| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/16871 |
| Subject | Land Acquisition |
| Court | Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal CESTAT Mumbai |
| Decided On | Sep-28-1999 |
| Reported in | (2000)(115)ELT485Tri(Mum.)bai |
| Appellant | Commissioner of Central Excise |
| Respondent | Basf (India) Ltd. |
2. The departmental representative explains the reasoning and grounds in the appeal, which is the same as the basis for the notice, i.e., the pre-expanded polystyrine is not classifiable under headings specified in the condition to the notification. He also contends that this point has been elaborately explained by the Board in its letter F.No.39/93/60/89-CX, dated 12-4-1986. This letter had not been included to the notice. The departmental representative was not able to produce it.
3. Advocate for the respondent brought to our notice the trade notice 111/90, dated 5-10-1990 of the Bombay Collectorate. This trade notice explains that the benefit under Notification 53/88 would be available to final products .made out of intermediate products not falling under any of the Headings 3901 to 3915 of the Tariff, if these intermediate goods are purchased from the market. It explains that there is no requirement in the notification that it applies to integrated units only. It is very clear from this that there is not least doubt in the mind of the department that the notification would clearly apply to the cases where an intermediate product arises in the course of the manufacture of the final product (in the process of manufacture of the raw material to the finished product) the position clear. Reliance by the Advocate for the respondent on the Tribunal's decision in C.C.E. v.IDL Chemicals Ltd.Gujarat Plastic Industries v. C.C.E. -1992 (59) E.L.T. 104 that the exemption under notification cannot be denied only for the reason that an intermediate product arises in the course of manufacture of the finished excisable product is well founded; there are many other decisions to the same effect. The exemption therefore could not be denied solely for this reason. We therefore see no reason to interfere.