| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/357379 |
| Subject | Labour and Industrial |
| Court | Mumbai High Court |
| Decided On | Oct-03-1994 |
| Case Number | W.P. No. 517/1994 |
| Judge | V.S. Sirpurkar, J. |
| Reported in | (1996)ILLJ55Bom |
| Acts | Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and prevention of Unfair Labour practices Act, 1971 - Sections 3(5) and 3S; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 2S; Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 |
| Appellant | Ramesh S/O. Ramarao Wase |
| Respondent | The Commissioner, Revenue Division |
| Appellant Advocate | J.L. Bhoot, Adv. |
| Respondent Advocate | D.N. Kukade, A.G.P. |
| Disposition | Petition dismissed |
V.S. Sirpurkar, J.
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard learned Counsel for the respective parties.
2. This is a petition challenging the order passed by the Industrial Court which has rejected the complaint in limine, by holding that the same is filed by a person who is a Class-II Gazetted Officer and a Sectional Engineer and cannot be termed as 'workman' and cannot excite the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
2A. The petitioner, it seems had filed a complaint before the Industrial Court, complaining against the order setting up a departmental enquiry against him for some acts of misconduct. This departmental enquiry seems to have been instituted by an order dated August 27, 1993. It seems that a charge-sheet and a statement of allegations had also been supplied to the petitioner. It is worth while to note that charges 1,2 and 3 are for misappropriation of money and complaint significantly is that the concerned employee is already facing a criminal prosecution for the offences under Sections 402 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code with other relevant Sections, in the Criminal Court.
3. I have gone through the whole complaint. The whole complaint is completely silent about the nature of duties of the petitioner. What is stated is that the petitioner is working as a Sectional Engineer at Panchayat Samiti, Risod, and is an employee of the Government working under the control of the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Akola. A bald statement thereafter has been made that the complainant (petitioner herein) is an employee within the meaning of Section 3(5) and the respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 3(6) of the Act.
4. In the whole complaint, thereafter, there is not a whisper regarding the duties of the complainant-petitioner, or any justification in support of his claim that he is a workman. It is now well-nigh settled that for being covered under the umbrella of the Act, one must be an employee within the definition of Section 3(5) of the Act and, in that, he should be a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, as the case may be. The relevant enactment in the present controversy is the Industrial Disputes Act. If the complainant wanted to excite the jurisdiction of the Court, he had to show in the plaint that he is really covered under the provisions of Section 3(5) of the Act, and bald statement to that effect would not be enough, particularly on the back-drop of the fact that he is a Class-II Gazetted Officer and a Sectional Engineer. It is skilfully not stated what his actual salary is, and the learned Government Pleader, on behalf of the respondent informs that his salary is more than Rs. 4000/- per month.
5. Shri Bhoot, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has heavily come against the observations made by the Industrial Court. In the whole petition, beyond dubbing the order of the Industrial Court as illegal and beyond contending that the Industrial Court has committed grave error of law in returning the case for being presented before the appropriate forum, there is absolutely nothing which is stated therein. In fact, the petition is liable to be dismissed only for the reason that nothing was stated before the Industrial Court regarding the duties of the petitioner and, secondly, it was also not made out before this Court in the petition. In ground No. 3 of the petition, the petitioner has contended that whether he is workman or not is a matter of evidence and cannot be decided on the face of record. Now, the matter being agitated on the basis of evidence and for leading evidence, the complainant had to essentially aver in the complaint the nature of his duties so that he could lead evidence to show that those were the precise duties assigned to him under his employment and the said duties did clothe him with the status of workman. The petition is sadly silent on the whole aspect. Therefore, exaggeration of the original complaint and the petition would itself show that the petitioner was not entitled to the reliefs that he claimed either in the complaint or in this petition.
6. Shri Bhoot, however did not stop there and filed an affidavit before this Court, pointing out the duties of the Sectional Engineer. In his affidavit, the deponent-petitioner has averred, inter alia, regarding his duties. However, it is not stated therein wherefrom these duties have been noted and picked up. If the verification clause of the affidavit is being seen, it is seen that this affidavit is verified and affirmed as the contents thereof are true to the knowledge of the petitioner. Wherefrom the petitioner has got this knowledge, has not been clarified. Be that as it may, even if a glance is cast at the duties, these duties do not spell out the claim of the petitioner that the duties are not of supervisory nature. The duties, as they reflect from the affidavit are as under :-
'(a) To prepare the plans and estimates of the sanctioned works like buildings, roads and drains etc., after getting the instructions of my superiors and under the guidance of the Deputy Engineer/Executive Engineer working under the respondents establishment.
(b) To give the layout/marking of foundation of works as per sanctioned plans. I myself mark the lines for foundations of works.
(c) To record measurement of completed and running works in the measurement book. To prepare the bills of works and to work-out the valuation of the completed works by Gram Panchayats.
(d) To give the technical guidance to the agency like Gram Panchayats and Contractors;
(e) To collect and to submit information of works to the heads of department i.e. to perform the reporting work.
(e) (Wrongly typed in the affidavit as '(e)'). I am neither the head of department nor the head of office. On the contrary, I perform my duties as per instructions of my head of office, i.e., the Block Development Officer/Deputy Engineer and Executive Engineer.
(f) I have no power of distribution of work, detect fault, report for penalty and to make arrangement for filling vacancies.
(g) I have no power of supervisory control over the subordinates, i.e., I am not empowered to sanction the leave, to give promotion or to sanction increments. I am also not empowered to take the disciplinary action against the employees, if they committed any mistake.'
7. A glance at these duties, even cursorily, would bring out the true nature of the duties of the petitioner and I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the dominant nature of the duties of the petitioner is supervisory and not technical as being claimed by Shri Bhoot. In order to prepare the plans and estimates of the sanctioned work, even if that has to be done under the guidance of the Deputy Engineer and/or Executive Engineer, the petitioner has to use his judgment and technical knowledge. Merely because he uses technical knowledge, it does not become technical duties. Technical duties do not involve taking of any judgment or using the technical knowledge. It is a duty of a technical nature, meaning thereby in that duty the concerned person has to do certain manual jobs depending upon his skill which is essentially technical. That is the ordinary meaning of 'technical duty'. Where, therefore, the petitioner has to use his knowledge and to take judgment regarding the preparation of plans and estimates, the duty cannot be termed to be, or dubbed to be, a technical duty. Similar is the case for making the layouts/marking of foundation of work. Even if the petitioner is making layout or marking of foundation of the work, that does not become a technical job.
7A. Coming to the duty mentioned in para 2(c) of the affidavit, if the petitioner has to record measurements of completed and running works in the measurement book, he has definitely to take judgment as to whether the work is completed as per technical specification or not. Therefore, he supervises the work done by the workmen. There is an element of inspection by him, and for these acts he has an authority over the workmen and labourers by reason of his post. He also has to prepare the bills and work out the valuation of the completed work. Therefore, he has to necessarily take judgment as to whether the work is completed as per the standards laid down by the contract. Here also he has an authority to sit over, and pass a judgment about the work. The nature of his work gets the label of 'supervision' because of this authority. This work cannot be said to be a technical job but has to be dubbed as a work of supervisory nature.;
7B. Duty mentioned in para 2(d) of the affidavit, by which the petitioner is required to give technical guidance to the agency like Gram Panchayats and contractors, speaks for itself. A workman does not give guidance to anybody else. He is guided by others, i.e., his supervisor and bosses. A person, who has the capacity to give guidance of a technical nature to the agencies like Gram Panchayats and contractors, can never be dubbed as a workman. Similarly, in respect of the duties mentioned in para 2(e), if the petitioner is to collect and submit information of work to the Heads of Department and to perform the reporting work, he has necessarily to take judgment as to whether the work is completed or not and what is the state of affairs of the work. There also the petitioner does a responsible supervisory job and not of a workman, viz., to do the work by himself. Insofar as the assertions in para 2(e), (f) and (g) are concerned, they are merely arguments and not the duties. Even if the petitioner is required to do the work as per the instructions of the Block Development Officer or Deputy Engineer, that does not give him a character of a workman. Again, the assertions are vague, to say the least. The petitioner may not have any power of distributing the work, or detecting faults. Here again, the affidavit is seriously disputed by the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent. If the petitioner has power to do measurement work, he certainly has the power to detect the incomplete work and not to include it in the measurement book.
8. The assertion in para 2(g) of the affidavit is most interesting. It is popularly believed that in order to dub the work as a 'supervisory', the person concerned must have control over the subordinates and the person concerned should have the power to sanction leave, give promotions etc., which is only one of the facets of the supervisory work. That is not the be all and end all of the term 'supervisory work'. If the supervision is required to be made in some other different way, like over the quality of the work and over other aspects such as to see and examine whether the work is completed or not in satisfactory manner and in keeping with specifications, that also becomes the supervisory work. It is, therefore, clear that really speaking, none of the duties of the petitioner are of technical nature, but are of supervisory nature.
9. Shri Bhoot relied upon a judgment of this Court reported in The Spices & Oils Seeds Exchange Ltd. v. Suhas Anant Kulkarni, (1986) 2 CLR 479. This is a judgment by a single Judge of this Court. Shri Bhoot relied on the observations that the 'status of a person as an employee cannot be decided merely on the basis of his designation. It is not a pure question of law. It will have to be decided by allowing parties to lead evidence and looking to the range of the duties which are performed by the concerned person'. In the first place, the judgment is different on facts. Secondly, in this case, the petitioner has not, in any manner, shown what his duties were, even in the complaint. Thirdly, the attempt on the part of the petitioner to show by affidavit here his real nature of duties, which is allowed by this Court, goes to show that he has been able to put before the Courts of law the real nature of his duties. Seeing the petitioner's assertions, it is clear that he cannot be dubbed as a 'workman'.
10. The second case relied upon by Shri Bhoot is Dr. Surendra Kumar Shuka v. Union of India, 1986 LIC 1516. In this case, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that the work of Assistant Medical Officer, Class II (Railways) is of technical nature and as such, he is a workman. There cannot be a comparison between an Assistant Medical Officer, Class-II and an Assistant Engineer, Class-II. The nature of the two duties - one of a Doctor and other of an Engineer - by itself, is not only distinct from each other but uncomparable inter se. Apart from that, I cannot persuade myself to accept the principle of law laid down in this judgment that the primary purpose of the respondents in employing the Assistant Medical Officer, Class II is to treat the patients who are employees of the Railways and their families and, therefore, his duties are technical. If a doctor has to treat a person, he has to 'diagnose' and has to take a judgment and thereafter has to 'decide' as to which particular line of treatment will have to be given to the patient. In this, doctor does not engage himself in a technical duty, though he uses his technical knowledge for the same. I respectfully do not agree with the Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court.
11. The word 'technical' has not to be read in contradistinction with the word 'simple'. All the work which requires technical knowledge need not necessarily be technical work. The word 'technical' has different connotation. In the 'technical' work, there would hardly be any scope for judging, opining or evaluating. It cannot, therefore, be held that a duty to treat the patient is merely of a technical nature. If that be so, even a surgeon will be doing a 'technical job'. That cannot be the import of law. The labour law is meant for the welfare of labourers. If Labour Courts under that law waste their time in holding that the doctors and engineers are labourers and deciding their claims, it will be an unfortunate state of affairs.
12. Shri Bhoot then relied upon a judgment of this High Court reported in : (1993)ILLJ127Bom . Gwalior investment Co. Pvt. Ltd v. K.M. Desai, Shri Bhoot, in this judgment, more particularly relied upon the quotation of the Supreme Court from A.G. Rajrao v. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. Bombay, 1985 LIC 1008. The observations are not applicable to the present case at all. It is the intendment of the observations that if a person has a primary, basic or dominant duty, which is not a supervisory capacity, and even if the person concerned is doing some supervisory work, he has to be dubbed as a workman. Such is not the case here. I have taken complete resume of the duties of the petitioner which, according to me, cannot be said to be of technical nature. Apart from this, the Supreme Court has gone into the question right from Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd. v. The Burmah Shell Management Staff Association : (1970)IILLJ590SC (SC) to its latest decision in S.K. Maini v. Corona Sahu Company Limited : (1994)IILLJ1153SC , and directed that the Courts should look into the 'nature of the duties'. In Burmah Shell's case, the Engineers, who were supposed to make estimates and plans and were supposed to give directions have been held not to be the workmen.
13. Considering all the aforesaid material together, it cannot be said that the Industrial Court was, in any way, in error in returning back the complaint to the complainant (petitioner herein) for being presented before the competent forum. The petition has no merits and is dismissed with costs.