Hislop Education Society Through Its Secretary Ms Anna D/O. Yashwant Masoji Vs. Presiding Officer, University College Tribunal, Dr. Ambedkar University Law College and ors. - Court Judgment

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service - removal - challenge thereto - on beign found to had committed certain irregularities while functioning as a principal of the college respondent was suspended from service - intiation of departmental enquiry - respondent abstain from participating in the enquiry, instead challenged the authority of the petitioner to initiate departmental enquiry - petitioner contended that it is a minority institution and therefore, has a right to manage its affairs subject to such statutory limitations as may be recognized, as applicable to minority institutions - university and college tribunal, nagpur decided in favour of respondent - hence, present petition - held, as per the ratio laid down in t.m.a. pai foundation's case , in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and in the matter of day to day management, like the appointment of staff, teaching and nonteaching and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency - university tribunal was not justified in interfering with punishment imposed upon respondent - petition allowed - code of criminal procedure, 1973 [c.a. no. 2/1974]. section 41: [ swatanter kumar, cj, smt ranjana desai & d.b. bhosale, jj] arrest of accused - held, a police officer or a person empowered to arrest may arrest a person without intervention of the court subject to the limitations specified under the provisions of the code. the provisions of section 41 of the code provides for arrest by a police officer without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant. a distinct and different power under section 44 of the code empowers the magistrate to arrest or order any person to arrest the offender. under section 44 of the code, that power is vested in the court of the magistrate when an offence is committed in his presence. if the legislature has taken care of providing such specific power under section 44 of the code, then there could be no reason for such a power not to be specified under the provisions of chapter xii of the code. in terms of section 41, a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant or order from the magistrate for any or all of the conditions specified in that provision. language of this provision clearly suggested that the police officer can arrest a person without an order from the magistrate. thus, there appears to be no reason why on the strength of section 156(3) of the code, any restriction should be read into the power specifically granted by the legislature to the police officer. of course, freedom of investigation is the essence of these provisions but in order to suppress the mischief it is sufficiently indicated under different provisions of the code that the arresting officer should exercise his power or discretion judiciously and should be free of motive. some kind of inbuilt safeguard is available to the accused in the cases where the magistrate directs investigation under section 156 (3) of the code by taking recourse to the provisions of section 438 of the code by approaching the court of session or the high court for such relief. thus, during the course of investigation of a criminal case, an accused is not remediless and that would further buttress the above view. [jagannath singh v dr. ajay upadyay & anr 2006 cri lj 4274; 2006 (5) air bom r held per incuriam]. - 2 to participate in the enquiry on certain conditions like withdrawal of all legal proceedings. 2, was comprising of persons recorded in the register(schedulei) maintained by the charity commissioner is only of academic importance, since both, the old as well as new bodies, have filed these two petitions and both the bodies agree that respondent no. 21. the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the university and college tribunal had also held in paragraph 42 of the judgment that the order of removal to be bad on the ground that the enquiry officer was the brother of a lecturer serving in the hislop college and that such a contention was never refuted by the petitioners. xaviers college's case air 1974 sc 1989 (supra) clearly shows that seven out of nine judges held that the provisions contained in clause (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 51a of the act ere not applicable to an educational institution established and managed by religious or linguistic minority as they interfere with the disciplinary control of the management over the staff of its educational institutions. the majority was accordingly of the view that the provisions contained in clause (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 51a of the act had the effect of destroying the minority institution's disciplinary control over the teaching and non-teaching staff of the college as no punishment could be inflicted by the management on a member of the staff unless it gets approval from an outside authority like the vice-chancellor or an officer of the university authorised by him. 5(c) whether the statutory provisions which regulate the facets of administration like control over educational agencies, control over governing bodies, conditions of affiliation including recognition/ withdrawal thereof and appointment of staff, employees, teachers and principals including their service conditions and regulation of fees, etc. so far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the conditions of affiliation to an university or board have to be complied with, but in the matter of daytoday management, like the appointment of staff, teaching and nonteaching and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. 2 been able to show first, that approval was required, and secondly, that the university authorities disapproved the proposed action. this does not hold good about removal. he submitted that the suspension order did not refer to any resolution and if there was no resolution, order itself was bad. he submitted that it is well known that a budget after all is a budget and not an exact measure of expenditure.r.c. chavan, j.1. these petitions are directed against judgment of the learned presiding officer, university and college tribunal, nagpur in appeal no. tn3 of 1996, whereby the tribunal allowed the appeal of respondent no. 2, set aside respondent no. 2's removal from service, ordering his reinstatement in the post of principal from the date of impugned order of removal dated 18.09.1992 with all consequential benefits.2. the facts, which are material for deciding these petitions are as under :the petitioner in writ petition no. 3075 of 1996 is old governing body of hislop education society, foundation society of hislop college at nagpur. the petitioner in writ petition no. 2174 of 1996 is new government body. respondent no. 2 was selected and appointed as principal of hislop college on 01.10.1989 and was confirmed as such on 23rd october, 1990.3. on 01.11.1987 elections of hislop education society were held for the period from 01.11.1987 to 31.10.1990 at which rt.rev vinod peter was elected as chairman and dr. bhelwa was elected as secretary. on 2nd february, 1991 elections of hislop society was again held at which rt. rev. vinod peter was elected as chairman and dr. t.s. wilkinson was elected as secretary. the new body filed a change report bearing no. 649 of 1991 before the charity commissioner which came to be ultimately rejected by order dated 13.11.1997 i.e. after the impugned order was passed by the university tribunal. the deputy charity commissioner directed that the names of the incoming managing committee be recorded as de facto managing committee. appeal against order dated 13.11.1997 rejecting change report was dismissed on 09.12.2003 and it was ordered that the deputy charity commissioner should decide and dispose of all other pending change reports. again on 21.03.1994 elections of the society were held at which rt. rev. vinod peter was elected as chairman and dr. t.s. wilkinson was elected as secretary. report about this change is yet to be decided.4. shri vilas m. gujar, respondent no. 4 in both the petitions, claimed that on 09.03.1991 elections of the society were held at which he was elected as secretary of the society. he filed a change report bearing no. 602 of 1991 which was pending when the writ petitions were filed but has been subsequently rejected. said vilas gujar filed civil suit no. 1348 of 1991 for an injunction to restrain dr. t.s. wilkinson, rt. rev. vinod peter and dr. bhelwa from interfering in the management of hislop college. on 24.06.1991 an exparte injunction was granted, which was vacated on appeal on 18.07.1991 by the learned additional district judge, nagpur. certain records were carried away by said vilas gujar when the injunction was in force, resulting in some police complaints being filed. the police authorities seized the record. vilas gujar and respondent no. 2 dr. raja singh, principal filed writ petition no. 1682 of 1991 against the state and commissioner of police. in the said petition on 04.07.1991 this court directed the deputy charity commissioner to break open the seals and take documents and cash in custody. the writ petition itself was disposed of on 25.07.1991.5. the petitioner society found that respondent no. 2 had committed certain irregularities while functioning as a principal of the college and therefore, it decided to initiate an inquiry against respondent no. 2. on 09.07.1991 respondent no. 2 was suspended from service. dr. ms. m.e. singh came to be appointed as a principal of hislop college.6. record which had been sealed was handed over to the old body by an order dated 26.12.1991 passed by the deputy charity commissioner. it was eventually handed over to dr. ms. m.e. singh in terms of a resolution passed by the recorded trustees. respondent no. 2 dr. raja singh filed writ petition no. 579 of 1992 challenging order of the deputy charity commissioner dated 26.12.1991 about handing over of the record. by judgment dated 2nd march, 1992 this court dismissed the petition, thereby confirming the order passed by the deputy charity commissioner. respondent no. 4 vilas gujar had also challenged the said order dated 26.12.1991 by filing writ petition no. 571 of 1992 which too was dismissed on 12.03.1992.7. after suspension of respondent no. 2 a show cause notice was issued to him on 04.10.1991. respondent no. 2 did not file any reply and therefore, the management decided to initiate departmental enquiry and appointed advocate shri p.c. marpakwar as an enquiry officer. the enquiry was fixed for 15.11.1991. since respondent no. 2 did not participate in the enquiry, statements of witnesses for the management were recorded on 17.12.1991. respondent no. 2 along with respondent no. 4 vilas gujar filed regular civil suit no. 1563 of 1991 for declaratory and injunctive reliefs. notice was ordered on 10th july, 1991 but the plaintiffs therein did not cause notice to be served on the defendants. respondent no. 2 filed another suit no. 1718 of 1991 seeking declaration that dr. wilkinson had no right to suspend him from service. he also filed writ petition no. 579 of 1992 before this court challenging the suspension order as also the appointment of dr. ms. m.e. singh. in the petition he raised a plea that dr. wilkinson and rt. rev. vinod peter had no authority to suspend him. by an order dated 2nd march, 1992 in writ petition no. 579 of 1992 this court refused to interfere in the suspension order, but permitted respondent no. 2 to participate in the enquiry on certain conditions like withdrawal of all legal proceedings. it was also recorded in the order that it was agreed that the enquiry was to start at 10.00 a.m. on 16.03.1992 at the residence of the enquiry officer shri p.c. marpakwar.8. on 16.03.1992 the management allegedly provided to respondent no. 2 copies of the relevant record. respondent no. 2 sought certain more documents to which the petitioners gave reply. respondent no. 2 filed rejoinder and another application for supply certain documents. however, respondent no. 2 did not file any reply in the enquiry. on 01.08.1992 when the enquiry was fixed for reply and crossexamination of the witnesses of the management, an adjournment was sought on the ground that respondent no. 2 had to leave for lucknow where his sister was reported to have been murdered. since a suitable date was possibly not communicated to the enquiry officer, he directed that he would close the enquiry for submission of report on 21.08.1992. respondent no. 2 prayed for further adjournment on 21.08.1992 stating that special leave petition had been filed in the supreme court. on 28.08.1992 the enquiry officer submitted his report holding respondent no. 2 guilty on all counts.9. on 07.09.1992 the management sent to the respondent no. 2 a notice to show cause and on 18.09.1992 the society resolved to remove respondent no. 2 from the post of principal and communicated the order of removal by registered post acknowledgment due on 19.09.1992.10. respondent no. 2 challenged the said order before the university and college tribunal, nagpur which held in favour of respondent no. 2 and against the petitioners and this is how the petitioners are before this court.11. i have heard advocate shri sunil manohar for the petitioners and advocate shri raghute for contesting respondent no. 2 as also advocate shri b.g. kulkarni for the respondent university. i have also heard advocate shri parsodkar for the petitioner in writ petition no. 2174 of 1996, who adopted the arguments of advocate shri sunil manohar in writ petition no. 3075 of 1996.12. the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the presiding officer of the university tribunal had set aside the removal of respondent no. 2 on the ground that it was ordered by a body whose change report was not accepted. he submitted that the question as to whether the body, which decided to initiate departmental enquiry against respondent no. 2, was comprising of persons recorded in the register(schedulei) maintained by the charity commissioner is only of academic importance, since both, the old as well as new bodies, have filed these two petitions and both the bodies agree that respondent no. 2 was rightly removed. his learned adversary submitted that since the change report in respect of the new body has been rejected, the body which allegedly suspended respondent no. 2, or ordered an enquiry, was not the body authorised to undertake such an action. he submitted that till 26.12.1991 when the deputy charity commissioner ordered handing over of record to the hislop education society as the de facto body and that too only for day to day functioning, there was no body which was competent to take action against respondent no. 2. he submitted that the suspension order dated 09.07.1991 was not preceded by any resolution by the governing body and there was not even a expost facto resolution ratifying such an act. he submitted that the action against respondent no. 2 was not by the foundation society but only by two persons namely rt. rev. vinod peter and dr. wilkinson. according to advocate shri raghute, the learned counsel for respondent no. 2, dr. wilkinson had absolutely no business to continue on the society after his term of office as principal of the college has come to and end, and therefore, he was not entitled to be elected as secretary of the body. therefore, according to the learned counsel for respondent no. 2, the entire proceedings is vitiated and the learned presiding officer of the tribunal had rightly held in favour of respondent no. 2.13. according to advocate shri sunil manohar, these contentions would have to be rejected because otherwise till the charity commissioner decided the question as to who were the recorded trustees there will be anarchy and mismanagement in the institutions which are run by such trusts. he submitted that respondent no. 2 had specifically raised all these challenges in writ petition no. 579 of 1992 which was decided by order dated 2nd march, 1992. this court had directed that the management shall permit respondent no. 2 to participate in the enquiry by enabling him to recall the witness already examined and permitting him to examine the witness on his side. it was also directed that to enable the petitioner to participate in the said enquiry he would have to withdraw all the suits and legal proceedings which had been initiated at his instance. the petitioner therein, i.e. respondent no. 2 in the present petition, was also directed to be paid subsistence allowance. as already recounted the enquiry was to commence on 16.03.1992 at 10.00 a.m. at the residence of the enquiry officer. the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in view of this order, which has not been set aside, it was not open to respondent no. 2 to challenge the authority of the petitioners to initiate disciplinary proceedings as also the authority of the enquiry officer appointed by the petitioners to continue with the enquiry. the learned counsel further submitted that in any case those at the helm of the affairs of the petitioner society are the de facto trustees and therefore, were entitled to carry on and conduct the business of the society. for this purpose, the learned counsel relied on a number of judgments as under:14. in pushpadevi m. jatia v. m.l. wadhawan : 1987crilj1888 . it is held in paragraph 21 as under:21. ...where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as validity of his acts are concerned. it is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions. the official acts of such persons are recognised as valid under the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. in gokaraju rangaraju case, chinnappa reddy, j. explained that this doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public. he quoted the following passage from the judgment of sir ashutosh mukherjee, j. in pulin behari das v. king emperor at p. 574:the substance of the matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and the individual whee those interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. the doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. the learned judge also relied upon the following passage from the judgment of p. govindan nair, j. in p.s. menon v. state of kerala at p. 170:this doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individuals involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law. but although these officers are not officers de jure they are by virtue of the particular circumstances, officers, in fact, whose acts, public policy requires should be considered valid.15. in lalji dharamsey v. bhagwandas reported at 1981 mh.l.j. 573. it was held that de facto trustees have sufficient locus standi to file suit against a trespasser.16. in gopal v. mahomed jaffar reported at : air1954sc5 the court held in paragraph 30 as under:30. now a 'de facto' manager or a trustee 'de son tort' has certain rights. he can sue on behalf of the trust and for its benefit to recover properties and moneys in the ordinary course of management. it is however, one thing to say that because a person is a 'de facto' manager he is entitled to recover a particular property or a particular sum of money which would otherwise be lost to the trust, for an on its behalf and for its benefit, in the ordinary course of management; it is quite another to say that he has the right to continue in 'de facto' management indefinitely without any vestige of title, which is what a declaration of this kind would import. we hesitate to make any such sweeping declaration.17. in b.r. kapur v. state of t.n. reported at : air2001sc3435 in paragraph 57 the court observed as under:57. we are aware that the finding that the second respondent could not have been sworn in as the chief minister and cannot continue to function as such will have serious consequences. not only will it mean that the state has had no validly appointed chief minister since 14.5.2001, when the second respondent was sworn in, but also that it has had no validly appointed council of ministers, for the council of ministers was appointed on the recommendation of the second respondent. it would also mean that all acts of the government of tamil nadu since 14.5.2001 would become questionable. to alleviate these consequences and in the interest of the administration of the state and its people, who would have acted on the premise that the appointments were legal and valid, we propose to invoke the de facto doctrine and declare that all acts, otherwise legal and valid, performed between 14.5.2001 and today by the second respondent as chief minister, by the members of the council of ministers and by the government of the state shall not be adversely affected by reason only of the order that we now propose to pass.18. i have carefully considered the rival contentions in the light of these judgments. the disputes between various faction in trust or the societies which manage educational institutions have become very common. very rarely elections to bodies managing such institutions are held smoothly leading to smooth transition from the old to new body. instances of various factions taking their factional fights to such fora as may be available, including the courts and the charity commissioner, are plenty. it is also a fact that such petitions or litigation cannot be disposed of or does not get disposed of promptly. if it were to be held that in the intervening period there is a vacuum, it would obviously lead to anarchy and mismanagement in the affairs of the institutions which are run by such societies or trusts. therefore, as observed in the judgments referred to by the learned counsel above, 'de facto doctrine' has taken birth out of necessity to maintain a continuity of authority in management of affairs of such societies or trusts.19. in the case at hand, apart from the fact that respondent no. 2's challenge to the authority of the petitioners to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against him was not countenanced in writ petition no. 579 of 1992 filed by him, it has to be noted that both the old and new bodies have filed these two petitions to show that they are united as far as the question of disciplinary proceedings against respondent no. 2 are concerned. advocate shri manohar for the petitioners also pointed out that seven persons in the outgoing and incoming bodies were the same. even if objection of respondent no. 2 to the continuation or presence of dr. t.s. wilkinson on the trust were to be considered for a while, he has not been able to show that majority of trustees, excluding dr. wilkinson, were against initiation of the departmental enquiry against respondent no. 2. his objections based on the inability of the petitioners to show resolution prior to respondent no. 2's suspension has also to be rejected because whatever may have been the defects in initiation of action, they stood cured by the subsequent ratification of the action by two bodies. therefore, the objection to the disciplinary proceedings against respondent no. 2 on the ground that it was initiated or concluded by a body whose change report was not accepted, has to be rejected. the university tribunal could not have set aside the removal of respondent no. 2 on such a ground, unless it was shown to the tribunal that a majority of trustees or the members of the governing council were against such an action.20. it appears that respondent no. 2 himself and one vilas gujar, whose membership of the governing council can not be inferred, are the only two persons who support the cause of respondent no. 2. therefore, it has to be held that the tribunal erred in concluding that the body, of which dr. wilkinson was secretary, was required to submit actions taken to the body of which dr. bhelwa was secretary or that since this was not done, the orders were voidabinitio. the learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that apart from the fact that both the bodies of which dr. bhelwa or dr. wilkinson are secretaries have joined in the cause and have approved the action against respondent no. 2, the old body has passed a resolution on 06.12.1996 which is annexed to the petition at annexure-51, ratifying all the decisions and proceedings of the new body since 18.09.1992 to 10.09.1996. such a resolution was required to be passed only because the tribunal had raised such a question, when it should have been seen that after the decision in writ petition no. 579/1992 filed by respondent no. 2 such a question did not at all survive. in view of this, the observations of the tribunal in paragraph 20 of its judgment cannot be sustained.21. the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the university and college tribunal had also held in paragraph 42 of the judgment that the order of removal to be bad on the ground that the enquiry officer was the brother of a lecturer serving in the hislop college and that such a contention was never refuted by the petitioners. the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 fairly submits that it is not correct that the enquiry officer is brother of a lecturer serving in hislop college. in any case, since that is not the only ground on which removal of respondent no. 2 was set aside by the tribunal this aspect need not detain us any further.22. the learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the tribunal had also faulted the order of removal passed on the ground that prior approval of the executive council of nagpur university was not obtained as required under the statute 53 of nagpur university act. the tribunal seems to have held that such an approval was required. the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is undisputedly a minority institution and therefore, has a right to manage its affairs subject to such statutory limitations as may be recognized, as applicable even to minority institutions.23. in lilly kurian v. sr. lewina reported at : [1979]1scr820 , referred to by advocate shri sunil manohar, the court held in paragraphs no. 51 and 52 held as under:51. an analysis of the judgment in st. xaviers college's case air 1974 sc 1989 (supra) clearly shows that seven out of nine judges held that the provisions contained in clause (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 51a of the act ere not applicable to an educational institution established and managed by religious or linguistic minority as they interfere with the disciplinary control of the management over the staff of its educational institutions. the reasons given by the majority were that the power of the management to terminate the services of any member of the teaching or other academic and nonacademic staff was based on the relationship between an employer and his employees and no encroachment could be made on this right to dispense with their services under the contract of employment, which was an integral part of the right to administer, and that these provisions conferred on the vicechancellor or any other officer of the university authorised by him, uncanalised, unguided and unlimited power to veto the actions of the management. according to the majority view, the conferral of such blanket power on the vicechancellor and his nominee was an infringement of the right of administration guaranteed under article 30(1) to the minority institutions, religious and linguistic. the majority was accordingly of the view that the provisions contained in clause (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 51a of the act had the effect of destroying the minority institution's disciplinary control over the teaching and non-teaching staff of the college as no punishment could be inflicted by the management on a member of the staff unless it gets approval from an outside authority like the vice-chancellor or an officer of the university authorised by him. on the contrary, the two dissenting judges were of the view that these provisions were permissive regulatory measures.52. the power of appeal conferred on the vice-chancellor under ordinance 33(4) is not only a grave encroachment on the institution's right to enforce and ensure discipline in its administrative affairs but it is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power. the extent of the appellate power of the vice-chancellor is not defined; and, indeed, his powers are unlimited. the grounds on which the vice-chancellor can interfere in such appeals are also not defined. he may not only set aside an order of dismissal of a teacher and order his reinstatement, but may also interfere with any of the punishments enumerated in items (ii) to (v) of ordinance 33(2), that is to say, he can even interfere against the infliction of minor punishments. in the absence of any guidelines, it cannot be held that the power of the vicechancellor under ordinance 33(4) was merely a check on maladministration.24. in yunus ali sha v. mohd. abdul reported at : air1999sc1377 on which advocate shri sunil manohar relied, even in case of government aided minority educational institution, it was held that the institution is entitled to terminate the services of its employees without obtaining prior approval of the authorities. the learned counsel, therefore, submitted that there can be no question of the order passed by the management being subjected to an approval by the authorities in the university.25. advocate shri b.g. kulkarni, learned counsel for respondent no. 5 university also drew my attention the judgment of the supreme court in t.m.a. pai foundation v. state of karnataka reported at : air2003sc355 . in paragraph 64 the chief justice of india held as under:64. ...where allegations of misconduct are made, it is imperative that a disciplinary enquiry is conducted, and that a decision is taken. in the case of a private institution, the relationship between the management and the employees is contractual in nature. a teacher, if the contract to provides, can be produced against, and appropriate disciplinary action can be taken if the misconduct of the teacher is proved. considering the nature of the duties and keeping the principle of natural justice in mind for the purposes of establishing misconduct and taking action thereon, it is imperative that a fair domestic enquiry is conducted. it is only on the basis of the result of the disciplinary enquiry that the management will be entitled to take appropriate action. we see no reason why the management of a private unaided educational institution should seek the consent or approval of any governmental authority before taking any such action. in the ordinary relationship of master and servant, governed by the terms of a contract of employment, anyone who is guilty of breach of the terms can be proceeded against and appropriate relief can be sought....26. the question formulated by the court in the said judgment and findings thereon are as under:162g. q. 5(c) whether the statutory provisions which regulate the facets of administration like control over educational agencies, control over governing bodies, conditions of affiliation including recognition/ withdrawal thereof and appointment of staff, employees, teachers and principals including their service conditions and regulation of fees, etc. would interfere with the right of administration of minorities ?a. so far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the conditions of affiliation to an university or board have to be complied with, but in the matter of daytoday management, like the appointment of staff, teaching and nonteaching and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. however, a rational procedure for the selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself.for redressing the grievances of employees of aided and unaided institutions who are subjected to punishment or termination from service, a mechanism will have to be evolved and in our opinion, appropriate tribunals could be constituted and till then such tribunals could be presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of district judge.the state or other controlling authorities, however, can always prescribe the minimum qualification, experience and other conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being appointed as a teacher or a principal of any educational institution.regulations can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the state, without interfering with the overall administrative control of the management over the staff.fees to be charged by unaided institutions cannot be regulated but no institution should charge capitation fee.27. hon'ble shri justice variava concurred with this view in his minority judgment, observing as under:395. ...we agree that there need not be either prior and subsequent approval from any functionaries of the state/ university/ board (as the case may be) for disciplinary action, removal or dismissal. however principles of natural justice must be observed and as already provided, by the learned chief justice all such action can be scrutinised by the education tribunal....28. in view of this, categorical pronouncement by the apex court there should be no doubt that an approval from the university was really not required. the petitioners have filed on record at annexure-44 the extract of minutes of executive council of nagpur university on 4th november, 1992. it would show that in paragraph 304 the executive council 'noted without any objection', letter dated 18.09.1992 received from the secretary hislop education society, communicating decision of the society regarding removal of dr. raja singh, respondent no. 2, from the services of hislop college with immediate effect. the learned counsel submitted that since approval was not required the executive council has rightly refrained from recording its approval. the terminology used 'noted without objection' by the executive council would be sufficient to debunk the contention of respondent no. 2 based on any presumed requirement of approval by the executive council. such a contention would have been countenanced had respondent no. 2 been able to show first, that approval was required, and secondly, that the university authorities disapproved the proposed action. the expression used 'noted without any objection' would imply that the university authorities were with the management as far as removal of respondent no. 2 was concerned that they did not find anything objectionable. therefore, this could not have been a ground for setting aside removal of respondent no. 2.29. the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that if approval was really not required for removal of a principal, it is not clear as to why the university authorities had approved the appointment of dr. ms. m.e. singh as acting principal. this has been referred to by the presiding officer of the tribunal in the impugned judgment at paragraph 31. the petitioners seem to have sought approval for appointment of the officiating principal which was granted by the university. the learned counsel for respondent no. 5 university submitted, and rightly in my view, that the appointment and removal are two different actions. approval for appointment is needed because appointment is required to be made after following prescribed selection process as also after ensuring that the candidate to be appointed possesses prescribed minimum qualifications which are applicable even to minority institutions. this does not hold good about removal.30. the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that the action was taken against his client because he filed writ petition no. 1682 of 1991 on account of record of the college becoming unavailable due to disputes in the management. he submitted that the suspension order did not refer to any resolution and if there was no resolution, order itself was bad. he pointed out that even for issuing show cause notice to respondent no. 2, a resolution was necessary and the petitioners have not shown that any such resolution was ever passed. as to the resolution whereby respondent no. 2 was removed he pointed out that the resolution produced at anneuxre32 shows that it was resolved on 17.09.1992 that if respondent no. 2 were to submit his resignation before the order of removal is dispatched to respondent no. 2, chairman should receive and accept the same. he submitted that this implied that respondent no. 2 should have been given an opportunity to consider this. but he was forthwith removed by an order of the next date. he hastened to add that his client had no intention of submitting resignation, but the haste with which the action was taken would show that a decision already made was merely slapped upon respondent no. 2. he submitted that the letter which was actually sent to respondent no. 2 removing him from services which is at annexure33 refers to meeting date 18.09.1992 whereas annexure32 shows that the meeting was held on 17.09.1992 creating a doubt as to whether the meeting was at all held. now, this objection too would have been accepted had respondent no. 2 been able to show that a majority of members of the governing body even subsequently supported his contention and stated that no such meeting was ever held.31. the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that if a meeting was indeed held on 18.09.1991 it would have been reflected in the minutes of the meeting of the old body dated 21.01.1992. it is true that the extracts of minutes of meeting of the old body at annexure43c refer to ratification and approval of all actions taken by the new body from 01.11.1990 till date and actually mention the decisions taken on 02.02.1991, 24.07.1991, 04.10.1991, 14.10.1991 and 09.01.1992 but do not refer to any decision taken on 17th or 18th september, 1991. yet, on the other hand from the two petitions which have been filed, it appears that the majority of the members of the governing body are united, as far as removal of respondent no. 2 is concerned. therefore, the question of ratification by a resolution is only of academic importance.32. the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that the petitioners had not followed procedure prescribed for imposing major punishment. the statement of allegations or chargesheet were not served. the charges levelled were also not proved, and were flimsy. he submitted that the allegations about exceeding budget ought to have been examined with reference to the budgets of earlier years and the expenditure incurred in earlier years in order to find out whether respondent no. 2 was the first person to breach the budgetary limits. he submitted that it is well known that a budget after all is a budget and not an exact measure of expenditure. there can be deviations while actually implementing the various schemes. he submitted that promissory notes executed by respondent no. 2 in favour of tata finance were not in the capacity of principal of college, but as a constituent of the society of the employees and therefore, could not have formed a part of the charge. he pointed out that upon the death of respondent no. 2's sister an adjournment had been sought and since at that time it was not possible to find out as to when respondent no. 2 would be available, the counsel did not commit to any time limit. yet the enquiry officer summarily closed the enquiry depriving respondent no. 2 an opportunity to meet the charges which had been levelled against him. the petitioner society too lost no time in promptly terminating his services for charges which were not grave.33. as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, respondent no. 2 had sufficient time to appear before the enquiry officer and participate in the enquiry. after respondent no. 2's writ petition no. 579 of 1992 was disposed of with certain directions, it was necessary for respondent no. 2 to appear before the enquiry officer after complying with the conditions in the said order. it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this court had, in fact, permitted respondent no. 2 to tender his defence at the enquiry. the order was for the benefit of respondent no. 2. rather than availing of this opportunity respondent no. 2 approached the apex court and delayed his participation in the enquiry. even thereafter he did not take steps to defend himself. therefore, according to the learned counsel, this lament of respondent no. 2 that he was denied opportunity of defending himself is sham, and respondent no. 2 must blame himself for the situation in which he finds himself now.34. i have carefully considered these submissions. while there can be no doubt that respondent no. 2 had right to approach the apex court if he was aggrieved by the order of this court, it has also to be borne in mind that after disposal of the special leave petition, it was necessary for him to promptly participate in the enquiry. he was not a layman or an ordinary worker, but principal of a prestigious college and therefore, was expected to behave with responsibility even as a delinquent. the university tribunal does not show that respondent no. 2 had any valid defence to the charges made but only deals with the issues pertaining to the competence of the body and procedural matters. therefore, it would not be permissible to reopen the findings recorded by the enquiry officer upon considering the evidence tendered before him at an enquiry in which respondent no. 2 voluntarily abstained.35. in view of the foregoing, it has to be held that the university tribunal was not justified in interfering with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the punishment imposed upon respondent no. 2 by the petitioner society.36. the petitions are, therefore, allowed. the impugned order of the university tribunal is quashed and set aside.37. in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.