K.K. Vasudeva Kurup Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. - Court Judgment

C.K. Thakkar, C.J.

1. This petition is filed by the petitioner, a practising advocate praying for a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction ordering respondent No. 1, Union of India, other respondents as also Courts of law everywhere in India, not to take cognizance of any case or proceeding under sections 138 to 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as amended by the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Act 66 of 1988),

2. The petitioner is a citizen of India. He is a lawyer by profession, practising in the High Court of Bombay as well as in other courts in Bombay since 1966. He has approached this court in public interest litigation by filing this petition for seeking a direction from this Court which would prevent illegal prosecution and thus benefit general public all over India.

3. The case of the petitioner is that the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was enacted and came into force in December, 1881. It deals with negotiable instruments, such as Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange, Cheques, etc. The said Act will hereinafter referred to as 'the original Act'. By the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Amending Act'), certain amendments were made by Parliament in the original Act. It, inter alia, inserted Chapter XVII ('Of Penalties in case of Dishonour of certain cheques for Insufficiency of Funds in the Accounts') contained in sections 138 to 142. The petitioner, however, states before this Court that by the Repealing and Amending Act, 2001 (Act 30 of 2001), published in the Gazette of India, on September 3, 2001, certain statutes were repealed as shown in the First Schedule. Several statutes were mentioned in the said Schedule along with the extent of repeal. At serial No. 66, the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988, is referred to and it is stated that it is repealed as 'the whole'.

4. The argument of the petitioner before this court is that since 'the Amending Act of 1988 is repealed as 'the whole', the provisions of Chapter XVII i.e. sections 138 to 142 also stood repealed. Appropriate directions, therefore, are required to be issued to the respondents not to take cognizance of any such offence alleged to have been committed under the aforesaid sections.

5. We have heard Mr. Kurup, petitioner in person and Mr. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

6. In our opinion, there is misconception on the part of the petitioner in raising a contention that the provisions of sections 138 to 142 of the original Act have been repealed and the case is governed by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and sections 138 to 142 cannot remain operative. In our opinion, the relevant section applicable to the instant case is Section 6A of the Act and not Section 6 thereof.

7. Section 6A, which is relevant and material, reads thus:

'6-A. Repeal of Act Baking textual amendment in Act or Regulation.--Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal'

It is clear that Parliament wanted to amend the original Act of 1881 by inserting Chapter XVII in the Act. For that purpose, an Amending Act of 1988 had been enacted. As soon as the Amending Act of 1988 had been brought into force and implemented, the provisions of Chapter XVII (sections 138 to 142) stood inserted in the original Act of 1881. Thus, from the date on which Amending Act had become law and brought into force, the provisions in the original Act stood amended containing Chapter XVII (sections 138 to 142). The Amending Act thus served its purpose and object. Nothing was required to be done thereafter so far as Amending Act is concerned and was required to be repealed. The repeal of the Amending Act, however, does not affect the law which already stood amended. Let us consider the legal position.

8. In Khuda Bux v. Manager, Caledonian Press, : (1954)IILLJ13Cal , speaking for the High Court of Calcutta Chakravarti, C.J. explained the doctrine of repeal of Amendment Act thus:

'Such Acts have no legislative effect, but are designed for editorial revision, being intended only to excise dead matter from th6 statute book and to reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reason for their existence. At times, inconsistencies are also removed by repealing and amending Acts. The only objects of such Acts which in England are called Statute Law Revision Acts, is legislative spring-cleaning and they are not intended to make any change in the law.'

9. The above observations of the High Court of Calcutta were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Jethanand Betab v. State of Delhi (now Delhi Administration), : 1960CriLJ160 . There, the Apex Court was considering the provisions of the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933. Under the 1933 Act, there was no specific provision making possession of Wireless Transmitter an offence. The said-Act, however, was amended by the Indian Wireless Telegraphy (Amendment) Act, 1949. By insertion of Section 6 (1-A), possession of Wireless Transmitter was made an offence. The Amendment Act of 1949 was repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952 (as has been done in the present case by the Act of 2001). The accused was prosecuted under Section 6 (1-A) for possessing a Wireless Transmitter and was convicted by the trial Court as well as by the High Court. He approached the Supreme Court.

10. It was contended before the Apex Court that in view of repeal of Section 6 (1-A) by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1952, conviction of the accused was illegal and unlawful. The position of the 1933 Act was restored under which possession of Wireless Transmitter was not an offence. The accused was, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

11. The precise question before the court was as to what would be the legal position of the amendment made in the original Act by the Amending Act which was subsequently repealed.

12. Referring to Maxwell, Craies and Halsbury's Laws of England, the court observed that such Repealing and Amending Acts strike out enactments which have become unnecessary. Having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, they have achieved their object. They have thereafter no reason for their existence. It is thus a legislative 'spring-cleaning' to strike out 'excise dead matter from the statute book in order to lighten the burden of ever increasing spate of legislation and to remove confusion from the public mind'.

13. According to the Court, the object of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952 was only to expurgate the Amendment of 1949, along with similar Acts which had served the purpose. It was, therefore, held by the Court that Section 6(1-A) of the Act continued to remain in the statute book even after Amending Act of 1949 was repealed in 1952 and the order of conviction could not be held to be illegal or unsustainable.

14. In our considered opinion, the ratio laid down in Jethanand Betab directly covers the case on hand and answers the question raised before us by the petitioner. To us, it is clear that once an amendment was made in 1881 Act by the Amending Act of 1988 and it had been brought into force, it has served its purpose and amended the original Act. Its object was to plant necessary amendment in the 1881 Act. Once such planting has been effected, the Amending Act (Planting Act), having achieved its object, lost its efficacy. It was thereafter not necessary to continue the Amending Act in a statute book. There are several such Amending Acts under which amendments have been made in original Acts. Once the plant takes root in the original Act, an appropriate step is required to be taken by the Legislature. If no action is taken, hundreds and thousands of such Amending Acts continue to remain in statute books. A device is, therefore, adopted by the Legislature to repeal all such Amending Acts, which wouldrepeal only those Acts, i.e. Amending Acts. But such repeal does not affect original Acts which already stood amended. As observed in Clarke v. Bradlough, (1881) 1 QBD 63, 'Where a statute is incorporated, by reference, into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second.'

15. In our view, therefore, the contention of the petitioner is not well-founded and cannot be upheld. The amendment made in the original Act of 1881 by the Amending Act of 1988 remains in force and repeal of Amending Act in 2001 has not affected the amendment. The contention is, hence, rejected.

16. There is an additional reason for holding that the Repealing and Amending Act, 2001 will not affect the amendment already made by the Amending Act of 1988 in the original Act of 1881. Section 4 of the Repealing and Amending Act saves the operation of the amendments inserted in the original Act by the repealed Act. The amendments, therefore, are clearly covered by the saving clause of Section 6A of the General Clauses Act. In Jethanand Betab, the Supreme Court indicated that such provision (section 4) is 'designed to provide for a different situation, namely, the repeal of an earlier Act which has been applied, incorporated or referred to in a later Act. Under that section the repeal of the earlier Act does not affect the subsequent Act.'

17. Thus, even considering Section 6A of the General Clauses Act read with Section 4 of the Repealing and Amending Act, we are satisfied that the amendment in the original Act remains in operation and does not get abrogated.

18. The learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has also placed on record an Office Memorandum dated 31st May, 2002 addressed by the Deputy Legislative Council wherein it was specifically stated that the sole purpose of the Repealing and Amending Act, 2001 was to weed out unnecessary enactments, which clutter the statute book. But it would not affect the amendments made in the Act of 1881. It was also clarified by Section 4 of the Repealing and Amending Act of 2001 (saving clause).

19. In our opinion, the legal position is well settled. Since the Amending Act has already been enacted and implemented by making necessary amendment and insertion in the original Act, the Amending Act has lost its utility as its purpose has already been served. Hence, the Amending Act was repealed 'as a whole'. We find no infirmity or illegality in such action. We see no reason to grant any relief to the petitioner. The petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

20. Parties be given copies of this judgment duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court.