Prakashnarayan Shaktia Vs. Hotel Corporation of India Limited and Another - Court Judgment

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arbitration - jurisdiction - sections 3, 28, 28 (2) and 30 of arbitration act, 1940 - petition to set aside arbitration award - second respondent sent abroad for training - petitioner signed as guarantor - in breach of agreement second respondent did not report after completion of training - arbitrator awarded damages against petitioner as guarantor - award is non-speaking award and it can be set aside if there is error of law on face thereof - there is no error of law on face of award since no erroneous proposition of law has been set out in award which has been made as basis thereof - it is not possible to interfere with same - whether all kinds of disputes inclusive of arbitrator's jurisdiction come within purview of arbitration clause or not primarily depends upon terms of clause itself - it cannot be said that arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide about his own jurisdiction - decision of arbitrator on issue of jurisdiction is subject to final decision by court - where parties have agreed to extend time for making award arbitrator has power to enlarge time - petitioner having signed agreement willingly without and pressure and force from first respondent it is not possible to hold arbitration agreement as unconscionable - petition dismissed and decree in terms of award passed. - - according to the petitioner, the petitioner in good faith and on the basis of the representations made by the said raghavendra kulkarni and the 2nd respondent, signed at the place shown by the 2nd respondent. 5. on 22nd may, 1989, the 2nd respondent was sent to germany for training and after completion of his training abroad, the 2nd respondent was to report to the 1st respondent at bombay on 17th december, 1990 but he failed to do so without assigning any reason. the 2nd respondent committed breach of his obligations under the said agreement and as provided in clause 12 thereof, the petitioner, as guarantor for the 2nd respondent, had agreed and undertook that if the 2nd respondent failed to perform any of his duties or obligations contained therein, the petitioner would indemnify the 1st respondent against any loss, damage, costs, charges and expenses which might be suffered by the 1st respondent by reason of the breach of the obligations on the part of the 2nd respondent. as recorded in the award itself, which fact is not in dispute, with the consent of the parties, the time to make the award was extended upto 31st august, 1992. 7. before the arbitrator, the petitioner contended that as the 1st respondent did not lead any evidence, the 1st respondent had failed to prove its claim. it is also challenged on the ground that the findings of the arbitrator rejecting the contention of the petitioner that his signatures were obtained fraudulently and by making misrepresentations are bad in law. tulzapurkar further submitted that the arbitration clause contained in the said agreement is totally one sided and unconscionable and hence, it did not bind the petitioner and as such, the purported appointment of the arbitrator by the 1st respondent made unilaterally and without consent of the petitioner was bad in law and consequently, the award being illegal is vitiated. it is lastly submitted that the award has been made beyond the time since the arbitrator entered upon the reference on 27th march, 1992 and became fungus officio on 26th july, 1992 and as such, is bad in law, it having been made on 27th august, 1992. 9. mr. needless to state that when the arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the disputes between the parties, an award is not open to challenge on the ground that the arbitrator reached a wrong conclusion or failed to appreciate the facts. the supreme court has further observed that -in the recent times, error in law and fact in passing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expending the import and implication on 'legal misconduct' of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration. there has neither been irrational conduct on the part of the arbitrator nor there was failure on the part of the arbitrator to apply judicious mind.s. m. jhunjhunuwala, j.1. by this petition, the petitioner seeks to have the award dated 29th august, 1992 filed in this court and numbered as award no. 114 of 1992 set aside and supersession of the arbitration agreement contained in agreement dated 12th april, 1989. 2. the petitioner has been in the employment of 1st respondent and, at the material tunes, was working in the engineering department thereof. the 2nd respondent was also in the employment of the 1st respondent. one raghavendra kulkarni was working in th engineering department of the 1st respondent where at the petitioner, at all material times, was also working. according to the petitioner, being in the same department, the petitioner knew the said raghavendra kulkarni. the 2nd respondent was a friend of the said raghavendra kulkarni. 3. it is the case of the petitioner that in or around the month of march, 1989, the petitioner was informed by the said raghavendra kulkarni that the 2nd respondent was selected by the 1st respondent for training abroad and was in need of a character certificate which the said raghavendra kulkarani had agreed to give him. the said raghavendra kulkarni inquired of the petitioner whether the petitioner would witness the papers which were required to be executed between the respondents. according to the petitioner, the petitioner answered the query in the affirmative and on or about 12th april, 1989, the 2nd respondent came to the said raghavendra kulkarni and asked him to sign some papers who signed the same. it is also the case of the petitioner that the said raghavendra kulkarni, thereafter accompanied by the 2nd respondent approached the petitioner and informed the petitioner that he had issued a character certificate and requested the petitioner to witness certain papers. according to the petitioner, the petitioner in good faith and on the basis of the representations made by the said raghavendra kulkarni and the 2nd respondent, signed at the place shown by the 2nd respondent. the petitioner believed the representations made by the 2nd respondent and the said raghavendra kulkarni without reading or knowing the contents of the papers and only when the petitioner was served with the papers in the matter of arbitration, the petitioner, on going through the papers, learnt that this signatures were taken on an agreement purporting to name the petitioner as guarantor therein. it is also the case of the petitioner that on perusal of the said agreement and the claim of the 1st respondent against the petitioner in arbitration, the petitioner realised the fraud which, according to the petitioner, was perpetrated by the 2nd respondent along with the said raghavendra kulkarni and that the signatures of the petitioner were fraudulently obtained by misrepresentation on the said agreement. in the arbitration commenced by the 1st respondent against the 2nd respondent and the petitioner on the basis of the arbitration agreement contained in the said agreement the award has been made by which the 2nd respondent and the petitioner have been jointly and severally directed to pay to the 1st respondent the net sum of rs. 1,81,910/- within a period of go days from the date thereof with interest at the rate of 14.5% per annum from the date of the award to the date of the decree. the costs of the arbitration determined at rs. 5,000/- has also been directed to be paid to the 2nd respondent. the said award has been filed in the court and has been challenged by the petitioner. though the 2nd respondent is a party to the petition, as per the order passed on 27th august, 1996, the petition as against the 2nd respondent has been dismissed for want of prosecution. the 2nd respondent has also been directed under the award to make payment of the amounts awarded to the 1st respondent since the liability of the petitioner and the 2nd respondent, as determined by the arbitrator, is held to be joint and/or several. the 2nd respondent has not challenged the said award. 4. there is no dispute as regards the execution by the petitioner of the agreement dated 12th april, 1989, a copy whereof is annexed as exhibit h-1 to the petition. under the said agreement; the 2nd respondent was sent abroad for practical training and/or study and the 1st respondent had agreed to grant him facilities for that purpose on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. as provided in the said agreement, in consideration of the premises and at the request of the 2nd respondent the petitioner guaranteed to the 1st respondent the due performance by the 2nd respondent of his duties and obligations set out thereunder and further agreed to indemnity and keep indemnified the 1st respondent against any loss or damages which might be caused to or suffered by the 1st respondent by reason of any breach by the 2nd respondent of any of the obligations contained therein. the 1st respondent had agreed to provide to and fro air-passage to the 2nd respondent. the boarding and lodging for the 2nd respondent was agreed to be arranged by the 1st respondent, the monetary value thereof was quantified at 420 dm per month. it was also provided in the said agreement that during the period of training, the 2nd respondent would be paid a total stipend of 800 dm per month and that out of the stipend, the deduction of 420 dm per month would be made leaving a balance of 380 dm per month for the 2nd respondent. immediately on completion of his training abroad, the 2nd respondent was to return to india and was to serve the 1st respondent for a period of 5 years commencing from the date of such return to india. the service by the 2nd respondent for the period of 5 years with the 1st respondent as provided in the said agreement was a condition precedent to the facilities for the foreign training and/or studying and benefits conferred on the 2nd respondent by the 1st respondent. 5. on 22nd may, 1989, the 2nd respondent was sent to germany for training and after completion of his training abroad, the 2nd respondent was to report to the 1st respondent at bombay on 17th december, 1990 but he failed to do so without assigning any reason. the 2nd respondent committed breach of his obligations under the said agreement and as provided in clause 12 thereof, the petitioner, as guarantor for the 2nd respondent, had agreed and undertook that if the 2nd respondent failed to perform any of his duties or obligations contained therein, the petitioner would indemnify the 1st respondent against any loss, damage, costs, charges and expenses which might be suffered by the 1st respondent by reason of the breach of the obligations on the part of the 2nd respondent. since, according to the 1st respondent, by reason of the breach of the obligations committed by the 2nd respondent, the 1st respondent suffered loss and/ or damages to the extent of rs. 1,81,910/-, the petitioner, as guarantor under the said agreement, became liable to pay the said sum of rs. 1,81,910/- to the 1st respondent. 6. clause 16 of the said agreement which incorporated the arbitration agreement between the parties to refer the dispute to sole arbitrator reads as under : '16. any dispute arising between the parties hereto shall be referred to the sole arbitration of a nominee of hotel corporation of india ltd., whose decision shall be final and binding upon the parties. the venue of such arbitration shall be in bombay.' accordingly, by letter dated 21st november, 1991 the 1st respondent appointed one mw deshmukh as the sole arbitrator for redressal of the dispute which arose between the 1st respondent on the one hand and the petitioner and 2nd respondent on the other hand since the liability in respect of the amount claimed by the 1st respondent from the petitioner was denied by the petitioner. in the preliminary meeting held on 5th march, 1992, the arbitrator gave directions for filing the statement of claims. the 1st respondent accordingly submitted its statement of claims on 27th march, 1992 along with the annexures thereto before the arbitrator. the petitioner submitted his reply to the statement of claims on 26th june, 1992. on 31st july, 1992, the petitioner examined himself before the arbitrator. the arbitrator held various meetings during which the petitioner and the 1st respondent submitted documents for consideration by the arbitrator and the arguments by the learned counsel representing the parties were advanced. as recorded in the award itself, which fact is not in dispute, with the consent of the parties, the time to make the award was extended upto 31st august, 1992. 7. before the arbitrator, the petitioner contended that as the 1st respondent did not lead any evidence, the 1st respondent had failed to prove its claim. the said contention of the petitioner was rejected by the arbitrator since the documents on which the 1st respondent put reliance to prove its claim were taken on record by consent of the petitioner and were marked as exhibits c-2 to c-7 in the proceedings before the arbitrator. before the arbitrator, the petitioner did not deny the execution of the said agreement. the petitioner contended that the petitioner had signed the said agreement as a witness and not as a guarantor and that too at the insistence of the 2nd respondent. this contention of the petitioner was not accepted by the arbitrator. the petitioner is an educated and literate person, serving in the engineering department of the centaur hotel, juhu, of the 1st respondent. as rightly held by the arbitrator, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner blindly signed the said agreement without reading the contents thereof and only on the basis of the alleged misrepresentation alleged to have been made by the 2nd respondent. the petitioner having signed and executed the said agreement knowing the contents thereof, was bound by the obligations contained therein. it is significance to note that though the petitioner has contended that his signature was obtained by reason of misrepresentation and that he signed the said agreement without understanding the contents thereof; the petitioner has not only subscribe his signature on the last page of the said agreement at the place shown as guarantor but has also put his initials on every page of the said agreement. moreover, as per the statements made in the petition, more particularly in sub-para (d) of paragraph 2 thereof, no one on behalf of the 1st respondent was present when the petitioner signed the papers at the behest of the 2nd respondent, and therefore in no event, the 1st respondent can be said to be a party to the alleged misrepresentation or fraud alleged to have been committed on the petitioner. despite the fact that no particulars of the alleged fraud allegedly committed on the petitioner are given in the petition, in the facts of the case, it is not possible to hold that by reason of fraud or misrepresentation allegedly played on the petitioner, the petitioner was made to sign the said agreement and as such, the petitioner is not bound by the obligations of the petitioner contained therein. 8. the said award has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the arbitrator wrongly disbelieved the oral evidence of the petitioner though no evidence in rebuttal on behalf of the 1st respondent was led. it is also challenged on the ground that the findings of the arbitrator rejecting the contention of the petitioner that his signatures were obtained fraudulently and by making misrepresentations are bad in law. mr. tulzapurkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide about the legality or validity of the agreement containing the arbitration clause since, in the submission of the learned counsel, the arbitrator could not clothe himself with the power to decide about his own jurisdiction which could be decided by the court alone. it is further submitted that the arbitrator misconducted himself and the proceedings by acting in excess of jurisdiction and that the award made by the arbitrator is without application of mind. it is also submitted that the award is vitiated by reason of misconduct of the proceedings in making the award as there was no material or evidence to justify the claim of the respondent. the learned counsel further submitted that there is error apparent on the face of the award in awarding rs. 1,69,920/- by way of expenses allegedly incurred by the 1st respondent on the 2nd respondent more particularly when no material document has been placed before the arbitrator to establish the claim of the 1st respondent in respect thereof. mr. tulzapurkar further submitted that the award is perverse as large claim has been allowed without evidence. mr. tulzapurkar further submitted that the arbitration clause contained in the said agreement is totally one sided and unconscionable and hence, it did not bind the petitioner and as such, the purported appointment of the arbitrator by the 1st respondent made unilaterally and without consent of the petitioner was bad in law and consequently, the award being illegal is vitiated. it is lastly submitted that the award has been made beyond the time since the arbitrator entered upon the reference on 27th march, 1992 and became fungus officio on 26th july, 1992 and as such, is bad in law, it having been made on 27th august, 1992. 9. mr. kamdar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, has supported the award and has submitted that the award is proper, legal, valid, and binding on the parties to the arbitration; that the said agreement dated 12th april, 1989 was signed and executed by the petitioner, the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent which contained an agreement for referring any dispute arising thereunder to arbitration as provided therein and since the disputes arose between the parties under the said agreement were within the ambit and scope of the arbitration agreement entered into between the parties; the same were justifiably referred to arbitration by the 1st respondent, that the reference to arbitration was made by the 1st respondent vide its letter dated 21st november, 1991 and since the time to make the award was extended by mutual consent as mentioned in the award itself till 31st august, 1992 the award made on 27th august, 1992 was within the time; that the arbitration agreement entered into between the parties authorised the 1st respondent to appoint a sole arbitrator and in the facts of the case, the petitioner being a guarantor for the 2nd respondent, there was no question of any bargaining power between the petitioner and the 1st respondent more particularly when the 1st respondent had not asked the petitioner to sign and/or execute the said guarantee who had voluntarily agreed to give the same and voluntarily agreed to sign the said agreement containing the said arbitration agreement and as such, was bound by the same. mr. kamdar further submitted that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to him for arbitration and the question of fraud or misrepresentation as now contended by the petitioner did not arise. it is further submitted that even as per the petitioner, the alleged misrepresentation was made by the raghavendra kulkarni and that the petitioner has not stated that any fraud or misrepresentation was played or made by the 1st respondent or any person on behalf of the 1st respondent. mr. kamdar further submitted that there is no substance in any of the challenges to the award, and that the arbitrator has neither misconducted himself nor the proceedings before him. it is further submitted that the award is not perverse nor it is based on no evidence. it is also submitted that it is not for this court to consider the quantity or quality of the evidence led before the arbitrator since this court is not sitting in appeal over the award. 10. the award is a non-speaking award. the ambit and scope of challenge to an award under section 30 of the arbitration act, 1940 (for short, 'the act') has now been circumscribed by the catena of decisions of the supreme court, our court and other high courts. an award is not vulnerable to any challenge thereto. needless to state that when the arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the disputes between the parties, an award is not open to challenge on the ground that the arbitrator reached a wrong conclusion or failed to appreciate the facts. the arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality and quantity of the evidence and it will not be open for the court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence before the arbitrator. once there is no dispute as to the contract, what is the interpretation of that contract is a matter for the arbitrator on which the court cannot substitute its own decision. if on the view taken of a contract, the decision of arbitrator on certain amounts awarded is a plausible view though perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court. no doubt, an award can be set aside if the arbitrator misconducts himself or the proceedings before him or proceeds beyond his jurisdiction. however, there is distinction between a dispute as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the dispute as to in what way the jurisdiction should be exercised. a distinction has to be drawn between an error within the jurisdiction and an error in excess of jurisdiction. the arbitrator's award is generally considered binding between the parties since he is the tribunal selected by the parties. as held by the supreme court in the case of bijendranath srivastava v. mayank srivastava : air1994sc2562 , the court should approach an award with a desire to support it, if that is reasonably possible,.rather than to destroy it by calling it illegal. 11. on the questions of fact determined by the arbitrator, the conclusions arrived at by the arbitrator are final and binding on the parties. however, mr. tulzapurkar has put reliance on the judgment of the supreme court in the case of state of rajasthan v. puri construction company ltd. : (1994)6scc485 , where, in paragraph 31, the supreme court has observed that as reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substantial amount has increased in recent times, the courts were impelled to have a fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award by the arbitrator so that the award does not get undesirable immunity. the supreme court has further observed that - 'in the recent times, error in law and fact in passing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expending the import and implication on 'legal misconduct' of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration.' as rightly submitted by mr. kamdar, the above observations made by the supreme court are general in nature and so far as the facts of the instant case are concerned, the same have no applicability. in the instant case, the award is a non-speaking award and it can be set aside or interfered with if there is an error of law on the face thereof. since there is no error of law on the face of the award, it is not possible to interfere with the same or to set it aside on the basis of above general observations made by the supreme court. 12. the arbitration clause as contained in the said agreement provides that any dispute arising between the parties thereto could be referred to sole arbitration of a nominee of the 1st respondent. the word 'any' will have the same significance and/or amplitude as the words 'arising out of or 'in relation to' or 'in connection with' and will cover all disputes arising under the said agreement between the parties thereto, including the dispute as to the existence of jurisdiction of the arbitrator. in the case of renusagar power company ltd. v. general electric company : [1985]1scr432 , the supreme court has held that whether all kinds of disputes inclusive of arbitrator's jurisdiction come within the scope or purview of arbitration clause or not primarily depends upon the terms of the clause itself, it is a question of what a party intends to provides and what language they employ. expressions such as 'arising out of or 'in respect of' or 'in connection with' or 'in relation to' or 'in consequence of or 'concerning' or 'relating to the contract' have the widest amplitude and contains and include even the questions as to the existence, validity and effect of the arbitration agreement. ordinarily, as a rule, arbitrator cannot clothe himself with the power to decide the question of his own jurisdiction but there is nothing to prevent the parties from investing him with the power to decide those questions. in the case of u.p. rajkiya nirman nigam ltd. v. indure pvt. ltd. : [1996]2scr386 , the supreme. court has held that the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement shall be finally decided by the court alone. the arbitrators, therefore, have no power or jurisdiction to decide or adjudicate conclusively by themselves the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement since it is the very foundation on which the arbitrators proceed to adjudicate the dispute. hence, the power of the arbitrators to decide in the given case their own jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute is not wholly taken away but is subject to final decision by the court and as such, it cannot be said that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide about his own jurisdiction. however, the decision of the arbitrator on the issue of jurisdiction was not conclusive. in the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly in view of the fact that the said agreement entered between the parties was a legal and binding agreement containing a clause for reference of any dispute arising thereunder to arbitration, the arbitrator had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim of the 1st respondent against the petitioner and the 2nd respondent and the arbitrator rightly, justly and properly exercised the jurisdiction in entertaining the claim of the 1st respondent against the petitioner and the 2nd respondent. 13. it is correct that the arbitrator entered upon the reference on 27th march 1992 and the award has been made on 27th august, 1992, however, as recorded in the award itself, by mutual consent of the parties, the time to make the award was extended till 31st august, 1992. mr. tulzapurkar has submitted that as per first schedule to the act the award was required to be made within four months of the arbitrator entering upon the reference and as there has been no provision in the arbitration agreement to extend that time, the consent of the parties for extending the time was immaterial since the court alone could have extended the time to make the award. in the submission of mr. tulzapurkar, though time to make the award was extended by the arbitrator by consent of the parties, it was without jurisdiction and as such, the award is invalid. in support of his submission, mr. tulzapurkar has put reliance on the judgment of the supreme court in the case of state of punjab v. hardayal : [1985]3scr649 . in that case, it has been held by the supreme court - 'a perusal of sections 3 and 28 and clause 2 of schedule i indicates that it is open to the parties to an arbitration agreement to fix the time within which the arbitrator must give award, but it has to be so stated in the agreement itself if per chance no time has been specified by the parties in the arbitration agreement, then by virtue of operation of section 3 read with clause 3 of the first schedule the award must be given within four months of the arbitrator entering on the reference or after having called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement or within such extended time as the court may allow ....................... sub-section (2) of section 28 also makes it evident that the court alone has the power to extend time.' however, in the very judgment, the supreme court has also held that - 'sub-section (1) of section 28 is very wide and confers full discretion on the court to enlarge time for making the award at any time.' it is further held by the supreme court that the clause in the arbitration agreement giving the arbitrator agreement giving the arbitrator power to enlarge time shall be void and of no effect except when all the parties consent to such enlargement. therefore, as held by the supreme court, with the consent of the parties, time to make the award can be enlarged. it is not open to arbitrators at their own pleasure without consent of the parties to the agreement to enlarge time for making the award. in the case of hindustan steel works construction ltd. v. c. rajasakhar rao : [1987]3scr653 , on which reliance has been placed by mr. kamdar, the supreme court has in terms held that the parties can also extend time by consent. it is further held - 'by sub-section (2) of section 28 the arbitrator gets jurisdiction to enlarge time for making the award only in a case where after entering on the arbitration, the parties to arbitration agreement to such enlargement of time.' the judgment of the supreme court in the case of state of punjab v. hardayal, (supra) was considered in the case of hindustan steel works construction ltd. mr. justice sabyasachi mukherji speaking for the bench held that the observations made in the case of state of punjab v. hardayal (supra) are out of context. the supreme court further held - 'the policy of law to that the arbitration proceedings should not be unduly prolonged. the arbitrator therefore has to give the award within the time prescribed or such extended time as the court concerned may in its discretion extend and the court alone has been given the power to extend the time for giving the award .......... but the court has to exercise its discretion in a judicial manner. the supreme court further held that - 'the arbitrator gets the jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award only in a case where after entering on arbitration the parties to arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement of time.' therefore, where the parties have agreed to have the time extended by consent the arbitrator has the power to enlarge the time. in the instant case, as aforesaid, the parties did agree to extend the time by consent and accordingly, the arbitrator rightly. legally and validly extended she time to make and publish the award till 31st august, 1992. 14. the arbitration agreement did provide that the dispute between the parties could be referred to the sole arbitrator of a nominee of the 1st respondent. such a clause contained in the said agreement was not unusual. in number of cases, the government officers are given power to appoint any person as arbitrator. in the case of lic of india v. consumer education & research centre : air1995sc1811 , on which reliance has been placed by mr. kamdar, the supreme court has observed that the doctrine of unconscionable contract is based on certain principles. reference has been made to the case of lloyds bank ltd. v. bundy (1970) 3 all er 757, where inequality of the bargaining power was enunciated by lord denning, m.r. and held that - 'one who enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity the one who stipulates for unfair advantage may be moved solely by his own self interest, unconscious of the distress he is bringing to the other ................... one who is in extreme need may knowingly consent to a most improvident bargain, solely to relieve that strain in which he finds himself. it would not be meant to suggest that every transaction is saved independent advice. but the absence of it may be fatal.' in paragraph 47 of the judgment, the supreme court has held as under : 'it is, therefore, the settled law that if a contract or a clause in a contract is found unreasonable or unfair or irrational, one must look to the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties. in dotted line contracts; there would be no occasion for a weaker party to bargains or to assume to have equal bargaining power. he has either to accept or leave the services or goods in terms of the dotted line contract. his option would be to either accept the unreasonable or unfair terms or forego the service for ever. with a view to have the services of the goods, the party enters into a contract with unreasonable or unfair terms contained therein and he would be left with no option but to sign the contract.' in the instant case, there was no question of any bargaining power between the petitioner and the 1st respondent. the principles as laid down by the supreme court to term a contract as unconscionable do not apply to the facts of the present case. the petitioner had signed the said agreement willingly and had given the guarantee on behalf of the 2nd respondent without any pressure or force from the 1st respondent. the petitioner had willing agreed to refer the disputes arising under the contract to arbitration in terms as provided in clause 16 thereof. it is, therefore, not possible to hold that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. 15. mr. tulzapurkar then submitted that the award is perverse since large claim was allowed without evidence and more particularly when no oral evidence was led on behalf of the 1st respondent. there is no merit in the submission made. the documents produced before the arbitrator have been considered by the arbitrator. as aforesaid, the quality and quantity of evidence is for the arbitrator to decide. the technical rules of law of evidence do not apply to the proceedings before an arbitrator. though mr. tulzapurkar, has put reliance on the case of delhi development authority new delhi v. m/s. alkaram, new delhi : air1982delhi365 , in support of his submission that if there is no evidence before an arbitrator or award is based on no evidence, the court can set aside such an award. in the facts of the case, it cannot be held that the award is based on no evidence at all. the adequacy of evidence is not to be examined by the court in the present proceedings. admittedly, six documents were produced by the 1st respondent before the arbitrator which, according to the arbitrator, were sufficient to adjudicate the claim of the 1st respondent. mr. tulzapurkar also submitted that irrational conduct on the part of the arbitrator amounted to the arbitrator misconducting himself and in support of his submission he has put reliance on the judgment of the supreme court in the case of union of india v. jain associates : [1994]3scr551 , mr. tulzapurkar submitted that when claim c was rejected by the arbitrator, the claim b of the 1st respondent should also have been rejected. mr. tulzapurkar is not right in his submission. in view of material documents being produced before the arbitrator, which have been considered by the arbitrator, the principle laid down by the supreme court in the case of jain associates has no applicability more particularly when in that case before the supreme court, material documents were produced but the arbitrator refused to look into it. such is not the situation in the present case. moreover, in my view, there is no inconsistent finding by the arbitrator. the claim c of the 1st respondent was for training given to the 2nd respondent in india prior to sending him abroad and since this claim could not be proved by the 1st respondent, which claim was independent of claim b, claim c, was not granted by the arbitrator. there is no error of law on the face of the award 'since no erroneous proposition of law has been set out in the award which has been made as the basis thereof. as regards deduction of the stipend and the submission of mr. tulzapurkar that the deduction was to be proved, which according to him was not proved, mr. kamdar has put reliance on the judgment of vyas, j. of this court in arbitration petition no. 134 of 1993 (delivered on 4th january, 1994) wherein the identical facts it has been held that on breach of the agreement the 1st respondent became entitled to receive the entire amount payable thereunder. in the appeal bearing no. 260 of 1994 preferred therefrom, the division bench of this court has, by its order dated 29th july, 1994, upheld the judgment of vyas, j. and summarily dismissed the same. in respect of claim a, it is not in dispute that 2nd respondent was sent abroad and the documents pertaining to plane tickets were produced before the arbitrator. there has neither been irrational conduct on the part of the arbitrator nor there was failure on the part of the arbitrator to apply judicious mind. taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, in my view, the petition is being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed. accordingly, the petition is dismissed with costs. in view of the dismissal of the petition. mr. kamdar applies for decree in terms of the award. under rule 787(5) of the rules of this court as applicable on its original side the court is entitled to pass the decree in terms of the award when the petition to challenge the award is dismissed. accordingly, judgment is pronounced and decree is passed in terms of the award dated 27th august, 1992 filed in this court and numbered as award no. 114 of 1992. the petitioner shall pay further interest on the principal amount of rs. 1,81,910/- at the rate of 14.5% per annum from the date hereof till payment or realisation, whichever is earlier. cc expedited. 16. petition dismissed.