Militant Security Bureau Pvt. Ltd. and anr. Vs. B.R. Mehr and Another - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- maharashtra village police act (46 of 1967)sections 5, 6 & 15: [swatanter kumar, c.j., a.p. lavande & smt. vasanti a. naik, jj] powers of police patil held, section 15 clearly states the varied powers that are vested in the police patil. he is vested with the power to call and examine witnesses, record their statements and search for concealed articles. such are the powers given to the police patil under the provisions of the village police act. the powers vested in the police patil under the provisions of the village police act are relatable to the duties and functions for which the police patil is appointed. to give meaning to these powers beyond the scope of the duties would be an approach not quite permissible in law. the duties, functions and powers of the police patil under the provisions of the village police act do not vest him with the powers which are vested in police officer under the provisions of the criminal procedure code. the powers given to him under the village police act are limited in their nature and scope and are not as wide specific and consequential as the powers of a police officer under the provisions of the criminal procedure code. the police patil is to act unlike a police officer under the orders of the district magistrate and has to report the matters to him and even where he makes some inquiry or investigation, he is expected to submit report to the station officer and has not been empowered to take any further action, like preparation of a charge sheet or its presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction. he is vested with no powers in regard to the powers vested in an investigating officer under the provisions of section 173 of the criminal procedure code. the act does not contain any deeming provision which by fiction of law would term a police patil as a police officer. it could be possible that an act may specifically stipulate that a police patil for all intent and purpose shall be deemed to be a police officer under the provisions of the village police act and/or the criminal procedure code. in the absence of such a deeming fiction of law, it is difficult to confer the status of a police officer in law upon a police patil or accept the contention that the police patil is clothed with the powers and functions of a police officer. neither there is any specific provisions in the act not on principle of implied interpretation it can be said that provisions of the act suggest that the police patil is a police officer in law. his duties, functions and powers are not identical or even closely identical to the powers of a police officer under the provisions of the criminal procedure code. - as rightly pointed out by the learned advocate, the averments in the petition and the correspondence annexed to the petition clearly establish the undisputed position that the principal employer in the case is the executive engineer and that the petitioners are only the contractor.1. petitioner no. 2 in this case is the director of m/s. militant security bureau pvt. ltd., which is a company and which is the petitioner no. 1 herein. respondent no. 1, who is a government labour officer and inspector under the contract labour (regulation and abolition) act, 1970, instituted a prosecution against the petitioners in the court of the learned metropolitan magistrate, court no. 13, dadar, bombay, being case no. 489/sl/1986, alleging infringement of the various provisions of the contract labour (regulation and abolition) act, 1970 and the rules framed thereunder. admittedly, the petitioners were the contractors of the executive engineer, south bombay electric division, public works department, and were required to contract for the services of liftmen in various government buildings. the petitioners have, both in the petition as also in the annexures thereto, set out a list of the buildings and the number of employees that are supplied to each of them. from this, it is evident that on an average one or two or at the most three employees are being provided for by the petitioners at these building for the purposes of manning the lifts. the respondents, obviously without examining the facts of the case straightway proceeded to file the complaint before the learned metropolitan magistrate against the petitioners on the assumption that the provisions of the act are applicable to them. 2. on behalf of the petitioners, miss raut, the learned advocate, has submitted that the institution of the prosecution is unjustified and that the proceedings will have to be quashed because the provisions of the act are not applicable to the case of the present petitioners. it is undisputed that under section 1(4) of the contract labour (regulation and abolition) act, it has been clarified that the act shall apply to every establishment in which twenty or more workmen are employed section 2(e) of the act defines the term 'establishment.' it is clear from that definition that the deployment of personnel at the buildings which are under the control and maintenance of the state public works department would not bring them within the ambit and definition of the term 'establishment'.under these circumstances, there can be no dispute with regard to the correctness of the submission advanced by the learned advocate that the provisions of this act do not apply to the present petitioners. 3. it was sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents that the bifurcation done by the petitioner to the effect that the number of employees in each building should not be separately computed, but the entire cluster of buildings should be treated as one; and, furthermore, that the public works department being the department of the state government the building in question would come within the definition of section 2(e) of the contract labour (regulation and abolition) act, which defines the term 'establishment' it is not possible to uphold either of these contentions because admittedly each of the buildings is situated at a different geographic location in the city and it is not as through that they are interconnected to form one cluster or one colony. secondly, the employees manning the lifts in those buildings cannot, by stretch of imagination, come within the definition of 'establishment' as contemplated under section 2(e) of the contract labour (regulation and abolition) act. the exercise of prosecuting the present petitioners on the ground that they have committed various breaches of the provisions of the act is therefore, unjustified. 4. the second ground of challenge advanced by miss raut on behalf of the petitioners is to the effect that the charge against the petitioners relating to non-registration is also unsustainable. as rightly pointed out by the learned advocate, the averments in the petition and the correspondence annexed to the petition clearly establish the undisputed position that the principal employer in the case is the executive engineer and that the petitioners are only the contractor. it is also brought on record that the petitioners did apply to the executive engineer for grant of the requisite certificate without which it is not permissible for them to apply for registration and that the executive engineer himself contended and to my mind rightly, that the provisions of the act did not apply and consequently, the question of issuing such a certificate did not arise. in this view of the matter to blame the present petitioners and furthermore, to prosecute them is something that cannot be sanctioned. 5. in the light of the above position since the provisions of the act do not apply to the petitioners, the criminal proceedings instituted against them before the trial court are liable to be quashed. accordingly criminal case no. 489/sl/1986, pending before the court of learned metropolitan magistrate, court no. 13, dadar, bombay, is quashed. the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). the interim orders to stand vacated.