National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Khantaria Devi and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/124351
Subject;Insurance;Motor Vehicles
CourtPatna High Court
Decided OnJan-24-2002
JudgeSomeshwar Nath Pathak, J.
AppellantNational Insurance Co. Ltd.
RespondentKhantaria Devi and anr.
Prior history
Someshwar Nath Pathak, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 23rd/24th November, 1997, passed by the Additional District Judge-cum-Claims Tribunal, Khagaria, in Case No. 8 of 1997, whereby the Court granted interim compensation of Rs. 25,000/- under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. National Insurance Co. Ltd. is the appellant here.
2. It was submitted by the appellant that the alleged accident took place on 3rd January, 1990 in which Harilal died in a motor acciden
Excerpt:
- - 3. before i advert to the plea of the appellant whether the claim case was time-barred, i would like to refer to some of the decisions on which the appellant's lawyer relied. this was an individual policy of the deceased and the policy had lapsed, but the learned judge failed to take note of that fact that when the deceased died, the cause of action arose then and at the time of insurance policy was very much valid. in this decision, hon'ble supreme court has clearly held that by the amending act, 1994, the time limit fixed for preferring a claim under motor vehicles act, 1988, has been completely given a go-by. i am, therefore, to hold that the case filed by the claimant of the case under reference was not time-barred nor the insurance company was absolved from its liability..... someshwar nath pathak, j.1. this appeal is directed against the order dated 23rd/24th november, 1997, passed by the additional district judge-cum-claims tribunal, khagaria, in case no. 8 of 1997, whereby the court granted interim compensation of rs. 25,000/- under section 140 of the motor vehicles act, 1988. national insurance co. ltd. is the appellant here.2. it was submitted by the appellant that the alleged accident took place on 3rd january, 1990 in which harilal died in a motor accident and thereafter the claimant filed the aforesaid case and the order for grant of interim compensation of rs. 25,000/- was passed. the main objection to the impugned order taken by the appellant is that the claim application was time-barred. moreover, the insurance policy of the concerned vehicle had.....
Judgment:

Someshwar Nath Pathak, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 23rd/24th November, 1997, passed by the Additional District Judge-cum-Claims Tribunal, Khagaria, in Case No. 8 of 1997, whereby the Court granted interim compensation of Rs. 25,000/- under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. National Insurance Co. Ltd. is the appellant here.

2. It was submitted by the appellant that the alleged accident took place on 3rd January, 1990 in which Harilal died in a motor accident and thereafter the claimant filed the aforesaid case and the order for grant of interim compensation of Rs. 25,000/- was passed. The main objection to the impugned order taken by the appellant is that the claim application was time-barred. Moreover, the insurance policy of the concerned vehicle had lapsed before the filing of the claim case. Therefore, the Insurance Company was not liable to pay any amount of compensation, much less the interim compensation, although the owner was very much liable. In this connection, it was further pointed out that since the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 has done away with the time limit as provided under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act shall be applicable and so the claim case was hopelessly time-barred.

3. Before I advert to the plea of the appellant whether the claim case was time-barred, I would like to refer to some of the decisions on which the appellant's lawyer relied. Appellant's lawyer referred to the decision of the Supreme Court, as reported in (1997) 6 S.C.C. 381 (sic). In this case, the claimant was an assignee of the insured under the Marine Insurance Act, 1963. The Insurance Company had specifically stipulated that in case of any damage or loss occurring to the insured in course of despatch of goods from Muscat to Bombay, he shall be entitled to prefer a claim within 60 days and not beyond that. There was delay in the despatch of the goods because the same had to be diverted from the usual course on account of the strike of the marine employees. However, the goods reached Bombay and were appropriated. Thereafter the original insured under the insured policy made an assignment of the right to claim damage, etc. The assignee preferred a claim before the Consumer Forum. The Insurance Company was absolved of the liability because the assignment was made after the right to claim damage, etc., had already lapsed on account of special contract in the insurance policy that it shall be claimed within a stipulated-period. This case is not applicable to the facts of this case because there was no specific contract in the insurance policy that the claimant should prefer the claim within a particular period. Another decision referred to by the appellant's lawyer has been reported in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Surjir Ganesh Nayak and Co. : [1997]3SCR202 . In this decision also, there is a reference to a forfeiture clause in the insurance policy to the effect that after a specific period, the insured could not recover any compensation for the loss or damage, suffered by the insured. It was held in this decision that this agreement in the insurance policy did not violate Section 28 of the Contract Act, even though the period prescribed in Article 44(b) of the Limitation Act, did not expire. Again I am forced to repeat that in the instant case before this Court, there was no special agreement in the insurance policy that claim shall be preferred within a specified time. So, this decision is also not applicable to the facts of this case. Then the learned appellant's lawyer referred to a decision of this Court as reported in 1998 (2) P.L.J.R. 692. I find that a Single Judge of this Court held that the claim for the death of the deceased who had died on 25th March, 1993 was preferred in the year 1994 after expiry of insurance policy. Hence, the Insurance Company was absolved of the liability to pay the compensation. However, the learned Judge directed the State Government to settle the claim of claimant. This was an individual policy of the deceased and the policy had lapsed, but the learned Judge failed to take note of that fact that when the deceased died, the cause of action arose then and at the time of insurance policy was very much valid. So Article 44(b) of the Limitation Act allowed the heirs of the deceased to claim compensation within three years from the date when the cause of action accrued. This Article has provided 3 years time limit for preferring a claim from the date of occurrence or from the date of denial by the Insurance Company of its liability wholly or partly to pay the compensation. So I am not enamoured of the aforesaid decision of the Single Judge of this Court. Proceeding further, the appellant's lawyer on his plea of the bar of this case, submitted that since the alleged accident in this case took place in the year 1990, and the case was filed in the year 1997, the case was barred even under Article 44(b) of the Limitation Act. I am of the opinion that this is the most crucial and relevant point for decision in this appeal. In my opinion, and admittedly when the alleged accident took place, the insurance policy was valid. Of course, it lapsed when the case was filed and, prima facie, it appeared to be time-barred, even under the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act on the basis of which the appellant's lawyer banked for his submission. But perhaps, the learned lawyer wrongly referred to the decision of the Supreme Court as reported in Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya : AIR1996SC2155 , for his further reliance. I find that this decision goes against his plea instead of supporting his plea. In this decision, Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that by the Amending Act, 1994, the time limit fixed for preferring a claim under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has been completely given a go-by. Now the question is whether according to the submission of the appellant's lawyer, if there is no time limit fixed in Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act shall be applicable. Of course, when there is a special provision for procedure to be adopted in conducting cases filed under the Special Act, those provisions have to be followed and when there is no provision, the provisions in the general laws shall be followed. The procedural laws are subjective laws applied and followed in decisions to be rendered for the cases filed under the substantive laws. The Motor Vehicles Act is a substantive Act and in the earlier Act of 1988, there was special provision for preferring claim within a specified period. But when the Amending Act of 1994 completely gave a go-by to the time limit, it is to be gathered as to what was the intention of the Legislature. The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 is not a new Act replacing the old Act, rather certain amendments have been incorporated in the old Act. So I am of the considered opinion that there was clear and explicit intention of the Legislature not to fix a time limit for preferring a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act. So I am further of opinion that this intention of the Legislature has to be carried into effect and the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act should not be allowed to come in its way. Grant of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a welfare measure and so no limitation should be placed upon the claim by a general law, as provided under the Indian Limitation Act. I am, therefore, to hold that the case filed by the claimant of the case under reference was not time-barred nor the Insurance Company was absolved from its liability because when the accident took place, insurance policy was valid and the claim thereunder cannot be defeated in violation of the intention of the Legislature in the Motor Vehicles Act.

4. In the result, this appeal is dismissed and the impugned order is maintained.