in order to enable the respondent to take its remedy before the higher forum. in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, and in view of the fact that i have mainly relied upon the supreme court judgment in the case of m/s. dwarkadas marfatia & sons (supra) relied upon by mr. sakhardande, the learned advocate for the respondent on the second and main question, i do not think that any further stay of the dis-possession should be granted. the request for stay is rejected.