| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/128013 |
| Subject | ;Labour and Industrial |
| Court | Patna High Court |
| Decided On | Jul-02-1997 |
| Case Number | L.P.A. No. 39/1990 (R) |
| Judge | B.P. Singh and M.Y. Eqbal, JJ. |
| Acts | Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 - Sections 30 |
| Appellant | Chhaya Rani (Smt.) |
| Respondent | Dhan Devi @ Dhan Dei (Smt.) |
| Advocates: | T.K. Das and S.N. Das, Advs. |
| Disposition | Appeal dismissed |
M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. This appeal filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court arises out of a judgment dated March 17, 1990 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in M. A.No. 97 of 1986 (R), dismissing the said appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act' for short).
2. While admitting the appeal the question of maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court against the judgment of a learned Single Judge passed in appeal under Section 30 of the Act was raised and has been kept open for decision by this Court.
3. Learned Counsel for the appellant in support of maintainability of the appeal has referred a Bench decision of this Court in Gulabadei Ahir v. Union of India, 1988 PLJR 1122.
Before deciding the question of maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal it would be proper to state the relevant facts of this case. The deceased (S.C.Roy) was an employee of M/s. National Construction Company, a Contractor of M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the TELCO' for Short). Sri Roy died in course of his duty and by reason of that the TELCO in the capacity of Principal employer deposited the amount of compensation before the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation. However, both the appellant and the respondent claimed herself to be the widow of the deceased and moved before the Commissioner for payment of the compensation amount. The Commissioner, in terms of the order dated August 29, 1986 passed in W.C.A. Case No. 1 of 1980 rejected the contentions of both the appellant and the respondent and directed the appellant to obtain succession certificate within a period of six months, failing which the amount of compensation deposited will be returned to the employer.
Aggrieved by the said order the appellant movea this Court by filing Misc. Appeal No. 97 of 1986 (R) and the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dismissed the said appeal with certain observations. Hence, this L.P.Appeal.
4. I will now take up the question of maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal against the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in an appeal under Section 30 of the Act. Mr. T.K.Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that there is no specific bar under the said Act for filing a Second Appeal against the judgment passed in appeal by this Court under Section 30 of the Act. In absence of any specific bar, according to the learned Counsel then submitted that this Court entertained the Letters Patent Appeal arising out of a judgment of a learned Single Judge passed in appeal under Section 30 of the Act. Reference has been made to a decision in the case of Gulabadei Ahir (supra).
5. No one appeared on behalf of the respondents to oppose the appeal.
6. To appreciate the contention raised by the
learned Counsel, it would be useful to look into
the provision of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent
of the High Court (Patna), which reads as un
der:
' 10. And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Patna from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdic- tion, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall He to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court shall be to us, Our Heirs or successors in Our or their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.'
7. Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of the High Court (Patna) is also worth to be quoted herein-below:
'11. And we do farther ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall be Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa and from all other Courts subject to superintendence, all shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such case as were, immediately before the date of publication of these presents, subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal by virtue of any law then in force, or as may after that date be declared subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna by any law made by competent legislative authority for India.'
8. A plain reading of Clause 10 aforementioned indicates that any judgment passed by a Single Judge in appeal in exercise of original jurisdiction will be subject to an appeal in the Division Bench of the said Court, if the order passed by the Single Judge is a judgment within the meaning of that clause.
9. In the case of South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh and Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1442, the Apex Court was considering the maintainability of appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Lahore) against the judgment passed by a Single Judge in appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The provisions of Clauses lOand 11 of the Letters Patent (Lahore) and Clauses 10 and 11 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court verbatim similar. The Apex Court while interpreting Clauses 10 and 11 of the Letters Patent considered its earlier decision and held as under:
'The following legal position emerges from the said decision: A statute may give a right of appeal from an order of a Tribunal or a Court to the High Court without any limitation thereon. The appeal to the High Court will be regulated by the practice and procedure obtaining in the High Court. Under the rules made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, an appeal under Section 39 of the Act will be heard by a Single Judge. Any judgment made by the Single Judge in the said appeal will, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, be subject to an appeal to that Court. If the order made by a single Judge is a judgment and if the appropriate Legislature has expressly or by necessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal, the conclusion is inevitable that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent to the High Court. It follows that, if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent Appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the Single Judge to the High Court.'
10. In the light of principles enunciated by the Apex Court, I have to consider whether the right of further appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent has been taken away by the Legislature, either expressly or by necessary implication under the provision of Section 30 of the Act.
11. The Act, namely, the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is a social piece of legislation enacted with a view to provide speedy and expedient remedy to the dependents of the deceased workman or the workman in case of death or permanent/partial disability caused to him by accident in course of employment. The Act is complete and exhaustive code in itself and provides a detailed procedure for the purpose of disposal of claim of compensation. The Commissioner appointed under the Act is exclusive authority to determine the liability of payment of compensation and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted. For better appreciation, Section 19 of the said Act is set out herein below :
'19. Reference to Commissioners:
(1) If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation (including any question as to whether a person injured is or is not a workman) or as to the amount or duration of compensation (including any question as to the nature or extent of disablement) the question shall, in default of agreement, be settled by a Commissioner.
(2) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under this Act.'
Section 30 of the Act makes the provision for appeal against the order of the Commissioner, which reads as under;
'30. Appeals. - (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:
(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise of disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;
(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A;
(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half monthly payment;
(c) an order providing for the distribution of a compensation among the dependents of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependent;
(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; or
(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions:
Provided that no appeal shall He against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees;
Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which order the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties:
Provided further that no appeal by an employer under Clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.
(2) The period of limitation for an appeal: under this Section shall be sixty days.
(3) The provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908) shall be applicable to appeals under this Section.'
12. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid Sections, it is manifest that a very restricted right of appeal has been given to the aggrieved party against specified orders and that too for a very restricted purpose. It further says that no appeal will lie even against those specified orders unless substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. It further says that an appeal filed by the employer shall be entertained only when the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the order appealed against. Moreaver period for filing appeal has been provided in the Section itself and not as provided for an appeal to the High Court under the Limitation Act. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the jurisdiction exercised by the learned Single Judge in entertaining and hearing the appeal is a special jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by virtue of Section 30 of the Act.
13. Mr. Das learned Counsel for the appellant, put heavy reliance on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Gulabdei Ahir (supra) and submitted that a Letters Patent Appeal was entertained by this Court. On going through the judgment I found that the question of maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal was neither raised by the parties nor the learned Judges have considered the same and the judgment is silent on this question. The said decision is of no help to the appellant.
14. Having regard to the history of legislation and the limited and restricted nature of appeal expressly provided under Section 30 of the Act, I am of the view that any further right of appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge has been taken away by necessary implication. No Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent is, therefore, maintainable.
15. In the result, this appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. However, there shall be no order as to costs.