Costao Fernandes, Preventive Officer, Customs Vs. the State at the Instance of Dy. Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
customs act, 1963 sections 106 & 155 - suits or proceedings against departmental officers/servants - no conditions imposed for initiation - not maintainable for anything done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of the act & rules.;section 155 of the customs act, 1963 does not put any bar in initiating or in continuing proceedings either civil or criminal against any govt. servants or officer or local authority. it only enables an officer of the government who is prosecuted for any act done in pursuance of the act that, apart from the defence available under the law, he is entitled to claim an additional defence and protection under the act if all his actions could be shown to have been done in good faith in pursuance of the act;code of criminal procedure, 1973 section 400 - revisional powers of high court - trial of preventive officer for inflicting injury leading to death - prima facie opinion of guilt on the basis of material before trial court - interference not warranted.;before discharging an accused officer before trial the court with the records available but not going any further, has to come to an irresistable and only conclusion that the act done by the officer was in good faith and in pursuance of the act; otherwise the trial must go on.;in this case the trial court has formed a prima facie opinion about the guilt of the accused on the basis of materials available before the court. it is therefore only lawful for the court to proceed with the trial and find out the truth of the acts alleged against the petitioner by the prosecution. if a trial is scuttled or stopped at this stage, interest of justice will definitely be in peril. the court must be equally concerned about the right and interest of both the prosecution and of the accused. therefore, there is nothing wrong in the view taken by the trial court to proceed with the trial. there is nothing illegal or irregular in the order passed by the court below warranting interference in the exercise of the revisional power of this court. - maharashtra village police act (46 of 1967)sections 5, 6 & 15: [swatanter kumar, c.j., a.p. lavande & smt. vasanti a. naik, jj] powers of police patil held, section 15 clearly states the varied powers that are vested in the police patil. he is vested with the power to call and examine witnesses, record their statements and search for concealed articles. such are the powers given to the police patil under the provisions of the village police act. the powers vested in the police patil under the provisions of the village police act are relatable to the duties and functions for which the police patil is appointed. to give meaning to these powers beyond the scope of the duties would be an approach not quite permissible in law. the duties, functions and powers of the police patil under the provisions of the village police act do not vest him with the powers which are vested in police officer under the provisions of the criminal procedure code. the powers given to him under the village police act are limited in their nature and scope and are not as wide specific and consequential as the powers of a police officer under the provisions of the criminal procedure code. the police patil is to act unlike a police officer under the orders of the district magistrate and has to report the matters to him and even where he makes some inquiry or investigation, he is expected to submit report to the station officer and has not been empowered to take any further action, like preparation of a charge sheet or its presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction. he is vested with no powers in regard to the powers vested in an investigating officer under the provisions of section 173 of the criminal procedure code. the act does not contain any deeming provision which by fiction of law would term a police patil as a police officer. it could be possible that an act may specifically stipulate that a police patil for all intent and purpose shall be deemed to be a police officer under the provisions of the village police act and/or the criminal procedure code. in the absence of such a deeming fiction of law, it is difficult to confer the status of a police officer in law upon a police patil or accept the contention that the police patil is clothed with the powers and functions of a police officer. neither there is any specific provisions in the act not on principle of implied interpretation it can be said that provisions of the act suggest that the police patil is a police officer in law. his duties, functions and powers are not identical or even closely identical to the powers of a police officer under the provisions of the criminal procedure code. - (b) it becomes necessary to stop any vehicle or animal, the proper officer may use all lawful means for stopping it, and where such means fail, the vehicle or animal may be fired upon. --(1) no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the central government or any officer of the government or a local authority for anything which is done or intended to be done in good faith, in pursuance of this act or the rules or regulations. ' 10. based on the above provisions the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the act of murder as alleged by the prosecution against the petitioner is well within his power and he is entitled to protection against any proceedings or prosecution under section 155 of the customs act. it is submitted that all the acts of the accused are deemed to have been done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of the act or the rules or regulations, made thereunder. it is distinguishable on facts as well on law. state of punjab and another, reported in 1966crilj82 .relying on these decisions he argued that in order to enable the petitioner to take refuge under section 155 of the customs act, the burden is on the petitioner to prove that the act done or intended to be done should be in pursuance of the customs act and that the act done or intended to be done must be in good faith. 12. as is well known, every penal statute contains a similar provision as that of sections 106 and 155 of the customs act. the intention of the legislature is evident that in discharge of the duties the officers of the government would have to transgress or infringe upon certain freedoms and rights of the citizens which may in exceptional circumstances be liable for prosecution of such officers, but for such protection. it is with this end in view that provisions like sections 106 and 155 of the customs act are enacted in the statute books which deal with penal laws. the very section denotes that such action of the officers must be in pursuance of the act and also in good faith. section 155 only says that no suit or proceedings will be maintainable against any government servant or officer or local authority for anything done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of the act or the rules. it only enables an officer of the government who is prosecuted for any act done in pursuance of the act that, apart from other defences available under the law, he is entitled to claim an additional defence and protection under the act if all his actions could be shown to have been done in good faith in pursuance of the act. 13. coming to the facts of the case in hand, inflicting an injury on a human being is not an act done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of the customs act. the petitioner is entitled to protection only if he succeeds to establish that he as a 'proper officer' of the customs department who is entrusted with certain duties and functions by his superior officer and that while discharging such duties and functions he happens to commit a criminal offence in good faith. but not doing any further, the court should be able to come to a irresistible and only conclusion that the act done by the officer was in good faith and also in pursuance of the act. the court has to be satisfied further whether such action of the accused has any nexus or reasonable connection with the duties and responsibilities that is entrusted with the officer or such action is incidental and inevitable to the official duties and functions of the officer and done in good faith. except the interested version of certain persons like the deceased's brother no other independent materials were brought to my notice to indicate any motive against the accused. in the circumstances of the case, i am not satisfied that it is a fit case to grant leave to appeal to the supreme court.t.k. chandrashekhara das, j.1. this petition is directed against the order dated 8th june 1995 passed by the district and sessions judge, panaji, in sessions case no. 4 of 1993 whereby protection under sections 106 and 155 of the customs act sought by the accused/petitioner was rejected by the learned district judge.2. for the purpose of this petition the bare facts involved in this case can be stated as follows:-the petitioner/accused was committed to the sessions court to stand trial for an offence punishable under section 302 of the indian penal code by the j.m.f.c., margao. the prosecution case is that on 16th may 1991 at about 12.30 p.m. when alvarnaz alemao was returning to his house in a white contessa car no. ga-02-a-4567, the petitioner, who was working as a preventive officer of the customs, started chasing the said car and at a particular point he could get into the car and thereafter inflicted knife injuries on alvarnaz. when alvarnaz was removed to the hospital, he succumbed to his injuries. it is alleged that the accused, after inflicting the aforesaid injuries on the deceased, took to his heels from the scene of offence and remained hiding for two days and thereafter surrendered to the panaji police on 18th may 1991. the prosecution has also alleged the motive for the offence alleging that the accused had a hostility against the deceased as the deceased was to receive an award from the customs in respect of recovery and seizure of goods worth rs. 28 lakhs, which were made in 1984 on information given by the deceased, who thus became entitled to claim a share in the award along with the accused. originally the case was investigated by the colva police station where the f.i.r. was lodged but later on, the investigation was transferred to the c.i.d., panaji and thereafter to the c.b.i. according to the c.b.i., after completing investigation it was concluded that there was prima facie evidence to implicate the accused. thus the charges had been framed against the petitioner by the sessions court on 6th august 1994 for an offence punishable under section 302 i.p.c. for having caused murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of alvarnaz alemao. the accused pleaded not guilty and accordingly the trial was to start on 1st october 1994. it is at that juncture that the aforesaid petition was filed before the court below. the court below on a detailed discussion of the prima facie materials available on the records has found that though the petitioner/accused is entitled to claim protection under sections 106 and 155 of the customs act, it is quite premature at this stage to come to the conclusion whether the petitioner is entitled for such protection as it could be proved only after undergoing a detailed trial. it is relevant to note the findings of the court below, which reads thus:-'with a careful application of my mind to all the material that is placed on record, i find that the acts of the accused as revealed by that material cannot be at this stage said to be fully protected by section 155.'therefore the important point that is to be decided in this revision application is as to whether the court below was justified in refusing the protection claimed by the petitioner under the customs act, particularly under sections 106 and 155 of that act?3. a little more details about the allegations made against the petitioner are necessary before proceeding further in this matter. it is relevant to note as to how the goa police were seized of the matter and proceeded with it before it was taken over by the c.b.i. on 16th may 1991 at or about 13.10 hours p.s.i. mohan naik was at the police station when he received a telephone call from h.c. 1539 r.g. prabhu, in-charge of police check-post orlim stating that an unknown caller had called the orlim police station and had informed him that the brother of churchill alemao by name of alvarnaz alemao was murdered near pinto bar at varca. on receiving this information, p.s.i. mohan naik instructed h.c. 1539 r.g. prabhu to rush to the place and verify the information. p.s.i. mohan naik made an entry in his station diary and also left along with the staff to that place after passing on the information to s.d.p.o., margao over the telephone. he was also informed by the s.d.p.o. that he was also rushing to the spot. p.s.i. mohan naik accordingly reached the spot at about 13.30 hours. when he reached guniawado p.s.i. mohan naik saw a contessa white car bearing no. ga-02-a-4567. he made a through examination of the spot and found lot of blood was fallen on the driver's seat and one helmet was lying on the back seat of the car. he could also see the handle of the headlight switch and indicator broken and fallen in the car. he also noticed blood stained palm print on the dicky top. he made local inquiries among the people who were gathered there and he found that one motorcycle of hero honda make bearing no. mmg-8546 of red colour had fallen on the road at guniawado, which was about 150 metres away from the car. he also saw some glass fallen on the road and damaged. he found the ignition key of the motorcycle but he could not find the ignition key of the contessa car, which was missing. on further inquiries by him from the local people he came to know that one customs officer, who was chasing the car driven by the deceased, was trying to stop the car and he succeeded in stopping the car when it reached guniawado where the motorcycle had fallen. then the said customs officer jumped into the car and tried to prevent alvarnaz alemao from proceeding further. p.s.i. mohan naik recorded as follows:-'when inquiry was going on, one shri l.r. naik, supdt. of customs, revenue intelligence, marmagao, approached me and told me that his one preventive officer by name constancio fernandes had been working on some tip-off about smuggling of gold and that the motorcycle bearing no. mmg 8546 fallen on the road belonged to him. one of the customs officer also stated that the helmet lying in the car and one shoe lying near the car was of constancio fernandes. in order to ascertain more details, statements of following persons were recorded and they stated as follows:-(1) saby s/o antonio fernandes, r/o house no. 469, guniawado, varca.(2) vency s/o sebastio fernandes, r/o house no. 29, guniawado, varca.sr. no. (1) has his house situate at a distance of about 25 metres from the place where the car finally stopped. in his statement he has stated that around 12.30 hrs. when he was in the house, he heard suddenly a sound of a brake of a vehicle on the road outside his house. he therefore, came out to see what had happened. in the meantime he saw a white contessa car had stopped and 2 persons were struggling with the steering of the car.in the meantime somebody told me that someone had jumped into the running car. he could see alvarnaz alemao was in driver's seat and one person was holding a dagger in his right hand and was telling alvarnaz alemao to stop the car and to come out. he also told alvarnaz alemao that he is his friend and a customs officer and that he will not do anything to him. but alvarnaz alemao would not listen. he was trying to start the car and proceed ahead and the customs officer was preventing him and trying to grab the ignition key. in the process the car used to go on the road and come down. both were struggling with each other and in that process alvarnaz got injured. suddenly the said customs officer got down and requested for help. someone from the crowd asked him who he was for which he showed his identity card and told the crowd that he is customs officer.the customs officer by getting down from the car tried to open the lock of the dicky and hurriedly disappeared from the place.the other witness at sr. no. (2) who is a mechanic by profession and has got his garage at a distance of about 50 metres from the car which finally stopped, states that he happened to see a car going off the road and anxious to know what had happened. he, therefore, came near to the car and found alvarnaz alemao was driving it and one more person was sitting in the front seat by the side of alvarnaz alemao and was telling alvarnaz alemao to stop the car and not to proceed ahead. both were struggling with each other. alvarnaz alemao was trying to go ahead with the car where the said person later on disclosed to be customs officer was preventing him from going away.'after completing preliminary inquiries, p.s.i. mohan naik lodged the f.i.r. at the colva police station under sections 341 and 302 of i.p.c. being information no. 78 of 91 at 18.30 hours. subsequently the matter has been taken over by the c.b.i. at the instance of the government of goa and c.b.i. registered a crime no. 17/dcb/91-bom. on 7th june 1991. it is not discernible from the records produced before the court as to the circumstances under which the matter was entrusted to the c.b.i. and what were the drawbacks of the local police investigating it. the f.i.r. lodged by the c.b.i. in substance was pari materia with the f.i.r. prepared by the local police when they described the incident. but the c.b.i. has made a further allegation about the motive of the accused in committing the crime. the c.b.i. filed a charge-sheet in the court of the learned judicial magistrate, first class, margao. after narrating the incident the charge-sheet runs as follows:-'it is further disclosed that the accused had animus against the deceased as the deceased was to receive a reward from the customs in respect of certain information conveyed to the customs upon which the contraband goods worth rs. 28 lakhs and odd were in fact recovered and seized, wherein the accused was claiming share in the reward with the deceased.'learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this portion of imputation of motive against the accused was not there in the allegations contained in the f.i.r. lodged by the police. the materials for the case have been mainly gathered from witnesses whose statements have been recorded by c.b.i. i need not go into the details of those statements though the counsel for the petitioner has taken me through all the details of the statements particularly of witness nos. 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 38 and 39 and documents. the learned counsel for the petitioner relying on those statements has strongly argued that the imputation of motive against the accused was a concocted story cooked up by the c.b.i. as they found that in the absence of the allegation of motive, the very corner stone of the prosecution case will be shaken. he further argued that this allegation of motive had first originated from the statement of churchill alemao, who is none other than the eldest brother of the deceased. in his statement shri churchill alemao states thus:-'my brother alvarnaz met him and demanded money. my brother met him in betul one month before his death. that was april 91. my brother told me that he met costao who promised to give the money.'the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that if the motive part is removed from the allegation of the prosecution, the charge levelled against the accused will not be maintainable as the action of the accused was only in furtherance of or in pursuance of the official duties as a preventive officer under the customs act. therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there are sufficient materials before the court below to afford protection to the accused under section 155 read with section 106 of the customs act and to dismiss the complaint made by the c.b.i.4. before i advert to the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the customs act.5. the object of the act as stated in the preamble is to prevent smuggling by facilitating the detection and confiscation of goods smuggled into the country and goods sought to be smuggled out of the country.6. under section 2(34) 'proper officer' has been defined as:-'proper officer', in relation to any functions to be performed under this act, means the officer of customs who is assigned those functions by the board or the collector of customs.'7. section 5(1) reads as under:-'5. powers of officers of customs:- (1) subject to such conditions and limitations as the board may impose, an officer of customs may exercise the powers and discharge the duties conferred or imposed on him under this act.'8. section 106 reads thus:-'106. power to stop and search conveyances:-(1) where the proper officer has reason to believe that any aircraft, vehicle or animal in india or any vessel in india or within the indian customs waters has been, is being or is about to be, used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any goods which have been smuggled, he may at any time stop any such vehicle, animal or vessel or, in the case of an aircraft, compel it to land, and--(a) rummage and search any part of the aircraft, vehicle or vessel;(b) examine and search any goods in the aircraft, vehicle or vessel or on the animal;(c) break open the lock of any door or package for exercising the powers conferred by clauses (a) and (b), if the keys are withheld.(2) where for the purposes of sub- section (1)--(a) it becomes necessary to stop any vessel or compel any aircraft to land, it shall be lawful for any vessel or aircraft in the service of the government while flying her proper flag and any authority authorised in this behalf by the central government to summon such vessel to stop or the aircraft to land, by means of an international signal, code or other recognized means, and thereupon such vessel shall forthwith stop or such aircraft shall forthwith land; and if it fails to do so, chase may be given thereto by any vessel or aircraft as aforesaid and if after a gun is fired as a signal the vessel fails to stop or the aircraft fails to land, it may be fired upon;(b) it becomes necessary to stop any vehicle or animal, the proper officer may use all lawful means for stopping it, and where such means fail, the vehicle or animal may be fired upon.'9. section 155(1) reads thus:-'155. protection of action taken under the act.---(1) no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the central government or any officer of the government or a local authority for anything which is done or intended to be done in good faith, in pursuance of this act or the rules or regulations.'10. based on the above provisions the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the act of murder as alleged by the prosecution against the petitioner is well within his power and he is entitled to protection against any proceedings or prosecution under section 155 of the customs act. it is submitted that all the acts of the accused are deemed to have been done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of the act or the rules or regulations, made thereunder. in support of his contention, the learned counsel has also relied upon a decision of the supreme court in bhappa singh v. rampal singh and others, reported in : 1982crilj627 . the aforesaid decision has been referred to by the learned district judge also in his judgment. the said decision of the supreme court was rendered on a similar provision of section 108 of the gold (control) act, 1968. there the raiding party consisting of the officers of the central excise and customs department were alleged to have committed offences under sections 307, 452, 504, 342 and 148 read with 149 of the indian penal code. the allegations against those officers were that they trespassed into the jewellery shop and cloth shop of the complainant and hurled abuses at the complainant and his people and demanded bribe and fired shots in order to commit dacoity. it was disclosed in that case that the raiding party had been obstructed and resized and there was a counter case charged against the complainant. in that case the high court of punjab and haryana was quashing the complaint at the instance of the officers of the central excise and customs department giving protection under section 108 of the gold (control) act and that was how the matter came before the supreme court. however the said decision of the supreme court cannot be applied to the facts of this case. it is distinguishable on facts as well on law. it is relevant to note at this juncture paragraph 6 of the said judgment of the supreme court:-'6. in view of the circumstances mentioned in the first paragraph, there is little room for doubt that the customs party was not due to commit dacoity either in the jewellery shop or the chaubara, that they also committed no trespass into either of those places but that the purpose of the raid was to find out if any illegal activity was being carried on therein. the presence of the licenced goldsmith in the chaubara speaks volumes in that behalf. it may further be taken for granted that the customs party was man-handled before they themselves resorted to violence, because there was no reason for them to open fire unless they were resisted in the carrying out of the raid peacefully.'it is on this background of facts that the supreme court in that case refused to interfere with the order of the high court of punjab and haryana quashing the complaint against the officers of the excise and customs department.11. on the other hand in this case, as submitted by the counsel for the respondent, the act of chasing the car, bringing the white contessa car to a standstill, jumping into the car and trying to get control of the car may be said to be an act in pursuance of the customs act but killing a person is not a matter which has been protected under the act. the learned counsel for the respondent therefore submits that after the car coming to a standstill and getting into the car, there was no necessity for the accused to inflict knife injuries on the neck of the deceased to do discharge of any duties envisaged under the provisions of the customs act. the learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the act of the petitioner cannot also come under section 106 of the customs act. he submitted that even though section 106 gives power to the customs officers to fire at any conveyance or vehicle to bring the said vehicle to a halt, after stopping that vehicle inflicting fatal injuries on the person who is alleged to have been involved in the illegal activities, is not permissible under section 106 of the customs act. therefore he submits that the petitioner is not entitled to protection under section 155 of the customs act. he also drew my attention to the decisions in matajog dobey v. h.c. bhari, reported in : [1955]28itr941(sc) and harbhajan singh v. state of punjab and another, reported in : 1966crilj82 . relying on these decisions he argued that in order to enable the petitioner to take refuge under section 155 of the customs act, the burden is on the petitioner to prove that the act done or intended to be done should be in pursuance of the customs act and that the act done or intended to be done must be in good faith. therefore the counsel for the respondent submitted that taking all the materials into consideration, the court below has exercised its discretion against the petitioner at that stage and asked the petitioner to face the trial. the counsel for the respondent also submits that no harm has been done to the petitioner by the order of the court below specially when the charge was allowed to be framed by the trial court against the petitioner and, therefore, it was only lawful on the part of the learned district judge to bring it to the logical end after the trial of the case. the learned counsel for the respondent also brought to my notice the incriminating circumstances of disappearance of the accused abruptly from the scene and surrendering before the police after two days. suspicious and doubtful circumstances were created by his own action of delayed surrender. he argued that this circumstance led to doubt the bonafide of the petitioner. those two days appeared to be utilized by the customs department for preparing a defence after proper debate among the officers of the customs in furtherance of the institutional defence afforded to the petitioner. therefore he argues that unless the trial court has been given an opportunity to appreciate the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defence, the protection under section 155 of the customs act cannot be claimed by the petitioner. on these rival contentions, the relevant provisions of the act and the materials available in this case, let us examine the legality or otherwise of the order passed by the court below.12. as is well known, every penal statute contains a similar provision as that of sections 106 and 155 of the customs act. such provisions are enacted as a matter of public policy with a view to protect the officers and servants of the government who are discharging the duties under the act. the intention of the legislature is evident that in discharge of the duties the officers of the government would have to transgress or infringe upon certain freedoms and rights of the citizens which may in exceptional circumstances be liable for prosecution of such officers, but for such protection. it is with this end in view that provisions like sections 106 and 155 of the customs act are enacted in the statute books which deal with penal laws. on a close reading of these sections 106 and 155 it can be seen that the claim for protection under the act can be made by such officers against criminal or civil proceedings that is likely to be filed against them. the very section denotes that such action of the officers must be in pursuance of the act and also in good faith. an attempt has been made by the counsel for the petitioner to show that the section prohibits the courts to initiate or to take cognizance of proceedings either criminal or civil against those officers who are entitled to protection under section 155 of the customs act. in support of this contention the counsel for the petitioner relied upon the certain decisions rendered under section 197 criminal procedure code where similar protection has been afforded to the government officers. i cannot accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioner for the simple reason that section 197 cr.p.c. and section 155 of customs act are operative in different planes. section 197 cr.p.c. postulates that no criminal action against a government officer shall be initiated in a court of law without previous sanction of the government and whereas section 155 does not impose any such condition against the initiation of the proceedings. section 155 only says that no suit or proceedings will be maintainable against any government servant or officer or local authority for anything done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of the act or the rules. it does not put any bar in initiating or in continuing with the proceedings. it only enables an officer of the government who is prosecuted for any act done in pursuance of the act that, apart from other defences available under the law, he is entitled to claim an additional defence and protection under the act if all his actions could be shown to have been done in good faith in pursuance of the act.13. coming to the facts of the case in hand, inflicting an injury on a human being is not an act done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of the customs act. the petitioner is entitled to protection only if he succeeds to establish that he as a 'proper officer' of the customs department who is entrusted with certain duties and functions by his superior officer and that while discharging such duties and functions he happens to commit a criminal offence in good faith. a decisions on these factors could be taken by a court of law only after a full fledged trial and taking evidence in the case. though the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that at any stage of the proceedings the petitioner is entitled to claim protection of the act may be correct; but that does not mean that when the trial court on its own wisdom and discretion after framing charge should not proceed with the trial of the case. all depends upon the satisfaction and conclusion that derives from the materials before it. may be it is possible in some cases for the trial court, even without going into the trial of the case, based only on the allegations contained in the prosecution case, could drop the proceedings against the officer giving protection under section 155. but in such cases with the records available; but not doing any further, the court should be able to come to a irresistible and only conclusion that the act done by the officer was in good faith and also in pursuance of the act. as i pointed out earlier inflicting an injury on a person, and which act ultimately led to the death of a person is not per se an act in pursuance of the customs act. the court has to be satisfied further whether such action of the accused has any nexus or reasonable connection with the duties and responsibilities that is entrusted with the officer or such action is incidental and inevitable to the official duties and functions of the officer and done in good faith. in this case the trial court has formed a prima facie opinion about the guilt of the accused on the basis of materials available before the court. it is therefore only lawful for the court to proceed with the trial and find out the truth of the acts alleged against the petitioner by the prosecution. if a trial is scuttled or stopped at this stage, interest of justice will definitely be in peril. the court must be equally concerned about the right and interest of both the prosecution and of the accused. therefore, according to me, there is nothing wrong in the view taken by the trial court to proceed with the trial. i find nothing illegal or irregular in the order passed by the court below warranting interference in the exercise of the revisional power of this court. as the trial court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and as rightly pointed out by it, as extracted in the earlier part of this judgment, at this stage the only course open to the trial court was to take the case to its logical end. i find that the petitioner could not have any grievance by the action of the trial court in deciding to proceed with the trial. for the reasons stated above, i find no merits in the petition and it is liable to be dismissed. i do so. the trial court may proceed with the trial of the case untramelled and uninfluenced by any opinion incidentally expressed by me on merit in the above discussion. i make it clear that this order will not preclude the petitioner to claim protection under section 155 of the customs act, if he is so advised, after the trial is concluded.14. before parting with this case, i think it is necessary in the interest of justice, to make certain observations regarding the conduct of the c.b.i. in alleging the motive against the petitioner. first of all imputation of motive is not at all necessary in light of the materials disclosed in this case to sustain the prosecution. normally motive becomes necessary in a criminal prosecution if the prosecution were to depend heavily on circumstantial materials where direct evidence to establish the guilt of the accused is lacking or insufficient. here, in this case such circumstances cannot be said to exist. it is therefore incomprehensible as to what prompted the c.b.i. to introduce the motive factor in this case, which the goa police, when they proceeded to investigate the case did not have such a case at all. another factor is that the only source of materials gathered and relied on by the c.b.i. for imputation of motive against the accused is the interested version of the deceased's eldest brother, who, first time spoke before the c.b.i. about the motive and incident that happened in 1984 with regard to the alleged dispute pertains to sharing of the reward on the recovery of smuggled goods worth rs. 28 lakhs that is alleged to have been going on between the customs department and the deceased. except the interested version of certain persons like the deceased's brother no other independent materials were brought to my notice to indicate any motive against the accused. not even a single document is available in the file to show that such dispute was pending since 1984 till the occurrence on 16th may 1991. as regards the recovery of smuggled goods worth rs. 28 lakhs in 1984 in concerned there are materials in the file to suspect the bonafides of such claim. at page 475 of the running page of the file, i came across a document marked as d-57 which is an extract of station diary of 17th may 1984 of margao rural police station. in the station diary one mr. i.b. khatib, p. s. i., margao rural police station recorded at 03.45 hours thus:-'i am proceeded to cole dongor raia as an information was received that the tempo no. gdz-6110 from there was used in smuggling activity. p.s.i. mamladar, p.cs. 2837, 451, 978 accompanied me. p.o.i.c. fernandes and his informant followed us on a motor cycle. we traced the owner of the tempo, gosalvo, who stated that he had allowed one benny to use his vehicle. on reaching benny's house he/his wife refused to open the house. when we were just passing by we noticed contraband goods consisting of textiles, watches, share parts of watches, battery cells etc. w/rs. 1,00,000/-, which p.o. said he will do the needful. as such we returned from the spot.'15. this piece of material casts grave suspicion about the story of recovery of goods worth rs. 28 lakhs made in 1984. i am at a loss to understand why the c.b.i. has not considered this statement of the police which was recorded at an undisputed point of time, when they mentioned in the charge-sheet about the recovery of goods worth rs. 28 lakhs and alleged animus of the accused against the deceased. it is true that c.b.i. has taken an improved version of the aforesaid mr. i.b. khatib, about the valuation of the goods recovered, after several years have passed. the trial court may consider this aspect carefully when it deals with the aspect of the motive part alleged against the accused in this case. rule discharged.16. in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.17. after pronouncing the judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner prays for leave to file an appeal before the supreme court against the judgment. i have heard both the counsel for the petitioner and the respondent on this matter. in the circumstances of the case, i am not satisfied that it is a fit case to grant leave to appeal to the supreme court.18. the counsel for the petitioner further prays that in order to take the matter before the supreme court, she requires some time and till then the order is to be suspended. in view of the request, the operation of the judgment stands stayed for two months from this date.