Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr. - Court Judgment

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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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- - 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. this would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the act. further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. the tribunal as also the high court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this court in satpal singh 2000 acj 1 (sc). the said decision has been overruled only in asha rani, 2003 acj 1 (sc). we, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy.....

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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '139998',
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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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h. baruah, j.1. heard mr. s.n. meitei, learned counsel for the appellant. also heard mr. lallianzuala sailo, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1. none appears for the respondent no. 2.2. this present appeal has been preferred by the oriental insurance co. ltd., zarkawt aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in mact case no. 74/03 by the ld. member, mact, aizawl under section 173of the motor vehicle act, 1988. by this appeal, the appellant oriental insurance co. ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.3. respondent no. 1 smt. thanmawii is the claimant in mact case no. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. respondent no. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending.....

Judgment:

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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'court' => 'Guwahati',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.

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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.

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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:

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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.

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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'court' => 'Guwahati',
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.

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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.

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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'court' => 'Guwahati',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;

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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => null,
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '139998',
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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => '',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:

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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.

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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:

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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.

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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
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		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:

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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'court' => 'Guwahati',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
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		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
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		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:

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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'court' => 'Guwahati',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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$casename_url = 'oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-thanmawii-anr'
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$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/139998/oriental-insurance-co-ltd-vs-thanmawii-anr'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
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		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.

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			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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			'court' => 'Guwahati',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'court' => 'Guwahati',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
		'sub' => ';Motor Vehicles',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '',
	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
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		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
	(int) 39 => '',
	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '139998',
			'acts' => '',
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			'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Guwahati',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
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			'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
			'judgement' => ' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">H. Baruah, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Thanmawii and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Oriental Insurance Co Ltd Vs Thanmawii and anr - Citation 139998 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '139998',
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		'appellant' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.',
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		'casename' => 'Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Thanmawii and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased.',
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		'court' => 'Guwahati',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-10-03',
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		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'H. Baruah, J.',
		'judgement' => ' </p><p>H. Baruah, J.</p><p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.</p><p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.</p><p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.</p><p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.</p><p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:</p><p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?</p><p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?</p><p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.</p><p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.</p><p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.</p><p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:</p><p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.</p><p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;</p><p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.</p><p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:</p><p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.</p><p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:</p><p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.</p><p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:</p><p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.</p><p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.</p><p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.</p><p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:</p><p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.</p><p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.</p><p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.</p><p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:</p><p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.</p><p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.</p><p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.</p><p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:</p><p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).</p><p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.</p><p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.</p><p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.</p><p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.</p><p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.</p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>H. Baruah, J.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>1. Heard Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Lallianzuala Sailo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. None appears for the respondent No. 2.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. This present appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Zarkawt Aizawl against the judgment and award dated 2.2.05, passed in MACT Case No. 74/03 by the Ld. Member, MACT, Aizawl Under Section 173of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. By this appeal, the appellant Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. seeks for setting aside and/or modification of the final award and order dated 2.2.05.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Thanmawii is the claimant in MACT Case No. 74/03 and she is the mother of the deceased Lalbiaktluanga aged about 46 years. Respondent No. 2 herein is the registered owner of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. AMZ-2459 (Tata 1210). On 28.4.03 deceased Lalbiaktluanga, while was travelling in the offending vehicle met with an accident at about 8.00 A. M. near Hunthar Veng Aizawl as a result of which the deceased died. The accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Police registered a case being Bawngkawn P.S. Case No. 317/03 Under Section 279/337/338/427/304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the said offending vehicle.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The respondent No. 1 herein on the death of her son in the said accident filed a claim petition before the MACT Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 claiming compensation to her. On filing of the claim petition this present appellant, the insurer of the offending vehicle and the owner of the offending vehicle contested the case, in other words, claim by filing written statement.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>5. The learned tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings of either party framed two issues as under:',
	(int) 7 => '<p>1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable or not?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any compensation and if so, who is liable to pay the compensation and to what extent?',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The inquiry commenced and at the conclusion of the enquiry the learned tribunal awarded compensation to the claimant (respondent No. 1) to the tune of Rs.5,32,000/-with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realization of the whole amount.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. The Oriental Insurance Company, the present appellant who had been arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in MACT Case No. 74/03 being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award filed this instant appeal challenging its legality.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. During the enquiry the respondent No. 1 in support of her claim put herself into the witness box and proved some documents which have been marked as exhibit C/1 & C/14.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. During the course of argument Mr. S.N. Meitei, learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following issues to be decided by this Court:',
	(int) 13 => '<p>(i) Whether the claim petition Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act, 1988 is maintainable in view of the income proved by the claimant-respondent No. 1.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>(ii) Whether the appellant is liable to make any compensation when the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and;',
	(int) 15 => '<p>(iii) Whether the learned tribunal was correct in applying the multiplier in the calculation of the income of the deceased.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. Admittedly, the claim petition was filed under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. The second scheduled of the M.V. Act is provided for the purpose of calculation of compensation to the claimant on the basis of the annual income either of the deceased or the injured at Rs. 40,000/-. It is submitted by Mr. Meitei that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. and in that calculation, the annual income of the deceased would be at Rs. 60,000/-. Therefore, the provisions so incorporated in second scheduled of the M.V. Act would not be applicable in the present case. Where the income of the deceased or injured is Rs. 40,000/- or less then an application Under Section 163 A of the M.V. Act is maintainable. From the judgment itself it is found that the learned tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p. m. Admittedly, when the annual income goes beyond Rs. 40,000/- this application cannot be maintained and the learned tribunal seemed to have committed error and illegality by awarding such compensation without looking into the provisions of the law. Mr. Meitei in support of this particular contention relied in a decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala reported in : [2001]2SCR999 . In para 14 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:',
	(int) 17 => '<p>14. In this context if we refer to the Review Committee's Report, the reason for enacting Section 163 A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump sum compensation under the scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal chanels. The Report of the Review 'Committee was considered by the State Governments and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made a suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the Report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with 'a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income which is more liberal and notional', i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163 A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of said criteria, schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as (1) Rs. 2000/- for funeral expenses (2) Rs. 5000/- for loss of consortium if beneficiary is the spouse (3) Rs. 2400/- for loss of estate (4) for medical expenses supported by the bill, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15000/-. Similarly, for disability in non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to accident at Rs. 15000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1/3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the said amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this Section and the second Schedule is to avoid long drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be 'no fault liability' and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai's case : [1987]3SCR404 (supra), 'in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents'. However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long drawn litigation on an predetermined formula, which is known as structured formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163 A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation of fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.',
	(int) 18 => '<p>11. Mr. Meitei further relied on the decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 51 speaks as under:',
	(int) 19 => '<p>51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/ - or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>12. Before the tribunal the application for compensation is proved and marked as exhibit C/1. From the said exhibit it is found that the claimant claimed compensation under the provisions of Section 163 A of the M.V. Act. In the context of the character of this application the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 -claimant has not shown otherwise that this application was not made Under Section 163 A, rather he has admitted that the claim was made under the provisions of Section 163 A. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also submitted that the claimant proved the income of the deceased at Rs. 5000/- and in that view of the matter, the application Under Section 163 A of the Act is not maintainable. This Court appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this context. However, he has further submitted that the respondent No. 1 will have no objection if the annual income of the deceased is reduced to Rs. 40,000/- p.a. Per contra to the submission Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the income cannot be reduced to the extent as provided under 2nd schedule of the M.V. Act when the scheme of the Act does not provide so. Mr. Meitei in support of his contention also relied on a decision in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . In para 53 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid as under:',
	(int) 21 => '<p>53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>13. Apparently the scheme provided Under Section 163A of the Act does not deserve liberal construction with a view to implementing legislative intent and the court cannot travel beyond the scope and extent as provided in the statute.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>14. From the facts appearing in the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases (supra), the application Under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be maintainable when the income of the deceased or the injured exceeds Rs. 40,000/- p.a. In our case, we have found that the annual income of the deceased stand at Rs. 60,000/- p.a. therefore, the scheme of the section is not available in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The court fully agrees with the submissions that advanced by Mr. Meitei and also equally the submissions so advanced by the counsel forthe respondent No. 1-claimant. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant that the income should be reduced to a permissible limit also cannot be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment reported in : AIR2004SC2107 . This Court, therefore, holds that this application Under Section 163 A of the Act, in view of the facts and circumstances, is not maintainable.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>15. Mr. Meitei further submits that the appellant is also cannot be fastened with liability since the deceased was a gratuitous passenger of the offending vehicle. In support of his contention Mr. Meitei has led me through the insurance policy marked as exhibit C/14. The exhibit C/14 does not say that premium had been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle in respect of such passengers and there is no evidence to that effect too. In support of his contention Mr.Meitei relied in the ratio of the case in between United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Ors. reported in : AIR2006SC1576 . In para 18 & 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that compensation to the claimant cannot be made against the insurance company when the deceased or injured is a gratuitous passenger and when the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. Para 18 & 21 of the judgment speak as under:',
	(int) 25 => '<p>18. Thus, even under the 1939 Act the established legal position was that unless there was a specific coverage of the risk pertaining to a gratuitous passenger in the policy, the insurer was not liable. We find that Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95 (1) has been eliminated while drafting Section 147 of the 1988 Act. Under Sub-section (1) (b) under the 1988 Act, compulsory policy of insurance required under the statute must now provide against any liability which may be incurred by the owner of the vehicle.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>21. In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owned no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>16. In the context of gratuitous passenger the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in 2004 ACJ 428 has held that when no premium has been paid by the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company can be directed to satisfy the award in favour of the claimant and recover the amount from the owner in execution proceeding. In such cases insurance company need not to file a separate suit.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 19, 20 & 21 laid as under:',
	(int) 29 => '<p>19. In Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been noticed that Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh 2000 ACJ 1 (SC). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claims as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner of driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>17. The same view was also adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case between Pramod Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. Mushtari Begum (Smt.) and Ors. reported in : AIR2004SC4360 . In para 12 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court speaks as under:',
	(int) 33 => '<p>12. Therefore, while upholding the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the owner the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant 1 shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle i.e. Appellant I shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured (Appellant 1).',
	(int) 34 => '<p>18. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in respect of application of the multiplier while calculating the income of the deceased. According to Mr. Meitei in case of death of the deceased like ours the multiplier in respect of the age of the claimant is required to be applied not the multiplier to be applied with the age of the deceased. The learned tribunal applied multiplier in consonance with the age of the deceased. This issue which has been pleaded by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. However, sometimes the multiplier with the consonance of the age of the claimant is taken into consideration. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-claimant submitted that the learned tribunal has not committed any error or illegality in applying the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased.',
	(int) 35 => '<p>19. The application of multiplier is seldom applied taking into the age of the claimant but generally the multiplier is used by the tribunal taking the age of the victim or the deceased. The facts and circumstances of this particular case do not warrant the application of the multiplier with regard to the age of the claimant. Learned tribunal rightly took the multiplier with regard to the age of the deceased. The argument so advanced by Mr. Meitei learned Counsel for the appellant is, therefore, not accepted.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>20. Since the issue of maintainability is decided by this Court in favour of the appellant this Court is inclined not to affirm the judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal dated 2.2.05 passed in MACT Case No. 74/01.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and award passed by the learned tribunal is accordingly set aside. However, it is made clear that since no limitation is provided for making a claim under this Act, the respondent-claimant may approach the tribunal, if so advised for grant of compensation Under Section 166 of the Act.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>21. With the above observations, this appeal is disposed of.',
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	(int) 40 => '<p>'
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