Mahadeorao Gulabrao Bhuibar and ors. Vs. the State of Maharashtra, Through Secretary Law and Judiciary Department and ors. - Court Judgment

H.W. Dhabe, J.

1. Parties by Counsel, Rule. Heard forthwith.

2. The instant writ petition can be disposed of on the basis of the preliminary objection regarding its maintainability raised on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3. Principally the preliminary objection is that none of the respondents 2 and 3 is holding a 'Public Office' and therefore, a writ of quo-warranto or any other appropriate writ, order, and/or direction in the nature of quo-warranto should be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to remove them from the offices held by them in Shree Shivaji Education Society, Amravati.

3. The basic facts relevant to the consideration of the above preliminary objection are that Shree Shivaji Education Society, Amravati is a Society registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The said Society was established long back on 2nd December 1932 by Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh for making the educational facilities available to the people in the Vidarbha region. With this object, the said Society has established several educational Institutions in the Vidarbha Region including schools and colleges. The colleges are in the various faculties such as Arts, Commerce, Science, Law, Engineering, Medicine and Agriculture. The said Society is also registered as a Public Trust under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, which is the requirement for getting recognition for secondary schools as well as the colleges run by it under the appropriate provisions of rules made by the State Government in this regard. According to the petitioners, who claim to be the members of the Managing Committee of the said Society, about 93,553 students are taking education in various educational institutions of this Society and about 4330 employees are employed by it. The annual budget of the Society according to them runs into crores of rupees which consists of the grant-in-aid received by its schools and colleges from the State Government, apart from the gifts and donations.

4. The respondent No. 2 was elected as the President of the Society on 31-5-1992. The petitioners 1, 2 and 3 were elected as Vice-Presidents. The petitioner No. 4 was elected as Treasurer and the petitioners 5 to 9 as Members of the Executive Council. According to the petitioners, the petitioners 10 to 12 were according to the constitution of the society co-opted as members of the Executive Council in its meeting held on 5-8-1992. Further, the petitioner No. 13 has been co-opted as the Secretary of the Society and according to them he is presently working in the same capacity in the said society.

5. It is then alleged in the petition that the first meeting of the Society was held on 5-8-1992 and the Second Meeting on 8-8-1992 both of which were presided over by the respondent No. 2. It is further alleged that in the last Executive Council Meeting, one Shri Salve was co-opted as paid Secretary of the Society. However, in April, 1991 he submitted his resignation and therefore, one of the employees of the Society by name Shri Kalbande was asked by the Executive Council to officiate as Secretary till a new Secretary was co-opted on regular basis. It is further alleged that the Notice of the meetings of the Executive Council dated 5-8-1992 and 8-8-1992 was issued by Shri Kalbande officiating as Secretary. On 18-8-1992, he issued a Notice convening the meeting of the Executive Council at the Dhanwate National College, Nagpur which is an Institution run by the Society. The said meeting was to take place on 2-9-1992. According to the submission made on behalf of the petitioners, the only Agenda for the said meeting was consideration of applications for admissions to Medical Colleges of the Society.

6. It is, however, the case of the petitioner that at the said meeting held on 2-9-1992 neither Shri Kalbande, officiating Secretary, who issued the notice of the meeting, nor the respondent No. 2, who was the President of the Society, were present. However, as all other members of the Executive Council were present, they decided to hold the meeting as convened in the absence of the President i.e. the respondent No. 2. The said meeting of the Executive Council was thus held under the Chairmanship of the Vice Chairman i.e. the petitioner No. 3 Shri Tasre. After transacting the business of the said meeting, the Executive Council by its Resolution No. 10 on that date decided to hold its next meeting on 13-9-1992 at 2.00 P.M. in the office of the Society at Amravati. By the said Resolution, the Executive Council also decided the Agenda for the next meeting to be held on 13-9-1992.

7. It is, then the case of the petitioners that the Resolutions passed in the meeting of the Executive Council held on 2-9-1992 were communicated to the respondent No. 2 including the Resolution relating to its meeting to be held on 13-9-1992 and the business to be transacted in the said meeting. He was also requested to attend the said meeting. As regards the question of the regular appointment to the post of the paid Secretary which Shri Kalbande held on officiating basis, it is alleged that a decision was taken to appoint the petitioner No. 13 as the Secretary of the Society on regular basis by Circular Resolution which was affirmed by the Council by its Resolution No. 2 in its aforesaid meeting held on 2-9-1992.

8. The meeting of the Executive Council was thereafter held on 13-9-1992 in which meeting also, according to the petitioners, the respondent No. 2 remained absent. it is submitted that he had not sent any objection also, if he had any, to the said meeting. The said meeting was held under the Chairmanship of the petitioner No. 1 who is also the Vice-Chairman of the Society. Again after transacting the business of the said meeting, the Executive Council decided to hold its next meeting, on 28-9-1992 at 2.00 P.M. in the office of the Society. The Agenda for the said meeting was settled by the Executive Council itself. The said decision about holding of the meeting on 28-9-1992 and about the Agenda for the said meeting was communicated to the respondent No. 2, who according to the petitioners, was the only member of the Executive Council, who did not attend the aforesaid meeting held on 13-9-1992.

9. According to the petitioners, the intimation of the next meeting to be held on 28-9-1992 was duly received by the respondent No. 2. However, in the meeting held on 28-9-1992, he again remained absent. The said meeting was presided over by the petitioner No. 2 who is the Vice-President of the Society. In the said meeting of the Executive Council held on 28-9-1992 it was decided to hold the next meeting on 16-10-1992. The Agenda for the said meeting was also settled in the said meeting held on 28-9-1992. According to the petitioners, the decision taken in the above meeting dated 28-9-1992 to hold the meeting on 16-10-1992 and the Agenda settled in the said meeting was communicated to the respondent No. 2 which was duly acknowledged by him. The respondent No. 2 still did not remain present in the meeting held on 16-10-1992. He did not raise any objection to the holding of the said meeting also. In his absence the meeting held on 16-10-1992 was presided over by the petitioner No. 2.

10. In the aforesaid meeting held on 16-10-1992, it was noted that the respondent No. 2 had remained absent in the meetings of the Executive Council held on 2-9-1992, 13-9-1992, 28-9-1992 and 16-10-1992 in spite of receipt of due intimation to him about the said meetings. Therefore, as provided in the bye-law No. 10(b) of the Society, since the respondent No. 2 was absent for three consecutive meetings of the Executive Council, his explanation was directed to be called by 2-11-1992 as per the decision taken in the said meeting. Accordingly, it is the case of the petitioners that the notice was issued to the respondent No. 2 by registered post acknowledgment due and also under Certificate of posting and the same was received by him also but he did not offer any explanation by 2-11-1992 upto which as per the resolution passed in the aforesaid meeting held on 16-10-1992, he was given time to submit his explanation.

11. It may be seen that in the meeting of the Executive Council dated 16-10-1992 which, according to the petitioners, was attended by all the members of the Executive Council except the respondent No. 2, it was decided to hold the next meeting of the Executive Council on 5-11-1992. The Agenda of the said meeting included the question about the cessation of the membership of the respondent No. 2. Due intimation of the said meeting was given to the respondent No. 2 as also its agenda. According to the petitioners, the respondent No. 2 did not remain present in the said meeting in spite of the receipt of its notice. The Executive Council, however, decided in the said meeting that the question regarding the continued absence of the respondent No. 2 for the meetings of the Executive Council and its effect on his status as a member of the Executive Council should be considered in its next meeting. The Executive Council then decided that its next meeting should be held on 22-11-1992. The agenda of the said meeting was also settled by it.

12. Accordingly, it is the case of the petitioners that due intimation of the meeting of the Executive Council to be held on 22-11-1992 with its agenda was sent to the respondent No. 2, but in spite of receipt of the said intimation, he did not remain present in the meeting of the Executive Council held on 22-11-1992. The said meeting was held under the Chairmanship of the petitioner No. 2. By resolution No. 2 passed by the Executive Council in the said meeting it was held that the respondent No. 2 had remained absent for more than three consecutive meetings of the Executive Council without there being any reason whatsoever and, therefore, he ceased to be a member of the Executive Council and as the President of the Society also.

13. It is thus the case of the petitioners that although the respondent No. 2 had thus ceased to be the President of the Society with effect from 22-11-1992, he was still continuing and continues to assert himself as the President of the Society and thus interferes in all the matters pertaining to the society and the educational institutions run by it. The petitioners have, therefore, preferred the instant writ petition claiming the relief that a writ of quo-warranto or any other appropriate, writ, order or direction should be issued to remove the respondent No. 2 from the office of the President of the Society i.e. Shri Shivaji Education Society, Amravati. The petitioners have also claimed similar relief against the respondent No. 3 who is not, according to them, appointed as Secretary of the Society by the Executive Council but who claims to have been appointed as Secretary by the President by his order dated 23-10-1992 on which date the officiating Secretary Shri Kalbande had submitted his resignation.

14. The main question which arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether a writ of quo-warranto or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of quo-warranto can be issued against the respondents 2 and 3 who are President and Secretary of Shri Shivaji Education Society which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and the Bombay Public Trusts Act. In other words, the question before us is whether the office or the post held by the respondent No. 2 or the respondent No. 3 is a public office for the purpose of issuance of a writ of quo-warranto or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the exercise of the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

15. In order to show that the office or the post held by the respondent No. 2 or 3 is a 'public office' much emphasis is laid upon the fact that the Society is a registered society under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 which confers upon it a public character. It is also submitted that the Society carries on the educational activities by running several schools and colleges with the assistance of numerous employees with a financial budget running into crores of rupees. What is further emphasised is that its finances come principally through the grants received from the State Government for its schools and colleges.

16. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn our attention to some of the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 in support of his submission that the office of the President of the Society held by the respondent No. 2 and the post of the Secretary held by the respondent No. 3 is a 'public office' so as to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

17. He has referred us to the definition of the expression 'Public Trust' and 'Trustee' given in section 2(xiii) and section 2(xviii) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 to show that the purposes contemplated therein are the public purposes. He has also drawn our attention to section 9 of the said Act to show that education is one of the charitable purposes included therein. He has laid emphasis upon the provisions relating to the registration of public trust contained in Chapter IV of the said Act. In particular, he has urged before us that in Public Trust Registration Office, a duty is cast upon the Assistant or Deputy Charity Commissioner in charge of such office to keep and maintain the relevant books, indices registers etc. as may be prescribed. A further duty is cast upon the incharge of the said office to enter in such books, indices, registers etc. the requisite particulars as may be prescribed about every public trust registered under the said Act. Section 18 of the said Act relating to registration of a public trust is pressed into service which, according to the petitioners, confers public character, if not statutory character, upon the society which is required to be registered as a Public Trust thereunder.

18. Perusal of section 18 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 shows that the duty is cast upon the trustee of a public trust to make an application for registration of his public trust in the prescribed manner to the appropriate authority in the region as contemplated by section 2 thereof. The said application has to contain the particulars as prescribed under sub-section (5) thereof. It has to be signed and verified in the manner laid down in sub-section (6). The Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner, as the case may be, is empowered to call for any particulars if the application is incomplete. Perusal of sub-section (7) shows that a duty is cast upon the trustee of the public trust to send memorandum in the prescribed form and the particulars regarding the name and description of the public Trust including the immoveable property held by it.

19. On receipt of the said application under section 18 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, an enquiry is contemplated under section 19 thereof upon the matters enumerated therein and on completion of the said enquiry, as provided under section 20 thereof, the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner is required to record his findings with reasons upon the said matters. It is after such enquiry is made that as provided under sub-section (1) of section 21 of the said Act, the entries are made in the register kept for the said purpose under section 17 of the said Act in accordance with the findings recorded by the Deputy or the Asstt. Charity Commissioner under section 20 of the said Act and if there is any appeal or application preferred against the said findings, then in accordance with the final decision of the competent authority prescribed under the said Act. The said entries, as provided in section 21(2) of the said Act are final and conclusive subject to any changes which may be recorded in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. If any changes are to be made in the said entries including the question of constitution of the managing committee of the Society, the said changes have to be intimated to the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner as the case may be and after necessary enquiry, the said changes are to be recorded in the said register as provided under section 22 of the said Act. The said changes are also final and conclusive until they are further amended in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.

20. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has then relied upon the provisions of section 36-A of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 to show that it provides for powers, duties and restrictions upon the trustees. Perusal of section 36-A would show that a trustee of every public trust has to administer the affairs of the trust and to apply the funds and properties thereof for the purpose and objects of the trust in accordance with the terms of the trust, usage of the institution and lawful directions which the Charity Commissioner or the Court may issue in respect thereof, and exercise the same care as a man of ordinary prudence takes when dealing with such affairs, funds or property, if they were his own. Sub-section (2) of section 36-A provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the instrument of trust, the trustee shall be entitled to exercise all the powers incidental to the prudent and beneficial management of the trust, and to do all things necessary for the due performance of the duties imposed on him. There are certain restrictions and limitations placed upon a trustee in respect of borrowings for the public trust and on borrowing money himself from the public trust.

21. It is in the light of the above provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and in the context of the facts and circumstances herein before referred to and in particular the fact that the educational institutions are run by the society principally from the salary and non-salary grants received from the Government that it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that the office of the President of the Society in question or the post of its Secretary is 'public office' for the purpose of issuance of a writ of quo-warranto to prevent the incumbents of the said posts from continuing in the said office.

22. In considering the said question, it is first necessary to notice the law relating to writ of quo-warranto. The classic case of the Supreme Court on the point is the case of The University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao and another, : [1964]4SCR575 . After observing in paragraph 6 of its Judgment that the Judgment of the High Court does not indicate that its attention was drawn to the technical nature of the writ of quo-warranto which was claimed by the respondent before it and to the conditions which were to be satisfied before such a writ could issue in such proceedings, the Supreme Court has quoted the passage from the Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol II, page 145 in paragraph 7 of its judgment on the question of the nature of the writ of quo-warranto, its purpose, procedure and use. Perusal of the said Judgment would show that the said principles are followed in India also for issue of a writ of quo-warranto under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

23. The principles enunciated in the above referred passage from the Halsbury's Laws of England quoted by the Supreme Court in para 7 of its judgment cited supra are as follows : The quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the enquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of writ of quo-warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo-warranto confers jurisdiction and authority upon the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. Before a citizen can claim such a writ, the proceedings must tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office. Sometimes when the persons not entitled to public office are allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, then in such cases if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo-warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post can be allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo-warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia that the office in question is a public office and is held by an usurper without legal authority, which necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not.

24. On facts, the Supreme Court held in the above decision that the appointment in question of the Reader which was challenged before the High Court was made by the University pursuant to the advertisement issued by it and there was no attempt made in the said case to show that the said appointment was illegal on the ground that it was contrary to the statutory provisions. Hence it was held that a writ of quo-warranto could not be issued in the said case. Before the Supreme Court a ground that the said appointment was in breach of the statutory Ordinances and provisions was sought to be raised for the first time which the Supreme Court did not allow. On merits, the Supreme Court has held that when the appointment of the respondent No. 2 before it as a reader was challenged only on the ground that he did not have the qualifications advertised for the post, it held that in the academic matters, the recommendation made by the Board of experts appointed by the University for selection of candidates for the post of Reader and accepted by the Chancellor would not be interfered with. It therefore, set aside the Judgment of the High Court and dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 before it under Article 226 of the Constitution.

25. It may thus be seen that it is a condition for issue of a writ of quo-warranto that the office or the post held by a person against whom such a writ is claimed must be a public office and that it is held by the person concerned i.e. the usurper contrary to the provisions of law. It is therefore necessary for the petitioners in the instant writ petition to show that the respondents 2 and 3 are holding public office and that too contrary to the provisions of law.

26. In Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Volume I para 171 pages 164 and 165, the question as to what the public nature of the office for the purposes of issuance of quo-warranto is, is dealt with. Perusal of the said para shows that the duties of the office must be of public nature. It further shows that an information in the nature of quo-warranto would not lie in respect of the office of master of a hospital and free school, which institution was a private charitable foundation, the right of appointment to offices in which was in Governors who were private and not public functionaries; and it was immaterial that a charter of incorporation for the institution had been obtained from the crown. The case relied upon was R. v. Mousley (1846)8 C.B. 946, which was followed in R. v. Auchinleck (1891) 28 L.R 404, where the office in question was that of surgeon or physician to a hospital founded by private persons and afterwards incorporated by Act of Parliament. Another case referred to was (R. Gregory)4, (1772) 4 Term Rep 24, on where it was held that a quo-warranto information would not lie for the purpose of trying the validity of an election to a fellowship of a college. There is a direct decision regarding offices of members of Management Committee of School rendered by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Amarendra v. Narendra, : AIR1953Cal114 , in which it is held that the said members do not hold office of a public nature, even though a small section of the public, viz., the students and their guardians are interested, as such in the school and therefore, a writ of quo-warranto does not lie in respect of such office.

27. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has however urged before us that once a society is registered as public trust, its bye-laws have statutory character and, therefore, if any person continues to hold the office in breach of the provisions of the said bye-laws, his office is amenable to a writ of quo-warranto or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of quo-warranto.

In the light of the Principles relating to the issue of a writ of quo-warranto discussed in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of University of Mysore v. Govind Rao, cited supra, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has sought to satisfy us that the offices held by the respondents 2 and 3 are public offices which they continued to hold contrary to the bye-laws, in particular the bye law No. 10(b) of the society which bye laws, according to him, have statutory force since the society is registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

28. To show that the respondents 2 and 3 are occupying public offices, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the following judgments :-

1) Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee and others v. V.R. Rudani and others, : (1989)IILLJ324SC .

2) M.G. Pandke and others v. M.C. Hinganghat, : AIR1993SC142 .

3) Mrs. Sejal Rikeen Dalal and others v. The Stock Exchange and another, : AIR1991Bom30 .

4) Pandurang Hindurao Patil v. State of Maharashtra and others 1993 M.L.J. 1081.

5) Ajay Gambhir and another v. Dean, Mahatma Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences and others, : AIR1986Bom26 .

6) 1993 M. L.J. 1981 short notes.

29. Perusal of the judgments in the cases cited supra, and in, particular, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anadi Mukta's case (cited supra) would show that they are all the cases dealing with the question of issue of writ of Mandamus to compel performance of statutory duty or a public duty. These cases are no authority on the question of the principles relating to issuance of a writ of quo-warranto. What is held in Anadi Mukta's case cited supra is that if the rights are purely of a private character, no mandamus can be issued. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty, mandamus will not lie. However, in other cases according to the said judgment, the mandamus can lie. Further, it is held in the said judgment that Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Court to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure, according to the said judgment, from the English law.

29A. It is then observed in the said judgment that under Article 226 of the Constitution, writs can be issued to 'any person or authority'. It is also observed that the term 'authority' used in Article 226 in the context must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Which is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of the fundamental rights under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution. It is thus held in the said case that the words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are not confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State but covers any person or body performing public duty also. It is clear from the said judgment that the issuance of a writ of Mandamus does not depend on the question whether the authority is purely a private body, and if a statutory or a public duty is cast upon such body, a writ of mandamus can be issued to such a body also. This view is also taken in the case of Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. Imanual, : (1969)IILLJ479SC .

30. The approach of the Court in respect of writ of mandamus is thus functional which may not be appropriately relevant when the question of issue of a writ of quo-warranto arises where the emphasis is upon the status of the person against whom the writ is claimed viz. the nature of the office held by him. It cannot be said that in the said judgment it is held that the authority to which a writ of mandamus is issued for compelling the performance of legal duty or a public duty is a 'public authority' in its true sense. The ratio of the above judgment is, therefore, not attracted when we are considering the question of issue of a writ of quo-warranto. In fact, as observed in de Smit's Judicial Review of Administrative Action Fourth Edition at page 464, an information in the nature of quo-warranto would lie in respect of a public office created by the Act of Parliament provided that the office was not that of a Deputy or Servant held at the will of others. The case relied upon is : Darley v. R. 1846 (12) C.L.F 520 .

31. In this regard we may also refer to the judgment of this Court in the case, Dr. D.K. Belsare v. Nagpur University, reported in : (1980)82BOMLR494 , upon which reliance is placed on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3. In that case a writ of quo-warranto was claimed to prevent the respondent concerned from continuing in the post of professor in the Nagpur University. It was held in the said case that the post of Professor in the Nagpur University is not a public office against which an information in the nature of quo-warranto can lie. It is also pertinent to see in this regard that in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of University of Mysore v. Govind Rao, cited supra, this question is not considered and the judgment has turned upon the second requirement for the issue of a quo-warranto viz. that it was not proved therein that the post of Reader in question was held in contravention of any statutory provisions.

32. The learned Counsel for the interveners has brought to our notice several decisions on the question of issue of a writ of quo-warranto and, in particular, the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Manidra Nath v. Anil Chandra and others, : AIR1953Cal689 , in which it is held that the member of Managing Committee of a school does not hold a 'public office'. We have already referred to the said case hereinbefore.

33. Considering now independently the question whether the offices held by the respondents 2 and 3 are public offices, what has first to be seen is that Shri Shivaji Education Society registered under the Societies Registration Act does not become a statutory body, merely because it is required to be registered under section 18 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. This is clear even from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anadi Mukta's, case cited supra paras 11 and 12 of which, it has referred to its judgments in the case of i) Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain, : (1976)IILLJ163SC , ii) Deepak Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instruction, : (1987)ILLJ516SC . It is held in the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, cited supra that a society running the said college which was registered under the Co-operative Societies Act was not a statutory body, because of which a relief of reinstatement could not be claimed against it. Therefore, merely because the Society of which the respondent No. 2 is a President and the respondent No. 3 is the Secretary is registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, it would not mean that it is a statutory body. The offices held by the respondents 2 and 3 cannot therefore, be said to be created under the Statute.

34. Even otherwise, merely because the education is a charitable purpose within the meaning of the definition of the expression 'Public Trust' under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, it would not necessarily follow that a society running an educational institution and registered as a Public Trust under the said Act is a public body or public authority. The character of the body, whether private or public is one thing and carrying on the charitable purpose is another. It has to be borne in mind that we have to consider the said question from the point of view of issuance of a writ of quo-warranto. As observed in the passage from Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Vol. 1 para 171 cited supra and the Judgement of the Calcutta High Court cited supra since the educational purpose is a charitable purpose and since it has to do something with the public or section of people, i.e. the students, the guardians and the teachers, it would not mean that the body which carries on such purpose is a 'public body' or 'public authority' in the sense that a writ of quo warranto can be issued to it. If such a meaning is given, then all trusts registered as public trusts under the Bombay Public Trusts Act would become 'public authorities' and the officers or the members of the Trust would be holding public offices for the purpose of issuance of a writ of quo warranto.

35. It is however urged that the educational institutions run by the society of which the respondent No. 2 is the President receive substantial salary and non-salary grants from the State for running them and therefore, such Institutions have an element of public character. In appreciating the above submission, again a distinction has to be made between the functions discharged by the society in relation to the educational institutions in regard to which a writ of Mandamus as held in Shri Anadi Mukta's case may lie, but so far as its internal working such as election, constitution, is concerned, it cannot be treated as a public body or an authority in regard to which a writ of quo warranto can lie. The above submission made on behalf of the petitioners cannot therefore be accepted.

36. The next submission made on behalf of the petitioners is that not only the Society in the instant case is required to be registered as a Public Trust under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, but there are certain restrictions or restraints placed by the said Act upon it which would show that it is a public body, if not a statutory body. It is difficult to accept the above submission made on behalf of the petitioners.

37. It may be seen that because some statutes require the bodies of association of persons to be registered under the said statutes and because certain restrictions or restraints are placed upon such bodies by such statutes, it would not mean that the said private body which is required to be registered is a public body for the purposes of issuance of writ of quo-warranto. Even all the companies are required to be registered under the Companies Act. Even certain duties and obligations are cast upon such companies under the said Act and some matters relating to them are also regulated by it, but for that reason it cannot mean that a Company is a public body and that its directors hold public office for the purpose of issuance of a writ of quo-warranto. Praga Tools Co-operation's, case reported in : (1969)IILLJ479SC , (cited supra), which is relied upon in Shri Anadi Mukta's, case (cited supra), shows that the Company registered under the Companies Act is a private body and is amenable to writ of Mandamus only if a statutory or a public duty is cast upon it. We cannot therefore, accept the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the office held by the respondents 2 and 3 is a 'public office' for the purpose of issue of a writ of quo-warranto.

38. Apart from the fact that the information in the nature of quo-warranto can lie in regard to a public office, the next requirement for issue of a writ of quo-warranto is that the office in question is held by usurper without legal authority or contrary to the provisions of law. It is sought to be shown to us by the learned Counsel for the petitioners by relying upon the procedure of registration of public trust and the requirement that all changes in the constitution of managing committee or its functioning are to be intimated to the authorities under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 that the bye-laws, according to which the society functions have statutory force. In support of the above submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Glaxo Lab (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Meerut and others, : (1984)ILLJ16SC and Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and others, : (1984)IILLJ223SC . Perusal of the said judgments would show that they relate to the question whether the standing orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 have statutory force or not. It may be seen that the provisions of the above Act casts an obligation upon the employer to frame the Standing Orders in respect of the industrial matters enumerated in the schedule thereof in accordance with the procedure laid down in the said Act. The said Act which lays down the procedure for framing the standing orders even provides for an appeal against the orders of the competent authority sanctioning or refusing to sanction the standing orders. The employees or their representatives have right to object to the Draft Standing Orders submitted by the employer and ultimately after hearing both the sides, the competent certifying authority certifies the said Standing Orders after which only the said Standing Orders come into force and are binding upon the parties. It is in view of the above procedure laid down in the said Act to frame the standing orders that it is held by the Supreme Court that the said standing orders have statutory force.

39. The provisions in section 18 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 relating to the registration of public trusts merely require that the bye-laws should be submitted to the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner and they are recorded in the Register of Public Trusts so as only to see that the public trust functions in accordance with the said bye-laws. For the same reasons the changes in the constitution of the Managing Committee and other relevant matters regarding functioning of the trust are required to be informed to the authority constituted under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. These provisions cannot be said to be in pari materia with the provisions of that Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The ratio of the Judgments of the Supreme Court cited supra cannot therefore be made applicable to the Bye laws framed by the Society in the instant case.

40. On the other hand, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, : (1969)IILLJ698SC , is more aptly applicable in the instant case. It is held by the Supreme Court in the said case that the Bye-laws framed by a Co-operative Society in pursuance of the provisions of Co-operative Societies Act in the said case cannot be held to be a law or to have the force of law. Therefore, even assuming that the offices held by the respondents 2 and 3 are public offices since the bye laws of the Society cannot be said to be a law or to have the force of law, a writ of quo-warranto cannot be issued, since the said offices cannot be said to be held by the respondents 2 and 3 without legal authority or contrary to the provisions of law.

41. A writ of quo-warranto against the usurpation of the office by the respondents 2 and 3, cannot be granted in the instant case also on the ground that the petitioners have an alternative remedy available under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. We are informed that in fact, the change report about the changes in the constitution of the Executive Council of the Society is submitted to the competent authority under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 and the matter is pending before it under section 22 of the said Act. This is not thus a fit case wherein a writ of quo-warranto should be issued.

42. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.