Yashwant S/O. Motiram Patel and Deoyani Madhushala Private Ltd. Through Its Director Shri Yeshwant S/O. Motiram Patel Vs. Deoyani Madhushala Private Ltd. Through Its Director Shri Yeshwant S/O. Motiram Patel - Court Judgment

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- - if admission of new partners and subsequent detection of original licensee were to be permitted the very purpose of process of selection and draw would be defeated. 23. the contentions of the petitioner about incompetence of commissioner to override the government would have been valid had it been shown that the government had, after examining the issue, for good reason, come to conclude that conditions imposed by letter dated 23.02.1989 had to be deleted, and then, as a sequel, issued letter dated 27.02.1989. such is not shown to be the case.r.c. chavan, j.1. by this petition, the petitioners seek quashing and setting aside appellate order passed by commissioner of state excise on 08.12.1995, whereby the commissioner allowed respondent no. 4's appeal against order of the collector and directed removal of names of petitioners from cliii licence no. 26/8687, for selling country liquor.2. facts relevant for deciding this petition are as under : one narayan naik was granted licence no. cliii 22/8687 for running a country liquor shop at ashok chowk, siraspeth, nagpur. on 04.10.1988 an application, bearing signatures of narayan naik, petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 5, was moved for transfer of said licence in the name of petitioner no. 2 a private limited company of which the three signatories were stated to be directors. after an enquiry, by order dated 23.02.1989 the state government transferred the licence in the name of petitioner no. 2 upon certain conditions, namely, that original licensee should get larger share of profit; if the original licensee's relation with licence is severed, remaining two directors shall not have any right over the licence, and upon demise of original licensee, his heirs will get the benefits from the licence.3. on 27.02.1989, the order dated 23.02.1989 was cancelled and the state government directed transfer of licence in favour of petitioner no. 2 as a special case. thus the conditions in order dated 23.02.1989 were deleted. on 01.06.1989 original licensee naik allegedly resigned as director and his resignation was accepted on 12.06.1989. an application to delete name of naik from licence was made. original licensee narayan challenged this deletion by filing writ petition no. 3303/1989 on 05.12.1989, which he withdrew with liberty to file a suit, if maintainable.4. on 28.03.1990 the commissioner directed the collector not to renew licence in the name of petitioner no. 2 and to hold an enquiry. the collector informed petitioner on 30.03.1990 that licence would not be renewed without the consent of naik on the prescribed renewal form. this order was challenged by petitioners by filing writ petition no. 766 of 1990 without making narayan naik a respondent. he intervened. the petition was allowed on 25.11.1992, directing the collector to hold a fresh enquiry. upon remand the collector rejected objections of naik by order dated 09.09.1993. naik challenged this order by preferring an appeal before the commissioner.5. during the pendency of the appeal, naik expired on 05.06.1994 and respondent no. 4 prosecuted the appeal further, claiming to be daughter and heir of original licensee naik. intervenor vikram narayan naik in the present petition claims that he was adopted by narayan naik by registered adoption deed dated 25.05.1990 and is the sole heir of original licensee. he states that respondent no. 4 is not the daughter of said narayan naik.6. the appeal was allowed by the commissioner by his impugned order dated 08.11.1995.7. i have heard the learned counsel for petitioners, respondent no. 4, the intervenor, as also the learned assistant government pleader.8. it is not necessary to go into the question of whether respondent no. 4 or the intervenor are the heirs of original licensee naik, for deciding this petition. the dispute to be resolved here is one between the estate of original licensee and the petitioners, who claim to be transferees.9. the learned counsel for petitioners submitted that in his statement of claim filed in december, 1992 before the collector, narayan naik had stated that petitioners, who were his employees, took advantage of his old age and indifferent health, as also shock of loss of his wife, and obtained signatures on a number of documents, which they used, to get the licence transferred. in that statement naik had stated that petitioners could take such undue advantage as naik had no issues. the learned counsel, therefore, submitted that respondent no. 4 could not have continued the appeal before the commissioner as narayan's daughter, as on narayan's own statement he had no issues, which is fortified by intervenor's claim to be adopted son. therefore, according to the learned counsel, appeal had abated. it is neither necessary, nor permissible to go into the question as to whether respondent no. 4 or intervenor could represent the deceased naik in the proceedings before the commissioner or this court, so long as petitioners do not claim to be heirs of naik. for the present respondent no. 4 could be taken to represent the estate of narayan naik and heirs of naik may settle their disputes in appropriate proceedings. therefore, the contention that appeal had abated has to be rejected.10. the learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that having withdrawn the writ petition no. 3303 of 1989, challenging deletion of conditions protecting his interest, after seeking liberty to file a suit, and not having availed of the liberty, the oder dated 27.02.1989 became final and could not be challenged by naik or persons claiming through him. his learned adversary submitted that though in the order allowing withdrawal of petition, the word, 'suit' was used, what was meant is a challenge to the deletion of directions. naik had filed a complaint to the minister/ commissioner, on 26.03.1990, i.e. before the petition was withdrawn on 13.06.1991, and the collector had already held on 30.03.1990 in favour of naik by refusing to renew licence in the name of the petitioners, which was challenged by the petitioners by filing writ petition no. 766 of 1990 without making naik a party. therefore, since the matter was already being examined in competent fora, naik was not required to file a suit.11. i have carefully considered these contention. if naik's grievance was not only already being looked into, but also orders favourable to him were already passed on 30.03.1990, before withdrawal of petition no. 3303 of 1989, his not availing of liberty sought while withdrawing the petition is inconsequential. the learned counsel for the petitioners ought to have seen that what was sought and granted was a liberty and not a liability or a duty. reference by the learned counsel for the petitioner to judgment of the supreme court in h.p. state electricity board v. k.r. gulati reported at : [1998]1scr502 is misplaced in view of the foregoing. therefore, the contentions based upon withdrawal of writ petition no. 3303 of 1989 have to be rejected.12. the question whether narayan naik was tricked into signing papers seeking transfer of his licence also need not be examined here since it is a disputed question of fact which would need adjudication by a competent court of facts. this petition would have to be decided on the presumption that narayan naik did sign the documents which led to transfer of licence. it would have to be found out if licence could be transferred in the manner done on a presumed prayer by narayan.13. the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order may not be sustained as the commissioner has virtually overridden orders passed on 27.02.1989 by the government which was a higher, or for that matter, the highest authority competent to decide question of grant of licence. therefore, the impugned order passed by exceeding his authority is invalid. the commissioner had no business to examine the correctness of order dated 27.02.1989 passed by the government and he was obliged to abide by the orders of government which was the superior authority.14. the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on judgment of the supreme court in s. nagraj v. state of karnataka reported at to support his contention that it was not open to the commissioner to correct the order of the government, even if he felt it to be deviating from the policy in force. in that case in the context of orders of passed by the apex court which had been disregarded, the court quoted in paragraph 12 with approval from halsbury's laws of england, that the fact that an order ought not to have been made is not a sufficient cause for disobeying it. the learned counsel submitted that the order dated 27.02.1989 could have been modified by the government itself or could have been set aside by a competent court, but could not have been ignored by the commissioner.15. the learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on two judgments of the supreme court in bhopal sugar industries v. income tax officer reported at : [1960]40itr618(sc) and union of india v. kamlakshi finance corporation ltd. reported at : air1992sc710 to support his contention that discipline requires that orders of higher authorities should be followed unreservedly by subordinate authorities and that therefore, the commissioner was bound by orders of the government.16. the learned counsel for respondent no. 4 submitted that the order dated 27.02.1989 was itself void, first, because there was no warrant for cancelling order dated 23.02.1989 and passing the fresh order dated 27.02.1989; and secondly, as it was against the avowed policy of the government. he submitted that the commissioner was, therefore, right in disregarding order dated 27.02.1989. for this purpose he relied on judgments of the supreme court in dhurandhar prasad v. jai prakash reported at : [2001]3scr1129 , balwant v. yadav reported at : air2004sc4377 and government of orissa v. ashok transport reported at : [2002]3scr632 , where it has been held that transactions and decrees which are void ab initio are not taken note of and can be disregarded in collateral proceedings.17. this would necessitate a probe into what was the cause for issuing order dated 27.02.1989 or for cancelling order dated 23.02.1989. the state government has supported the commissioner's impugned order by its submission dated 02.04.1996 and additional grounds for opposing the petition dated 10.04.1996. in the additional grounds, the state has referred to its policy of not permitting such transfers divesting original licensee, and had specifically quoted from judgment dated 06.01.1992 of a division bench of this court in writ petition no. 2916 of 1991 in respect of licences for sale of foreign liquor. the policy was upheld by the court. according to the learned assistant government pleader, the policy in respect of country liquor licences was the same. the state of maharashtra, therefore, sought dismissal of the petition. copy of letter dated 06.07.1989 is annexed to the additional grounds, which refers to confidential letters dated 18.02.1989, circulars dated 22.02.1989 and notification dated 17.02.1989. annexurec to this letter enumerates directions about adding partners in licences to sell country/foreign liquor. it may be seen that conditions incorporated in letter dated 23.02.1989 are in tune with those in annexurec, namely that original licensee should have a larger share of profit; that, should the relation of original licensee be severed the remaining two directors would not have right over the licence and after the death of the licensee his heirs will get the benefits under the licence.18. there is no record to show as to how and why conditions in letter dated 23.02.1989 were deleted by letter dated 27.02.1989. the learned assistant government pleader as also the learned counsel for respondent no. 4, therefore, rightly submitted that this part of decision making process is shrouded in mystery and therefore, suspicious. they submit that the conditions could not have came to be inserted in the letter dated 23.02.1989 without there being a policy to that effect in force. therefore, unless departure or review of order dated 23.02.1989 is justified, it would not be permissible even to have a look at letter dated 27.02.1989.19. the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that letter dated 06.07.1989 which is annexed to 'additional grounds', does not show that on 23.02.1989 or 27.02.1989, the government had formulated a policy as appearing in annexure 'c' to the letter. the letter would depict the position as on 06.07.1989 and therefore, if on 27.02.1989 there was no such policy in force, the state could, in its wisdom, as the ultimate authority in the matter of grant of licence, delete such conditions.20. circulars dated 22.02.1989 bearing nos. 1089 and 1189 in respect of country and foreign liquor licences made available by the assistant government pleader lay down the procedure for granting such licences. confidential letter dated 18.02.1989 too has nothing to do with addition of partners. relevant notification dated 17.02.1989 published in part iv b of gazette of same date too does not make a reference to the policy in respect of adding partners.21. the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the absence of any document indicating as to what was the policy of government on 23rd or 27th february, 1989, it would be impermissible to assail the government's order dated 27.02.1989 as having been issued in breach of policy. true it is, that a document declaring such a policy of a date prior to 27.02.1989 has not been produced. the letter dated 06.07.1989 to which guidelines are appended as annexure 'c' does not give any clue about date on which the policies were evolved. but as rightly submitted by the learned assistant government pleader this policy must have been evolved prior to 23.02.1989, first, because it could not have sprung up suddenly just before the letter dated 06.07.1989 was issued. secondly and most importantly, if no such conditions were in contemplation, they could not have suddenly appeared in letter dated 23.02.1989. inclusion of such conditions in an undated annexure released with letter dated 06.07.1989 would unmistakably point to the fact that such policy was formulated when letter dated 23.02.1989 was issued.22. in any case, since the petitioner banks on a subsequent letter deleting conditions which protect interests of original licensee, it is for him to show as to what led to supersession of letter dated 23.02.1989 in just four days. if the entire scheme of grant of licences for selling liquor is considered (from the notification and circulars dated 17.02.1989 and 22.02.1989), it would be at once clear that licences to sell liquor were not to be issued as transferable commercial papers. eligibility of the applicants was to be examined and then from the eligible applicants selection was to be made by a draw. if admission of new partners and subsequent detection of original licensee were to be permitted the very purpose of process of selection and draw would be defeated. unscrupulous cartels would tempt eligible persons to apply, participate in draw, get a licence allotted and then admit cartels to partnership, easing out the licensees. therefore, even from this view, it cannot be said that the state could have deleted conditions in letter dated 23.02.1989, by superceding it by letter dated 27.02.1989. though the reasons for superceding the letter dated 23.02.1989 remain an enigma, it could also be an innocuous correction of a faux pass in letter dated 23.02.1989 where licence holder n.g. naik was described as 'late' shri n.g. naik. this is a wild guess. it is just possible that petitioners are taking advantage of omission to reiterate the conditions in letter dated 27.02.1989. ordinarily if the object of letter dated 27.02.1989 was to only delete the conditions imposed, it could have simply stated that conditions stood deleted.23. the contentions of the petitioner about incompetence of commissioner to override the government would have been valid had it been shown that the government had, after examining the issue, for good reason, come to conclude that conditions imposed by letter dated 23.02.1989 had to be deleted, and then, as a sequel, issued letter dated 27.02.1989. such is not shown to be the case. therefore, since letter dated 27.02.1989 does not refer to deletion of conditions, mere supersession of letter dated 23.02.1989 would not imply that conditions were sought to be superceded. therefore, there would be no question of commissioner having overridden the orders of the government by his impugned order. in view of this, impugned order cannot be assailed.24. the question as to whether respondent no. 4 or the intervenor should inherit the licence may have to be considered by authorities concerned. should there be no heir, principle of escheat may apply, but in no case can petitioners succeed to the licence held by n.g. naik.25. the petition is, therefore, dismissed. in the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs.