Dr. Sharad Vaidya Vs. Paulo Joel Vales (deceased by L.R.'s) and others (16.06.1992 - BOMHC) - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - 8 in the aforesaid suit which is treated as preliminary issue and held that the petitioner has failed to prove that the suit filed against him and respondent no. hence the learned trial judge while upholding the contention of the then plaintiffs has committed a patent error of jurisdiction, the impugned order being thus bad and illegal. shri kholkar urged that when a patient approaches a doctor for treatment there is a contract established between him and the doctor for giving him good treatment against the payment of fees. the implications of the said ruling clearly show that the period of limitation prescribed in article 535 of the portuguese civil code and relied by the learned trial judge is applicable in this case in view of the finding arrived at by me that the liability sought to be established against the petitioner is essentially based on a tortious act allegedly committed by him as contemplated in article 2361 of the said portuguese civil code. 13. i am therefore satisfied that there is no infirmity or any error of jurisdiction committed by the learned trial judge while passing the impugned order which requires interference on the part of this court in the exercise of its revisional powers, 14. in the result there is no merit in this revision which is hereby dismissed.order1. this revision is directed against the order of the learned civil judge s.d., panaji, dated 19th july, 1989 in special civil suit no. 25/83/a whereby the learned judge has decided against the petitioner issue no. 8 in the aforesaid suit which is treated as preliminary issue and held that the petitioner has failed to prove that the suit filed against him and respondent no. 3 was barred by limitation.2. the facts of the case are that the late respondent no. 1 paulo joel vales and respondent no. 2 filed a suit against the petitioner and respondent no. 3 for compensation and damages in respect of treatment given by the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 to their deceased wife and mother santana vales. the suit was instituted on 1-3-1983 and according to the then plaintiffs the cause of action arose on 2-3-1978 which is the date of the admission of the deceased santana in respondent no. 3's hospital and continued up to 18-8-1979 which is the date of expiry of the said sahtana.3. it appears that the then, plaintiffs had taken santana for examination by the petitioner on 2-3-78 to his hospital known as vaidya hospital at panaji. at that time the petitioner advised the said santana to go to the respondent no. 3's hospital known as cancer hospital with a note addressed to one dr. dias to do the biopsy. it has been alleged by the then plaintiffs that when the biopsy was being done by dr. dias the petitioner came to the hospital, examined santana and without waiting for the results of the biopsy, prescribed that the said santana should be administered 5000 units of cobalt rays. the biopsy was done and sent to bombay for the purpose of analysis since respondent no. 3's hospital had no facilities available for analysing the biopsy. on that very day i.e. on 2-3-78 the said santana was administered by the petitioner 200 units of cobalt rays at respondent no. 3's hospital and advised to come to the hospital everyday for administration of further cobalt rays. the plaintiffs were told by the petitioner that biopsy report would be known within three to five days. accordingly the plaintiffs being laymen on the matter took santana regularly to the goa cancer hospital at dona paula between 2-3-78 to 27-3-78 during which period 3200 units of cobalt rays were administered to her. after the administration of the cobalt rays the petitioner advised santana on 3-3-78 that her teeth should be extracted and that should be also done at the goa cancer hospital. however in spite of the request made by the plaintiff no. 2 who is respondent no. 2 not to extract her teeth until the receipt of the biopsy report the petitioner on 6-3-78 forcibly removed her teeth by making santana lie on the bed and opened her mouth after which her teeth were extracted by the petitioner. on 28-3-78 a total of 3200 units of cobalt rays had already been administered and on that day the late plaintiff no. 1 was informed that the biopsy report had arrived from bombay and the same was not showing any evidence of malignancy in the concerned sections of santana's body. the plaintiffs thereupon took the said santana to tata memorial cancer hospital where she was examined by dr. l. j. d'souza who also confirmed that the biopsy report was negative and that it was not a case of cancer. subsequently the health of santana went on deteriorating and in spite of various treatments to which she was subjected and she finally expired on 18-8-79. the plaintiffs then filed a suit seeking for recovery of the actual expenses to the tune of rs. 12,000/- spent on medical treatment of the late santana and for rs. 1,00,000/- as damages along with interest at the rate of 18% from 18-8-79 till the filing of the suit.4. the suit was contested by the petitioner and respondent no. 3 after which the learned trial judge framed issues and among them issue no. 8 which was regarding the limitation pleaded by the petitioner and respondent no. 3 which was taken and tried as a preliminary issue and ultimately adjudicated against the petitioner by holding that the suit is not barred by limitation.5. shri kholkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the suit, it any, filed by the original plaintiffs should have been instituted within three years from the date of the cause of action, namely from 18-8-79 which is the date of santana's death. hence the suit ought to have been filed up to 17-8-79. the learned counsel further urged that respondents' plea that art. 535 of the portuguese civil code was applicable in this case and hence the suit could be filed within 20 or 30 years could not and should not be sustained by the learned trial judge. hence the learned trial judge while upholding the contention of the then plaintiffs has committed a patent error of jurisdiction, the impugned order being thus bad and illegal.6. shri kholkar further urged that the suit was not instituted under any provision of the portuguese civil code and the same was filed only in the year 1979 after the coming into force of the limitation act on 1-1-1964. besides the code of civil procedure was also made applicable to this state in the year 1966. he further argued that the provisions of art. 535 of the portuguese civil code would apply only when there was no specific provisions in the limitation act governing the case in question. reliance was placed by shri kholkar on the case of m/s. cadar constructions v. m/s. tara tiles, : air1984bom258 wherein it has been held that the provisions of the portuguese civil code or other codes in force in the union territory of diu, daman, goa relating to the periods of limitation are local laws within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the limitation act, 1963. they are also special laws dealing with the rights and liabilities under the codes themselves of which they form a part. hence if any cause of action arises under the portuguese law in force in the union territory, then the period of limitation for the suit based upon that cause of action will be the period mentioned in the relevant portuguese law. if, however, the relevant provision in the portuguese law has been repealed and the cause of action has arisen before the repeal of the law then notwithstanding the repeal, a suit based upon that cause of action can be filed and even in that case the relevant provision relating to the period of limitation will be the provision in the code itself. if, however, the cause of action has arisen outside the portuguese law, then the part of the law dealing with the period of limitation will not apply; on the other hand, a suit filed on the basis of the cause of action arising outside the portuguese law will be governed by the provisions of the limitation act, 1963. it was argued by shri kholkar on behalf of the petitioner that the liability sought to be enforced by the then plaintiffs against him and respondent no. 3 was at the most a contractual liability arising out of a contract deemed to be executed between the patient and the doctor when the deceased santana approached him for treatment. shri kholkar urged that when a patient approaches a doctor for treatment there is a contract established between him and the doctor for giving him good treatment against the payment of fees. therefore if such contract is to be held as existing between them the obligations and liability arising out of the contract are to be regulated by the indian contract act which came into force in this territory prior to the cause of action in the suit which admittedly occurred on 18-8-79. the indian contract act was extended to this territory on 1-12-1965.7. i am unable to accept the submissions of shri kholkar in this respect. it is indeed difficult to appreciate that when a patient goes to a doctor for treatment he intends to enter into an agreement or contract with the doctor to look after his health. the patient approaches a doctor when he is in need of medical assistance and there is no intention on the part of the patient to execute any agreement with him with regard to the treatment to be dispensed to the patient by the concerned doctor. the professional services rendered by a doctor 10 a patient treated by him does not appear to come within the purview of a contract or within the meaning of such expression as contemplated in the indian contract act. apart from that the stand taken by the petitioner in his written statement, namely, in its para 5 to the effect that when on 2-3-78 smt. santana vales approached him in the office house in the building where vaidya hospital is being run by him with a reference note from dr. m.r. de menezes mesquita of vasco-da-gama, the petitioner never treated or examined smt. santana vales as his patient and whatever care or attendance given to her was on behalf of defendant no. 2 and as a staff of its hospital is very much relevant. these pleadings of the petitioner unmistakably negotiate the case sought to be made by shri kholkar that the liability, if any, which could be enforced by the original plaintiffs against him would arise only out of a breach of a contractual obligation on his part. since the petitioner himself denies the existence of any direct dealings between him and the patient there is no question of any contract having been established between late santana vales and the petitioner. on this count alone the submission of shri kholkar with regard to the contractual liability of the petitioner is to be discarded.8. it was further contended by shri kholkar that even assuming that the petitioner's liability would arise out of any tortious act as contended by the original plaintiffs who are now respondents nos. 1 and 2 still the period of limitation for the suit relating to this act would come within the schedule of the limitation act, namely, its art. 72 which prescribes a period of one year for such suit. hence the question of the applicability of the period of limitation prescribed in article 535 of the portuguese civil code could not and did not arise in the circumstances of this case.9. shri kolwalkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents nos. 1 and 2, vehemently disputed the contention of shri kholkar that the liability sought to be enforced against the petitioner is a contractual one. he has submitted that the suit was filed by the then original plaintiffs against the petitioner and respondent no. 3 on account of a tortious act and negligence committed by the petitioner while treating the late santana vales. he has further urged that the law of torts was not codified in india and therefore we should fall back to the provisions of the portuguese civil code which in its article 2361 provides that one who violates or causes breach of third party's rights incurs an obligation to compensate the victim for ail the damages caused to him on account of own action. it was also argued by the learned counsel that article 2361 is included in part iv of the portuguese civil code which chapter has not been repealed by the goa, daman and diu (laws) regulation, 1962 dated 28th november, 1962 (hereinafter called the regulation). according to him the said regulation has saved all the existing laws in force in the territory of goa, daman and diu at the time of liberation except those which had been expressly repealed. hence article 72 of the schedule to the limitation act could not be invoked because the concerned portuguese law being still in force and not having been expressly repealed the question of the cause of action having arisen more than 3 years prior to the filing of the suit had no relevancy in this case.10. there appears to be a very valid point in these submissions of shri kolwalkar. section 4(1) of the regulation expressly prescribes that any law in force in goa, daman and din or any area thereof corresponding to any act referred to in section 3 or any part thereof shall stand repealed as from the coming into force of such act or part in goa, daman and diu or such area, as the case may be. there is no dispute that the law of torts has not been codified in india and therefore art. 2361 of the portuguese civil code which deals with tortious liability is to be held as still in force once there is nothing to show that part iv of the portuguese civil code has been repealed consequent upon the extension to the territory of goa, daman and diu of any other enactment dealing with the liability arising out of a tortious act. it is true that art. 72 of the schedule to the limitation act in its part vii refers to suits relating to torts and provides for a period of limitation of one year for suits claiming compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in the territories to which this act extends. however from the very wording of art. 72 it is clear that such provision is not to be applied in case of the liability sought to be enforced by the original plaintiff against the petitioner is not based on the breach of any act of commission or omission in respect of an enactment in force in the territory to which the limitation act exterids. here it is just a liability which is contemplated in art. 2361 inserted in part iv of the portuguese civil code which is to be deemed as still very much alive so far the same has not been repealed by any corresponding act or enactment dealing with tortious liability.11. shri kholkar has invited my attention to article 79 of the schedule which refers to compensation for an illegal, irregular or excessive distress and to which a period of limitation of one year is also prescribed. i am afraid, however, that this provision is not helping the petitioner or takes his case any further. it is not at all the case of the original plaintiffs ana nowhere it has been so stated that they arc claiming damages or compensation from the petitioner on account of any illegal or irregular or excessive distress caused to them or to the late santana vales. on the contrary the liability sought to be established is essentially based on account of crude negligence and utmost recklessness displayed by the petitioner while treating the late santana. it is purely a tortious liability which is meant to be enforced by them against the petitioner.12. reliance placed by shri kolwalkar on the case of justiniano augusto de piedade barret v. antonio vicente da fonseca, : [1979]3scr494 which has laid down 'that the laws prevailing in the territory of goa daman and diu at the time of liberation were to be held as local laws and the period of limitation prescribed in those laws was saved under section 29(1) of the limitation act and deemed to be incorporated in the schedule of the act appears to be very much to the point and is no doubt fully attracted in this case. the implications of the said ruling clearly show that the period of limitation prescribed in article 535 of the portuguese civil code and relied by the learned trial judge is applicable in this case in view of the finding arrived at by me that the liability sought to be established against the petitioner is essentially based on a tortious act allegedly committed by him as contemplated in article 2361 of the said portuguese civil code. the said provision as incorporated in part iv of the code still being in force in this state on account of not having been repealed by the extension of a corresponding legislation to this territory it is obvious that the period of limitation to file a suit based on such liability cannot be the period of limitation prescribed in the limitation act namely in its art. 72 or for that matter art. 79 of the schedule to the said act. for the same reason the period of limitation prescribed in residuary provision of art. 113 of the said schedule seems also not to be relevant in the case.13. i am therefore satisfied that there is no infirmity or any error of jurisdiction committed by the learned trial judge while passing the impugned order which requires interference on the part of this court in the exercise of its revisional powers, 14. in the result there is no merit in this revision which is hereby dismissed. rule discharged in the above terms with no orderas to costs.revision dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

1. This revision is directed against the order of the learned Civil Judge S.D., Panaji, dated 19th July, 1989 in Special Civil Suit No. 25/83/A whereby the learned Judge has decided against the petitioner issue No. 8 in the aforesaid suit which is treated as preliminary issue and held that the petitioner has failed to prove that the suit filed against him and respondent No. 3 was barred by limitation.

2. The facts of the case are that the late respondent No. 1 Paulo Joel Vales and respondent No. 2 filed a suit against the petitioner and respondent No. 3 for compensation and damages in respect of treatment given by the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 to their deceased wife and mother Santana Vales. The suit was instituted on 1-3-1983 and according to the then plaintiffs the cause of action arose on 2-3-1978 which is the date of the admission of the deceased Santana in respondent No. 3's hospital and continued up to 18-8-1979 which is the date of expiry of the said Sahtana.

3. It appears that the then, plaintiffs had taken Santana for examination by the petitioner on 2-3-78 to his hospital known as Vaidya Hospital at Panaji. At that time the petitioner advised the said Santana to go to the respondent No. 3's hospital known as Cancer Hospital with a note addressed to one Dr. Dias to do the biopsy. It has been alleged by the then plaintiffs that when the biopsy was being done by Dr. Dias the petitioner came to the Hospital, examined Santana and without waiting for the results of the biopsy, prescribed that the said Santana should be administered 5000 units of cobalt rays. The biopsy was done and sent to Bombay for the purpose of analysis since respondent No. 3's hospital had no facilities available for analysing the biopsy. On that very day i.e. on 2-3-78 the said Santana was administered by the petitioner 200 units of cobalt rays at respondent No. 3's hospital and advised to come to the hospital everyday for administration of further cobalt rays. The plaintiffs were told by the petitioner that biopsy report would be known within three to five days. Accordingly the plaintiffs being laymen on the matter took Santana regularly to the Goa Cancer Hospital at Dona Paula between 2-3-78 to 27-3-78 during which period 3200 units of cobalt rays were administered to her. After the administration of the cobalt rays the petitioner advised Santana on 3-3-78 that her teeth should be extracted and that should be also done at the Goa Cancer Hospital. However in spite of the request made by the plaintiff No. 2 who is respondent No. 2 not to extract her teeth until the receipt of the biopsy report the petitioner on 6-3-78 forcibly removed her teeth by making Santana lie on the bed and opened her mouth after which her teeth were extracted by the petitioner. On 28-3-78 a total of 3200 units of cobalt rays had already been administered and on that day the late plaintiff No. 1 was informed that the biopsy report had arrived from Bombay and the same was not showing any evidence of malignancy in the concerned sections of Santana's body. The plaintiffs thereupon took the said Santana to Tata Memorial Cancer Hospital where she was examined by Dr. L. J. D'souza who also confirmed that the biopsy report was negative and that it was not a case of cancer. Subsequently the health of Santana went on deteriorating and in spite of various treatments to which she was subjected and she finally expired on 18-8-79. The plaintiffs then filed a suit seeking for recovery of the actual expenses to the tune of Rs. 12,000/- spent on medical treatment of the late Santana and for Rs. 1,00,000/- as damages along with interest at the rate of 18% from 18-8-79 till the filing of the suit.

4. The suit was contested by the petitioner and respondent No. 3 after which the learned trial Judge framed issues and among them issue No. 8 which was regarding the limitation pleaded by the petitioner and respondent No. 3 which was taken and tried as a preliminary issue and ultimately adjudicated against the petitioner by holding that the suit is not barred by limitation.

5. Shri Kholkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the suit, it any, filed by the original plaintiffs should have been instituted within three years from the date of the cause of action, namely from 18-8-79 which is the date of Santana's death. Hence the suit ought to have been filed up to 17-8-79. The learned counsel further urged that respondents' plea that Art. 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code was applicable in this case and hence the suit could be filed within 20 or 30 years could not and should not be sustained by the learned trial Judge. Hence the learned trial Judge while upholding the contention of the then plaintiffs has committed a patent error of jurisdiction, the impugned order being thus bad and illegal.

6. Shri Kholkar further urged that the suit was not instituted under any provision of the Portuguese Civil Code and the same was filed only in the year 1979 after the coming into force of the Limitation Act on 1-1-1964. Besides the Code of Civil Procedure was also made applicable to this State in the year 1966. He further argued that the provisions of Art. 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code would apply only when there was no specific provisions in the Limitation Act governing the case in question. Reliance was placed by Shri Kholkar on the case of M/s. Cadar Constructions v. M/s. Tara Tiles, : AIR1984Bom258 wherein it has been held that the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code or other Codes in force in the Union Territory of Diu, Daman, Goa relating to the periods of limitation are local laws within the meaning of S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. They are also special laws dealing with the rights and liabilities under the Codes themselves of which they form a part. Hence if any cause of action arises under the Portuguese law in force in the Union Territory, then the period of limitation for the suit based upon that cause of action will be the period mentioned in the relevant Portuguese Law. If, however, the relevant provision in the Portuguese law has been repealed and the cause of action has arisen before the repeal of the law then notwithstanding the repeal, a suit based upon that cause of action can be filed and even in that case the relevant provision relating to the period of limitation will be the provision in the Code itself. If, however, the cause of action has arisen outside the Portuguese law, then the part of the law dealing with the period of limitation will not apply; on the other hand, a suit filed on the basis of the cause of action arising outside the Portuguese law will be governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was argued by Shri Kholkar on behalf of the petitioner that the liability sought to be enforced by the then plaintiffs against him and respondent No. 3 was at the most a contractual liability arising out of a contract deemed to be executed between the patient and the doctor when the deceased Santana approached him for treatment. Shri Kholkar urged that when a patient approaches a doctor for treatment there is a contract established between him and the doctor for giving him good treatment against the payment of fees. Therefore if such contract is to be held as existing between them the obligations and liability arising out of the contract are to be regulated by the Indian Contract Act which came into force in this Territory prior to the cause of action in the suit which admittedly occurred on 18-8-79. The Indian Contract Act was extended to this territory on 1-12-1965.

7. I am unable to accept the submissions of Shri Kholkar in this respect. It is indeed difficult to appreciate that when a patient goes to a doctor for treatment he intends to enter into an agreement or contract with the doctor to look after his health. The patient approaches a doctor when he is in need of medical assistance and there is no intention on the part of the patient to execute any agreement with him with regard to the treatment to be dispensed to the patient by the concerned doctor. The professional services rendered by a doctor 10 a patient treated by him does not appear to come within the purview of a contract or within the meaning of such expression as contemplated in the Indian Contract Act. Apart from that the stand taken by the petitioner in his written statement, namely, in its para 5 to the effect that when on 2-3-78 Smt. Santana Vales approached him in the office house in the building where Vaidya Hospital is being run by him with a reference note from Dr. M.R. de Menezes Mesquita of Vasco-da-Gama, the petitioner never treated or examined Smt. Santana Vales as his patient and whatever care or attendance given to her was on behalf of defendant No. 2 and as a staff of its hospital is very much relevant. These pleadings of the petitioner unmistakably negotiate the case sought to be made by Shri Kholkar that the liability, if any, which could be enforced by the original plaintiffs against him would arise only out of a breach of a contractual obligation on his part. Since the petitioner himself denies the existence of any direct dealings between him and the patient there is no question of any contract having been established between late Santana Vales and the petitioner. On this count alone the submission of Shri Kholkar with regard to the contractual liability of the petitioner is to be discarded.

8. It was further contended by Shri Kholkar that even assuming that the petitioner's liability would arise out of any tortious act as contended by the original plaintiffs who are now respondents Nos. 1 and 2 still the period of limitation for the suit relating to this act would come within the schedule of the Limitation Act, namely, its Art. 72 which prescribes a period of one year for such suit. Hence the question of the applicability of the period of limitation prescribed in Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code could not and did not arise in the circumstances of this case.

9. Shri Kolwalkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, vehemently disputed the contention of Shri Kholkar that the liability sought to be enforced against the petitioner is a contractual one. He has submitted that the suit was filed by the then original plaintiffs against the petitioner and respondent No. 3 on account of a tortious act and negligence committed by the petitioner while treating the late Santana Vales. He has further urged that the Law of Torts was not codified in India and therefore we should fall back to the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code which in its Article 2361 provides that one who violates or causes breach of third party's rights incurs an obligation to compensate the victim for ail the damages caused to him on account of own action. It was also argued by the learned counsel that Article 2361 is included in Part IV of the Portuguese Civil Code which Chapter has not been repealed by the Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation, 1962 dated 28th November, 1962 (hereinafter called the Regulation). According to him the said Regulation has saved all the existing laws in force in the Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu at the time of liberation except those which had been expressly repealed. Hence Article 72 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act could not be invoked because the concerned Portuguese law being still in force and not having been expressly repealed the question of the cause of action having arisen more than 3 years prior to the filing of the suit had no relevancy in this case.

10. There appears to be a very valid point in these submissions of Shri Kolwalkar. Section 4(1) of the Regulation expressly prescribes that any law in force in Goa, Daman and Din or any area thereof corresponding to any Act referred to in Section 3 or any part thereof shall stand repealed as from the coming into force of such Act or part in Goa, Daman and Diu or such area, as the case may be. There is no dispute that the Law of Torts has not been codified in India and therefore Art. 2361 of the Portuguese Civil Code which deals with tortious liability is to be held as still in force once there is nothing to show that Part IV of the Portuguese Civil Code has been repealed consequent upon the extension to the Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu of any other enactment dealing with the liability arising out of a tortious act. It is true that Art. 72 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act in its Part VII refers to suits relating to torts and provides for a period of limitation of one year for suits claiming compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in the territories to which this Act extends. However from the very wording of Art. 72 it is clear that such provision is not to be applied in case of the liability sought to be enforced by the original plaintiff against the petitioner is not based on the breach of any act of commission or omission in respect of an enactment in force in the territory to which the Limitation Act exterids. Here it is just a liability which is contemplated in Art. 2361 inserted in Part IV of the Portuguese Civil Code which is to be deemed as still very much alive so far the same has not been repealed by any corresponding Act or enactment dealing with tortious liability.

11. Shri Kholkar has invited my attention to Article 79 of the Schedule which refers to compensation for an illegal, irregular or excessive distress and to which a period of limitation of one year is also prescribed. I am afraid, however, that this provision is not helping the petitioner or takes his case any further. It is not at all the case of the original plaintiffs ana nowhere it has been so stated that they arc claiming damages or compensation from the petitioner on account of any illegal or irregular or excessive distress caused to them or to the late Santana Vales. On the contrary the liability sought to be established is essentially based on account of crude negligence and utmost recklessness displayed by the petitioner while treating the late Santana. It is purely a tortious liability which is meant to be enforced by them against the petitioner.

12. Reliance placed by Shri Kolwalkar on the case of Justiniano Augusto de Piedade Barret v. Antonio Vicente da Fonseca, : [1979]3SCR494 which has laid down 'that the laws prevailing in the Territory of Goa Daman and Diu at the time of Liberation were to be held as local laws and the period of limitation prescribed in those laws was saved under Section 29(1) of the Limitation Act and deemed to be incorporated in the Schedule of the Act appears to be very much to the point and is no doubt fully attracted in this case. The implications of the said ruling clearly show that the period of limitation prescribed in Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code and relied by the learned trial Judge is applicable in this case in view of the finding arrived at by me that the liability sought to be established against the petitioner is essentially based on a tortious act allegedly committed by him as contemplated in Article 2361 of the said Portuguese Civil Code. The said provision as incorporated in Part IV of the Code still being in force in this State on account of not having been repealed by the extension of a corresponding legislation to this Territory it is obvious that the period of limitation to file a suit based on such liability cannot be the period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act namely in its Art. 72 or for that matter Art. 79 of the Schedule to the said Act. For the same reason the period of limitation prescribed in residuary provision of Art. 113 of the said Schedule seems also not to be relevant in the case.

13. I am therefore satisfied that there is no infirmity or any error of jurisdiction committed by the learned trial Judge while passing the impugned order which requires interference on the part of this Court in the exercise of its revisional powers,

14. In the result there is no merit in this revision which is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged in the above terms with no orderas to costs.

Revision dismissed.