Jitmal Maheswari and anr. Vs. State of Assam - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - replacement of code number may protect the secrecy of the source of the sample and prevent the personnel in the laboratory section from identifying the source of the sample and this protects the interests of the accused as well as public interest. a scientific expert like public analyst may reasonably be expected to take all necessary precautions in transferring the sample from the bottle used by the food inspector to a bottle in his own office; we are not satisfied that there was any delay in analysis or that any alleged delay affected the result of the analysis or caused prejudice to the accused. but the circumstances may occur where the court may think that the production of the diary is necessary for a just decision of the case and in that situation it will be perfectly..... u.l. bhat, c.j.1. the chief judicial magistrate, kamrup, guwahati in complaint case no. 1459c/78 convicted the three accused, namely, m/s. mahabir store, its employee and its proprietor respectively, under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7(i) of the prevention of food adulteration act, 1954 (for short, the act) and duly sentenced them. in appeal, cri. appeal no. 24(k-1)/84, sessions judge, kamrup, guwahati set aside the conviction and sentence entered against first accused, but dismissed the appeal in regard to second and third accused. hence this revision petition by accused 2 and 3.2. p.w. 1, food inspector, guwahati visited the premises of m/s. mahabir stores on 6-4-1978,-found mustard oil exhibited for sale and after conforming to requirements of the act and the rules framed.....

Judgment:

U.L. Bhat, C.J.

1. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati in Complaint Case No. 1459C/78 convicted the three accused, namely, M/s. Mahabir Store, its employee and its proprietor respectively, under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short, the Act) and duly sentenced them. In appeal, Cri. Appeal No. 24(K-1)/84, Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati set aside the conviction and sentence entered against first accused, but dismissed the appeal in regard to second and third accused. Hence this revision petition by accused 2 and 3.

2. P.W. 1, Food Inspector, Guwahati visited the premises of M/s. Mahabir Stores on 6-4-1978,-found mustard oil exhibited for sale and after conforming to requirements of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, purchased 375 ml. of the oil and dealt with the same as required by the Act and the Rules. Part of the sample was duly sent to the Public Analyst and the remaining two parts thereof were sent to the Local (Health) Authority (LHA). The Public Analyst in Ext. 6 report indicated that the sample did not conform to the prescribed standards. After obtaining consent from the statutory authority, namely, Chief Medical and Health Officer, Kamrup, P.W. 1 filed complaint against the store (A-l), the vendor (A-2) and the proprietor (A-3). LHA sent copies of the report along with the necessary intimation to the three accused by registered post with acknowledgment due.

3. Accused pleaded not guilty. The Food Inspector was examined as P.W. 1. A peon in the office of the Chief Medical and Health Officer who accompanied P.W. 1 and witnessed the sampling was examined at P.W. 2 All the necessary documents were exhibited and proved. The Assistant Analyst in the office of the Public Analyst was examined as D.W. 1. Accused, when questioned, denied the truth of the prosecution evidence. They denied receipt of copies of Public Analyst's report and intimation. Third accused denied that he was the proprietor of the business. The trial court upheld the prosecution case in its entirety and convicted the three accused and imposed minimum sentence on each of them. The appellate court sustained the conviction and sentence entered against accused Nos. 2 and 3, but held that first accused cannot be convicted or sentenced since it is only the trade name under which third accused was conducting the trade.

4. The report dated 17-5-1978 of the Public Analyst shows that he received on 6-4-1978 the sample sent by the Food Inspector, it was properly sealed and fastened and the seal was intact and unbroken. The seal on the container and the outer cover of the sample tallied with the specimen impression of the seal separately sent by the Food Inspector and the sample was in a condition fit for analysis. The results were as follows:-

B.R. Reading at 40 C -- 59 .0

Saponification value -- 179.2

Iodine value -- 102.9

Unsaponifiable matter -- 1.0%

Free Fartty Acids as Oleic Acid -- 0.36%

Bellier Test Turbidity -- 24 1C.

Temperature Acetic

Acid method.

Test for argemone oil -- Negative.

Test for Hydrocyanic Acid -- Negative.

The Public Analyst reported that the sample did not conform to the prescribed standards. According to A. 17.06 of Appendix B to the Rules, Saponification value should be between 168 to 177, Saponification value of the sample in this case being 179.2, the sample did not conform to the standards prescribed by Rules and was therefore an adulterated article of food.

5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners urged the following contentions:

(a) Written consent ext. 7 under Section 20 of the Act for the prosecution was not by an empowered officer.

(b) The sample analysed under Ext. 6 report of the Public Analyst was not the sampletaken from second accused.

(c) Violation of Rule 7(3) of the Rules has caused serious prejudice to the accused.

(d) There was violation of Section 13(2) of the Act.

(e) There was violation of Section 10 of the Act.

(f) No legal evidence was adduced to prove that third accused is proprietor of the business.

(g) The sentence imposed is excessive.

6. POINT (a):

Ext. 7 is the consent for prosecution granted by the Chief Medical and Health Officer, Kamrup under Section 20 of the Act. Ext. 7 traces the power of the Officer to grant consent to Government orders dated 9-8-1961, 21-12-1974, and 3-5-1978. It is said copies of the notifications were not produced in the trial court. The judgment of the. appellate court shows that the notifications were made available to it. On our direction, learned Public Prosecutor produced copies of the notifications and they have been shown to the learned counsel for the petitioners. The earliest notification empowered the 'Civil Surgeons' of all districts to give written consent to Food Inspectors to prosecute for offences under the Act. By the second notification, the post of 'Civil Surgeon' was redesignated as 'District Health Officer'. By the third notification the post of 'District Health Officer' was redesignated as 'Chief Medical & Health Officer'. A combined reading of the three notifications shows that the Chief Medical & Health Officer, Kamrup had the authority to give sanction or consent to P.W, 1 to prosecute offenders under the Act.

7. POINT (b):

At the instance of the accused, Assistant Analyst in the office of the Public Analyst, who also headed the Fats & Oils section in the office, was examined as D.W. 1. D.W. 1 had assistants working under him in the laboratory. His evidence can be summarised as follows :-

The Public Analyst decoded the sample received from the Food Inspector, put it in another bottle in the Public Analyst's office and sent it to D.W. 1 with a new code number given by the Public Analyst. D.W. 1 entered the particulars in the work book of his laboratory section. After completion of chemical tests, D.W. 1 entered the result in the report under his signature and sent it to the Public Analyst. The papers are in the office of the Public Analyst. D.W. 1 proved Exts. 'Ka' and 'Kha', attested copies of his reports. They show the new code number put in the office of the Public Analyst and do not show the code number put by the Food Inspector.

8. On the basis of D.W. 1's evidence it is argued that the Public Analyst had, no legal authority to put the sample in another bottle in his office and this involves infraction of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The Act and the Rules, besides requiring the Public Analyst to compare the seals on the outer; packet and the sample container and to verify if the container is intact, do not prescribe the procedure to be adopted by him in getting the sample analysed. There is no statutory requirement that the Public Analyst, before sending the sample to the laboratory section, should not give his own code number or change the container of the sample. Replacement of Code number may protect the secrecy of the source of the sample and prevent the personnel in the laboratory section from identifying the source of the sample and this protects the interests of the accused as well as public interest. A scientific expert like Public Analyst may reasonably be expected to take all necessary precautions in transferring the sample from the bottle used by the Food Inspector to a bottle in his own office; the laboratory technicians may reasonably be expected to take all necessary precautions in transferring parts of the sample to other vessels or instruments in the course of conduct of tests. We do not agree that this court has to draw a presumption that procedures are adopted in the office of the Public Analyst and tests are conducted in the laboratory in such a manner as to affect the identity or integrity, quality or purity of the sample. The report of the Public Analyst shows that the sample taken from the second accused (identified by code number and other particulars) was duly received intact by the Public Analyst and that sample was got analysed by him and analysis yielded results as indicated in the report. There is nothing in the evidence of D.W. 1 which will throw any doubt on the facts mentioned in the Public analyst's report. D.W. 1 further deposed that titration method using Hydrochloric acid is; employed in determining saponification value and if there is difference of half a drop of the acid, there can be difference in colour. Therefore, it is argued that the result of analysis cannot be safely accepted. Chemical analysis conducted by experts can be expected to take into consideration factors which may cause error. D.W. 1 himself deposed that whether another half a drop is necessary and when titration is complete can be ascertained. The laboratory uses a burrette with a fine orifice to get fine result. The tip of: the burrette is connected to the inside wall of a half a drop flask and thereby fine and accurate result is secured. All precautions are taken to prevent evaporation of acid and it is frequently tested to see if it maintains the necessary standard. Filtration, to remove moisture, is done before every test. The evidence on record does not indicate that result of analysis in this case is doubtful or inaccurate. Hence the contention fails.

9. POINT (c):

The sample was taken on 6-4-1978. It was received on the same day by the Public Analyst. The report bears the date 17-5-1978. On the basis of the date endorsement in Ext. 7, P.W. 1 deposed that L.H.A. received the report on 18-7-1978, i.e., 103 days after the date of purchasing the sample. Learned counsel for revision petitioners argued that the deviation in standard of saponification value which is small, could have been caused by delay in analysis and the report may have been antedated. Ext. 'Ka' is the forwarding letter by which the L.H.A. sent the report to the Food Inspector on 23-6-1978. This shows that L.H.A. must have necessarily received the report before 23-6-1978. There is nothing to indicate that the report was antedated. The report bears the date 17-5-1978 and in the absence of any material indicating to the contrary, must be taken to have been prepared on that date. The report shows that the sample was fit for analysis. It must follow that analysis must have been done before 17-5-1978, i.e., within 40 days of the purchase of the sample, in conformity with Rule 7(3) of the Rules. This court in Bijay Kumar Choudhury v. State of Assam, (1992) 2 GLR 283 has held Rule 7(3) of the Rules to be directory. D.W. 1 was not asked any question regarding effect of any delay in analysis on the result of the analysis. We are not satisfied that there was any delay in analysis or that any alleged delay affected the result of the analysis or caused prejudice to the accused.

10. POINT (d):

It is argued that the requirement of Section 13(2) of the Act has been violated and accused have been prejudiced. P.W. 1 deposed that copies of the report of the Public Analyst were sent to accused 2 and 3 by registered post acknowledgement due. Ext. 8 is the copy of the accompanying letter. Exts. 9 and 10 are the postal receipts. Exts. 11 and 12 are their acknowledgment cards. Accused 2 and 3 denied receipt of the report and the accompanying letter. It is argued that the addresses of the two accused to which the report and letter were sent did not contain the name of the road. The address shown in these records is the address shown in all the relevant documents and is the same as the address shown by the two accused in their appeal before the Sessions Court and the Memorandum of Revision in this Court, They cannot now turn round and find fault with the address. It is argued that a copy of the letter or intimation sent to second accused was sent to third accused and no separate letter or intimation was sent to him. The Act and the Rules do not prescribe any particular form or formality for the intimation contemplated under Section 13(2) of the Act. It is sufficient that the accused is informed that he may, if he so desires, make an application to the court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the L.H.A. analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. The letter sent to the third accused contains the necessary information as contemplated in Section 13(2) of the Act and this provision has not been violated. This court in Ratanlal Agarwalla v. State of Assam, (Criminal Revn. No. 261/1985 and Criminal Revn. No. 262/1985, D/-19-1-1993) reported in (1993) 1 GLR 118 has held Section 13(2) to be directory. In any event, accused have not shown any prejudice. Hence this contention fails.

11. POINT (e):

It is contended that Section 10(7) of the Act has been violated P.W. 1 deposed that he called persons in three nearby shops to witness the sampling, but they refused to do so. They did not give their names. They were customers in those shops. P.W. 2 corroborated the evidence of P.W. 1 P.W. 2 is not a subordinate of P. W. 1; he is a subordinate of the LHA and cannot be regarded as a person interested in the prosecution.

12. In this connection it is argued that Rule 9(e) of the Rules has been violated. Rule 9 lays down the duties of Food Inspector. Clause (e) states that it is the duty of the Food Inspector to maintain a record of all inspections made and action taken by him in the performance of his duties, including the taking of samples and the seizure of stocks and to submit copies of such records to the health officer or the Food (Health) Authority as directed in this behalf. It is argued that the record required to be maintained under Rule 9(e) would show whether the claim of P.W. 1 that he called independent witnesses is true or not and the record has not been produced in court. P.W. 1, when asked about the diary or records stated that the diary maintained by him regarding the sampling in this case would show that he had called customers in other shops and they declined to witness. He was asked why he did not produce the diary in court. He stated that the Act and the Rules did not require him to produce it in court. It is argued that non-production of the record called for an adverse inference against the prosecution. In this connection, our attention has been invited to certain decisions including the decisions of this court.

13. In Public Prosecutor v. Thatha Rao, : AIR1968AP17 a learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court held as follows (para 10):-

'It is not incumbent on the Inspector to produce his diary before the Court. The rule simply says that the Inspector who maintains a diary shall submit copies of such records to the Health Officer or the Food Authority. Nowhere it has been stated that it should be necessary for the Food Inspector to produce copies of his diary before the Court. But the circumstances may occur where the Court may think that the production of the diary is necessary for a just decision of the case and in that situation it will be perfectly legitimate for the Court to ask the Food Inspector to produce his diary.'

(Emphasis supplied)

In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Puran Chand, 1972 FAC 326, the Food Inspector did not maintain the diary. Nevertheless, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court reversed the acquittal of the accused and convicted him. The court observed as follows :-

'If the Food Inspector is to comply with the requirements of Rule 9(e) and such evidence was made available at the stage of the trial, it would lend assurance to the conduct of the Food Inspector and prevent to some extent any allegation of excesses or resort to unfair means at the hands of the Food Inspector. We therefore commend the observance of this rule to the authorities under the Act.'

(Emphasis supplied)

A learned single Judge of the same High Court in Ganpat Ram v. State, 1972 FAC 695, declined to interfere with the conviction and referring to the earlier decision observed :-

'....but it does not mean that failure to produce record prepared under Rule 9(e) should result in disbelieving the Food Inspector.'

14. In the State of Assam v. Radha Oil Industries, (1987) 1 GLR 134 a learned single Judge of this Court taking note of the failure of the Food Inspector to maintain the diary and in the background of the very unsatisfactory nature of his evidence held that a presumption ought to be drawn that he maintained the diary and did not produce it in court as it would have gone against the prosecution case. This was followed in State of Assam v. Jagat Singh, (1992) 1 GLR 62. A Division Bench of this court in Pawan Kr. Agarwalla v. State of Assam, (1992) 2 GLR 118 dissented from the decision of the Delhi High Court in Ganpat Ram's case 1972 FAC 695, in the following words:-

'........With respect we are unable to agree with the above ratio laid down by Delhi High Court as in our opinion all public functionaries are to discharge their duties in accordance with the procedure laid down by the legislature or by the Rule maker authority as laid down (sic) that the Food Inspector is to follow certain procedure as laid down in Rule 9(e). We cannot, therefore, accept that even if this Rule is not followed, the evidentiary value of the Food Inspector (sic) will not be effected. This will amount to making the rule nugatory. We. therefore, hold that the Food Inspector shall have to maintain the record of inspection as laid down in Rule 9(e) of the Rules and produce the record whenever necessary. We are not saying that this Rule is mandatory. What we say is that this Court has rightly laid down in M/s. Radha Oil Industries (supra) regarding appreciation of evidence of Food Inspector vis-a-vis Rule 9(e).'

(Emphasis supplied)

15. We notice that the decision of the Division Bench in Pawan Kumar Agarwalla's case, (1992) 2 GLR 118 that Rule 7(3) of the Rules is mandatory and violation of this Rule will result in acquittal even if no prejudice is caused and that the question of prejudice does not arise, has been overruled by a Full Bench of this Court in Bijoy Kumar Choudhury v. State of Assam, (1992) 2 GLR 283. The Full Bench has laid down the correct approach in deciding whether a statutory provision or Rule is mandatory or directory. The Division Bench in Pawan Kumar Agarwalla's case, (1992) 2 GLR 118, has taken care to hold with reference to Rule 9(e) that :--

'We are not saying that this Rule is mandatory.'

(Emphasis supplied).

A provision in a statute or rule cannot be quasi-mandatory or quasi-directory. It is either mandatory or directory. If it is not mandatory, it is directory. Clause (j) of Rule 9 of the Rules dealing with the manner of sending copies of Public Analysis report to the accused has been held to be directory by the Supreme Court in Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal, : 1983CriLJ448 . Clauses (a) to (d) and (f) to (h) of Rule 9 merely indicate the scope and amplitude of the duties of the Food Inspector and cannot be regarded as mandatory as those duties do not have any impact on the prosecution in any case. Clause (e) requires the Food Inspector to maintain a record of all inspections made and action taken by him in the performance of his duties, including the taking of samples and seizure of stocks and to submit copies of such records to the Health Officer or the Food (Health) Authority as directed in that behalf. The record relates not only to samples taken, but to all inspections made and all action taken by him. The clause specifically requires the Food Inspector to submit copies of such record to superior officer or authority. The obvious purpose of the record or diary is to enable the supervision of the Food Inspector's actions and omissions by his superiors. Bearing in mind the purpose of the Act and Rule 9 in general, the purpose sought to be achieved by Clause (e) and the consequences of holding it to be mandatory or directory, with respect, we agree with the view expressed in Pawan Kumar Agarwalla's case, (1992) 2 GLR 118, that Rule 9(e) is not mandatory. This does not mean that the Food Inspector can with impunity disregard the requirement of the Rule. He will do so only at the risk of departmental action being taken against him. This does not also mean that where he does not maintain the record, it cannot have any impact on the appreciation of evidence in a given case. What impact, if any, it can have, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

16. The decision in Radha Oil Industries case, (1987) 1 GLR 134, is not an authority for the proposition that in all cases involving failure of Food Inspector to maintain the record, or that in all cases involving failure to produce the record in court, adverse inference can be drawn. Whether adverse inference can be drawn depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and the nature and quality of the evidence of the Food Inspector and the other evidence in the case. In Radha Oil Industries Case, (1987) GLR 134, the evidence of the Food Inspector was of a very poor quality, as a reading of para 5 of the reported decision will show. Pawan Kumar Agarwalla's ease, (1992) 2 GLR 118, did not indicate that the record has to be produced in all cases; if any, it indicated that it has to be produced 'when ever necessary'. Who is the authority to decide when such production is necessary? Obviously, it is the court which has to decide whether production of the record is necessary in a given case. This is the principle that was indicated by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Thatha Rao's case, : AIR1968AP17 . This was not contra-indicated by the Delhi High Court in Puran Chand's case, 1972 FAC 326. It is quite open to the accused to suggest to the Court by way of an application to require the Food Inspector to produce the record for the purpose of cross-examination of the Food Inspector. It is also open to the Food Inspector to produce it of his own accord. Either on the application of the accused or otherwise, it is open to the court in a given case to require the Food Inspector to produce his record, if it is found necessary. If it is produced and proved, it has evidentiary value as a contemporaneous document prepared by the Food Inspector and can be used for corroboration or contradiction. If in spite of the direction of the court the Food Inspector fails to produce the record but offers an explanation for such non-production, the court is bound to consider the explanation. If the explanation is found unacceptable, the circumstance of non-production has to be considered along with the evidence and circumstances of the case before concluding whether the evidence can be acted upon or not. We do not understand the decision in Pawan Kumar Agarwalla's case, (1992) 2 GLR 118 as laying down anything different than what we have now indicated. The decision in Radha Oil Industries case, (1987) 1 GLR 134, cannot be understood as laying down a principle of law of general or invariable application and must be confined to the facts of that case.

17. The evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 shows that P.W. 1 attempted to secure the presence of independent witnesses, but failed in his attempt. P.W. 2 cannot be regarded as an interested witness. The two courts below have considered the oral evidence and circumstances in their proper perspective. Accused did not apply to the court to require the Food Inspector to produce the record maintained under Rule 9(e) of the Rules. The two courts below did not find the record necessary for a proper disposal of the case or in the interest of justice. In Rameswar rathi v. State of Assam, reported in (1993) 1 GLR 136 (Criminal Rev. No. 212/1186, D/-22-1-1993) a Division Bench of this Court has held Section 10(7) of the Act to be directory and observed:-

'........In case of non-compliance with Section 10(7) of the Act, the court must scrutinize the evidence of the Food Inspector and other, witnesses, the documentary evidence in the light of facts and circumstances of the case to decide whether the evidence can be accepted; there is no question of sampling or trial being, vitiated or prejudice being presumed.'

The courts below have on a proper consideration of oral and documentary evidence and; the circumstances of the case accepted the evidence of P.W. 1 and the prosecution case. We find no ground to interfere.

18. POINT (f):

Prosecution alleged that third accused is the proprietor of the shop from where the sample of adulterated mustard oil was purchased by P.W. 1 and he was liable. This contention was accepted by the courts below on the basis of the evidence of P.W. 1. Evidence of P.W. 1 was based on what second accused allegedly told him at time of purchase. Third accused denied any connection with the business. The two courts below failed , to notice that the evidence of P.W. 1 is wholly inadequate to prove that third accused was the proprietor of the shop. Prosecution did not produce any reliable documentary or oral evidence to prove this aspect of the case. Therefore we hold that prosecution has failed to prove its case against third accused beyond reasonable, doubt.

19. POINT (g):

Learned counsel for revision petitioners contended that accused may be let off with fine and should not be sent to prison in view of the fact that more than fourteen years have elapsed since the sampling in the case. We do not think the accused can seek to take advantage of the delay in the final disposal of the case in the third court since part of the delay was due to the accused themselves. We notice that the trial court has imposed only minimum sentence contemplated under Section 16(1)(a}(i) of the Act. Even in cases governed by the proviso to the above provision, sentence of imprisonment for three months is mandatory. The court has therefore no power to reduce the sentence of imprisonment or not to impose sentence of imprisonment as it could do under the provision as it stood before the Amending Act 34 of 1976.

20. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners relied on the decision in Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, : 1988CriLJ1816 , where the Supreme Court directed that part of the sentence of imprisonment need not be undergone. The Supreme Court did not advert to the provision for minimum sentence incorporated in the Act by the Amending Act of 1976. The Supreme Court in this decision has not declared the law or laid down any principle of law or precedent which is binding on the High Courts or subordinate courts. The High Court cannot reduce or set aside the minimum sentence of imprisonment in the absence of any specific provision enabling it to do so.

21. Our attention has been invited to several decisions of this court in this connection. In State of Assam v. Ram Narayan Basudeo, (1986) 1 GLR 273, and State of Assam v. Amrit Lal Ghose, (1986) 2 GLR 250, learned single Judge of this Court while reversing acquittal, imposed sentences of fine only. So also in State of Assam v. Rameswar Prasad, (1984) 2 GLR 88, State of Assam v. Binode Kumar Agarwalla, (1985) 2 GLR 332, State of Assam v. Siba Ram Agarwalla, (1985) 1 GLR 16, and itr some un-reported cases, such as, Government Criminal Appeal No. 17/ 1986 (State of Assam v. Shri Hanuman Singh, D/-1-4-1986) and Criminal Revn. No. 123/81 (Md. Shamsul Hage v. State of Assam, d/-10-4-1986, since reported in (1986) 2 GLR 476). These decisions do not declare the law or lay down any principle of law binding as a precedent. Dealing with the plea for lecience in regard to sentence, the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Hanif, : 1992CriLJ1429 , observed (Para 6) :-

'In view of the fact that after Amending Act 34 of 1976 the sentence imposed by courts below is minimum, and that, therefore, there is no scope warranting interference.'

This same principle is laid down by a learned single Judge of this Court in Gumaniram Sharma v. State of Assam, (1992) 2 GLR 60 : 1992 Cri LJ 3071, and by a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in State of Haryana v. Yad Ram, . We cannot therefore reduce the sentence imposed on second accused.

22. In the result, we set aside the conviction and sentence entered against third accused (second revision petitioner) and acquit him of the charge against him. His bail bonds are cancelled. We decline to interfere with the conviction and sentence entered against the second accused (first revision petitioner). The Criminal Revision petition is accordingly disposed of.

R.K. Manisana, J.

23. I agree.