M.P. Mustafa Vs. Secretary (Preventive Detention) to the Govt. of Maharashtra and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
[a] conservation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities act, 1974 - section 3(1) - detention under - belated reply of detenue - same statement as given under customs act reieterated - non consideration of belated reply while formulating grounds of detention - not to vitiate impugned detention.;it cannot be said that because of non-consideration of the reply of the detenu dated 19.12.1988 any material fact or circumstance was not considered by the detaining authority.;[b] conservation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities act, 1974 - section 3(1) - unexplained delay - grounds not illusory or stale - nexus between grounds and detention order - held, impugned detention is valid.; even though there is no explanation given in this regard by the state government or even assuming that there was some delay in preparing translations, it cannot be inferred in the instant case that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority was not genuine, or that the grounds were stale or illussory, or that there was no rational connection between the grounds and the order of detention. we cannot, therefore, give effect to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that because of long delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the prejudicial activity of the detenu, his order of detention is vitiated. - - (1) as well as the ground no. it is then held that in cases of mere delay in making of an order of detention under the law like cofeposa enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay is not satisfactorily explained or that such delay must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or should not merely on account of delay assume that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. no hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. ' 18. the learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice several decisions of this court as well as of the delhi high court out of which in view of the above law laid down by the supreme court only two decisions of this court need to be examined. abdul rahman's case that no hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. public safety act, 1978 and perusal of the said judgment does not show that there was any provision like section 5-a of the cofeposa act, in the said act. at any rate no provision like section 5-a of the cofeposa act is considered by the supreme court in that case.h.w. dhabe, j.1. the petitioner, who is the cousin brother of the detenue shri areeparambil bappu (hereinafter referred to as 'the detenu'), resident of post purathoor via tirur, mallapuram, district kerala, has filed the instant criminal writ petition challenging the order of detention of the detenu dated 7-4-1989.2. the facts are that by the aforesaid order of detention dated 7-4-1989 the detenu, areeparambil bappu, was directed to be detained u/s 3(1) of the conservation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities act, 1974 (for short, the 'the coffposa act'). the grounds of detention upon which the above order of detention was based are dated 7-4-1989 itself and they were communicated to the detenu on the same date on which the detention order was served upon him. the grounds of detention show that on 16-1-1988 the intelligence officers of the customs department, on suspicion, intercepted in the presence of panchas three pieces of unaccompanied cargo which arrived under cover of airways bill no. 176:9000;3620 from dubai by emirates airlines flight ex. 502. the said consignment consisted of 'national' room air conditioner c.w. 188 us 235: t-b one 'national' washer na 200x and one techogas cacina cooker, which consignment was in the name of the detenu with the address given as p.o. pinjrathijre, kerala. the name of the consigner was also that of the detenu and the address of the consigner was p.o. box 8982 dubai, u.a.e. on examination of the gas cooker in the presence of the panchas the custom officers recovered 60 foreign marker gold bars of 10 totals each, totally weighing 6996 gms. v/a rs. 13,64,220/- i.m.v. and rs. 24,34,608/- lmv. these 60 foreign marked gold bars along with other items national room air conditioner and national washer totally valued at rs. 7,000/- cif and rs. 21,000/- l.m.v. were seized by the custom officers in the reasonable belief that these were smuggled goods and were liable to confiscation under the provisions of the customs act, 1962.3. the detenu was apprehended of 11-3-1988 by the custom officers when he went to the office of the emirates airlines in the new international passengers terminal to enquire about the three pieces of baggage which he had shipped from dubai. he was found in possession of the documents in regard to the relevant articles. during his personal search indian currency notes amounting to rs. 24,000/- and an air ticket of an air india flight for sector dubai-bombay-dubai were found and were sized.4. the statement of the detenu was recorded on 11-3-1988. on the same date he was also arrested under section 104 of the custom act and was produced before chief metropolitan magistrate. the detenu was granted bail of rs, 4 lakhs with one surety. however, the detenu did not avail of the bail. he, however, filed an application, i.e. criminal application no. 199/88 on 9.6.1988 for reduction of bail. a complaint was filed under section 135(1)(a) & 135(1)(b) of the customs act and section 5 of the import and exports (control) act, 1947 against the detenu.5. after testing the seized sample of gold it was found to be 99.9% pure. the show cause notice was issued to be the detenu on 24-6-1988 under section 124 of the customs act. after considering the statement of the detenu made by him on 11-3-1988, the detaining authority passed the above order of detention on 7-4-1989 and communicated the same along with the grounds of detention and other relevant documents to the detenu on 12-4-1989. feeling aggrieved the petitioner has challenged the detention of the detenu by way of this criminal writ petition.6. the learned counsel for the petitioners has raised the following grounds before us :(1) that the order of detention is vitiated for non-consideration of the material documents by the detaining authority, viz. the reply of the detenu dated 19-12-1988 to the show cause notice dated 24-6-1988 issued under section 124 of the customs act.(2) that, the order of detention is vitiated because of delay in issuing the same, and(3) that, the order of detention suffers from improper application of mind as in the ground of detention it is stated that a complaint has been filed under section 135(1)(a), 135(1)(b) read with section 133(1)(i) of the customs act and section 5 of the imports and exports (control) act, 1947, when the alleged section 133 of the customs act has no sub-section and the same has no relevance to the subject-matter of detention in the instant case.7. as regards the ground no. (1) as well as the ground no. (2) it is necessary to notice certain dates in considering the case of detention of the detenu in the instant case. as already pointed out, the date of the incident i.e. detention of contraband gold in the baggage of the detenu is 16-1-1988. however, actually the detenu was apprehended on 11-3-1988 only when he had gone on that date to the office of the emirates airlines for making enquiry about the three places of baggage which he had shipped from dubai. on the same date he was arrested and his statement was recorded. on 17-3-1988 the test memo was issued by chemical examiner that the seized gold was 99.9% pure. the detenu was granted bail on 17-5-1988 but on 9-6-1988 he made an application for reduction of the bail. after testing the gold a criminal complaint was filed against the detenu and a show cause notice was also given to him on 24-6-1988. perusal of the show cause notice would show that the detenu had to file his reply within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the said show cause notice. however, the detenu sent his reply to the said show cause notice on 19-12-1988.8. a proposal for detention of the detenu was also initiated by the sponsoring authority and it was place before the screening committee which cleared the same on 16-8-1988. the sponsoring authority thereafter by its letter dated 13th/14th september, 1988 sent the proposal for detention of the detenu to the detaining authority which was received in the home department on 11-10-1988. after scrutinising the proposal, the detaining authority sought for additional information from the sponsoring authority by its letter dated 14-10-1988 in regard to which a reminder was also sent on 28-10-1988. the information sought from the sponsoring authority was received by it on 1-11-1988.9. after considering the proposal for detention, the detaining authority formulated the grounds of detention of 24-11-1988. it appears that since the detenu understood only malayalam language, the translations of the documents were required and the same were, therefore called by the detaining authority by its letter dated 28-11-1988. the translations of the proposed order of detention, the grounds of detention and the documents recied upon were received by the detaining authority on 1-2-1989 from the customs department. according to the return filed by the detaining authority, after considering the proposal and the documents, the order of detention was thereafter passed by it on 7-4-1989 and was communicated to the detenu on 12-4-1989.10. in the light of the aforesaid relevant dates and the facts and circumstances, it is clear that a show cause notice under section 124 of the customs act was issued to the detenu on 24-6-1988 to which the reply was sent by the detenu on 19-12-1988. in considering the ground no. 1, raised by the petitioner it is material to see that the detenu had to file his reply within 20 days from the date of receipt of the show cause notice. it is not brought to our notice that the detenu had asked for time to file his reply to the show cause notice. it is also not brought to our notice that although the show cause notice is dated 24-6-1988 it was received very late by the detenu and thus the reply filed by him on 19-12-1988 was within the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the show cause notice. in the absence of any such facts or circumstances being brought on record it will have to be presumed that the official acts have been regularly performed and that the regular course of business must have been followed so that the detenu must have received the notice within a reasonable time from 24-6-1988 particularly when it appears that he was in judicial custody in bombay at that time. it is, therefore, clear that the detenu had not submitted his reply within 30 days from, the date of receipt of the show cause notice dated 24-6-1988. the detaining authority was not, therefore bound to consider the same.11. moreover, it may be seen that before the reply was sent by the detenu on 19-12-1988, the detaining authority had already formulated the grounds of detention on 24-11-1988 and the only question that had remained was on translation of the proposed order of detention, the grounds of detention and the documents. however, the learned counsel for the petitioner has laid much stress upon the averment of the detaining authority in para 8 of its return in this criminal writ petition in which it is stated that after the receipt of the translations the detaining authority again considered the proposal and the documents and issued the order of detention on 7-4-1989 after contemporaneously finalising the grounds of detention on the same date. the submission is that since the proposal of detention was finalised after 1-2-1989, the sponsoring authority should have sent the reply of the detenu to the show cause notice to the detaining authority and the detaining authority should have considered the same.12. it may be seen that when the grounds of detention were already formulated by the detaining authority on 24-11-1988 and the proposed order of detention, the grounds of detention, and the documents were sent to the sponsoring authority, i.e. the customs department by the detaining authority for preparing their translations, there was no reason for the sponsoring authority to believe that the grounds of detention were not finalised because the stage of translation would come only when they were finalised. in our view what is meant by reconsideration in this case by the detaining authority is merely re-verification of the grounds of detention which it had already formulated with reference to the documents which were already on record and which were translated before issuing the order of detention to the detenue because it is clear from the said the para itself that the translations were made not only of the grounds of detention and the documents but also of the proposed order of detention to be issued to the detenu. the above submission made on behalf of the petitioner is, therefore, devoid of any merit.13. moreover, what needs to be considered to appreciate the above submission is whether the reply to the show cause notice given by the detenu contained such vital facts and circumstances which had to be taken into consideration by the detaining authority failing which its order could be said to be vitiated. it may be seen that the statement of the detenu was recorded on 11-3-1988 and the same had been taken into consideration by the detaining authority. we, therefore, asked the learned counsel for the petitioner to show from the reply of the detenu to the show cause notice whether any new fact or whether any new ground was sought to be made out in his reply dated 19-12-1988 which was not contained in his statement recorded on 11-3-1988. the learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice para 5 of the reply of the detenu dated 19-12-1988 which, according to him, contained vital matters which were not contained in the statement of the detenu recorded on 11-3-1988.14. perusal of para 5 of the reply dated 19-12-1988 would show that after making some enquiry about arrival of the cargo in this case, the petitioner had one to kerala to make arrangements for payment of the excise duty for these three pieces of the cargo and had with him for the said purpose rs. 24.000/- when he was nabbed by the customs officers. perusal of the statement of the detenu recorded on 11-3-1988 also shows that the detenu has referred therein to the said material fact that the indian currency amounting to rs. 24.400/- recovered and seized from him was brought by him from his house for payment of duty for his baggage. (see : internal page 6 of the statement dated 11-3-1988). it is thus clear that the above material fact contained in the reply dated 19-12-1988 is also contained in the statement of the detenu recorded on 11-3-1988 by the detaining authority. it cannot, therefore, be said that because of non-consideration of the reply of the detenu dated 19-12-1988 and material fact or circumstances was not considered by the detaining authority. for all these reasons the ground no. (1) raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be given effect to.15. the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the supreme court in the case of ayya alias ayub v. state of u.p. : 1989crilj991 to show that as the material document viz a telegram sent by one person acting on behalf of the detenue in that case to the senior superintendent of police was not considered by the detaining authority the order of detention was held to be vitiated in that case. perusal of para 6 of the said judgment would show that the vital fact contained in the telegram in that case sent by one mirazuddin acting on behalf of the detenu in that case to the senior superintendent of police. meerut, at 12.30 a.m. at night on 18-2-1988 was that the detenu in the said case had been taken away by the police at 8.00 p.m. earlier that night which would have therefore shown improbability of the detenu's participation in the incident which was alleged to have taken place at 9-10 p.m. on that night itself. the said telegram was thus a vital document which ought to have been placed before and considered by the detaining authority. it may be seen that the question whether a document which ought to be considered by the detaining authority contains vital or material fact or not would depend upon the facts in each case. as already pointed out since all the material facts contained in the reply of the detenu dated 19-12-1988 are all contained in his statement recorded on 11-3-1988 it cannot be urged that its non-consideration has vitiated the impugned order of detention apart from the fact that as already held by us, since the reply was sent beyond the period of 30 days and the grounds of detention were already, formulated on 24-12-1988 should have been considered.16. as regards ground no. (2), it is material first to notice the decision of the supreme court, in the case of rajendrakumar v. state of gujarat : 1988crilj1775 . it is laid down in the said judgment of the supreme court that the rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not an inflexible rule. it is observed by the supreme court that a distinction should be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under the cofeposa act and the delay in complying to with the procedural safeguards of article 22(5) of the constitution. it is then held that in cases of mere delay in making of an order of detention under the law like cofeposa enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay is not satisfactorily explained or that such delay must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or should not merely on account of delay assume that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. the supreme court further held that taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the court finds that the grounds are 'state' or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention.16-a. by this judgment the view taken by the high courts that unexplained delay in passing the order of detention is fatal was overruled. in para 9 of the judgment, the supreme court has pointed out that some delay is inherent in the procedure of passing the order of detention under section 3 of the cofeposa act. in the aforesaid case of the supreme court there was five months delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the prejudicial activity of the detenu out of which although there was an unexplained delay from 2-2-1987 i.e. the date of the order or his detention, it was held that the said delay did not give rise to the legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the district magistrate was not rational connection between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. it is in the light of the above decision of the supreme court that the question of delay in passing the order of detention has to be considered.17. the question of delay in passing the order of detention is also considered by the supreme court in its recent decision in the case of t.a. abdul rahman v. state of kerala : 1990crilj578 . it is pertinent to see that there was a long delay of 11 months in the said case between the alleged prejudicial activities and the passing of the detention order. after, referring to its previous decisions including the rajendrakumar shah's case (cited supra) the supreme court has laid down the law in the matter in paragraph 11 of its judgment, which is reproduced below :'11. the conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus. the question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. no hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. it follows that the test of proximity is not a right or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. however, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of the detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.'18. the learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice several decisions of this court as well as of the delhi high court out of which in view of the above law laid down by the supreme court only two decisions of this court need to be examined. in the case of mrs. arifa vaz v. shri k. l. verma, criminal writ petition no. 1170 of 1988 decided on 7-4-1989 by the division bench of this court at bombay, the decision of the supreme court in the case of rajendra kumar natwarlal shah v. state of gujarat referred to above was cited before the division bench which after referring to the said decision held that bearing in mind the nature of the incident and the role of the detenue in the alleged incident in the case before it, the incident was very minor and that the entire backgrounds of the case and the time interval made the entire matter stale. it is thus clear that the said decision of the division bench of this court turns upon the facts in the said case and does not lay down any law different from the above decision of the supreme court. as regards the other decision of this court in criminal writ petition no. 9 of 1987 paruthikktu prambil v. the state of maharashtra and others, decided on 9-7-87, the division bench has held that by reason of delay there was no nexus between the activity of the detenue in the said case and the preventive action taken by the detaining authority. it may be seen that the judgment of the supreme court cited supra, was not rendered and was not noticed by the division bench at that time.19. it is clear from the judgment of the supreme court in rajendrakumar's case (cited supra) that the mere unexplained delay is no grounds for holding that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no nexus between the grounds and order and order of detention. the above view taken by the supreme court stands approved in its recent decision in t.a. abdul rahman's case, (cited supra) which has referred to rajendrakumar's case in paragraph 8. however, it is clear from the decision of the supreme court in t.a. abdul rahman's case that no hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. it is held by the supreme court in the above case that the test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test to be applied by merely counting number or months between the offending acts and the order of detention, although when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of the detention order the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.20. it is clear from the grounds of detention in the instant case that although the prejudicial activity of smuggling was detected in the instant case on 16-1-1988, the detenu had come to bombay from dubai thereafter on 28-1-1988. according to him after learning that his cargo had not come the detenue had gone to his native place in kerala from where he came to bombay on 6-3-1988. he could thus be apprehended only on 11-3-1988 when he had gone to the office of the emirates airlines to enquire about his cargo. his statement was prompt they recorded by custom officers on the same date itself. the detenu was remanded to judicial custody from time to time. ultimately he was granted bail on 17-5-1988 but did not avail of the same. however, on 9-6-1988 he made an application for reduction of bail. in the meantime the customs department obtained the report about the contraband gold. a criminal complaint was thereafter filed and a show-cause notice dated 24-6-1988 was served upon the detenu. the sponsoring authority initiated the proposal for detention of the detenu which was cleared by the screening committee on 16-8-1988. after its clearance, the said proposal was sent by the sponsoring authority by its letter dated 13th/14th september, 1988 which was received in the home department on 11-10-1988.21. it is true that there is no explanation given in the affidavits filed in the instant criminal writ petition either by the detaining authority or the state government as to why in bombay itself the proposal for detention was received after about 28 days. however, after the scrutiny of the said proposals the detaining authority called for additional information from the sponsoring authority by its letter dated 14-10-1988 and the said additional information was received by it from the customs department on 1-11-1988, after a reminder was sent to it on 28-10-1988. the detaining authority thereupon considered the proposal of the sponsoring authority for detention of the detenue in the light of the material or documents placed before it and formulated the grounds for detention on 24-11-1988. the time thereafter was consumed in making translations of the proposed order of detention, the grounds of detention and the documents because it appears that the detenu understood only malayalam language. the said translations were received by the detaining authority on 1-2-1989 which means that about three months time was consumed in making the translations which looking to the bulk of the documents on record and the fact that they were required to be carefully translated in malayalam language, cannot be said to be unreasonable. according to the detaining authority, after receipt of the translations on 1-2-1989, it again considered the proposal for detention and the documents and after finalising the grounds of detention it passed the order of detention on 7-4-1989.22. in considering the question of delay in passing the order of detention, what has to be borne in mind in the instant case is that the cause for detention of the detenu is his prejudicial activity in smuggling huge contraband gold in india which adversely affects the economy of the country. the question which has, therefore, to be considered is whether the live link in regard to the above prejudicial activity can be said to be snapped because of delay in passing the order of detention in the instant case. it is true that there is delay of more than one year in passing the detention order in the instant case from 16-1-1988 on which date the contraband gold was detected in the instant case. it is, however, clear that although contraband gold was detected on 16-1-1988, the detenu had come to bombay on 28-1-1988 and could be apprehended only on 11-3-1988 when after returning from his native place in kerala he had gone to the customs office of emirates airlines for enquiry about his cargo. the usual procedure of the customs department, i.e. the sponsoring authority has thereafter consumed some time as is clear from the facts narrated above and the proposal for detention was received in the home department only on 11-10-1988. what is, however, objected to by the learned counsel for the petitioner's is the delay of about 28 days in the receipt of proposal by the home department on 11-10-1988 sent by the sponsoring authority under its letter dated 13th/14th september, 1988 and the delay in making translations of the proposed order of detention, the grounds of detention and the documents upon which they are based for which according to him there is no satisfactory explanation.23. as regards the delay of three months in preparing translations of the proposed order of detention, the grounds of detention and the documents on which they are based, we have already held that looking to the bulk of the documents and the fact that they were required to be translated carefully into malayamam language which only the detenu understands, the time of three months taken by the customs department for translations cannot be said to be unreasonable. as regards the delay of about 28 days in the receipt of the proposal of detention by the detaining authority, it is true that there is no explanation given for the said delay by the detaining authority or by the state government. however, in our view, even though there is no explanation given in this regard by the state government or even assuming that there was some delay in preparing translations, it cannot be inferred in the instant case that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority was not genuine, or that the grounds were staleor illusory, of that there was no rational connection between the grounds and the order of detention. we cannot, therefore, give effect to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that because of long delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the prejudicial activity of the detenu, his order of detention is vitiated.24. the last ground urged before us has merely to be stated for being rejected only. the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that there is no section 133(1)(i) in the customs act and that section 133 of the customs act has no relevance to the grounds upon which the order of detention can be passed under section 3 of the cofeposa act and as such the order of detention suffers from improper application of mind by the detaining authority. in appreciating the above contention raised on behalf of the petitioners reference to section 133(1)(i) of the customs act in the grounds of detention is not a reference to any ground of detention as such. the ground of detention made out in the grounds of detention is about the detection of smuggling of contraband gold in the cargo of the petitioner which arrived from dubai by emirates airlines flight and the reference to section 133(1)(i) of the customs act is in relation to the document, viz., a complaint filed by the customs department under the customs act against the detenu upon which document along with others the above ground of detention is based. it is in this background that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner and the explanation given in the affidavit of the detaining authority needs to be examined.25. it may be seen that as per the affidavit of the detaining authority, reference in the grounds of detention to section 133(1)(i) of the customs act in regard to the complaint filed by the customs department was a typographical error. the said complaint itself is included in the documents as document no. 9 supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention. perusal of the said complaint shows that it is filed under section 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) read with section 135(1)(i) of the customs act, 1962 and section 5 of the imports exports (control) act, 1947, as is also reiterated in the affidavit of the detaining authority. the contents of the said complaint also do not contain any accusation against the detenu under section 133 of the customs act. the explanation given by the detaining authority that there is a typographical error in the grounds of detention is, therefore, proper and the contents of section 133 of the customs act have not entered into the mind of the detaining authority in formulating the grounds of detention and/or in passing the order of detention in the instant case. there is thus no question of lack of proper application of mind on the part of the detaining authority.25. however, even assuming that such a ground as contained in section 133 of the customs act, viz., 'obstruction to the officers of the customs department' is also included in the grounds of detention it would be a separate ground and since the said ground is not relevant for making the order of detention under section 3(1) of the cofeposa act, by virtue of section 5-a of the said act introduced in it by amendment in 1975, the detaining authority shall be deemed to have made the order of detention upon the valid ground, viz., of preventing the detenue from smuggling the goods in india. the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the supreme court in the case of mohd, yusuf v. state of j. & k. : [1980]1scr258 in support of the submission that if the order of detention is made on more than one ground and one of the grounds is invalid, the whole order of detention is vitiated and is liable to be struck down. it may be seen that the order of detention was passed in the above case under the j.& k. public safety act, 1978 and perusal of the said judgment does not show that there was any provision like section 5-a of the cofeposa act, in the said act. at any rate no provision like section 5-a of the cofeposa act is considered by the supreme court in that case. the ratio of the said decision is not, therefore, applicable in the instant case in which section 5-a of the cofeposa act is attracted. the above contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, deserves to be rejected.27. in the result, the instant criminal writ petition fails and is dismissed.