| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/120134 |
| Subject | ;Service |
| Court | Guwahati High Court |
| Decided On | Jul-25-2008 |
| Judge | U.B. Saha, J. |
| Appellant | Ravinder Pal |
| Respondent | Union of India (Uoi) and ors. |
| Disposition | Petition dismissed |
| Prior history | U.B. Saha, J. 1. The petitioner in this writ petition has sought for setting aside the impugned order dated 7.1.2000 passed by the Deputy Inspector General (Pers), Directorate General, Central Industrial Security Force, Ministry of Home Affairs terminating the service of the petitioner as an Assistant Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force (in short CISF) and also for a direction from this Court for reinstatement of the petitioner in service with effect from the date of his termination |
U.B. Saha, J.
1. The petitioner in this writ petition has sought for setting aside the impugned order dated 7.1.2000 passed by the Deputy Inspector General (Pers), Directorate General, Central Industrial Security Force, Ministry of Home Affairs terminating the service of the petitioner as an Assistant Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force (in short CISF) and also for a direction from this Court for reinstatement of the petitioner in service with effect from the date of his termination granting all service benefits.
2. The pleaded case of the petitioner as stated in the writ petition is that having passed in the Civil Service Examination, 1994 and been recommended, he was appointed to the post of Assistant Commandant in CISF and accordingly, he joined the said post on 8.1.1996. Thereafter, the petitioner was sent to National Industrial Security Academy, Hakimpet, Hyderabad for under going training in various indoor and outdoor subjects. But in the course of training, the petitioner got fracture in his right leg and underwent medical treatment, whereupon, although the training of the Assistant Commandant was held, the petitioner could not attend the rest part of the training. The petitioner joined his first posting at CISF Unit at Khetari Copper Corporation in Rajasthan on 10.4.1997 and then at CISF Unit, Sheetapur on 13.6.1997. From there, he was sent for sector attachment training till 5.7.1997 and from 4.8.97 to 4,11.97, he went on medical leave due to sciatica and disc problem and his leave was regularized. Then the petitioner was directed to proceed to Raj Mahal Camp. On 8.1.1998, the petitioner was staying in a Guest House and at about 5.30 p.m. the petitioner received a telephone call from Sub-Inspector (Ex) R.N.S. Mahapatra that an incident occurred in Hizuketa area where some CISF personnel was injured. The petitioner rushed to ECL hospital at Urjanagar to see the jowans and conducted the enquiry about the occurrence. He also informed the Commandant, ECL, Sheetalpur and lodged FIR with the local police. Thereafter, a show cause notice dated 14.1.1998 was issued asking the petitioner to explain the matter. The petitioner submitted his reply on 24.1.1998 giving detailed explanation, whereupon the respondent No. 4 expressed his displeasure. The petitioner again went on leave for 15 days from 2.5.1998 and he was sick again and subsequently joined on 16.5.1998. The petitioner was asked to proceed on an urgent duty in Kanustaria camp, but the petitioner fell ill. Then again the petitioner was detailed for some course. Later by an order dated 4.6.1999; the petitioner was posted from CISF Unit ECL, Sheetalpur (West Bengal) to CISF Unit, ONGC Tripura. The petitioner went on three days casual leave from 22.7.1999 but till 14.12.1999, he could not resume his duties as he was suffering from jaundice and fever from 29.7.1999 to 11.10.1999 and he had to avail leave on medical advice. He also enjoyed paternity leave from 12.10.1999 to 26.10.1999. He joined his duties on 15.12.1999 and made his explanation for his absence on 17.12.1999. In the meanwhile, a memorandum dated 2.10.1999 (Annexure-11) was issued to the petitioner advising him to improve his shortcomings/lapses to which the petitioner replied on 1.12.1999 (Annexure-12). Thereafter, the impugned order of termination of the services of the petitioner was made on 7.1.2000 as aforesaid.
3. The respondents while filing their counter affidavits contended therein that the petitioner was appointed in the post of Assistant Commandant, CISF on probation for a period of two years with further condition that in case his performance was found unsatisfactory or he failed in the test prescribed basic training, he would be liable to be discharged from service. As per service condition, the petitioner was detailed for basic training in the National Industrial Security Academy, (in short NIS A) Hakimpet, Hyderabad, but he did not take adequate interest to qualify himself in the basic training. In the result, he failed in Paper-VI and X and 9mm pistol firing which was revealed from the result published by NIS A on 26.6.1997 vide Annexure-R 1 to the counter-affidavit, and the petitioner also did not attend the outdoor test due to leg injury. Subsequently, the petitioner was given two more chances to appear at the supplementary test from 24.4.1998 to 2.5.1998 and from 20.10.1998 to 27.10.1998, but in both time, he failed in P.T. and Drill. As such, the result published by NIS A, the petitioner was declared 'not qualified', which would be evident from Annexure-R 2 to the counter-affidavit. Further during the probation period while posted in the vital unit of CISF i.e. Eastem Coal Fields, Seetalpur, the senior officers noticed that (i) the petitioner is in the habit of shirking responsibilities which led to open firing by CISF personnel of Rajmahal camp; (ii) he feigned sickness at RTC, Barwaha where he was detailed to undergo commando course, after reporting late by one week; (3) he obtained medical rest on his being detailed in Panchayat Election duty in West Bengal in May, 1998; (4) he was found hand in glove with the illegal coal mafias during an enquiry by DIG (NEZ), Calcutta. Taking into consideration of his unsatisfactory performance and as he could not qualify himself in the basic training, his probation period was extended up to 7.1.1999 followed by another one year up to 7.1.2000. It is also alleged by the respondents that on 21.5.1998 about 1230 hrs, a CISF party seized a truck loaded with illegal coal and the petitioner instead of encouraging and admiring his subordinates, threatened them and narrating the same a report dated 6.6.98 was submitted by the Deputy Commandant In-charge, vide Annexure-R 10. From a secret enquiry conducted by the Inspector (Exe) confirmed petitioner's close link with Mafias and his attempt to facilitate theft of coal by selected groups. It is also submitted by the respondents that as per existing rules, a Screening Committee headed by the Head of Department, namely, Director General, CISF assessed the suitability of the petitioner and it was decided to extend his probation period for his unsatisfactory performance which was communicated to the petitioner by a office letter dated 20.10.98. Thereafter, by letter dated 5.7.99, the petitioner was advised to improve his performance failing which his service would be terminated any time. But, in the month of July, 1999, after availing three days casual leave from 22.7.99 to 24.7.99, when the petitioner was expected to join duty on 28.7.99, he did not turn up and remained absent without permission. Six call up notices were sent to the petitioner at his leave address directing him to report to the Unit forthwith, but the petitioner was reluctant to receive call up notices and when a Sub-officer was sent and service the call up notice dated 1.11.99, the petitioner reported to the Unit on 15.12.99 after 140 days. As such the act on the part of the petitioner itself showed that the petitioner was irresponsible and he did not take care to improve his performance and when even after advising for many times, the performance of the petitioner was found unsatisfactory during the probation period, his service was terminated by the competent authority vide order dated 7.1.2000.
4. From the pleadings of the parties, the questions that arise to decide the fate of writ petition are as follows:
(1) Whether a probationer like the petitioner appointed against the permanent post can be treated as a temporary employee and whether a probationer can be terminated in exercise of power under the provision of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 and whether the order of termination of service of the writ petitioner is a stigmatic or punitive one and/or bad in law.
5. Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, learned senior Counsel in support of the pleaded case of the petitioner would contend that the impugned order of termination is not an order simpliciter, but a stigmatic one which has a civil consequence as it would be evident from the record when produced before this Court that the order of termination is the result of so called misconduct relating to alleged mafia link with the petitioner for which an enquiry was conducted by the respondent No. 4 behind the back of the petitioner without affording any opportunity to him to defend those allegations. He also contended that the Court cannot interfere with the order of termination simpliciter, but the Court has the power for interfering with the order of termination when the said order is stigmatic one. Whether the said order is stigmatic or not, to find out the real nature of the order, the court is supposed to lift the veil and after opening the veil, if it is found by the Court that there is direct nexus between the charge so levelled and the action taken, then the Court should interfere with the said order of termination. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India : (1984)ILLJ337SC . He further contended that the allegations made by the respondents against the petitioners were that petitioner was in the habit of shirking responsibilities which led to open fire by CISF personnel of Rajmahal camp and he feigned sickness at RTC Barwaha where he was detailed to undergo commando course and he obtained medical rest on being detailed in panchayat election duty in West Bengal and further allegation that he was found hand and glove with the illegal coal mafia during the enquiry by DIG (NEZ), Calcutta are nothing but the foundation of the order of termination, not the motive and it is settled by the Apex Court that if the termination order is founded on the basis of misconduct, then that should be considered as a stigmatic one and liable to be quashed. In support of his aforesaid contention, he referred to the decision of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar reported in : (2006)ILLJ718SC wherein their lordship of the Apex Court while discussing the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences (1999) 3 SCC 60 stated that in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) after referring to various decisions, it was interpreted as to when a simple order of termination is treated as foundation on the allegations of misconduct and whether the complaint should be only a motive for passing such simple order of termination. Mr. Bhattacharjee particularly relied on Para-21 of the said judgment quoted therein. Placing reliance on the aforesaid decision, Mr. Bhattacharjee further contended that the impugned order of termination was made on the foundation of the allegations like mafia link with the petitioner by a secret enquiry without holding any regular enquiry as contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. He also contended that the petitioner could not attend and complete the training in all subjects due to fracture he got in his legs and for other ailments and during the period of probation up to 17.5.1997, no superior authority passed any adverse remarks against the petitioner. But his misfortune started when he was posted to CISF Unit Sheetalpur where he joined on 13.6.97 under the respondent No. 4 and it is the respondent No. 4 who forced and impressed his cause against the petitioner on several occasions and conducted the said enquiry relating to alleged mafia links and also proposed for termination of the petitioner while he was on probation and the petitioner was also not provided with two supplementary test in addition to final test for P. T. and drill although same was provided to other candidates which itself is a discriminatory one. He further contended when the petitioner was ready to proceed on 25.5.1998, suddenly the petitioner was vomiting and he was sent to the Central Govt. Hospital at kala, where he was treated and the said matter was accordingly informed to the Deputy Commandant, but the respondent No. 4 issued a warning that it was a case of malingering sickness which was purposefully done by the respondent No. 4 to foil the service record of the petitioner. Mr. Bhattacharjee further contended that the letter dated 5.7.1999 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) was received by the petitioner from the office of the Deputy Commandant, CISF Unit ONGC, Tripura whereby the petitioner was intimated that by the letter dated 25.9.99, the Director General, CISF as Chairman of the Scrutiny Committee assessed the suitability and the performance of the petitioner and found unsatisfactory based on report of the respondent No. 4 who was inimical to the petitioner and as a result, the probation period of the petitioner was extended, but no specific fact as to why the performance of the petitioner had not been found satisfactory was mentioned therein. According to him, an officer appointed on probation is observed for his performance but not for finding his fault. And it is required to point out the shortcomings of him with a view to provide him opportunity to rectify and/or correct himself. But in the case of the petitioner there was no such endeavour, rather respondent 4 always tried to find out some shortcomings of the petitioner instead of developing the performance of the petitioner. Mr. Bhattacharjee finally contended that the impugned termination order under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services), 1965 is impermissible and illegal and liable to be quashed as the said termination order is not a termination simpliciter, but an order of termination with stigma attached which is in violation of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
6. Mr. Biswas, learned Assistant SG on the other hand submits that it is an admitted position that the petitioner was appointed in CISF subject to condition that he would be under probation for two years and failure to complete the probation period to the satisfaction of the competent authority or failure to pass the prescribed test required will render him liable to be discharged from service and admittedly at the time of issuance of the impugned order of termination, the petitioner was on probation and a probationer has no right to be continued in service if the authority is not satisfied with his performance. He also contended that the impugned order of termination not only passed under Sub-section (1) of Rule (5) of Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, but also under the provisions of Para-1 (viii) of the conditions of the offer of appointment of the petitioner. Therefore, the order of termination is in accordance with the terms and conditions of the offer of appointment as well as in accordance with the conditions contained in the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, order of termination is a punitive and/or a stigmatic one. He further submits that the performance and the conduct of the petitioner was not founded as a ground of termination. The enquiry which was made regarding the alleged link of the petitioner with the mafia is a internal enquiry to check up the performance of the petitioner and same is not foundation for the purpose of termination of the petitioner, but alleged misconduct of the petitioner might have provided a motive for passing an order of termination, but not foundation as alleged by the petitioner. He also contended that the Apex Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) and Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences : (2002)ILLJ690SC , after survey of most of the earlier decisions observed as to when an order of termination can be treated as simpliciter and when it can be treated as punitive one and also when a stigma is said to be attached to an employee discharged during the period of probation. He relied upon the aforesaid judgment to support the case of the respondents to show that there is no direct nexus between the charge levelled and action taken, mere making of some enquiry or examination of complaints received by the authority against an employee, who is a probationer, for assessment his over all performance would not vitiate the simple order of termination on the ground of alleged stigma. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied on the case of Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore v. Dr. Pandurang GodwaIkar reported in : (1993)ILLJ308SC , which are quoted below:
6. Generally in connection with an order of termination, a question is raised before the court as to what is the motive behind the termination of the service of the employee concerned-whether the reason mentioned in the order of termination has to be accepted on its face value or the background in which such order of termination simpliciter has been passed should be examined to find out as to whether an officer on probation or holding a temporary appointment has been, in fact, dismissed from the service without initiating any departmental enquiry. If an employee who is on probation or holding an appointment on temporary basis is removed from the service with sigma because of some specific charge, then a plea cannot be taken that as his service was temporary or his appointment was on probation, there was no requirement of holding any enquiry, affording such an employee an opportunity to show that the charge levelled against him is either not true or it is without any basis. But whenever the service of an employee is terminated during the period of probation or while his appointment is on temporary basis, by an order of termination simpliciter after some preliminary enquiry it cannot be held that as some enquiry had been made against him before the issuance of order of termination it really amounted to his removal from service on a charge as such penal in nature.
7. When an appointment is made on probation, it presupposes that the conduct, performance, ability and the capacity of the employee concerned have to be watched and examined during the period of probation. He is to be confirmed after the expiry of probation only when his service during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory and he is considered suitable for the post against which he has been appointed. The principle of tearing off the veil for finding out the real nature of the order shall be applicable only in a case where the Court is satisfied that there is a direct nexus between the charge so levelled and the action taken. If the decision is taken, to terminate the service of an employee during the period of probation, after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or inaction on the part of such employee then it cannot be said that it amounts to his removal from service as punishment. It need not be said that the appointing authority at the stage of confirmation or while examining the question as to whether the service of such employee be terminated during the continuance of the period of probation, is entitled to look into any complaint made in respect of such employee while discharging his duties for purpose of making assessment of the performance of such employee.
8. Even if such employee while questioning the validity of an order of termination simpliciter brings on the record that some preliminary enquiry or examination of some allegations had been made, that will not vitiate the order of termination. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Mohd. S. Iskender Ali where it was pointed out that a temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period 'only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained.' It was also said that even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the influencing factor which induced the employer to terminate the service of the employee which such employer admittedly had under the terms of the appointment, such termination cannot be held to be penalty or punishment. Same view has been reiterated in connection with appointment on temporary or ad hoc basis in the cases of Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation Ltd. (1987) Supp SCC 739, State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla : [1991]1SCR29 and Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524.
7. He also relied and referred to the decision of this Court in the case of Tapas Lal Banik v. State of Tripura 2000 (2) GUT 351: (2000) 2 GLR 586 wherein this Court also considered the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), the case of State of U.P. v. Premlata Misra (Km) : (1995)ILLJ28SC , State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla (1991) 1 SCC 671.
8. Mr. Biswas finally referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the State of U.P. v. Ram Bachan Tripathi (2005) 6 SCC 496 wherein their Lordship while examining the plea regarding stigma stated that usually a stigma is understood to be something that is detraction from the character or reputation of a person. It is a blemish, imputation, a mark or label indicating a deviation from a norm. Their lordship also held that mere description of a background fact cannot be called a stigma.
9. This Court has given anxious thought to the submissions of the learned Counsel of the parties as well as the records available before this Court including relevant file from which the impugned order of termination was originated as produced by the learned Assistant SG and law reports cited by the learned Counsel for the parties. In the case of Tapas Lal Banik (supra), this Court discussed what is stigma. A 'stigma' is something that detracts from the character or reputation of a person, a mark, sign etc. according to the Webster's New World Dictionary. The Legal Thesuras' by Burton, says 'stigma' indicates blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute, imputation, mark of disgrace or shame. The Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives the meaning of 'Stigma' as a mark or label indicating a deviation from a norm.
10. At this stage, to appreciate the submissions of the learned Counsel of the parties as well as the law reports, it would be profitable to quote the impugned termination order. Accordingly, the said impugned order of termination dated 7.1.2000 issued by the Deputy Inspector General (Pers) is reproduced below:
In pursuance of the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule-5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules-1965 and Para-1 (viii) of offer of appointment, the President, hereby, terminates forthwith the services of Shri Ravinder Pal, Assistant Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force and directs that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice at the same rates at which he was drawing immediately before the termination of his service, or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month.
By order and in the nameof the PresidentSd/-7.1.2000
Deputy Inspector General (PERS)
Station: New DelhiDated: 07 Jan' 2000Shri Ravinder PalAssistant Commandant,CISF Unit, ONGC Tripura
11. In the case of Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar (supra), the Apex Court held that whenever the service of an employee is terminated during the period of probation or while his appointment is on temporary basis, by an order of termination simpliciter. after some preliminary enquiry it cannot be held that as some enquiry had been made against him before the issuance of order of termination it really amounted to his removal from service on a charge as such penal in nature. When an appointment is made on probation, it pre-supposes that the conduct, performance, ability and the capacity of the employee concerned have to be watched and examined during the period of probation. He is to be confirmed after the expiry of probation only when his service during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory and he is considered suitable for the post against which he has been appointed. Not only that, their Lordship also held that the principle of tearing of the veil for finding out the real nature of the order shall be applicable only in a case where the Court is satisfied that there is a direct nexus between the charge so levelled and the action taken. If the decision is taken, to terminate the service of an employee during the period of probation after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or inaction on the part of such employee then it cannot be said that it amounts to his removal from service as punishment. In Prem Lata Misra (Km) (supra), the Apex Court held that termination is in terms of the order of appointment and therefore, it is not by way of punishment as a punitive measure and accordingly, need to conduct an enquiry into the alleged misconduct does not arise and termination of service in terms of contract is held to be valid. The Apex Court in that case while considering the doctrine 'lift the veil theory' stated inter alia that it is settled law that the court can lift the veil of the innocuous order to find whether it is the foundation or motive to pass the offending order. If misconduct is the foundation to pass the order then an enquiry into misconduct should be conducted and an action according to law should follow. But if it is motive, it is not incumbent upon the competent officer to have the enquiry conducted and the service of the temporary employee could be terminated in terms of the order of the appointment and Rules giving one month's notice or pay/salary in lieu thereof. Even if an enquiry was initiated, it could be dropped in. the mid way and action could be taken in terms of the Rules or order of appointment. The said enquiry was virtually an intra-departmental enquiry to assess the performance of the petitioner during the probation period.
12. In the instant case, there is nothing mentioned in the termination order that the said order is passed in view of the enquiry conducted by the respondent No. 4 as well as for the petitioner's link with the mafia's, rather it appears that the termination order is innocuous one. However, as Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order was passed due to mala fide action of the respondent No. 4 and the alleged misconduct is the foundation of the termination, this Court to satisfy itself and to pronounce the satisfactory judgment feels it necessary to call for the original records/files relating to the termination of the petitioner to find out whether the result of the enquiry conducted by the respondent No. 4 is the foundation of the termination or the same is the motive.
13. As called for, the learned Assistant SG also placed the relevant files and after survey, it appears from the record, particularly, the file from which the order of termination was originated, this Court finds that the respondent 4 enquired regarding information received by him relating to petitioner's link with mafia as the same was his duty being a superior officer as he is to report the necessary information regarding the performance of the petitioner to the ultimate authority i.e. the Director General of CISF who will confirm the petitioner's service after completion of the probation period. This Court is of the considered opinion that the order of termination is to be treated as not founded on the allegations of alleged misconduct and complaints, rather the result of the enquiry, at best can be said as motive for passing the instant termination order. It is also noticed from the record that the respondent No. 4 received confidential report from Sri N.R. Rao, the Deputy Commandant regarding the suspicious activities on the part of the petitioner and the aforesaid enquiry was made on those allegations and the report to watch the conduct, performance, ability and the capacity of the petitioners as he was a probationer before his service is confirmed. This Court is unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee, inter alia that in the case of the petitioner there was no endeavour, rather the respondent No. 4 was always trying to find out some shortcomings of the petitioner instead of developing the performance of the petitioner with mala fide intention and he also did not file counter-affidavit in the instant writ proceedings for refuting the allegations made against him
14. It is found from the record that the scrutiny committee held by the Director General, CISF assessed the suitability of the petitioner and decided to extend his period of probation which was also informed him vide letter dated 20.10.98 and thereafter also he was advised vide letter dated 5.7.99 to improve his performance failing which his service would be terminated. Therefore, it can be easily said that the petitioner was provided opportunity to develop himself for confirmation/regularization of his service, but he failed to do so and took the plea of mala fide against the respondent No. 4 Mala fide means dishonest intention or corrupt motive in the exercise of power or a deliberately malicious or fraudulent purpose, on the part of the decision maker. Mala fide includes those cases where the motive force behind an action is personal animosity spite, vengeance, personal gratification or benefit to the concerned authority or its friends or relatives as stated in paragraph 005.189 of the Halsbury's Laws of India (Vol. 1). It is also noticed by this Court that the respondent No. 4 though did not file separate counter affidavit refuting the allegations of the petitioner, but counter-affidavit has been filed by one Amar Kanti Sarkar, Group Commandant, CISF on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 4 did not refute the allegations. If for the argument sake, this Court accepts the submissions of Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior Counsel, then also the petitioner cannot absolve himself from the liability of proving the allegations of mala fide as alleged. By this time, it is settled that the allegations must be direct, specific and precise to sustain a plea of mala fide and broad and general allegations of bad faith against the concerned authority do not suffice. The plea of mala fide cannot be sustained by the Court on the basis of mere probabilities. The burden of proving mala fides rests on the person who seeks to invalidate an order on this ground. However, suspicious, allegations of mala fides, bereft of details and unsupported by acceptable evidence, are not recognized by law. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that action has been taken mala fide for any such consideration or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand. In the instant case, this Court has already stated that the respondent No. 4 enquired regarding the information received by him relating to petitioner's link with mafia as the same was his duty being a superior officer as it is necessary to report the necessary information regarding the performance of the petitioner to the Director General of the CISF, ultimately who will confirm the petitioner's service after completion of the probation period. Therefore, it can be easily held that there was no mala fide intention on the part of the respondent No. 4 towards the petitioner and the petitioner also failed to make out any specific case of mala fide against the respondent No. 4. Mere non-refuting the allegations by the person against whom the allegation is made will not prove the case of the mala fide. It is the duty of the person raised allegation to prove the same placing the specific materials in support of his allegation. Not only that it also appears from the record that the petitioner while availing three days casual leave and expected to join duty on 28.7.95, he did not turn up and remained absent without permission.
15. In the backdrop what has been stated herein above and principle laid down by the Apex Court in the cases cited above and this being the position that the petitioner was admittedly a probationer and his service was not confirmed and the termination order was not founded on the basis of the alleged enquiry, it is held that the impugned order of termination was passed in view of the terms of the order of appointment and related Rules, therefore, no interference is called for.
16. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. There shall be no order as to costs.
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