Kashipathi S/o Manappapattar Vs. Rajugouda And Ors - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/1232916
CourtKarnataka Kalaburagi High Court
Decided OnApr-24-2020
Case NumberWA 200239/2019
JudgeG.NARENDAR AND M.NAGAPRASANNA
AppellantKashipathi S/o Manappapattar
RespondentRajugouda And Ors
Excerpt:
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® 1 in the high court of karnataka kalaburagi bench dated this the24h day of april2020present the hon’ble mr. justice g.narendar and the hon’ble mr.justice m.nagaprasanna writ appeal no.200239 of2019(lb-res) between: kashipathi s/o. manappa pattar, aged about 59 years, occ.: agriculture and president of gram panchayat, yalagod, r/o. karvinal, post: khanapura, tq: sindagi, dist.: vijayapura – 586 128. …appellant (by sri ameetkumar deshpande, advocate for sri biradar viranagouda, advocate) and1 sri. rajugouda s/o girimallappagouda hosagoudar, aged about 36 years, occ: agriculture and former president of yalagod, gram panchayat, 2 r/o yalagod, tq.: devarahipparagi, dist.: vijayapura – 586 120.2. the state of karnataka rep. by its principal secretary, department of gram swaraj and.....
Judgment:

® 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA KALABURAGI BENCH DATED THIS THE24H DAY OF APRIL2020PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE G.NARENDAR AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT APPEAL NO.200239 OF2019(LB-RES) BETWEEN: Kashipathi S/o. Manappa Pattar, Aged about 59 years, Occ.: agriculture and President of Gram Panchayat, Yalagod, R/o. Karvinal, Post: Khanapura, Tq: Sindagi, Dist.: Vijayapura – 586 128. …APPELLANT (By Sri Ameetkumar Deshpande, Advocate For Sri Biradar Viranagouda, Advocate) AND1 Sri. Rajugouda S/o Girimallappagouda Hosagoudar, Aged about 36 years, Occ: Agriculture and Former President of Yalagod, Gram Panchayat, 2 R/o Yalagod, Tq.: Devarahipparagi, Dist.: Vijayapura – 586 120.

2. The State of Karnataka Rep. By its Principal Secretary, Department of Gram Swaraj and Panchayatraj, M.S. Building, Bengaluru – 560 001.

3. The Deputy Commissioner Vijayapura Dist. Vijayapura – 586 101.

4. The Assistant Commissioner Indi, Dist.: Vijayapura – 586 209.

5. The Gram Panchayat, Yalagod, Tq.: Devarahipparagi, Dist.: Vijayapura – 586 120. Rep. By its Project Development Officer. …. RESPONDENTS (By Sri. Huleppa Heroor, Advocate for R-1, Smt. Archana P Tiwari, AGA for R-2 to R-4, Smt. Ratna Shivayogimath, Advocate for R-5) This Writ Appeal is filed under Section 4 of the High Courts Act praying to set aside the final order dated 9.12.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.202034/2019, etc. This Writ Appeal having been heard and reserved for judgment on 24.2.2020, coming on this day, M. NAGAPRASANNA, J, pronounced the following:

3.

JUDGMENT

Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.202034/2019 dated 09.12.2019, whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the 1st respondent herein setting aside the order of acceptance of resignation of the 1st respondent as Adhyaksha of Yelagod Gram Panchayat. The appellant who was not a party before the learned Single Judge has sought permission to prosecute the instant appeal claiming that the order of the learned Single Judge would take away his rights.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts material for adjudication of the instant appeal are as follows: The 1st respondent was elected as a member of the Gram Panchayath, Yalagod. He was thereafter elected to the post of Adhyaksha to the Yalagod Gram Panchayath, on 23.05.2017. On 08.03.2019, the 1st respondent resigned from the post of Adhyaksha of the Gram Panchayath, Yalagod by tendering his resignation in writing to the 4 competent authority in terms of Section 48 of the Karnataka Graham Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for short). Since the 1st respondent did not withdraw his resignation even after completion of 10 days of its submission, the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner, on 18.3.2019, conducted an inquiry as required under Section 48 of the Act and verified as to whether the resignation of the 1st respondent was voluntary or was pressure, coercive. It transpires, that in the said inquiry, the Assistant Commissioner recorded the statement of 1st respondent and concluded that the resignation tendered by him was voluntary and forwarded the report of such inquiry made under Section 48 of the Act for further action to the Deputy Commissioner, Vijayapura.

3. On the expiry of 10 days from the date of resignation of the 1st respondent, the post of Adhyaksha of the Gram Panchayat, Yelagod was declared to be vacant and the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner appointed the Executive Officer, Taluk Panchayath, Sindagi to be the 5 Returning officer for the conduct of election to the post of Adhyaksha, the post that the 1st respondent was earlier holding. On such appointment, the Taluka Executive Officer notified calendar of events on 01.04.2019 fixing the election on 09.04.2019. This was immediately withdrawn by the Deputy Commissioner on 02.04.2019 as a consequence thereof, the order of appointment of the Returning Officer was also withdrawn.

4. This order dated 02.04.2019 of the Deputy Commissioner and the consequential order of the 3rd Respondent were challenged by the appellant and other members of the Panchayat before this Court in Writ Petition No.201914/2019, in which the 1st respondent was not a party. This Court granted stay of the order impugned, dated 02.04.2019. In the light of the interim order granted, the Executive Officer of the Taluk Panchayat issued an official memorandum dated 09.04.2019 for conduct of elections to the post of a Adhyaksha of the 4th respondent Gram Panchayat and also notified calendar of events fixing the date 6 of election to be 18.04.2019. This official memorandum dated 09.04.2019 was challenged by the 1st respondent herein in writ petition No.201971/2019. This Court by its order dated 16.04.2019 granted stay of the official memorandum dated 09.04.2019 to be operational till the next date of hearing.

5. It transpires that during the pendency of the aforementioned writ petitions, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 16.04.2019 accepting the resignation tendered by the 1st respondent which came to be challenged by the 1st respondent before this Court in Writ Petition No.202034/2019.

6. During the pendency of the writ petition No.202034/2019 which was filed by the 1st respondent herein challenging acceptance of his resignation by the Deputy Commissioner, the aforementioned Writ Petitions, one filed by the members of the Gram panchayat in Writ Petition No.201914/2019 and the other by the 1st respondent herein 7 in Writ Petition No.201971/2019, were taken up together and were disposed off by an order dated 26.04.2019 holding that during the pendency of the Writ Petitions, on 16.04.2019, after due process of law the resignation of the 1st respondent was accepted and in terms of this new development, both the Writ Petitions would not survive for consideration and granted liberty to the Deputy Commissioner to proceed to fill up the post of the Adhyaksha of Yalagod Gram Panchyath, in accordance with law.

7. The 1st respondent herein questioned the order dated 26.04.2019 passed in the aforementioned Writ Petitions before the learned Division Bench in writ appeal No.200070 of 2019. The learned Division Bench, by its order dated 09.05.2019, noticed the fact that the writ petitions were disposed on the ground that the resignation submitted by the 1st respondent herein, the appellant therein, was accepted on 16.04.2019 itself and accordingly dismissed the writ appeal. The learned Division Bench also found that the order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.04.2019 was just 8 and proper and did not call for any interference. Thus, the order disposing the writ petitions, one filed by the members of the Gram Panchayat and one filed by the 1st respondent herein attained finality as they were not taken any further.

8. Writ Petition No.202034/2019 in which the 1strespondent herein had challenged the acceptance of his resignation came up for its consideration before this court on 09.12.2019, the appellant herein was not a party in the Writ Petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the ground that the act contemplates 10 days time to be given to the person who intends to withdraw the resignation tendered and in the case of the 1st respondent, 10 days clear notice has not been given. On such finding the writ petition was allowed and the impugned order of acceptance of resignation of the 1st respondent was set aside. The appellant who is now the elected Adhyaksha of Yalagod Gram Panchayat has challenged the order passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the Writ Petition of the 1st respondent 9 and setting aside the acceptance of the resignation of the 1st respondent.

9. We have heard Sri Ameetkumar Deshpande, learned Counsel for Sri Biradar Viranagouda, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri Huleppa Heroor, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.1, Smt. Archana P Tiwari, learned AGA appearing for respondent Nos.2 to R-4, Smt. Ratna Shivayogimath, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the 1st respondent herein was a party to the earlier writ petition in writ petition No.201971/2019 and was completely aware of the fact that the writ petitions were disposed observing that the resignation of the 1st respondent had been accepted in accordance with law and liberty was given to the official respondents therein to proceed with the conduct of elections. The 1st respondent challenged the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.201971/2019 10 before the learned Division Bench in writ appeal No.20070/2019. The Learned Division Bench, dismissed the writ appeal by its order dated 09.05.2019, affirming the order passed by the Learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.201971/2019, holding it to be just and proper. It is the contention of the appellant that the 1st respondent was also aware of the fact that pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 26.04.2019, at the order of the learned Division Bench, the appellant herein was elected as Adhyaksha of Yalagod Gram Panchayat and has been functioning as such from 09.05.2019.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant further contends that the writ petition filed by the 1st respondent challenging the order of the Deputy Commissioner accepting his resignation on 16.04.2019 in Writ Petition No.202034/2019, though was filed on 22.04.2019, prior to the disposal of the Writ Petition No.201971/2019, it came up before the learned Single Judge for its consideration only on 09.12.2019 close to 7 months of the appellant becoming the 11 Adhyaksha of Yalagod Gram Panchayat. The 1st respondent, a party to the earlier proceedings before the learned Single Judge, having filed the writ petition himself and a writ appeal against the order of dismissal of the writ petition, he was duty bound to bring the subsequent developments that have happened on the issue, in the writ petition challenging the acceptance of his resignation. The learned counsel contends that the 1st respondent is guilty of suppression of material facts with regard to subsequent developments and has played fraud on the court which has led the learned Single Judge to pass the impugned order dated 09.12.2019.

12. Per contra, learned counsel for the 1st respondent contends that he had filed the writ petition No.202034/2019 challenging the order of the Deputy Commissioner accepting his resignation, long before the orders were passed in the writ petition. It is his contention that it was unimaginable for him to foresee what would happen in future and he is not guilty of any suppression of material facts with regard to subsequent developments and has not played any fraud on 12 the court as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. He would further contend that he has mentioned at paragraphs 7 and 9 these facts in the memorandum of the Writ Petition No.202034/2019. He would contend, that would suffice to counter the allegation that the 1st respondent has suppressed material facts and played fraud at the Court. He would support the order passed by the learned Single Judge contending that the action impugned in the Writ Petition was completely contrary to the statute, as 10 days clear notice was not given to the 1st respondent to permit him to withdraw the resignation that was submitted by him. The action of the Deputy Commissioner being contrary to the statute is rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge and does not call for any interference as the appellant has nothing to do with the resignation of the 1st respondent.

13. The Learned Additional Government Advocate would submit that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is in accordance with law and no fault can be 13 found with the action of the Deputy Commissioner in accepting the resignation of the 1st respondent, She would submit that the appellant is right in contending that the subsequent events ought to have been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge as he was the petitioner and it was the duty of the petitioner to place all subsequent material facts before the Court.

14. Learned counsel for the 5th respondent would also adopt the submissions of the appellant in contending that the order of the learned Single Judge is erroneous.

15. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by all the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and have perused the material on record.

16. The facts are not in dispute, the 1st respondent after becoming a member of Yelagod Gram Panchayat was later elected as Adhyaksha to the Gram Panchayat on 14 23.05.2017 in terms of a resolution of the Panchayat dated 23.5.2017. Close to completion of two years of assuming the office of Adhyaksha of the Gram Panchayat, the 1st respondent submitted his resignation from the post on 08.03.2019 in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act. The Assistant Commissioner on receipt of the letter of resignation from the 1st respondent as required under the Act issued a notice to the 1st respondent to appear before him on 18.03.2019 for an enquiry as to whether the resignation was submitted under duress or voluntarily. The 1st respondent appeared before the Assistant Commissioner who recorded his statement and submitted a detailed report to the Deputy Commissioner for taking necessary action as is required under Section 48(1)(ii) of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner on receipt of the report of the Assistant Commissioner passed an order on 26.03.2019 declaring the post of Adhyaksha of Yalagod Gram Panchayat vacant. The Taluk Executive Officer was appointed as Returning Officer to conduct the election for the post of Adhyaksha. After notifying the aforementioned events, the Deputy 15 Commissioner issued an official memorandum dated 02.04.2019 withdrawing the earlier order dated 26.03.2019 by which he had declared the post to be vacant. This action of the Deputy Commissioner became the cause of action to the appellant and other members of the Panchayat to litigate.

17. The appellant and other members of the Panchayat filed writ petition before this Court challenging the official memorandum/order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 02.04.2019 in W.P. No.201914 of 2019. This Court by its order dated 08.04.2019 stayed the impugned orders in the writ petition which were the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 02.04.2019 and the consequential order of withdrawal of the appointment of the Returning Officer, till the next date of hearing and directed the matter to be relisted on 22.04.2019. In view of the interim order granted, the election to the post of Adhyaksha was re-notified on 09.04.2019 by issuing calendar of events and fixing the date of election on 18.04.2019. This gave rise to filing of another writ petition by the incumbent who was earlier holding the 16 post of Adhyaksha i.e., the 1st respondent herein, who challenged this action of again notifying the calendar of events in Writ Petition No.201971/2019. This Court by its order dated 16.04.2019 stayed the orders impugned in the writ petition i.e., the calendar of events notified for the conduct of elections on 18.04.2019. Thus, two writ petitions arose with regard to conduct of elections, one by the Members of the Gram Panchayat and the other by the 1st respondent herein.

18. One analogous development takes place, the Deputy Commissioner on 16.04.2019, before whom the report of the Assistant Commissioner concerning the resignation of the 1st respondent was pending accepted the resignation of the 1st respondent and the report of the Assistant Commissioner. This action of the Deputy Commissioner was challenged by the 1st respondent who was at the relevant point of time holding the post of Adhyaksha in Writ Petition No.202034/2019. Thus, there were three writ 17 petitions in all concerning the post of Adhyaksha of Yalagod Gram Panchayat.

19. The writ petitions filed by the Appellant along with other members of the Gram Panchayat and the 1st respondent herein concerning the notification of calendar of events were directed to be connected and listed on 26.04.2019, in the light of the fact that both the writ petitions arose due to the notification of conduct of elections to the post of Adhyaksha of Yalagod Gram panchayat. On 26.04.2019, this Court disposed both the Writ Petitions holding that the resignation of the 1st respondent herein was accepted following the due process of law and in the wake of the new development, the writ petitions would not survive for consideration. The order dated 26.04.2019 reads as follows: “02. Sri Rajugouda, petitioner in W.P.No.201971/2019 who was the President of the Yalagod Gram Panchayat, tq: Devarahipparigi, Dist Vijayapur had submitted his resignation on 08.03.2019 and it was accepted on 17.03.2019. Thereafter, the 18 Deputy Commissioner proceeded to appoint Taluk Executive Officer as Returning Officer for the purpose of conducting election. The Taluk Executive Officer had proceeded to notify the calendar of events on 01.04.2019 while fixing the election date on 09.04.2019. On 02.04.2019 the Deputy Commissioner withdrew the order of appointment of Taluk Executive Officer as Returning Officer and it was stayed by this court on 08.04.2019. In the meanwhile on 16.04.2019 after due process of law and in accordance with law the resignation of Rajugouda was accepted. In view of these new development and circumstances of the case, present writ petitions do not survey for consideration. 03. Accordingly, writ petition stands disposed off reserving liberty to the Deputy Commissioner to proceed in filling up the post of President in Yalagod Gram Panchayat tq: Devarahipparigi, Dist Vijayapur, in accordance with law.” 19 The 1st respondent herein challenged the afore-extracted order dated 26.04.2019 before the Learned Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.20070/2019 which was dismissed on 09.05.2019 by the following order:

02. Admittedly, the said memorandum was subject matter of challenge by other members of the 5th respondent Gram Panchayat herein in Writ Petition No.201914/2019. It is seen that writ petitions filed by the petitioner and others were dismissed on the ground that resignation submitted by the appellant herein on 08.03.2019 was accepted on 17.03.2019 itself. Therefore, in that background, the learned Single Judge found that the process of conducting election to the post of President of the fifth respondent gram panchayat should continue and accordingly disposed of both the writ petitions by a common order dated 26.04.2019, which is sought to be impugned in this proceeding.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as contesting respondent.

4. On going through the order impugned, it is clearly seen that the view taken by the learned Single Judge and disposing both the writ petitions appears to be just and proper, which needs no 20 interference in this intra-court appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Thus, the 1st respondent suffered an order both before the learned Single Judge and before the learned Division Bench wherein a categorical finding is given that the resignation of the 1st respondent is accepted in accordance with law and a further direction was given to fill up the post of Adhyaksha. He was fully aware of the facts obtaining in each of the cases as both the writ petitions filed by the Gram Panchayat and the 1st respondent were clubbed together before the learned Single Judge and the order of the learned Single Judge was challenged by the 1st respondent herein before the learned division bench. The 1st respondent cannot be imagined to feign ignorance of all the aforementioned facts.

20. The developments that took place after the disposal of the aforementioned cases are germane to be noticed. On 09.05.2019, elections were conducted to the post of Adhyaksha of Yelagod Gram Panchayat and the appellant 21 herein was elected as Adhyaksha of for the said Panchayat. The appellant was also a party in one of the writ petitions filed by members of the Gram Panchayat before the learned Single Judge, a mention of which is made hereinbefore. The elections held on 09.05.2019 resulted in electing the appellant as Adhyaksha of the Gram Panchayat, the post which the 1st respondent was earlier holding. The appellant continued to function as Adhyaksha of the Gram Panchayat from 09.05.2019 which fact the 1st respondent herein is completely aware of.

21. The writ petition filed by the 1st respondent challenging the order of the Deputy Commissioner accepting his resignation in Writ Petition No.202034/2019 was pending consideration before this Court, in all fairness it was the bounden duty of the 1st respondent to have impleaded the elected President namely, the appellant in the writ petition challenging his resignation, as the result of an order in favour of the 1st respondent herein would affect the rights of the appellant. Shockingly, this was not done by the 22 1st respondent. The writ petition came up for its consideration before this Court on 09.12.2019 and considering the matter on its merits with regard to compliance or otherwise with the provisions of the Act, this Court allowed the writ petition by the following order. “8. In the light of the above provisions, the impugned order passed by the second respondent cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 16.04.2019 passed by the second respondent at Annexure – J is set aside.” The effect of setting aside of the order dated 16.04.2019, is that the resignation of the 1st respondent is obliterated. This is the order that is under challenge before us in the instant writ appeal.

22. The appellant who is now the elected President of the Panchayat has preferred instant writ appeal seeking permission of this Court to file the appeal as he was not a 23 party in the proceedings and his rights are affected by the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. This Court by accepting the reasons shown in the application for permission, by its order dated 27.12.2019 allowed the said application and also granted an interim order of stay of the order of the Learned Single Judge.

23. A bare perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge would clearly indicate that the fact of the litigations and the subsequent developments that have happened after the orders passed in writ petition No.201971/2019 and the writ appeal No.200701/2019 mentioned hereinabove were not brought to the notice of the Court. The 1st respondent was a party to every proceeding and he had a duty to bring it to the notice of the Court. The 1st respondent is without a shadow of a doubt guilty of suppression of material facts before the learned Single Judge which has led the learned Single Judge to pass the order impugned in the instant writ appeal. We are pained to notice that the State which was privy to all the aforementioned proceedings also remained 24 astoundingly silent before the learned Single Judge. In the case concerning resignation of the first respondent, the State also had a duty to bring it to the notice of this Court at the time of consideration of the case on 09.12.2019. We deprecate such action of the State as well.

24. The 1st respondent who was privy to all the litigations aforementioned was duty bound to bring all the subsequent material facts before the Court in a pending writ petition which will have the effect of annulling the earlier orders passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Division Bench. The 1st respondent has deliberately suppressed, misrepresented and misled the learned Single Judge at the time of disposal of the Writ Petition No.200274/2017, resulting in the impugned order in the instant writ appeal. There cannot be any other inference that can be drawn to the conduct of the 1st respondent. It is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Singh Vs. State of U.P reported 25 in (2010) 2 SCC114of which paragraphs 1 to 10 read as follows:

1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa” (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.

2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In 26 order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

3. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR1963SC1558 this Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making the following observations: (AIR p. 1558) “It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the 27 material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked.

4. In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC575:

1983. SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR1983SC1015 the Court held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case.

5. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka [(1991) 3 SCC261: AIR1991SC1726 the Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed 28 by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed: (SCC p. 263, para

2) “2. … Curiously enough, there is no reference in the special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter-affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the special leave petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petitions.

6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath[(1994) 1 SCC1: JT (1993) 6 SC331 the Court held that where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an 29 important document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [(2007) 8 SCC449 it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J.

in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB486(CA), and observed: (Prestige Lights Ltd. case [(2007) 8 SCC449 , SCC p. 462, para

35) In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant 30 materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.

8. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. [(2007) 4 SCC221: AIR2007SC1546 the Court held that Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other words, the Constitution has not made the Supreme Court a regular court of appeal or a court of error. This Court only intervenes where justice, equity and good conscience require such intervention.

9. In Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India [(2008) 2 SCC326 the Court held that while exercising discretionary and equitable 31 jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, the facts and circumstances of the case should be seen in their entirety to find out if there is miscarriage of justice. If the appellant has not come forward with clean hands, has not candidly disclosed all the facts that he is aware of and he intends to delay the proceedings, then the Court will non-suit him on the ground of contumacious conduct.

10. In K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC481 the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G. 32 Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel [(2009) 3 SCC141.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment has dealt with every facet and circumstance of a litigant approaching the Court with unclean hands and how the approach of the Courts should be to curb such conduct of the litigants. On the bedrock of the aforementioned circumstances narrated in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court if the facts in the instant appeal as aforementioned are noticed, it becomes unmistakably clear that the conduct of the 1st respondent disentitles him for any relief from the hands of the Court.

25. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent would submit that he has an excellent case on merits of the matter and that the order of the learned Single Judge is unassailable as it is in consonance with the provisions of the Act with regard to the conduct of the 1st respondent in not bringing the subsequent events which were material to the disposal of 33 the writ petition, the learned counsel would contend that it was only an error and he had filed the impugned writ petition long before the disposal of the writ petition and the writ appeal concerning the calendar of events. This submission of the learned counsel is unacceptable to us for the reason that, in the memorandum of the writ petition, the 1st respondent mentions about Writ Petition Nos.201971/2019 and 201914/2019, one filed by the members of the Gram Panchayat along with the appellant and Writ Petition No.201971/2019 filed by him. Having mentioned the pending writ petitions, it was a duty cast upon the 1st respondent to have brought to the notice of the Court as to what became of the pending writ petitions. Due to the suppression of those facts which were material for the disposal of the case, the order of the learned Single Judge now runs counter to earlier orders passed in writ petition No.201914/2019 and writ appeal No.200070/2019, as the effect of the order passed by the learned Single Judge is that the resignation of the 1st respondent is effaced. This will take away the subsequent 34 proceedings that have happened pursuant to the orders passed by the Learned Division Bench.

26. The conduct of the 1st respondent cannot be brushed aside as a mere error. It is a deliberate suppression amounting to playing fraud on the Court and is highly deplorable. We are acutely aware of the fact that no human is immune to error, infallibility is unknown to humanity, but there is a difference between an error and a deliberate act of suppression and misrepresentation. A deliberate act of suppression of material fact by a litigant amounts to playing fraud on Court, as “Fraud” is a knowing misrepresentation of truth or concealment of a material fact. Fraud can be of different forms and hues. The Black's Law Dictionary defines “fraud” as a concealment or false representation through a statement or conduct that injures another who relies on it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the afore extracted judgment has clearly held that the party who has misled the Court in passing an order is disentitled to be heard on the merits of the matter. The observation of the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment is applicable on all fours to the case on hand. The 1st respondent may have 35 the finest case on its merits, but we refrain from considering any of the contentions advanced by the 1st respondent on the merits of the matter as his conduct disentitles such consideration. If we consider the writ appeal on its merits and analyse the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Learned Single Judge, it would be putting a premium on the such litigative practice of the 1st respondent. The order of the learned Single Judge in our considered view, warrants appropriate interference only for the conduct of the 1st respondent. For the aforementioned reasons, we pass the following:

ORDER

(i) The writ appeal is allowed. (ii) The order passed by the learned Single Judge in writ petition No.202034/2019 dated 09.12.2019 is set aside. (iii) The writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/- payable by the first respondent-writ petitioner to the Chief Ministers Relief Fund – Covid-19 within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. 36 In view of the disposal of the main appeal, all pending I.As. are also disposed off as they do not survive for consideration. Sd/- JUDGE Sd/- JUDGE Cs/-