Uma Sabnavis and anr. Vs. State of Bihar and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - the opposite party (when he failed to persuade the cashier to receive the amount) met the branch manager, petitioner no. he has submitted that the word 'undermine',according to the dictionary meaning, is, to wear away and weaken the foundation or base of' or 'to affect injuriously' or 'weaken by secret or underhand means' or 'weaken or destroy insidiously or gradually' and the word 'calculate' if not used mathematically will mean 'to plan in advance' or 'think out or to adapt' or 'to intend' and the fact of refusal to accept the amount given by the opposite party at best can be said to be done with intention to avoid the trouble of counting smaller currency notes. according to him, the impugned order of the learned magistrate taking cognizance is perfectly justified and legal and requires no interference, particularly when in several decisions, the supreme court have emphasised that the power under section 482 of the code for quashing the criminal proceeding should be rarely and sparingly exercised and only for good reasons only in certain cases and this case does not fall in any of the categories, as given in the case of state of haryana v. bhajan lal, air 1992 sc 604. 8. i have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel and gone through the petition of the complainant as well as statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the statement of the two witnesses. those two witnesses also deposed in support of the facts alleged in the complaint petition, which is itself indicative of the fact that they disliked the working of bank where there was refusal by the cashier to accept the amount, that was sought to be deposited by the opposite party. if there was any rush, the bank authority should ensure persons, who had assembled, to come in queue and this cannot be a good excuse for refusing to accept the money that is tendered. dharmpal sinha, j. 1. in this petition, filed under section 482 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 (for short 'the code'), the two petitioners have made a prayer for quashing of the criminal proceedings including the order, dated february 3, 1992, passed by the sub-divisional judicial magistrate, patna, whereby he has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under section 36ad of the banking regulation act, 1949 ('the act' for short), and has directed issue of summons against them. 2. the facts necessary for disposal of this petition may briefly be stated as follows : opposite party no. 2 filed a complaint petition (a copy of which is annexure 1 to this petition), wherein he stated, inter alia, that on october 1, 1991, he had gone to deposit in the bank of india (rajendra nagar branch) a sum of rs. 7,400 in his current account and on that day on the receipt counter of the bank, petitioner no. 2 (ashok kumar mishra), a cashier in the bank was on duty and petitioner no. 1, uma sabnavis, was the branch manager of the bank, opposite party no. 2 (hereinafter referred to as 'the opposite party') had filled up a pay-in-slip for making the deposit and requested the cashier to receive the same for depositing. the amount which he wanted to deposit consisted of some notes of rs. 100, some of rs. 50, some of rs. 20 and some notes of rs. 10, and there were two hundred notes of rs. 2 denomination. the opposite party alleged in his complaint petition that petitioner no. 2, the cashier, refused to receive the notes of rs. 2 (two) denomination without assigning any reason for refusal, in spite of several requests made by the opposite party to accept the amount. the opposite party (when he failed to persuade the cashier to receive the amount) met the branch manager, petitioner no. 1 ; but the branch manager did not give a proper hearingin the matter and asked the opposite party to request the cashier for accepting the money. it was further alleged that the acts of the petitioners were illegal and had the object of undermining the confidence of the depositors in the banking company. 3. on filing of the complaint, the learned magistrate examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and two further witnesses, who had been produced by the complainant, and passed the impugned order dated february 3, 1992, observing that on a perusal of the complaint petition, the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the evidence of witnesses a prima facie case under section 36ad of the act was made out, and, accordingly, he took cognizance of the offence and directed issue of summons to the petitioners. 4. the main contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that even if the facts alleged in the complaint petition are accepted, the offence punishable under sub-section (2) of section 36ad of the act cannot be said to be prima facie made out against any of the petitioners. he has made further submissions by referring to what the witnesses had said and the provisions of section 36ad(1) and 36ad(2) of the act. the relevant provision of section 36ad of the act may be quoted here : '36ad. punishment for certain activities in relation to banking companies.--(1) no person shall- (a) obstruct any person from lawfully entering or leaving any office or place of business of a banking company or from carrying on any business there, or (b) hold, within the office or place of business of any banking company, any demonstration which is violent or which prevents, or is calculated to prevent, the transaction of normal business by the banking company, or (c) act in any manner calculated to undermine the confidence of the depositors in the banking company. (2) whoever contravenes any provision of sub-section (1) without any reasonable excuse shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.' 5. sub-section (3) of this section does not need to be quoted for the purpose in hand.6. according to the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners, the relevant clause (c) shows that only such act has been prohibited as would be 'calculated to undermine the confidence of the depositors in the banking company' and sub-section (2) indicates that even if such an act as is referred to in sub-section (1) is done, it is not punishable unless it wasdone without any reasonable excuse. in this connection, he has pointed out to the part of the evidence of one of the witnesses (no. 2) produced by the complainant and examined by the learned magistrate to the effect that there was a great rush in the bank. according to his submission, if there was rush the cashier must have felt difficulty in accepting and counting the smaller notes of rs. 2 denomination, and this provided a reasonable excuse for not accepting the notes of smaller denomination tendered by the opposite party and so the acts alleged would not be an offence punishable under sub-section (2) of section 36ad of the act. learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the expression used in the relevant clause (c), namely, 'calculated to undermine the confidence of the depositors in the banking company' would indicate that the prohibited act if done only with intention or on calculation that it would undermine the confidence of the depositors it will be punishable and on the facts alleged such calculation or intention on the part of the cashier, when he refused to receive the notes, cannot be inferred. in this connection he has submitted that the words 'calculated' and 'undermine' convey some definite meaning according to the dictionary and those meanings will show that the acts alleged in the complaint petition cannot be said to be falling under the expression 'calculated' to undermine the confidence. he has submitted that the word 'undermine', according to the dictionary meaning, is, 'to wear away and weaken the foundation or base of' ; or 'to affect injuriously' ; or 'weaken by secret or underhand means' ; or 'weaken or destroy insidiously or gradually' and the word 'calculate' if not used mathematically will mean 'to plan in advance' or 'think out or to adapt' or 'to intend' and the fact of refusal to accept the amount given by the opposite party at best can be said to be done with intention to avoid the trouble of counting smaller currency notes. according to him, the act of refusal could not be considered to have been done keeping in mind the undermining of the confidence of the depositors. he has also submitted that undermining the confidence of one depositor would not amount to an offence because the relevant word appearing in clause (c) is 'depositors'. in the course of argument learned counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the act of refusal to accept the amount tendered by the opposite party may amount to be an act of indiscipline, but it will not constitute such an act as is made punishable by sub-section (2) of section 36ad of the act. he has further submitted that there would be no chance of conviction and if there is bleak chance of conviction, the criminal proceeding should be quashed in view of the ratio of the decision of the supreme court in madhavrao jiwaji rao scindia v. sambhajirao chandrojirao angre, air 1988 sc 709. 7. on the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that from the alleged statement in the complaint petition andsupporting statement of two witnesses examined by the learned magistrate, it would appear that the cashier had refused, despite repeated requests, to accept the notes of rs. 2, which the opposite party after filling up the necessary pay-in-slip had tendered to the cashier and requested him to accept, and no reason was given by him for not receiving the notes. according to him, there was no reasonable excuse for not accepting the amount, which the opposite party had wanted to deposit in his current account. according to his submission the complainant on refusal by the cashier had approached the higher authority, namely, the branch manager, but he also did not give orders to the cashier to accept the money ; nor did he ensure that the cashier received the amount, but he only directed the opposite party to go to the cashier again and make request. his submission is that when such acts are done by bank staff, who refused to accept the money given to them for deposit even if the currency was valid, such act is bound to shake the confidence of the depositors in the functioning or working of the banking company. according to him, the impugned order of the learned magistrate taking cognizance is perfectly justified and legal and requires no interference, particularly when in several decisions, the supreme court have emphasised that the power under section 482 of the code for quashing the criminal proceeding should be rarely and sparingly exercised and only for good reasons only in certain cases and this case does not fall in any of the categories, as given in the case of state of haryana v. ch. bhajan lal, air 1992 sc 604. 8. i have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel and gone through the petition of the complainant as well as statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the statement of the two witnesses. in my opinion, so far as the branch manager, petitioner no. 1, is concerned, i do not think that any prima facie case of commission of any such act by him is made out as is punishable under sub-section (2) of section 36ad of the act, and the facts alleged against him in this complaint petition cannot be said to be such act, which is prohibited by sub-section (1)(c) of section 36ad of the act, and made punishable under sub-section (2) of that section. as regards the branch manager the only allegation made in the complaint petition (which allegation is also supported by the statement of witnesses examined in support of the complaint) was that when he was approached by the opposite party and told about non-acceptance of the notes of rs. 2 denomination, he asked the opposite party to go and make request to the cashier again. this act of directing the complainant to go to the cashier for making request would indicate that the branch manager might have calculated that further request by the complainant to the cashier might prove fruitful and the latter might receive the amount. of course, it would have been proper for him to give positive orders or directions and he should have ensured that the amountwhich the complainant wanted to deposit would have been accepted by the staff at the counter, that is, the cashier, but this will only indicate lack of proper administrative control and supervision. i do not think that merely directing the complainant to go again to the cashier can be said to be an act from which it would be inferred that it could even have occurred in his mind that his action would have undermined the confidence of the depositors. so, in this view of the matter, i think that the impugned order initiating criminal proceeding, so far as the branch manager, petitioner no. 1, is concerned, is fit to be quashed. 9. as regards the cashier (petitioner no. 2), i may first notice that from what has been alleged in the complaint petition and deposed by the witnesses, it is definitely indicated, at least prima facie, that he had refused to accept the amount which the opposite party wanted to deposit and he said that he will not accept currency note of rs. 2 denomination. such act, in my opinion, could have the effect of undermining confidence of the depositors in the working of the bank. it is obvious that if a person comes to the bank for depositing some amount and the amount which he wants to deposit is not received by the bank staff for depositing even though valid notes are given and no reason is assigned for not accepting the money, the confidence of the depositor is bound to be shaken in the working of the bank. 10. as regards the argument that the word used is 'depositors' and not 'depositor', it may be noticed that the two other witnesses, who were examined by the complainant have stated to have gone to the bank for obtaining some bank drafts, and for obtaining bank draft also the amount, for which the bank draft is to be obtained, along with the commission for the same, had to be deposited before they could have got the bank draft. those two witnesses also deposed in support of the facts alleged in the complaint petition, which is itself indicative of the fact that they disliked the working of bank where there was refusal by the cashier to accept the amount, that was sought to be deposited by the opposite party. they also said that repeated requests had been made by the opposite party and yet the cashier did not receive the same. if the act of refusal by the cashier to accept the money tendered by the opposite party, who made several requests, was done in the presence of other depositors, i do not think that the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners, based on the use of the plural word 'depositors' and not 'depositor', can be accepted. 11. now, so far as the word 'calculate(d)' is concerned, it may be noticed that one of the meanings, which has been given to the word 'calculate' is 'to intend'. in criminal law the effect of an act done by an individual is ordinarily presumed to be the intended. if the act of refusal to accept thevalid currency has the effect of undermining the confidence of the people, the effect will be deemed to be intended, and it cannot be argued that the cashier at that time only intended to avoid counting of notes of small value and with that intention he did not receive the notes of small denomination. 12. it may be noticed here that the notes of rs. 2 were not so numerous that it would have taken a long time in counting the same. according to the complaint petition there were only two hundred notes of rs. 2 while other notes were of higher denomination. the refusal to receive the same seems, prima facie, to be without any reasonable excuse, and according to the complaint petition itself no reason was given by the cashier as to why he was refusing to accept the same. learned counsel for the petitioners, of course, has argued on the basis of the statement made by one of the witnesses that there was a huge rush, and so because of paucity of time the cashier could be held to be justified in refusing because of the rush. but i do not think that this line of argument can be accepted. if there was any rush, the bank authority should ensure persons, who had assembled, to come in queue and this cannot be a good excuse for refusing to accept the money that is tendered. moreover, from the facts alleged in the complaint petition it would appear that the opposite party had made repeated requests to the cashier and this implied that he was definitely not away in the queue but near the counter, wherefrom he could make requests. in such a situation the fact of there being a rush would be a lame excuse for not accepting the amount. 13. i do not think that it is necessary to go into the other meanings of the word 'calculate' (which includes 'to intend') or the word 'undermine' used in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 36ad of the act. the obvious intention in prohibiting some act by introduction of the provision of section 36ad of the act and making some acts punishable was to ensure proper functioning of the bank in a way which would have ensured that the people may have confidence in the functioning of the bank. but if a cashier at the counter, who has the duty to accept the amount given to him by persons, who want to deposit the money in the bank, refuses for no justifiable reason to accept the money, i think that the depositor's confidence in the working of such bank is bound to be shaken and affected adversely. i am also not impressed by the argument that there are some special features of the case. nor will it be proper to anticipate whether there is likelihood of conviction or bleak chance of conviction and so the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners on that basis is rejected. 14. i may also observe that the expression 'in any manner' used in clause (c) of section 36ad(1) makes its ambit wide and the alleged act of thecashier, prima facie, will fall in the wide ambit. so, in view of the reasons given above, i am of the opinion that the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted so far as the cashier, petitioner no. 2, is concerned. 15. in view of the reasons indicated above, i allow this petition so far as petitioner no. 1 (uma sabnavis) is concerned and the impugned order, so far as that petitioner is concerned, shall stand quashed. so far as petitioner no. 2, ashok kumar mishra (cashier), is concerned, the criminal proceeding shall continue and this petition is dismissed so far as he is concerned. 16. this petition stands, accordingly, disposed of. 17. any observation made herein or finding given for the purpose of considering the submissions made by counsel will not cause any prejudice to any side in the further proceeding of the case before the trial court.

Judgment:

Dharmpal Sinha, J.

1. In this petition, filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code'), the two petitioners have made a prayer for quashing of the criminal proceedings including the order, dated February 3, 1992, passed by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna, whereby he has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 36AD of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 ('the Act' for short), and has directed issue of summons against them.

2. The facts necessary for disposal of this petition may briefly be stated as follows : Opposite party No. 2 filed a complaint petition (a copy of which is annexure 1 to this petition), wherein he stated, inter alia, that on October 1, 1991, he had gone to deposit in the Bank of India (Rajendra Nagar branch) a sum of Rs. 7,400 in his current account and on that day on the receipt counter of the bank, petitioner No. 2 (Ashok Kumar Mishra), a cashier in the bank was on duty and petitioner No. 1, Uma Sabnavis, was the branch manager of the bank, Opposite party No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as 'the opposite party') had filled up a pay-in-slip for making the deposit and requested the cashier to receive the same for depositing. The amount which he wanted to deposit consisted of some notes of Rs. 100, some of Rs. 50, some of Rs. 20 and some notes of Rs. 10, and there were two hundred notes of Rs. 2 denomination. The opposite party alleged in his complaint petition that petitioner No. 2, the cashier, refused to receive the notes of Rs. 2 (two) denomination without assigning any reason for refusal, in spite of several requests made by the opposite party to accept the amount. The opposite party (when he failed to persuade the cashier to receive the amount) met the branch manager, petitioner No. 1 ; but the branch manager did not give a proper hearing

in the matter and asked the opposite party to request the cashier for accepting the money. It was further alleged that the acts of the petitioners were illegal and had the object of undermining the confidence of the depositors in the banking company.

3. On filing of the complaint, the learned magistrate examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and two further witnesses, who had been produced by the complainant, and passed the impugned order dated February 3, 1992, observing that on a perusal of the complaint petition, the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the evidence of witnesses a prima facie case under Section 36AD of the Act was made out, and, accordingly, he took cognizance of the offence and directed issue of summons to the petitioners.

4. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that even if the facts alleged in the complaint petition are accepted, the offence punishable under Sub-section (2) of Section 36AD of the Act cannot be said to be prima facie made out against any of the petitioners. He has made further submissions by referring to what the witnesses had said and the provisions of Section 36AD(1) and 36AD(2) of the Act. The relevant provision of Section 36AD of the Act may be quoted here :

'36AD. Punishment for certain activities in relation to banking companies.--(1) No person shall-

(a) obstruct any person from lawfully entering or leaving any office or place of business of a banking company or from carrying on any business there, or

(b) hold, within the office or place of business of any banking company, any demonstration which is violent or which prevents, or is calculated to prevent, the transaction of normal business by the banking company, or

(c) act in any manner calculated to undermine the confidence of the depositors in the banking company.

(2) Whoever contravenes any provision of Sub-section (1) without any reasonable excuse shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.'

5. Sub-section (3) of this section does not need to be quoted for the purpose in hand.

6. According to the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners, the relevant Clause (c) shows that only such act has been prohibited as would be 'calculated to undermine the confidence of the depositors in the banking company' and Sub-section (2) indicates that even if such an act as is referred to in Sub-section (1) is done, it is not punishable unless it was

done without any reasonable excuse. In this connection, he has pointed out to the part of the evidence of one of the witnesses (No. 2) produced by the complainant and examined by the learned magistrate to the effect that there was a great rush in the bank. According to his submission, if there was rush the cashier must have felt difficulty in accepting and counting the smaller notes of Rs. 2 denomination, and this provided a reasonable excuse for not accepting the notes of smaller denomination tendered by the opposite party and so the acts alleged would not be an offence punishable under Sub-section (2) of Section 36AD of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the expression used in the relevant Clause (c), namely, 'calculated to undermine the confidence of the depositors in the banking company' would indicate that the prohibited act if done only with intention or on calculation that it would undermine the confidence of the depositors it will be punishable and on the facts alleged such calculation or intention on the part of the cashier, when he refused to receive the notes, cannot be inferred. In this connection he has submitted that the words 'calculated' and 'undermine' convey some definite meaning according to the dictionary and those meanings will show that the acts alleged in the complaint petition cannot be said to be falling under the expression 'calculated' to undermine the confidence. He has submitted that the word 'undermine', according to the dictionary meaning, is, 'to wear away and weaken the foundation or base of' ; or 'to affect injuriously' ; or 'weaken by secret or underhand means' ; or 'weaken or destroy insidiously or gradually' and the word 'calculate' if not used mathematically will mean 'to plan in advance' or 'think out or to adapt' or 'to intend' and the fact of refusal to accept the amount given by the opposite party at best can be said to be done with intention to avoid the trouble of counting smaller currency notes. According to him, the act of refusal could not be considered to have been done keeping in mind the undermining of the confidence of the depositors. He has also submitted that undermining the confidence of one depositor would not amount to an offence because the relevant word appearing in Clause (c) is 'depositors'. In the course of argument learned counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the act of refusal to accept the amount tendered by the opposite party may amount to be an act of indiscipline, but it will not constitute such an act as is made punishable by Sub-section (2) of Section 36AD of the Act. He has further submitted that there would be no chance of conviction and if there is bleak chance of conviction, the criminal proceeding should be quashed in view of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, AIR 1988 SC 709.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that from the alleged statement in the complaint petition and

supporting statement of two witnesses examined by the learned magistrate, it would appear that the cashier had refused, despite repeated requests, to accept the notes of Rs. 2, which the opposite party after filling up the necessary pay-in-slip had tendered to the cashier and requested him to accept, and no reason was given by him for not receiving the notes. According to him, there was no reasonable excuse for not accepting the amount, which the opposite party had wanted to deposit in his current account. According to his submission the complainant on refusal by the cashier had approached the higher authority, namely, the branch manager, but he also did not give orders to the cashier to accept the money ; nor did he ensure that the cashier received the amount, but he only directed the opposite party to go to the cashier again and make request. His submission is that when such acts are done by bank staff, who refused to accept the money given to them for deposit even if the currency was valid, such act is bound to shake the confidence of the depositors in the functioning or working of the banking company. According to him, the impugned order of the learned magistrate taking cognizance is perfectly justified and legal and requires no interference, particularly when in several decisions, the Supreme Court have emphasised that the power under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the criminal proceeding should be rarely and sparingly exercised and only for good reasons only in certain cases and this case does not fall in any of the categories, as given in the case of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604.

8. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel and gone through the petition of the complainant as well as statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the statement of the two witnesses. In my opinion, so far as the branch manager, petitioner No. 1, is concerned, I do not think that any prima facie case of commission of any such act by him is made out as is punishable under Sub-section (2) of Section 36AD of the Act, and the facts alleged against him in this complaint petition cannot be said to be such act, which is prohibited by Sub-section (1)(c) of Section 36AD of the Act, and made punishable under Sub-section (2) of that section. As regards the branch manager the only allegation made in the complaint petition (which allegation is also supported by the statement of witnesses examined in support of the complaint) was that when he was approached by the opposite party and told about non-acceptance of the notes of Rs. 2 denomination, he asked the opposite party to go and make request to the cashier again. This act of directing the complainant to go to the cashier for making request would indicate that the branch manager might have calculated that further request by the complainant to the cashier might prove fruitful and the latter might receive the amount. Of course, it would have been proper for him to give positive orders or directions and he should have ensured that the amount

which the complainant wanted to deposit would have been accepted by the staff at the counter, that is, the cashier, but this will only indicate lack of proper administrative control and supervision. I do not think that merely directing the complainant to go again to the cashier can be said to be an act from which it would be inferred that it could even have occurred in his mind that his action would have undermined the confidence of the depositors. So, in this view of the matter, I think that the impugned order initiating criminal proceeding, so far as the branch manager, petitioner No. 1, is concerned, is fit to be quashed.

9. As regards the cashier (petitioner No. 2), I may first notice that from what has been alleged in the complaint petition and deposed by the witnesses, it is definitely indicated, at least prima facie, that he had refused to accept the amount which the opposite party wanted to deposit and he said that he will not accept currency note of Rs. 2 denomination. Such act, in my opinion, could have the effect of undermining confidence of the depositors in the working of the bank. It is obvious that if a person comes to the bank for depositing some amount and the amount which he wants to deposit is not received by the bank staff for depositing even though valid notes are given and no reason is assigned for not accepting the money, the confidence of the depositor is bound to be shaken in the working of the bank.

10. As regards the argument that the word used is 'depositors' and not 'depositor', it may be noticed that the two other witnesses, who were examined by the complainant have stated to have gone to the bank for obtaining some bank drafts, and for obtaining bank draft also the amount, for which the bank draft is to be obtained, along with the commission for the same, had to be deposited before they could have got the bank draft. Those two witnesses also deposed in support of the facts alleged in the complaint petition, which is itself indicative of the fact that they disliked the working of bank where there was refusal by the cashier to accept the amount, that was sought to be deposited by the opposite party. They also said that repeated requests had been made by the opposite party and yet the cashier did not receive the same. If the act of refusal by the cashier to accept the money tendered by the opposite party, who made several requests, was done in the presence of other depositors, I do not think that the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners, based on the use of the plural word 'depositors' and not 'depositor', can be accepted.

11. Now, so far as the word 'calculate(d)' is concerned, it may be noticed that one of the meanings, which has been given to the word 'calculate' is 'to intend'. In criminal law the effect of an act done by an individual is ordinarily presumed to be the intended. If the act of refusal to accept the

valid currency has the effect of undermining the confidence of the people, the effect will be deemed to be intended, and it cannot be argued that the cashier at that time only intended to avoid counting of notes of small value and with that intention he did not receive the notes of small denomination.

12. It may be noticed here that the notes of Rs. 2 were not so numerous that it would have taken a long time in counting the same. According to the complaint petition there were only two hundred notes of Rs. 2 while other notes were of higher denomination. The refusal to receive the same seems, prima facie, to be without any reasonable excuse, and according to the complaint petition itself no reason was given by the cashier as to why he was refusing to accept the same. Learned counsel for the petitioners, of course, has argued on the basis of the statement made by one of the witnesses that there was a huge rush, and so because of paucity of time the cashier could be held to be justified in refusing because of the rush. But I do not think that this line of argument can be accepted. If there was any rush, the bank authority should ensure persons, who had assembled, to come in queue and this cannot be a good excuse for refusing to accept the money that is tendered. Moreover, from the facts alleged in the complaint petition it would appear that the opposite party had made repeated requests to the cashier and this implied that he was definitely not away in the queue but near the counter, wherefrom he could make requests. In such a situation the fact of there being a rush would be a lame excuse for not accepting the amount.

13. I do not think that it is necessary to go into the other meanings of the word 'calculate' (which includes 'to intend') or the word 'undermine' used in Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 36AD of the Act. The obvious intention in prohibiting some act by introduction of the provision of Section 36AD of the Act and making some acts punishable was to ensure proper functioning of the bank in a way which would have ensured that the people may have confidence in the functioning of the bank. But if a cashier at the counter, who has the duty to accept the amount given to him by persons, who want to deposit the money in the bank, refuses for no justifiable reason to accept the money, I think that the depositor's confidence in the working of such bank is bound to be shaken and affected adversely. I am also not impressed by the argument that there are some special features of the case. Nor will it be proper to anticipate whether there is likelihood of conviction or bleak chance of conviction and so the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners on that basis is rejected.

14. I may also observe that the expression 'in any manner' used in Clause (c) of Section 36AD(1) makes its ambit wide and the alleged act of the

cashier, prima facie, will fall in the wide ambit. So, in view of the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted so far as the cashier, petitioner No. 2, is concerned.

15. In view of the reasons indicated above, I allow this petition so far as petitioner No. 1 (Uma Sabnavis) is concerned and the impugned order, so far as that petitioner is concerned, shall stand quashed. So far as petitioner No. 2, Ashok Kumar Mishra (cashier), is concerned, the criminal proceeding shall continue and this petition is dismissed so far as he is concerned.

16. This petition stands, accordingly, disposed of.

17. Any observation made herein or finding given for the purpose of considering the submissions made by counsel will not cause any prejudice to any side in the further proceeding of the case before the trial court.