Rajendra Jainarayan Sharma Vs. R.P. Patankar, Asstt. Collector of Customs, New Customs House, Bombay - Court Judgment

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criminal - bail - section 37 of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances act, 1985 and sections 167, 437 (1) and 437 (5) of criminal procedure code, 1973 - successor of trial judge canceled bail considering new material and also on ground that earlier grant of bail was inchoate in nature - such bail granted after hearing both parties - confirmation of such bail order by high court bars successor of trial judge from revoking order of his predecessor - held, cancellation of bail by successor of trial judge untenable. - - the petitioner contends that the learned special judge has failed to consider the relevant material necessary to decide while granting bail. george submits that the reasons given by judge ghare in support of the cancellation of bail and the taking of the petitioner into custody are well founded, both in law as also on merits. faruqui on behalf of the crown that when bail is granted by the high court at a certain stage in the proceedings the order would necessarily hold good during that stage of the proceedings alone. for instance, if a case in which bail is granted by the high court is under investigation by the police, the order would hold good so long as the charge-sheet has not been submitted against the accused by the police and that as soon as the charge-sheet has been submitted, it would be open to the magistrate before whom the charge-sheet has been submitted to reconsider the matter and cancel the bail granted to the accused person if he so chooses. such a practice would clearly lead to confusion and no justification for it is to be found in any of the provisions contained in the code of criminal procedure in regard to the grant of bail .it is thus clear that the bond does not continue till after the end of the trial and any order granting bail to an accused person during an inquiry or trial is obviously effective only up to the termination of the trial and no further. that application also would have to be dealt with in the manner recommended by the supreme court in vikramjit singh v. justice gupta cancelled the earlier order of judge varma and while doing so, made strong remarks in re grant of bail in similar cases. the supreme court remarked (at page 517 (of cri lj)) :it appears that the learned judge while passing the impugned order, failed to appreciate that no bench can comment on the functioning of a co-ordinate bench of the same court, much less sit in judgment as an appellate court over its decision.order1. this purports to be a petition under sections 482 and 439 of the criminal procedure code, 1973 - herein after referred to as 'the code'. 2. petitioner was arraigned along with another person for offences punishable under narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances act, 1985 (the act). petitioner was the first accused and the other person was accused no. 2. shortly stated, the case against them was that on 11-2-1992 at about 1.45 p.m. petitioner and accused no. 2 were going by a scooter, with accused no. 2 being on the driver's seat and petitioner on the pillion seat. they were stopped by the officers of the 1st respondent and searched. at the foot of the driver were two plastic bags which contained a sum of rs. 5,99,900/- in currency notes. a search of the person of the petitioner was taken and therein was found a match box containing three mandrex tablets and a sticker having on it a number and some particulars of an airway bill. petitioner and accused no. 2 were taken to the new customs house and on 13-3-1992 were produced before a magistrate. the said magistrate remanded them into custody till the next day. on 21-2-1992, petitioner and accused no. 2 were produced before the special court at bombay constituted under the act and presided over by judge gupta. petitioner and the 2nd accused moved applications for bail and the said applications were allowed. the order passed by judge gupta in relation to the petitioner sets out the above factual position plus a summary of what he had stated when interrogated by the authorities under s. 67 of the act. the reasoning for the grant of bail is to be found in para 3 of the said judgment, which reads as follows :- 'whatever statement the appellant made before the customs officer were retracted by him on the very first day he was produced before the ld. chief metropolitan magistrate. therefore if his statement is kept aside, for the time being, there is nothing to connect the applicant with the alleged export of the mandrex tablets to nairobi. the cash of rs. 5,99,900/- was recovered from below the legs of one treveni singh (accused no. 2). the prosecution till date has not been in a position to connect this amount with the sale proceeds of the mandrex tablets, already exported some time in the months of december, 1991 and january, 1992. moreover it is not the case of the prosecution that it was recovered from the possession of the applicant. the prosecution has not been in a position to connect the air india cargo sticker with the goods already exported sometime in december, 1991 or january, 1992. the only material implicating the accused are the three mandrex tablets recovered from his possession. before the customs officers, he initially said that the three tablets were for his personal consumption and subsequently changed his statement by saying that the same were the sample to be shown to other persons. which of these two statements are true is open to debate; that is apart from the fact that the statements itself has been retracted. in any event, the accused has only to account for the possession of the three mandrex tablets. the provisions of s. 27 of the ndps act, 1985, shall be open to him. during the last seven days, the applicant was in custody, the prosecution has not interrogated him even for one day. i do not find any justifiable reasons to detain him in custody.' the order granting bail to the petitioner was challenged by the 1st respondent vide criminal application no. 828 of 1992. the said application came up before a division bench, and, on 31-3-1992, the said bench rejected the application opining as follows :- 'the assistant collector of customs (p) seeks cancellation of bail of the two accused in an offence under the ndps act. the petitioner contends that the learned special judge has failed to consider the relevant material necessary to decide while granting bail. upon perusal of the orders impugned and on hearing both parties, we find, the learned special judge has adequately covered all the points necessary for concluding the question of grant of bail. no doubt, in cases under the ndps act, the caution imposed by the non-obstante clause of s. 37 of the act must never be overlooked and in particular where the learned p.p. opposes the grant of bail as in this case. however, we find that the factors governance to determine grant of bail have been taken into consideration in the instant case and needs no interference except for modification of the conditions. instead of reporting once a week for six weeks as directed by the trial court, the respondents nos. 1 and 2 shall report daily between 10.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. to the office of the petitioner till filing of the complaint or a period of two months more whichever is earlier and thereafter once in every week till end of trial.' 3. the investigation over the 1st respondent filed a complaint in the special court. at a certain stage when the proceedings were before the special court, it was urged that the petitioner and accused no. 2 be allowed to continue on bail and that in any case, the same should not be cancelled without hearing them and, this more-so, on account of the fact that the bail granted by judge gupta had been confirmed by the high court in criminal application no. 828 of 1992. the learned special court now presided over by judge ghare, took a different view of the matter. according to that learned judge, the order passed by his predecessor and confirmed by the high court was provisional in nature because the proceedings up to that stage were inchoate. the bail granted would sure only up to the filing of the complaint and bail to granted did not confer on the petitioner an indefeasible right to remain on bail where the investigation carried out subsequently revealed that the accused had committed a serious offence. next, at the time when the order granting bail was passed by judge gupta, the entire material available against the petitioner had not been taken into consideration and the excluded material which had an important bearing on the culpability of the petitioner was, so a vital piece of evidence as the confessional statement of accused nos. 3 and 4. dealing with the confirmation of judge gupta's order by the high court, judge ghare remarked that there would have been an impediment in the way of his cancelling the bail had the original order of bail been passed by the high court itself. as the situation stood, the order passed was that of judge gupta and its confirmation by the high court did not come in the way of his cancelling judge gupta's order. he therefore cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner and directed that he be taken into custody pending the trial. operation of this order was stayed to enable the petitioner to move this court. 4. petitioner contends that the order for cancellation of bail is illegal, without jurisdiction and tainted with serious impropriety. judge ghare had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail granted to the petitioner by judge gupta who presided over a court of jurisdiction co-ordinate to that presided over by judge ghare. in any event, once the order passed by judge gupta has been confirmed, the matter was beyond the reach of a judge having the same jurisdiction as judge gupta. it was an error to hold that the bail granted by judge gupta was provisional in nature and enuring only up to the filing of the complaint. the said bail was operative until cancelled upon an application moved by the respondent for that purpose or upon the conclusion of the trial wherein the petitioner was found to be guilty. no new material warranting revocation of the bail had come to the notice of the court and in any case the same could not be taken into consideration for depriving the petitioner of the privilege secured by him after he had obtained bail from judge gupta which bail had been confirmed by this court. in reply, the respondent's counsel mr. george submits that the reasons given by judge ghare in support of the cancellation of bail and the taking of the petitioner into custody are well founded, both in law as also on merits. 5. the first question that arises for consideration is whether the order granting bail by judge gupta and the correctness whereof was affirmed by a division bench of this court, can be said to be provisional, or inchoate or enuring only up to the submission and consideration of the taking of cognizance by the special court upon a complaint moved by the respondent 6. mr. vakil in support of the petitioner relies upon a judgment of the full bench of the allahabad high court reported in the case of seoti in 1948 cri lj 521. what had happened in that case was that the applicants before the high court were committed to the court of session by an order of the committal magistrate. they were released on bail by an order of the high court and the sessions court. while committing the applicants to the court of session, the magistrate took them into custody after cancelling the bail granted to them by the high court and the court of session. the applicants petitioned the court of session for bail and the sessions judge rejected their application on the ground that the offence of which they had been charged was a non-bailable one and also that they were likely to tamper with the prosecution evidence if released on bail. the contention of the applicants was that when the bail had been granted by the high court or the court of session, it was not within the power of the subordinate court to cancel it at a subsequent stage in the proceedings. the cancellation of bail which was impugned before the high court was characterised by the applicants as 'illegal'. counsel representing the crown made a submission and the answers thereto have been summarised thus at para 7 by wanchoo j. speaking for the full bench :- 'it is urged by dr. faruqui on behalf of the crown that when bail is granted by the high court at a certain stage in the proceedings the order would necessarily hold good during that stage of the proceedings alone. for instance, if a case in which bail is granted by the high court is under investigation by the police, the order would hold good so long as the charge-sheet has not been submitted against the accused by the police and that as soon as the charge-sheet has been submitted, it would be open to the magistrate before whom the charge-sheet has been submitted to reconsider the matter and cancel the bail granted to the accused person if he so chooses. similarly if an order granting bail is passed by the high court while proceedings are going on in the court of the committing magistrate, it would be open to the committing magistrate to cancel the bail as soon as he decides to commit the accused to the court of session. such a practice would clearly lead to confusion and no justification for it is to be found in any of the provisions contained in the code of criminal procedure in regard to the grant of bail ......... it is thus clear that the bond does not continue till after the end of the trial and any order granting bail to an accused person during an inquiry or trial is obviously effective only up to the termination of the trial and no further. thus, the fact that any orders granting bail to an accused person during an inquiry or trial necessarily terminate at the conclusion of the trial is no support for the view that such orders are in every case of a temporary nature and terminate with the termination of the stage in which inquiry or trial during which they are made and there is no substance in the contention urged on behalf of the crown.' it is true that the above observations were made at a time when the criminal procedure code, 1973 was not in force. even so, the provisions under the old code do not on this subject at least, materially differ from those of the code. 7. the next question to be examined is whether the order of judge gupta confirmed by the high court was provisional in nature or inchoate as judge ghare put it. apparently, the learned judge was of the view that when the order was passed, neither judge gupta nor the division bench of this court had the benefit of going through the entire material that had been collected by the respondent for lodging the complaint in the special court against the petitioner and his co-accused. it is doubtful if this non-consideration or non-availability of material pertaining to the culpability or otherwise of the suspects can be taken into consideration for revoking bail granted earlier. mr. george relies upon v. s. kotwal j.'s decision in state of maharashtra v. khodidas sonabhai chavan, 1984 cri lj 811. kotwal j. observed :- 'it cannot be said to be impermissible to assess the situation, after filing of the charge-sheet and if the facts so demand and justify, squarely attracting the two provisions of s. 437(1) with the proviso and s. 437(5) to take back the accused in custody notwithstanding he has been released on bail under s. 167(2) on the earlier occasion.' apart from the fact that a provision similar to s. 167(2), cr.p.c. was not the reason for grant of bail to the petitioner, what must not be overlooked is that kotwal j.'s observations are in direct conflict with the judgment of the supreme court in rajnikant jivanlal patel v. intelligence officer narcotic control bureau new delhi, reported in : [1989]3scr377 . this matter came up before the supreme court upon the petitioners i.e. patel and another person, taking exception to their re-arrest by cancellation of bail. but the re-arrest consequent to the cancellation was upon an application moved by the complainant for that purpose. negativing the contention that an order of bail under s. 167(2), cr.p.c. was an act of charity, the learned judges observed (at page 64) :- 'an order for release on bail under proviso (a) to s. 167(2) may appropriately be termed as an order-on-default. indeed, it is a release on bail on the default of the prosecution in filing charge-sheet within the prescribed period. the right to bail under s. 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is absolute. it is a legislative command and not court's discretion. if the investigating agency fails to file charge-sheet before the expiry of 90/60 days, as the case may be, the accused in custody should be released on bail. but at that stage, merits of the case are not to be examined, not at all. in fact, the magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days. he must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds.' the court thereafter went on to observe that because the accused has secured his release under s. 167(2)(a), cr.p.c., it did not follow that he had a special right to remain on bail. the bail granted to him could be cancelled, provided it was established by the investigating agency that he had committed a serious offence and that the charge-sheet had been filed. the observations of the court would not warrant an inference that the power of cancellation can be exercised suo motu. the said power can be exercised only after an application for cancellation is moved and allowed. that is not the case here. judge gupta appraised the material on the basis of which the petitioner and accused no. 2 were held in custody. on the one hand was a request of the respondent to remand them to custody, and, on the other the bail application moved on behalf of the petitioner and accused no. 2. as shown by his observations re-produced above, the facts of the case were taken into consideration and it was after an appraisal on merits that the petitioner was granted bail. this power cannot in any way be compared in quality to the order-in-default which the court passes under s. 167(2)(a) of the cr.p.c. mr. george then relies upon a judgment of saldanha j. in the case of asstt. collector of customs (p) v. madam ayado atanda ciadipo orisan, reported in : 54(1982)clt369 . the facts of the case and the submission relied upon by mr. george appear in headnote (b), which reads as follows (at page 2352 (of cri lj)) :- 'in case of drug trafficking the accused a foreign lady was granted bail before filing the charge-sheet ....... bail was not availed of. the charge sheet was filed. the question arose if the earlier order or bail survived even after the charge sheet, was filed. held, in the negative. it was clear that when the initial bail order was passed even if that order had been availed of, that the order was to be effective only until the filing of the complaint, one enters a different stage of the proceeding and even if the accused was on bail at that point of time, it would have been essential for her to be released on bail by the court once again, the earlier order having exhausted itself. the bail order of 8-6-1987 would, therefore, be an order that was current or an order that was capable of being availed of only until such time as the filing of the complaint, since under the relevant provisions of law on the filing of the complaint the court has to enter into a de novo consideration with regard to whether the accused should be released on bail or whether the accused should be taken into custody. it follows that the life of the earlier order whether availed of or not availed of is only of a limited duration up to that point of time. therefore, in these circumstances, it was unnecessary for the court to have passed an order for revocation of bail under s. 439 of the code of criminal procedure before proceeding further when the complaint was filed. such an order would only have been necessary if the prosecution applied for revocation of the order of bail passed on 9-6-1987 on the ground that the accused had given cause for revocation of that order.' with respect to the learned judge, these observations are in direct conflict with the full bench decision of the allahabad high court in seoti' case (supra). even at the pre-charge sheet or pre-complaint stage, the court to which an application for bail is made and which grants bail, acts upon the material available. in cases under the ndps act, 1985, especially those to which the disabling provisions of s. 37 of the act apply, the court takes the caution to hear both the parties and take into consideration all the relevant factors before granting bail. this being the position, it would be difficult to agree with the observations of saldanha j. that an order of bail passed before the filing of the complaint exhausts itself once a complaint is filed, at which stage the court taking cognizance can apply itself afresh to whether the person accused should be allowed to continue at liberty or be taken into custody. this is of course not to say that in appropriate cases, the prosecution cannot apply for cancellation of bail. such a power is specifically vested in the high court or the court of session under s. 439(2) of the code. so far as the present case is concerned, that chance was already taken by the respondent when it moved criminal application no. 828 of 1992. somehow judge ghare persuaded himself to believe that the high court while affirming the order of judge gupta was acting in a perfunctory manner. with respect to the learned judge, he should have been careful of the words he was using when describing an order of the high court. when the high court confirms an order passed by the lower court, it does not cease to be a high court; nor does it exercise a higher jurisdiction when instead of confirming the order of a lower court, it passes an order on a substantive application made to itself. in both the cases, it is the high court which is acting and the courts subordinate to the high court are not at liberty to intervene, and, set right, what they believe to be the shortcomings of the order of the high court. if there existed a case for cancellation of bail even after the merits had been appraised by judge gupta and the high court when dealing with the application for cancellation, the respondent should have been left to find his remedies in an appropriate forum. that appropriateness was certainly not in the court presided over by judge ghare. 8. learned counsel mr. george has referred to a number of circumstances which according to him have come to light at a subsequent stage and which show the petitioner to be engaged in drug trafficking on a vast scale. i will not go into this aspect of the matter, unless it be upon an application for cancellation of bail. that application also would have to be dealt with in the manner recommended by the supreme court in vikramjit singh v. state of madhya pradesh, reported in : 1992crilj516 . the facts and observations of this case are instructive on the subject and therefore, i shall deal with the said decision in some detail. vikramjit singh was an accused in a murder case. he had applied for bail to the trial court which rejected the application. thereafter he moved the high court which court dismissed the application with an observation that he could renew the prayer after the submission of the report of the police officer on completion of the investigation. after the charge sheet was filed, vikramjit singh and two others renewed the prayer before the sessions judge, who again rejected the claim for bail. vikramjit thereafter moved the high court with another application, which came up before b. c. varma j. justice varma on 6-7-1990 directed vikramjit to be released on bail. another accused dharmendra kumar sharma approached the high court for bail and his application was placed before g. c. gupta j. g. c. gupta, j. made an order in favour of dharmendra kumar sharma, but observed that some of the other accused including vikramjit did not deserve to be enlarged on bail and that the state should apply for cancellation of bail granted to the said persons including vikramjit singh. the state filed a petition for cancellation of the bail order passed by justice varma. in this application no additional facts were stated. the petition for cancellation was founded on the observations of mr. justice gupta. justice gupta cancelled the earlier order of judge varma and while doing so, made strong remarks in re grant of bail in similar cases. that order of mr. justice gupta was challenged by a s.l.p. before the supreme court. the supreme court remarked (at page 517 (of cri lj)) :- 'it appears that the learned judge while passing the impugned order, failed to appreciate that no bench can comment on the functioning of a co-ordinate bench of the same court, much less sit in judgment as an appellate court over its decision. if the state was aggrieved by the order of bail by mr. justice b. c. varma it could have approached this court but that was not done. the judgment of mr. justice b. c. varma therefore became final so far as the high court was concerned.' the supreme court accepted the possibility of the person bailed, misusing his liberty or new material coming to light which could have furnished a ground for cancellation of bail. even so it deprecated the practice of forum-shopping, observing - 'it must be, therefore, held that mr. justice gupta had no authority to upset the earlier order of the high court. that which could not be done directly could also not be done indirectly. otherwise, a party aggrieved by an order passed by one bench of the high court would be tempted to accept to get the matter reopened before another bench, and there would not be any end to such attempts. besides, it was not consistent with the judicial discipline which must be maintained by courts both in the interest of administration of justice by assuring the binding nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary.' making it clear that the state was at liberty to make a prayer for cancellation of the bail on the ground of objectionable conduct on the part of the appellant or any other fresh relevant material, which could be a permissible ground for cancellation of bail, the court said - 'but, in such a case it will be highly desirable for the chief justice of the high court to hear the case himself or assign it to some other judge who had not earlier dealt with the present matter.' in the instant case judge ghare purports to set at naught the order passed by judge gupta and also the high court. he had no jurisdiction to set aside either order. if it were held otherwise, there would be anarchy in the administration of justice. 9. the result of the foregoing discussion is a quashing of that part of the order of the special court which directs that the petitioner be taken into custody and held in detention pending the trial. the petitioner shall continue to be on bail unless the said bail is cancelled upon a properly moved application and which application shall be to an appropriate court, having regard to the observations made above. in substitution of issue process order by a non-bailable warrant, the special judge may issue another process inclusive of permitting appearance by the petitioner of his own accord. rule in these terms is made absolute. order accordingly.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. This purports to be a petition under sections 482 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - herein after referred to as 'the Code'.

2. Petitioner was arraigned along with another person for offences punishable under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (the Act). Petitioner was the first accused and the other person was accused No. 2. Shortly stated, the case against them was that on 11-2-1992 at about 1.45 p.m. petitioner and accused No. 2 were going by a scooter, with accused No. 2 being on the driver's seat and petitioner on the pillion seat. They were stopped by the officers of the 1st respondent and searched. At the foot of the driver were two plastic bags which contained a sum of Rs. 5,99,900/- in currency notes. A search of the person of the petitioner was taken and therein was found a match box containing three Mandrex Tablets and a sticker having on it a number and some particulars of an Airway bill. Petitioner and accused No. 2 were taken to the New Customs House and on 13-3-1992 were produced before a Magistrate. The said Magistrate remanded them into custody till the next day. On 21-2-1992, petitioner and accused No. 2 were produced before the Special Court at Bombay constituted under the Act and presided over by Judge Gupta. Petitioner and the 2nd accused moved applications for bail and the said applications were allowed. The order passed by Judge Gupta in relation to the petitioner sets out the above factual position plus a summary of what he had stated when interrogated by the authorities under S. 67 of the Act. The reasoning for the grant of bail is to be found in para 3 of the said judgment, which reads as follows :-

'Whatever statement the appellant made before the Customs Officer were retracted by him on the very first day he was produced before the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Therefore if his statement is kept aside, for the time being, there is nothing to connect the applicant with the alleged export of the Mandrex Tablets to Nairobi. The cash of Rs. 5,99,900/- was recovered from below the legs of one Treveni Singh (accused No. 2). The prosecution till date has not been in a position to connect this amount with the sale proceeds of the Mandrex Tablets, already exported some time in the months of December, 1991 and January, 1992. Moreover it is not the case of the prosecution that it was recovered from the possession of the applicant. The prosecution has not been in a position to connect the Air India Cargo Sticker with the goods already exported sometime in December, 1991 or January, 1992. The only material implicating the accused are the three Mandrex Tablets recovered from his possession. Before the Customs Officers, he initially said that the three tablets were for his personal consumption and subsequently changed his statement by saying that the same were the sample to be shown to other persons. Which of these two statements are true is open to debate; that is apart from the fact that the statements itself has been retracted. In any event, the accused has only to account for the possession of the three Mandrex Tablets. The provisions of S. 27 of the NDPS Act, 1985, shall be open to him. During the last seven days, the applicant was in custody, the prosecution has not interrogated him even for one day. I do not find any justifiable reasons to detain him in custody.'

The order granting bail to the petitioner was challenged by the 1st respondent vide Criminal Application No. 828 of 1992. The said application came up before a Division Bench, and, on 31-3-1992, the said Bench rejected the application opining as follows :-

'The Assistant Collector of Customs (P) seeks cancellation of bail of the two accused in an offence under the NDPS Act. The petitioner contends that the learned Special Judge has failed to consider the relevant material necessary to decide while granting bail. Upon perusal of the orders impugned and on hearing both parties, we find, the learned Special Judge has adequately covered all the points necessary for concluding the question of grant of bail. No doubt, in cases under the NDPS Act, the caution imposed by the non-obstante clause of S. 37 of the Act must never be overlooked and in particular where the learned P.P. opposes the grant of bail as in this case. However, we find that the factors governance to determine grant of bail have been taken into consideration in the instant case and needs no interference except for modification of the conditions. Instead of reporting once a week for six weeks as directed by the trial Court, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall report daily between 10.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. to the office of the petitioner till filing of the complaint or a period of two months more whichever is earlier and thereafter once in every week till end of trial.'

3. The investigation over the 1st respondent filed a complaint in the Special Court. At a certain stage when the proceedings were before the Special Court, it was urged that the petitioner and accused No. 2 be allowed to continue on bail and that in any case, the same should not be cancelled without hearing them and, this more-so, on account of the fact that the bail granted by Judge Gupta had been confirmed by the High Court in Criminal Application No. 828 of 1992. The learned Special Court now presided over by Judge Ghare, took a different view of the matter. According to that learned Judge, the order passed by his predecessor and confirmed by the High Court was provisional in nature because the proceedings up to that stage were inchoate. The bail granted would sure only up to the filing of the complaint and bail to granted did not confer on the petitioner an indefeasible right to remain on bail where the investigation carried out subsequently revealed that the accused had committed a serious offence. Next, at the time when the order granting bail was passed by Judge Gupta, the entire material available against the petitioner had not been taken into consideration and the excluded material which had an important bearing on the culpability of the petitioner was, so a vital piece of evidence as the confessional statement of accused Nos. 3 and 4. Dealing with the confirmation of Judge Gupta's order by the High Court, Judge Ghare remarked that there would have been an impediment in the way of his cancelling the bail had the original order of bail been passed by the High Court itself. As the situation stood, the order passed was that of Judge Gupta and its confirmation by the High Court did not come in the way of his cancelling Judge Gupta's order. He therefore cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner and directed that he be taken into custody pending the trial. Operation of this order was stayed to enable the petitioner to move this Court.

4. Petitioner contends that the order for cancellation of bail is illegal, without jurisdiction and tainted with serious impropriety. Judge Ghare had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail granted to the petitioner by Judge Gupta who presided over a Court of jurisdiction co-ordinate to that presided over by Judge Ghare. In any event, once the order passed by Judge Gupta has been confirmed, the matter was beyond the reach of a Judge having the same jurisdiction as Judge Gupta. It was an error to hold that the bail granted by Judge Gupta was provisional in nature and enuring only up to the filing of the complaint. The said bail was operative until cancelled upon an application moved by the respondent for that purpose or upon the conclusion of the trial wherein the petitioner was found to be guilty. No new material warranting revocation of the bail had come to the notice of the Court and in any case the same could not be taken into consideration for depriving the petitioner of the privilege secured by him after he had obtained bail from Judge Gupta which bail had been confirmed by this Court. In reply, the respondent's counsel Mr. George submits that the reasons given by Judge Ghare in support of the cancellation of bail and the taking of the petitioner into custody are well founded, both in law as also on merits.

5. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the order granting bail by Judge Gupta and the correctness whereof was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court, can be said to be provisional, or inchoate or enuring only up to the submission and consideration of the taking of cognizance by the Special Court upon a complaint moved by the respondent

6. Mr. Vakil in support of the petitioner relies upon a judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in the case of Seoti in 1948 Cri LJ 521. What had happened in that case was that the applicants before the High Court were committed to the Court of Session by an order of the committal Magistrate. They were released on bail by an order of the High Court and the Sessions Court. While committing the applicants to the Court of Session, the Magistrate took them into custody after cancelling the bail granted to them by the High Court and the Court of Session. The applicants petitioned the Court of Session for bail and the Sessions Judge rejected their application on the ground that the offence of which they had been charged was a non-bailable one and also that they were likely to tamper with the prosecution evidence if released on bail. The contention of the applicants was that when the bail had been granted by the High Court or the Court of Session, it was not within the power of the subordinate Court to cancel it at a subsequent stage in the proceedings. The cancellation of bail which was impugned before the High Court was characterised by the applicants as 'illegal'. Counsel representing the Crown made a submission and the answers thereto have been summarised thus at para 7 by Wanchoo J. speaking for the Full Bench :-

'It is urged by Dr. Faruqui on behalf of the Crown that when bail is granted by the High Court at a certain stage in the proceedings the order would necessarily hold good during that stage of the proceedings alone. For instance, if a case in which bail is granted by the High Court is under investigation by the police, the order would hold good so long as the charge-sheet has not been submitted against the accused by the Police and that as soon as the charge-sheet has been submitted, it would be open to the Magistrate before whom the charge-sheet has been submitted to reconsider the matter and cancel the bail granted to the accused person if he so chooses. Similarly if an order granting bail is passed by the High Court while proceedings are going on in the Court of the committing Magistrate, it would be open to the committing magistrate to cancel the bail as soon as he decides to commit the accused to the Court of Session. Such a practice would clearly lead to confusion and no justification for it is to be found in any of the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure in regard to the grant of bail ......... It is thus clear that the bond does not continue till after the end of the trial and any order granting bail to an accused person during an inquiry or trial is obviously effective only up to the termination of the trial and no further. Thus, the fact that any orders granting bail to an accused person during an inquiry or trial necessarily terminate at the conclusion of the trial is no support for the view that such orders are in every case of a temporary nature and terminate with the termination of the stage in which inquiry or trial during which they are made and there is no substance in the contention urged on behalf of the Crown.'

It is true that the above observations were made at a time when the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was not in force. Even so, the provisions under the old Code do not on this subject at least, materially differ from those of the Code.

7. The next question to be examined is whether the order of Judge Gupta confirmed by the High Court was provisional in nature or inchoate as Judge Ghare put it. Apparently, the learned Judge was of the view that when the order was passed, neither Judge Gupta nor the Division Bench of this Court had the benefit of going through the entire material that had been collected by the respondent for lodging the complaint in the Special Court against the petitioner and his co-accused. It is doubtful if this non-consideration or non-availability of material pertaining to the culpability or otherwise of the suspects can be taken into consideration for revoking bail granted earlier. Mr. George relies upon V. S. Kotwal J.'s decision in State of Maharashtra v. Khodidas Sonabhai Chavan, 1984 Cri LJ 811. Kotwal J. observed :-

'It cannot be said to be impermissible to assess the situation, after filing of the charge-sheet and if the facts so demand and justify, squarely attracting the two provisions of S. 437(1) with the proviso and S. 437(5) to take back the accused in custody notwithstanding he has been released on bail under S. 167(2) on the earlier occasion.'

Apart from the fact that a provision similar to S. 167(2), Cr.P.C. was not the reason for grant of bail to the petitioner, what must not be overlooked is that Kotwal J.'s observations are in direct conflict with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajnikant Jivanlal Patel v. Intelligence Officer Narcotic Control Bureau New Delhi, reported in : [1989]3SCR377 . This matter came up before the Supreme Court upon the petitioners i.e. Patel and another person, taking exception to their re-arrest by cancellation of bail. But the re-arrest consequent to the cancellation was upon an application moved by the complainant for that purpose. Negativing the contention that an order of bail under S. 167(2), Cr.P.C. was an act of charity, the learned Judges observed (at page 64) :-

'An order for release on bail under proviso (a) to S. 167(2) may appropriately be termed as an order-on-default. Indeed, it is a release on bail on the default of the prosecution in filing charge-sheet within the prescribed period. The right to bail under S. 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is absolute. It is a legislative command and not Court's discretion. If the investigating agency fails to file charge-sheet before the expiry of 90/60 days, as the case may be, the accused in custody should be released on bail. But at that stage, merits of the case are not to be examined, not at all. In fact, the Magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days. He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds.'

The Court thereafter went on to observe that because the accused has secured his release under S. 167(2)(a), Cr.P.C., it did not follow that he had a special right to remain on bail. The bail granted to him could be cancelled, provided it was established by the investigating agency that he had committed a serious offence and that the charge-sheet had been filed. The observations of the Court would not warrant an inference that the power of cancellation can be exercised suo motu. The said power can be exercised only after an application for cancellation is moved and allowed. That is not the case here. Judge Gupta appraised the material on the basis of which the petitioner and accused No. 2 were held in custody. On the one hand was a request of the respondent to remand them to custody, and, on the other the bail application moved on behalf of the petitioner and accused No. 2. As shown by his observations re-produced above, the facts of the case were taken into consideration and it was after an appraisal on merits that the petitioner was granted bail. This power cannot in any way be compared in quality to the order-in-default which the Court passes under S. 167(2)(a) of the Cr.P.C. Mr. George then relies upon a judgment of Saldanha J. in the case of Asstt. Collector of Customs (P) v. Madam Ayado Atanda Ciadipo Orisan, reported in : 54(1982)CLT369 . The facts of the case and the submission relied upon by Mr. George appear in headnote (b), which reads as follows (at page 2352 (of Cri LJ)) :-

'In case of drug trafficking the accused a foreign lady was granted bail before filing the charge-sheet ....... Bail was not availed of. The charge sheet was filed. The question arose if the earlier order or bail survived even after the charge sheet, was filed. Held, in the negative. It was clear that when the initial bail order was passed even if that order had been availed of, that the order was to be effective only until the filing of the complaint, one enters a different stage of the proceeding and even if the accused was on bail at that point of time, it would have been essential for her to be released on bail by the Court once again, the earlier order having exhausted itself. The bail order of 8-6-1987 would, therefore, be an order that was current or an order that was capable of being availed of only until such time as the filing of the complaint, since under the relevant provisions of law on the filing of the complaint the Court has to enter into a de novo consideration with regard to whether the accused should be released on bail or whether the accused should be taken into custody. It follows that the life of the earlier order whether availed of or not availed of is only of a limited duration up to that point of time. Therefore, in these circumstances, it was unnecessary for the Court to have passed an order for revocation of bail under S. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before proceeding further when the complaint was filed. Such an order would only have been necessary if the prosecution applied for revocation of the order of bail passed on 9-6-1987 on the ground that the accused had given cause for revocation of that order.'

With respect to the learned Judge, these observations are in direct conflict with the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Seoti' case (supra). Even at the pre-charge sheet or pre-complaint stage, the Court to which an application for bail is made and which grants bail, acts upon the material available. In cases under the NDPS Act, 1985, especially those to which the disabling provisions of S. 37 of the Act apply, the Court takes the caution to hear both the parties and take into consideration all the relevant factors before granting bail. This being the position, it would be difficult to agree with the observations of Saldanha J. that an order of bail passed before the filing of the complaint exhausts itself once a complaint is filed, at which stage the Court taking cognizance can apply itself afresh to whether the person accused should be allowed to continue at liberty or be taken into custody. This is of course not to say that in appropriate cases, the prosecution cannot apply for cancellation of bail. Such a power is specifically vested in the High Court or the Court of Session under S. 439(2) of the Code. So far as the present case is concerned, that chance was already taken by the respondent when it moved Criminal Application No. 828 of 1992. Somehow Judge Ghare persuaded himself to believe that the High Court while affirming the order of Judge Gupta was acting in a perfunctory manner. With respect to the learned Judge, he should have been careful of the words he was using when describing an order of the High Court. When the High Court confirms an order passed by the lower Court, it does not cease to be a High Court; nor does it exercise a higher jurisdiction when instead of confirming the order of a lower Court, it passes an order on a substantive application made to itself. In both the cases, it is the High Court which is acting and the Courts subordinate to the High Court are not at liberty to intervene, and, set right, what they believe to be the shortcomings of the order of the High Court. If there existed a case for cancellation of bail even after the merits had been appraised by Judge Gupta and the High Court when dealing with the application for cancellation, the respondent should have been left to find his remedies in an appropriate forum. That appropriateness was certainly not in the Court presided over by Judge Ghare.

8. Learned Counsel Mr. George has referred to a number of circumstances which according to him have come to light at a subsequent stage and which show the petitioner to be engaged in drug trafficking on a vast scale. I will not go into this aspect of the matter, unless it be upon an application for cancellation of bail. That application also would have to be dealt with in the manner recommended by the Supreme Court in Vikramjit Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in : 1992CriLJ516 . The facts and observations of this case are instructive on the subject and therefore, I shall deal with the said decision in some detail. Vikramjit Singh was an accused in a murder case. He had applied for bail to the trial Court which rejected the application. Thereafter he moved the High Court which Court dismissed the application with an observation that he could renew the prayer after the submission of the report of the Police Officer on completion of the investigation. After the charge sheet was filed, Vikramjit Singh and two others renewed the prayer before the Sessions Judge, who again rejected the claim for bail. Vikramjit thereafter moved the High Court with another application, which came up before B. C. Varma J. Justice Varma on 6-7-1990 directed Vikramjit to be released on bail. Another accused Dharmendra Kumar Sharma approached the High Court for bail and his application was placed before G. C. Gupta J. G. C. Gupta, J. made an order in favour of Dharmendra Kumar Sharma, but observed that some of the other accused including Vikramjit did not deserve to be enlarged on bail and that the State should apply for cancellation of bail granted to the said persons including Vikramjit Singh. The State filed a petition for cancellation of the bail order passed by Justice Varma. In this application no additional facts were stated. The petition for cancellation was founded on the observations of Mr. Justice Gupta. Justice Gupta cancelled the earlier order of Judge Varma and while doing so, made strong remarks in re grant of bail in similar cases. That order of Mr. Justice Gupta was challenged by a S.L.P. before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remarked (at page 517 (of Cri LJ)) :-

'It appears that the learned Judge while passing the impugned order, failed to appreciate that no Bench can comment on the functioning of a co-ordinate Bench of the same Court, much less sit in judgment as an appellate Court over its decision. If the State was aggrieved by the order of bail by Mr. Justice B. C. Varma it could have approached this Court but that was not done. The judgment of Mr. Justice B. C. Varma therefore became final so far as the High Court was concerned.'

The Supreme Court accepted the possibility of the person bailed, misusing his liberty or new material coming to light which could have furnished a ground for cancellation of bail. Even so it deprecated the practice of forum-shopping, observing -

'It must be, therefore, held that Mr. Justice Gupta had no authority to upset the earlier order of the High Court. That which could not be done directly could also not be done indirectly. Otherwise, a party aggrieved by an order passed by one Bench of the High Court would be tempted to accept to get the matter reopened before another Bench, and there would not be any end to such attempts. Besides, it was not consistent with the judicial discipline which must be maintained by Courts both in the interest of administration of justice by assuring the binding nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary.'

Making it clear that the State was at liberty to make a prayer for cancellation of the bail on the ground of objectionable conduct on the part of the appellant or any other fresh relevant material, which could be a permissible ground for cancellation of bail, the Court said -

'But, in such a case it will be highly desirable for the Chief Justice of the High Court to hear the case himself or assign it to some other Judge who had not earlier dealt with the present matter.'

In the instant case Judge Ghare purports to set at naught the order passed by Judge Gupta and also the High Court. He had no jurisdiction to set aside either order. If it were held otherwise, there would be anarchy in the administration of justice.

9. The result of the foregoing discussion is a quashing of that part of the order of the Special Court which directs that the petitioner be taken into custody and held in detention pending the trial. The petitioner shall continue to be on bail unless the said bail is cancelled upon a properly moved application and which application shall be to an appropriate Court, having regard to the observations made above. In substitution of issue process order by a non-bailable warrant, the Special Judge may issue another process inclusive of permitting appearance by the petitioner of his own accord. Rule in these terms is made absolute.

Order accordingly.