Emperor Vs. Usman Haroon - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
criminal procedure code (act v of 1898), section 526-transfer of case-apprehension of accused-sentence, elements to be considered in imposing-standardisation of sentences-bombay city police act (bom. iv of 1902), section 33-bombay act xv of 1946, section 4-legislature fixing maximum and minimum sentences.;the high court will direct the transfer of a case, under section 526 of the criminal procedure code, 1898, apart from the susceptibilities of the accused, if cirumstances do exist or events have happened, which are calculated to create in the mind of the accused the reasonable apprehension that he will not be fairly treated at the trial.;in re pandurang (1900) 2 bom. l.r. 755 and queen-empress v. hyderally, (1894) unrep. cr. c. 685 referred to.;the court in fixing the punishment for any particular crime must take into consideration the nature of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, the degree of deliberation shown by the offender, the provocation which he has received, if the crime is one of violence, the antecedents of the prisoner up to the time of sentence, his age and character. all these points must be established by evidence.;observations on standardisation of sentences when the legislature has fixed both the maximum and minimum sentences. - - we also note that the chief presidency magistrate has sent a copy of our judgment containing our criticism with regard to the variety of sentences for the same offence to all his magistrates and that the magistrates have now the question of evolving a system for these sentences well before them. in our opinion that submission is not well founded. it may well be that in levelling out the work they may go to the board of some other magistrate, or it may be that the learned magistrate, mr, barot, may himself ask to be relieved of them.leonard stone, kt., c.j.1. the report of the chief presidency magistrate which we called for by our judgment of december 20, 1946, has now been received and by it and by a circular which has been issued by the chief presidency magistrate to all his magistrates it appears that new arrangements have been made for the distribution of magisterial work arising out of the disturbances and that there will now be three magistrates at the esplanade police court whose duty it will be to try these cases. the cases will go into the lists of these three magistrates, on a rotation basis depending entirely upon the day upon which any particular case first happens to come before the court. in our opinion that is a very satisfactory arrangement. we also note that the chief presidency magistrate has sent a copy of our judgment containing our criticism with regard to the variety of sentences for the same offence to all his magistrates and that the magistrates have now the question of evolving a system for these sentences well before them.2. we are asked by mr. peerbhoy and mr. parpia who represent the six accused in these transfer applications that in spite of the withdrawal of the allegation of actual bias against mr. barot and our exoneration of him, these cases should still be transferred, on the ground that the whole of the circumstances which have come to light in the investigation of this matter must have introduced into the minds of the accused a feeling that they could never get a fair trial before this magistrate. in our opinion that submission is not well founded. these applications, as we have already stated, have served a very useful purpose, but it is now quite clear that in view of our previous judgment these six accused persons will get before whichever magistrate their cases may come a full and proper trial. we do not know what will happen to these six cases in the new distribution of magisterial business which the chief presidency magistrate's report informs us has been made. it may well be that in levelling out the work they may go to the board of some other magistrate, or it may be that the learned magistrate, mr, barot, may himself ask to be relieved of them. but in the circumstances and in view of the directive and guidance given by our judgment there no longer exists any reason why we should interfere judicially. we leave the matter to the chief presidency magistrate. the rule in each case is discharged.