State of Madhya Pradesh Thr. Principal Secretary Vs. Mahendra Gupta - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/1192864
CourtSupreme Court of India
Decided OnFeb-08-2018
Case Number29578 / 2017
JudgeHON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
AppellantState of Madhya Pradesh Thr. Principal Secretary
RespondentMahendra Gupta
Advocates:Arjun Garg
Excerpt:
1 reportable in the supreme court of india civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal no.1562 of 2018 (arising out of slp(c) no.35738 of 2017) state of madhya pradesh through principal secretary & anr.    ... appellants versus mahendra gupta & ors.    ... respondents j u d g m e n t ashok bhushan, j.the   state   of   madhya   pradesh   is   in   appeal   against   the judgment   of   division   bench   of   the   high   court   of   madhya pradesh, bench at gwalior dated 22.03.2017 by which judgment writ appeal filed by the state questioning the judgment of the learned single judge dated 17.03.2015 has been dismissed.  2. the parties shall be described as referred to in the writ petition. the facts giving rise to this appeal are: the   writ   petitioners   have   permanent   permit   for   two 2 routes, one gwalior to bhander and second gwalior to datia. respondent no.3 has also the permanent permit for the route gwalior   to   jhansi.   respondent   no.3   preferred   an   application for modification of time schedule for movement of his vehicle. the application of respondent no.3 came for hearing before the state   transport   authority   on   16.10.2014.   on   the   date   of hearing both counsel for the applicant as well as counsel for the   objectors   were   heard.   the   state   transport   authority allowed   the   modification   and   decided   to   change   the   time schedule as prayed by the applicant in the public interest. the   order   was   issued   by   the   state   transport   authority   on 15.12.2014.   aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   15.12.2014,   writ petition no.883 of 2015 was filed by the two petitioners who were  objectors  before  the  state  transport  authority.  in  the writ   petition   various   grounds   were   taken   questioning   the application   filed   by   the   applicant­pawan   arora.   one   of   the grounds   taken   before   the   learned   single   judge   was   that although   the   state   transport   authority   heard   the   matter   on 16.10.2014 consisted of chairperson and two members, however, the order was delivered with the signatures of chairperson and only one member, since one member, shri sanjay choudhary was transferred   in   the   meanwhile,   hence,   the   order   dated 15.12.2014 is illegal. the learned single judge accepted the contention   of   the   writ   petitioners   and   allowed   the   writ petition by setting aside the order dated 15.12.2014.  3 3. the state of madhya pradesh filed writ appeal challenging the judgment of the learned singe judge. the state contended before the division bench of the high court that there was no illegality   in   the   order   issued   by   the   chairperson   and   one member,   although,   it   was   heard   by   three   members   when   the meeting   took   place   on   16.10.2014.   the   division   bench dismissed the appeal upholding the view of the learned single judge.4. learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in   support   of   the appeal contends that under the madhya pradesh motor vehicles rules,   1994   quorum   of   the   meeting   of   the   state   transport authority is three ­ chairman plus two members and quorum was complete when the meeting was held on 16.10.2014, the decision delivered   by   the   majority   of   the   members   is   in   no   manner illegal. it is submitted that after hearing, one member was transferred   and   was   not   available   to   be   part   of   the   order issued on 15.12.2014. it is submitted that even it is assumed that   one   member   was   not   agreeing   with   the   decision   of   two other members, although, there is no such pleading or material on   the   record,   the   decision   taken   by   the   majority   of   the 4 members   was   fully   valid   and   there   was   no   infirmity   in   the order   dated   15.12.2014.   it   is   submitted   that   the   learned single   judge   as   well   as   division   bench   committed   error   in taking the view that the order dated 15.12.2014 was an illegal order.5. learned counsel for the respondents supported the order of the high court and contends that when one member who heard the matter on 16.10.2014 was not available, no decision could have been taken by the state transport authority. he submits that   the   matter   was   heard   by   three   members,   hence   decision could   have   been   issued   only   by   three   members   and   the   views taken by the learned single judge and division bench are in accordance with law.6. we have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.7. the motor vehicles act, 1988 provides for constitution of a   state   transport   authority   to   exercise   and   discharge   the powers   and   functions   as   specified   in   sub­section   (3)   of section 68. section 68(1) and 68(3) are quoted below: "68.transport   authorities.­(1)   the   state government   shall,   by   notification   in   the official   gazette,   constitute   for   the   state   a 5 state   transport   authority   to   exercise   and discharge   the   powers   and   functions   specified in sub­section (3), and shall in like manner constitute   regional   transport   authorities   to exercise   and   discharge   throughout   such   areas (in   this   chapter   referred   to   as   regions)   as may   be   specified   in   the   notification,   in respect of each regional transport authority; the powers and functions conferred by or under this chapter on such authorities:  provided   that   in   the   union   territories, the   administrator   may   abstain   from constituting any regional transport authority. (2) .................................... (3)   the   state   transport   authority   and   every regional transport authority shall give effect to any directions issued under section 67 and the   state   transport   authority   shall,   subject to   such   directions   and   save   as   otherwise provided   by   or   under   this   act,   exercise   and discharge   throughout   the   state   the   following powers and functions, namely :­ (a) to co­ordinate and regulate the activities and   policies   of   the   regional   transport authorities, if any, of the state ;  (b)   to   perform   the   duties   of   a   regional transport   authority   where   there   is   no   such authority   and,   if   it   thinks   fit   or   if   so required by a regional transport authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions;  (c)   to   settle   all   disputes   and   decide   all matters on which differences of opinion arise between regional transport authorities;  [(ca)   government   to   formulate   routes   for playing stage carriages;]. and   (d) to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed.”  6 8. the   rules   have   been   framed   by   the   state   of   madhya pradesh,   namely,   the   madhya   pradesh   motor   vehicles   rules, 1994.   chapter   v   of   the   rules   contains   heading   “control   of transport   vehicles”.  rule   63   provides   for   state   transport authority. rule 63(4) to (7) are quoted as below:“63. state transport authority.­  (4)   the   state   transport   authority   shall meet   at   such   time   and   at   such   place   as   the chairman may appoint. (5) not less than three days' notice shall be   given   to   a   member   of   the   meeting   of   the state transport authority. (6) the quorum to constitute a meeting of the   state   transport   authority   shall   be   the chairman   or   the   nominated   chairman   under   the sub­rule   (7)   and   two   other   members   (whether official   or   non­official).   if   within   hall   an hour from the time appointed for the meeting a quorum is not completed, the meeting shall be adjourned   to   such   day   and   at   such   time   and place as the chairman or the acting chairman nominated   under   sub­rule   (7)   may   appoint   and no   quorum   is   necessary   for   holding   the adjourned meeting. (7) the chairman, if unable to attend the meeting,   shall   nominate   a   member   to   act   as chairman at the meeting.” 9. rule   64   provides   for   regional   transport   authority   and rule 65 is for conduct of business of transport authorities. rule 65(2) to 65(4) are as follows:65.   conduct   of   business   of   transport authorities. ­  7 (2) the state or regional transport authority, as the case may be, may decide any matter of urgent nature without holding a meeting by the majority   of   votes   of   members   by   recorded   in writing and send to the secretary (hereinafter referred to as the procedure by circulation). (3) in the event of procedure by circulation being   followed,   the   secretary   shall   send   to each   member   of   the   transport   authority   such particulars of the matter as may be reasonably necessary   in   order   to   enable   the   member   to arrive   at   a   decision   and   shall   specify   the date by which the votes of members are to be received   in   the   office   of   the   transport authority.   upon   receipt   of   the   votes   of members as aforesaid, the secretary shall lay the   papers   before   the   chairman,   who   shall record the decision by endorsement on the form of application or other document, as the case may   be,   according   to   the   votes   received   and the   vote   or   votes   cast   by   the   chairman.   the record   of   the   votes   cast   shall   not   be available for inspection by any person save by a   member   of   the   transport   authority   at   a regularly constituted meeting of the transport authority.   no   decision   shall   be   made   upon procedure   by   circulation,   if   before   the   date by which the voles of members are required to reach   the   office   of   the   transport   authority, not less than one­third of the members of the transport   authority   have   given   notice   in writing   to   the   secretary   demanding   that   the matter   be   referred   to   a   meeting   of   the transport authority. (4)   the   number   of   votes,   excluding   the chairman's   second   or   casting   vote,   necessary for a decision to be taken upon procedure by circulation shall not be less than the members necessary to constitute a quorum. xxx xxx xxx xxx 8 10. the facts of the case, as noted above, reveal that state transport authority convened the meeting of the authority by issuing the agenda for 16.10.2014. in addition to chairperson, two   members   ­   shri   sanjay   chaudhary,   transport   commissioner and   shri   rajiv   sharma,     chief   engineer,   public   works department were present in the meeting. the applicant as well as the counsel for the objectors were heard on 16.10.2014. the decision of the committee was issued on 15.12.2014 which was signed   by   the   chairperson   and   only   one   member,   shri   rajiv sharma, since, after the date of the hearing and before the issuance of the order one member, shri sanjay chaudhary was transferred. the copy of the order dated 15.12.2014 has been brought on record as annexure p­1 which clearly mentions the date   of   hearing,   i.e.,   16.10.2014.   it   is   useful   to   extract only the relevant parts of the order for the present case: "the state transport authority,  madhya pradesh motimahal, gwalior agenda serial no.71 case no.2159/2014  hearing on 16.10.2014 before:1. pramod agrawal principal secretary, madhya pradesh government transport department, bhopal   chairperson 9 2.3. sanjay chaudhary transport commissioner madhya pradesh, gwalior   member rajiv sharma chief engineer  public works department, gwalior   member ... ... ... ... ... ... listing   the   aforesaid   application submitted by the applicant for hearing in the meeting of the state transport authority dated 16.10.2014 the same was included in the agenda and published on the departmental website and the   notice   board   of   the   office   and   all regional/   additional   regional   /   district transport   office.   the   objections   of   the aforesaid   drivers   were   obtained   until   the aforesaid fixed date. the   case   was   presented   in   the   meeting dated   16.10.2014   of   the   state   transport authority. on the day of hearing, on behalf of the parties their appointed counsels appeared, who were heard. ... ... ... ... … … note:   since   one   member   shri   sanjay   chaudhary of   the   authority   was   transferred   after hearing,   the   aforesaid   order   is   being   passed by   the   chairperson   and   one   member   chief engineer of the authority. sd/­    member sd/­    member state transport authority        state transport authority madhya pradesh”11. the   only   issue   which   needs   to   be   considered   in   this 10 appeal is as to whether, when in the meeting dated 16.10.2014 the chairperson and two members had heard the application for the   change   of   the   time   schedule,   the   order   could   have   been passed   allowing   the   application   by   the   two   members (chairperson and one member) alone, since the order was signed only by the chairperson and one member, on 15.12.2014.12. the statutory provisions of the motor vehicles act, 1988 as   well   as   the   madhya   pradesh   motor   vehicles   rules,   1994 indicate that the state transport authority is a multi­member body constituted by the state government under section 68(1). the   state transport authority is a multi­member body which transacts   business   in   meeting   except   in   case   of   emergency. meeting is to be convened at such time and at such place as the chairman may appoint. three days' notice is required to be given to the members and quorum of the meeting is the chairman or the nominated chairman and two other members, i.e., quorum is three. in the present case, there is no dispute that when the meeting was held on 16.10.2014 quorum was complete since chairperson and two members were present which fact is clearly noticed in the order dated 15.12.2014 as extracted above. the three   members   who   were   present   in   the   meeting   heard   the applicant and objectors. but the order could be issued only on 15.12.2014, by which one of the members had been transferred 11 and was not available to sign  the order. one more important fact which is to be noticed is that learned single judge had categorically   noted   that   the   above   issue   was   raised   only during the hearing before the learned single judge and there was no pleading in the writ petition. in paragraph 16 of the judgment,   learned   single   judge   himself   has   noticed   the following:"6. the last question raised by the parties is about the competency of the sta in passing the impugned order.  although there is no pleading in   this   regard   in   this   petition.   however, learned   senior   counsel,   shri   k.n.   gupta   has not   disputed   the   fact   that   the   matter   was heard by three members and order is passed by two members.....” 13. the   multi­member   body   transacts   its   business   after debate, consultation and discussion. the view of multi­member body is expressed unanimously or by votes. for various kind of decisions   by   multi­member   body   special   majorities   are   also provided   for   acceptance   of   the   decision.   normally,   all decisions of a multi­member body are expressed by opinion of majority   of   the   members   present   except   where   the   special majorities are provided in the statute itself.14. shackleton  on   the   “law   and   practice   of   meetings”, eleventh   edition   while   discussing   the   majority   has   stated following in paragraph 7­30. relevant parts of paragraphs 7­30 12 and 7­31 are quoted below: "4. ?majority definition 7­30 majority is a term signifying the greater number.   in   legislative   and   deliberative assemblies, it is usual to decide questions by a majority of those present and voting. this is sometimes expressed as a “simple” majority, which   means   that   a   motion   is   carried   by   the mere   fact   that   more   votes   are   cast   for   than against   ,   as   distinct   from   a   “special” majority   where   the   size   of   the   majority   is critical.  the   principle   has   long   been   established that   the   will   of   a   corporation   or   body   can only be expressed by the whole or a majority of its members, and the act of a majority is regarded as the act of the whole. a majority vote binds the minority 7­31   unless   there   is   some   provision   to   the contrary   in   the   instrument   by   which   a corporation   is   formed,   the   resolution   of   the majority, upon any question, is binding on the majority   and   the   corporation,   but   the   rules must be followed.” 15. although   rules,   1994   do   not   expressly   provide   that decision of the state transport authority shall be taken in accordance with the opinions of the majority but there being no special majority provided for decision to be taken in the meeting of the   state transport authority, normal, rule that decision   by   majority   of   the   members   present   has   to   be followed. in the present case when three members were present and quorum was complete, the decision taken by majority, i.e., opinion of two members shall form the valid decision of the state transport authority. 13 16. rule   65   sub­section   (2)   of   the   rules   dealing   with   the conduct of business of transport authorities provides:“65(2)   the   state   or   regional   transport authority, as the case may be, may decide any matter   of   urgent   nature   without   holding   a meeting by the majority of votes of members by recorded in writing and send to the secretary (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   procedure   by circulation).” 17. thus, the concept of taking decision by majority of votes of   the   members   is   very   much   present   in   the   scheme   of   the rules.   although,   where   a   decision   is   to   be   taken   by   the circulation by votes a special majority is provided in rule 65(4) but present being not a case of decision by circulation, simple majority by members present was sufficient for making a binding decision by the state transport authority.18. in   paragraph   18.1   of   the   judgment,   the   division   bench observed that: "18.1. in the instant case there is nothing on record   to   indicate   that   the   sta with complete quorum heard the matter and before one of the members shri sanjay chaudhry was   transferred   out   any   draft   order   was   got approved from the said transferred member.” 14 19. the above observation was made by the division bench of the high court while distinguishing the judgment of this court in  ramaswamy nadar v. the state of madras, air 1958 sc 56. before   we   refer  to   the   decision  of   this  court   in  ramaswamy nadar,  it is clear that observation of the division bench of the   high   court   that   there   is   nothing   on   record   to   indicate that the quorum of state transport  authority was complete, is factually  wrong.   the  order  of  the  state  transport  authority dated 15.12.2014 has been brought on record as annexure p­1 and the relevant portion of the order has been extracted above by us which clearly mentions that the hearing took place on 16.10.2014 where the chairperson and two members were present the   quorum   being   three   as   per   rule   68(1)   was   complete.   the hearing   took   place   by   three   members   which   is   noted   in   the order   itself,   as   extracted   above.   thus,   observation   of   the division bench of the high court that quorum was not complete and matter was not heard by three members is not correct.20. now, we come to the judgment of this court in  ramaswamy nadar(supra).  in   the   above   case   the   matter   was   heard   by   a bench   of   three   judges   of   this   court   who   after   hearing   had announced the decision of acquittal. draft judgment was also approved by one of the judges who had, however, died before judgment could be delivered. note appended in the judgment was 15 to the following effect: " note sinha, j.when hearing of this appeal was finished last   week   by   a   bench   consisting   of   three   of us,   b.p.   sinha,   p.   govinda   menon   and   j.l. kapur, jj., we announced that we had come to the   conclusion   that   the   appellant   should   be acquitted. we also indicated that the judgment will   be   delivered   the   week   following.   the draft   of   the   judgment   was   sent   to   late   mr. justice menon last week and he had approved of it. what we are now delivering are the reasons of the judges who constituted the bench; but it will be signed by two only of us on account of the unexpected death of mr. justice. menon. k.s.b. appeal allowed.” 21. in   the   above   case   judgment   was   pronounced   with   the concurrence of the three judges. when the hearing took place opinion   of   all   the   three   judges   was   expressed   but   judgment could be signed  by two judges since one of the judges died. although,   the   facts   of   the   above   case   was   little   different i.e. there was material to indicate that the third judge who could not sign had also concurred with the opinion, but in the 16 present   case   there   is   no   pleading   of   third   member   whether agreeing or not agreeing with the decision.   for the present case, we proceed on the premise that the third member did not agree   with   the   decision.   for   the   decisions   of   this   court, article   145   sub­clause   (5)   of   the   constitution   of   india provides that judge of this court can deliver a judgment with the   concurrence   of   a   majority   of   the   judges   present   at   the hearing of the case.22. the   present   is   a  case  where   decision   by   a  multi­member body is to be taken in the meeting of the committee as per the statutory   rules.   there   being   no   such   majority   provided   for taking a decision, the decision by majority has to be accepted as the opinion of the state transport authority.23. two   more   cases,   which  were   relied  by   the   appellant   and noticed by the high court need to be noted.  the privy council judgment   in  gokal   chand­   jagan   nath  vs.  nand   ram   das­   atma ram, air (1938) p.c. 292, is relevant for the present case. in the   appeal   before   the   privy   council,   judgment   of   the   high court was assailed on the ground that the two hon'ble judges of   the   high   court   heard   the   matter,   although,   both   judges concurred   with   the   judgment,   but   one   judge   went   on   leave 17 before   signing   the   judgment,   which   was   signed   by   only   one judge.     the   privy   council   repelled   the   contention   and   held that   signing   by   one   of   the   judges   at   best   was   only irregularity, not affecting the merits of the case.  following was laid down in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8:­“6.   a   further   point   was   raised   by   the appellants.   they   urged   that   the   judgment   of the high court appealed from was not a valid judgment   because   it   failed   to   comply   with order   xli,   rule   31,   of   the   code   of   civil procedure.   the   relevant   facts   on   this   issue are   that   the   hearing   in   the   high   court   was before   two   judges,   harrison   and   agha   haider jj., and was actually delivered by the former judge,   the   latter   agreeing.   the   judgment   was delivered on february 22, 1933.   but harrison j. went on leave before signing the judgment, which was signed by agha haider j., the deputy registrar   appending   a   note   that   harrison   j.had gone on leave before signing the judgment he delivered.7.   order   xli,   rule   31   requires   that   the judgment   of   the   appellate   court   shall   be   in writing   and   shall   state   various   matters,   and "shall   at   the   time   that   it   is   pronounced   be signed and dated by the judge or by the judges concurring therein."  8.   the   rule   does   not   say   that   if   its requirements   are   not   complied   with   the judgment   shall   be   a   nullity.   so   startling   a result   would   need   clear   and   precise   words. indeed   the   rule   does   not   even   state   any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled. the   time   is   left   to   be   defined   by   what   is reasonable. the rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to   a   judgment.   it   is   intended   to   secure certainty   in   the   ascertainment   of   what   the 18 judgment   was.   it   is   a   rule   which   judges   are required   to   comply   with   for   that   object.   no doubt in practice judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. but accidents may happen. a   judge   may   die   after   giving   judgment   but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign   it.   the   court   must   have   inherent jurisdiction to supply such a defect. the case of   a   judge   who   has   gone   on   leave   before signing   the   judgment   may   call   for   more comment,   but   even   so   the   convenience   of   the court   and   the   interest   of   litigants   must prevail. the defect is merely an irregularity. but in truth the difficulty is disposed of by sections   99   and   108   of   the   civil   procedure code. section 99 provides that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any   error,   defect   or   irregularity   in   any proceedings   in   the   suit,   not   affecting   the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. that section conies in the part dealing with   appeals   from   original   decrees.   but section   108   applies   the   same   provision   to appeals   from   appellate   decrees   and   it   is always in the discretion of the board to apply the   principle   on   appeal   to   his   majesty   in council.   in   their   lordships'   judgment,   the defect here was an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court, and is no ground for setting aside the decree. ”24. another judgment, which was cited by the appellant was a. shanta rao vs. state transport appellate tribunal, hyderabad & ors., air 1985 a.p. 256.  in the above case, state transport appellate   tribunal   consisting   of   chairman   and   two   members heard the matter.  however, the order was issued only with the signature of chairman.   the order was attacked on the ground that the other two members having not signed the order, the order   is   illegal.     repelling   the   contention   following   was stated in paragraph 9:­ 19 “9. on the  first  question,  i  am of the  view that once the minutes of the state transport authority   are   found   to   be   signed   by   all   the members including the chairman, the mere fact that the final order is communicated under the signature   of   the   chairman   alone   does   not amount to any illegality. the court has to see the substance of the matter and not the mere form, and if it is clear that all the members of the tribunal have applied their mind to the facts of the case and arrived at a conclusion, it   does   not   matter   if   the   communication   is made under the signature of the chairman. ”  25. although,   in   above   two   cases,   there   was   concurrence   of all the members of court/tribunal but all had not signed the order.     the   present   is   a   case   where   chairperson   and   two members heard the application in meeting dated 16.10.2014 but order was subsequently pronounced on 15.12.2014 and signed by only chairperson and one member.  the third member having been transferred in the meanwhile.   as noticed above, there is no pleading in the writ petition as to whether the third member, who was transferred had agreed with the proposed order or did not agree with the decision, which was to be delivered by the state   transport   authority.     had   third   member   agreed,   there cannot be any debate in this matter, the issues being covered 20 by   judgment   of   this   court   in  ramaswamy   nadar(supra)  and judgment   of   the   privy   council   in  gokal   chand   ­jagan   nath (supra). but there being neither any pleading nor any material to   come   to   the   conclusion   that   the   third   member   has   agreed with   the   opinion,   we   have   proceeded   to   examine   the   present case as if,   the third member did not agree with the order proposed.   we have already noticed the reason for coming to the conclusion that the order issued by the state transport authority, signed by the chairperson and one member is a valid order having been issued with the majority opinion of two out of three, who heard the application on 16.10.2014.   thus, in any view of the matter, no illegality can be attached with the order  dated  15.12.2014,  which  was  signed   by  the  chairperson and one member.                      26. in   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   we   are   of   the opinion   that   decision   dated   15.12.2014   issued   with   the signatures of chairperson and one member was a valid decision in spite of the fact that one of the members who was present in the hearing when the meeting took place on 16.10.2014 and had been transferred in the meanwhile did not sign the order. the decision of the state transport authority dated 15.12.2014 was   fully   in   accordance   with   the   statutory   scheme   of   the rules,   1994   and   both   the   learned   single   judge   and   division bench erred in holding the decision as invalid. we, thus, are of   the   view   that   judgments   of   learned   single   judge   and division bench do not express the correct view of the law. 21 27. in the result, the appeal is allowed and judgments of the high court are set aside. ...............................j.( a.k. sikri ) ...............................j.( ashok bhushan ) new delhi, february 08, 2018.
Judgment:

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1562 OF 2018 (arising out of SLP(C) No.35738 of 2017) STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY & ANR.    ... APPELLANTS VERSUS MAHENDRA GUPTA & ORS.    ... RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

The   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   is   in   appeal   against   the judgment   of   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior dated 22.03.2017 by which judgment writ appeal filed by the State questioning the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17.03.2015 has been dismissed.  2. The parties shall be described as referred to in the writ petition. The facts giving rise to this appeal are: The   writ   petitioners   have   permanent   permit   for   two 2 routes, one Gwalior to Bhander and second Gwalior to Datia. Respondent No.3 has also the permanent permit for the route Gwalior   to   Jhansi.   Respondent   No.3   preferred   an   application for modification of time schedule for movement of his vehicle. The application of Respondent No.3 came for hearing before the State   Transport   Authority   on   16.10.2014.   On   the   date   of hearing both counsel for the applicant as well as counsel for the   objectors   were   heard.   The   State   Transport   Authority allowed   the   modification   and   decided   to   change   the   time schedule as prayed by the applicant in the public interest. The   order   was   issued   by   the   State   Transport   Authority   on 15.12.2014.   Aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   15.12.2014,   Writ Petition No.883 of 2015 was filed by the two petitioners who were  objectors  before  the  State  Transport  Authority.  In  the writ   petition   various   grounds   were   taken   questioning   the application   filed   by   the   applicant­Pawan   Arora.   One   of   the grounds   taken   before   the   learned   Single   Judge   was   that although   the   State   Transport   Authority   heard   the   matter   on 16.10.2014 consisted of Chairperson and two members, however, the order was delivered with the signatures of Chairperson and only one member, since one member, Shri Sanjay Choudhary was transferred   in   the   meanwhile,   hence,   the   order   dated 15.12.2014 is illegal. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention   of   the   writ   petitioners   and   allowed   the   writ petition by setting aside the order dated 15.12.2014.  3 3. The State of Madhya Pradesh filed writ appeal challenging the judgment of the learned Singe Judge. The State contended before the Division Bench of the High Court that there was no illegality   in   the   order   issued   by   the   Chairperson   and   one member,   although,   it   was   heard   by   three   members   when   the meeting   took   place   on   16.10.2014.   The   Division   Bench dismissed the appeal upholding the view of the learned Single Judge.

4. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in   support   of   the appeal contends that under the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules,   1994   quorum   of   the   meeting   of   the   State   Transport Authority is three ­ Chairman plus two members and quorum was complete when the meeting was held on 16.10.2014, the decision delivered   by   the   majority   of   the   members   is   in   no   manner illegal. It is submitted that after hearing, one member was transferred   and   was   not   available   to   be   part   of   the   order issued on 15.12.2014. It is submitted that even it is assumed that   one   member   was   not   agreeing   with   the   decision   of   two other members, although, there is no such pleading or material on   the   record,   the   decision   taken   by   the   majority   of   the 4 members   was   fully   valid   and   there   was   no   infirmity   in   the order   dated   15.12.2014.   It   is   submitted   that   the   learned Single   Judge   as   well   as   Division   Bench   committed   error   in taking the view that the order dated 15.12.2014 was an illegal order.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the order of the High Court and contends that when one member who heard the matter on 16.10.2014 was not available, no decision could have been taken by the State Transport Authority. He submits that   the   matter   was   heard   by   three   members,   hence   decision could   have   been   issued   only   by   three   members   and   the   views taken by the learned Single Judge and Division Bench are in accordance with law.

6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

7. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for constitution of a   State   Transport   Authority   to   exercise   and   discharge   the powers   and   functions   as   specified   in   sub­section   (3)   of Section 68. Section 68(1) and 68(3) are quoted below: "68.Transport   Authorities.­(1)   The   State Government   shall,   by   notification   in   the Official   Gazette,   constitute   for   the   State   a 5 State   Transport   Authority   to   exercise   and discharge   the   powers   and   functions   specified in sub­section (3), and shall in like manner constitute   Regional   Transport   Authorities   to exercise   and   discharge   throughout   such   areas (in   this   Chapter   referred   to   as   regions)   as may   be   specified   in   the   notification,   in respect of each Regional Transport Authority; the powers and functions conferred by or under this Chapter on such Authorities:  Provided   that   in   the   Union   territories, the   Administrator   may   abstain   from constituting any Regional Transport Authority. (2) .................................... (3)   The   State   Transport   Authority   and   every Regional Transport Authority shall give effect to any directions issued under section 67 and the   State   Transport   Authority   shall,   subject to   such   directions   and   save   as   otherwise provided   by   or   under   this   Act,   exercise   and discharge   throughout   the   State   the   following powers and functions, namely :­ (a) to co­ordinate and regulate the activities and   policies   of   the   Regional   Transport Authorities, if any, of the State ;  (b)   to   perform   the   duties   of   a   Regional Transport   Authority   where   there   is   no   such Authority   and,   if   it   thinks   fit   or   if   so required by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions;  (c)   to   settle   all   disputes   and   decide   all matters on which differences of opinion arise between Regional Transport Authorities;  [(ca)   Government   to   formulate   routes   for playing stage carriages;]. and   (d) to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed.”

  6 8. The   Rules   have   been   framed   by   the   State   of   Madhya Pradesh,   namely,   the   Madhya   Pradesh   Motor   Vehicles   Rules, 1994.   Chapter   V   of   the   Rules   contains   heading   “Control   of Transport   Vehicles”.  Rule   63   provides   for   State   Transport Authority. Rule 63(4) to (7) are quoted as below:

“63. State Transport Authority.­  (4)   The   State   Transport   Authority   shall meet   at   such   time   and   at   such   place   as   the Chairman may appoint. (5) Not less than three days' notice shall be   given   to   a   member   of   the   meeting   of   the State Transport Authority. (6) The quorum to constitute a meeting of the   State   Transport   Authority   shall   be   the Chairman   or   the   nominated   Chairman   under   the sub­rule   (7)   and   two   other   members   (whether official   or   non­official).   If   within   hall   an hour from the time appointed for the meeting a quorum is not completed, the meeting shall be adjourned   to   such   day   and   at   such   time   and place as the Chairman or the acting Chairman nominated   under   sub­rule   (7)   may   appoint   and no   quorum   is   necessary   for   holding   the adjourned meeting. (7) The Chairman, if unable to attend the meeting,   shall   nominate   a   member   to   act   as Chairman at the meeting.”

9. Rule   64   provides   for   Regional   Transport   Authority   and Rule 65 is for Conduct of Business of Transport Authorities. Rule 65(2) to 65(4) are as follows:

65.   Conduct   of   Business   of   Transport Authorities. ­  7 (2) The State or Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may decide any matter of urgent nature without holding a meeting by the majority   of   votes   of   members   by   recorded   in writing and send to the Secretary (hereinafter referred to as the procedure by circulation). (3) In the event of procedure by circulation being   followed,   the   Secretary   shall   send   to each   member   of   the   Transport   Authority   such particulars of the matter as may be reasonably necessary   in   order   to   enable   the   member   to arrive   at   a   decision   and   shall   specify   the date by which the votes of members are to be received   in   the   office   of   the   Transport Authority.   Upon   receipt   of   the   votes   of members as aforesaid, the Secretary shall lay the   papers   before   the   Chairman,   who   shall record the decision by endorsement on the form of application or other document, as the case may   be,   according   to   the   votes   received   and the   vote   or   votes   cast   by   the   Chairman.   The record   of   the   votes   cast   shall   not   be available for inspection by any person save by a   member   of   the   Transport   Authority   at   a regularly constituted meeting of the Transport Authority.   No   decision   shall   be   made   upon procedure   by   circulation,   if   before   the   date by which the voles of members are required to reach   the   office   of   the   Transport   Authority, not less than one­third of the members of the Transport   Authority   have   given   notice   in writing   to   the   Secretary   demanding   that   the matter   be   referred   to   a   meeting   of   the Transport Authority. (4)   The   number   of   votes,   excluding   the Chairman's   second   or   casting   vote,   necessary for a decision to be taken upon procedure by circulation shall not be less than the members necessary to constitute a quorum. xxx xxx xxx xxx 8 10. The facts of the case, as noted above, reveal that State Transport Authority convened the meeting of the Authority by issuing the Agenda for 16.10.2014. In addition to Chairperson, two   members   ­   Shri   Sanjay   Chaudhary,   Transport   Commissioner and   Shri   Rajiv   Sharma,     Chief   Engineer,   Public   Works Department were present in the meeting. The applicant as well as the counsel for the objectors were heard on 16.10.2014. The decision of the Committee was issued on 15.12.2014 which was signed   by   the   Chairperson   and   only   one   member,   Shri   Rajiv Sharma, since, after the date of the hearing and before the issuance of the order one member, Shri Sanjay Chaudhary was transferred. The copy of the order dated 15.12.2014 has been brought on record as Annexure P­1 which clearly mentions the date   of   hearing,   i.e.,   16.10.2014.   It   is   useful   to   extract only the relevant parts of the order for the present case: "THE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,  MADHYA PRADESH MOTIMAHAL, GWALIOR Agenda Serial No.71 Case No.2159/2014  Hearing on 16.10.2014 Before:

1. Pramod Agrawal Principal Secretary, Madhya Pradesh Government Transport Department, Bhopal   Chairperson 9 2.

3. Sanjay Chaudhary Transport Commissioner Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior   Member Rajiv Sharma Chief Engineer  Public Works Department, Gwalior   Member ... ... ... ... ... ... Listing   the   aforesaid   application submitted by the applicant for hearing in the meeting of the State Transport Authority dated 16.10.2014 the same was included in the agenda and published on the Departmental Website and the   notice   board   of   the   Office   and   all regional/   additional   regional   /   District Transport   Office.   The   objections   of   the aforesaid   Drivers   were   obtained   until   the aforesaid fixed date. The   case   was   presented   in   the   meeting dated   16.10.2014   of   the   State   Transport Authority. On the day of hearing, on behalf of the parties their appointed counsels appeared, who were heard. ... ... ... ... … … Note:   Since   one   member   Shri   Sanjay   Chaudhary of   the   Authority   was   transferred   after hearing,   the   aforesaid   order   is   being   passed by   the   Chairperson   and   one   member   Chief Engineer of the Authority. Sd/­    Member sd/­    Member State Transport Authority        State Transport Authority Madhya Pradesh”

11. The   only   issue   which   needs   to   be   considered   in   this 10 appeal is as to whether, when in the meeting dated 16.10.2014 the Chairperson and two members had heard the application for the   change   of   the   time   schedule,   the   order   could   have   been passed   allowing   the   application   by   the   two   members (Chairperson and one member) alone, since the order was signed only by the Chairperson and one member, on 15.12.2014.

12. The statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as   well   as   the   Madhya   Pradesh   Motor   Vehicles   Rules,   1994 indicate that the State Transport Authority is a multi­member body constituted by the State Government under Section 68(1). The   State Transport Authority is a multi­member body which transacts   business   in   meeting   except   in   case   of   emergency. Meeting is to be convened at such time and at such place as the Chairman may appoint. Three days' notice is required to be given to the members and quorum of the meeting is the Chairman or the nominated Chairman and two other members, i.e., quorum is three. In the present case, there is no dispute that when the meeting was held on 16.10.2014 quorum was complete since Chairperson and two members were present which fact is clearly noticed in the order dated 15.12.2014 as extracted above. The three   members   who   were   present   in   the   meeting   heard   the applicant and objectors. But the order could be issued only on 15.12.2014, by which one of the members had been transferred 11 and was not available to sign  the order. One more important fact which is to be noticed is that learned Single Judge had categorically   noted   that   the   above   issue   was   raised   only during the hearing before the learned Single Judge and there was no pleading in the writ petition. In paragraph 16 of the judgment,   learned   Single   Judge   himself   has   noticed   the following:

"6. The last question raised by the parties is about the competency of the STA in passing the impugned order.  Although there is no pleading in   this   regard   in   this   petition.   However, learned   senior   counsel,   Shri   K.N.   Gupta   has not   disputed   the   fact   that   the   matter   was heard by three members and order is passed by two members.....”

13. The   multi­member   body   transacts   its   business   after debate, consultation and discussion. The view of multi­member body is expressed unanimously or by votes. For various kind of decisions   by   multi­member   body   special   majorities   are   also provided   for   acceptance   of   the   decision.   Normally,   all decisions of a multi­member body are expressed by opinion of majority   of   the   members   present   except   where   the   special majorities are provided in the statute itself.

14. Shackleton  on   the   “Law   and   Practice   of   Meetings”, Eleventh   Edition   while   discussing   the   majority   has   stated following in paragraph 7­30. Relevant parts of paragraphs 7­30 12 and 7­31 are quoted below: "

4. ?MAJORITY Definition 7­30 Majority is a term signifying the greater number.   In   legislative   and   deliberative assemblies, it is usual to decide questions by a majority of those present and voting. This is sometimes expressed as a “simple” majority, which   means   that   a   motion   is   carried   by   the mere   fact   that   more   votes   are   cast   for   than against   ,   as   distinct   from   a   “special” majority   where   the   size   of   the   majority   is critical.  The   principle   has   long   been   established that   the   will   of   a   corporation   or   body   can only be expressed by the whole or a majority of its members, and the act of a majority is regarded as the act of the whole. A majority vote binds the minority 7­31   Unless   there   is   some   provision   to   the contrary   in   the   instrument   by   which   a corporation   is   formed,   the   resolution   of   the majority, upon any question, is binding on the majority   and   the   corporation,   but   the   rules must be followed.”

15. Although   Rules,   1994   do   not   expressly   provide   that decision of the State Transport Authority shall be taken in accordance with the opinions of the majority but there being no special majority provided for decision to be taken in the meeting of the   State Transport Authority, normal, rule that decision   by   majority   of   the   members   present   has   to   be followed. In the present case when three members were present and quorum was complete, the decision taken by majority, i.e., opinion of two members shall form the valid decision of the State Transport Authority. 13 16. Rule   65   sub­section   (2)   of   the   Rules   dealing   with   the conduct of business of Transport Authorities provides:

“65(2)   The   State   or   Regional   Transport Authority, as the case may be, may decide any matter   of   urgent   nature   without   holding   a meeting by the majority of votes of members by recorded in writing and send to the Secretary (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   procedure   by circulation).”

17. Thus, the concept of taking decision by majority of votes of   the   members   is   very   much   present   in   the   scheme   of   the Rules.   Although,   where   a   decision   is   to   be   taken   by   the circulation by votes a special majority is provided in Rule 65(4) but present being not a case of decision by circulation, simple majority by members present was sufficient for making a binding decision by the State Transport Authority.

18. In   paragraph   18.1   of   the   judgment,   the   Division   Bench observed that: "18.1. In the instant case there is nothing on record   to   indicate   that   the   STA with complete quorum heard the matter and before one of the members Shri Sanjay Chaudhry was   transferred   out   any   draft   order   was   got approved from the said transferred member.”

14 19. The above observation was made by the Division Bench of the High Court while distinguishing the judgment of this Court in  Ramaswamy Nadar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56. Before   we   refer  to   the   decision  of   this  Court   in  Ramaswamy Nadar,  it is clear that observation of the Division Bench of the   High   Court   that   there   is   nothing   on   record   to   indicate that the quorum of State Transport  Authority was complete, is factually  wrong.   The  order  of  the  State  Transport  Authority dated 15.12.2014 has been brought on record as Annexure P­1 and the relevant portion of the order has been extracted above by us which clearly mentions that the hearing took place on 16.10.2014 where the Chairperson and two members were present the   quorum   being   three   as   per   Rule   68(1)   was   complete.   The hearing   took   place   by   three   members   which   is   noted   in   the order   itself,   as   extracted   above.   Thus,   observation   of   the Division Bench of the High Court that quorum was not complete and matter was not heard by three members is not correct.

20. Now, we come to the judgment of this Court in  Ramaswamy Nadar(supra).  In   the   above   case   the   matter   was   heard   by   a Bench   of   three   Judges   of   this   Court   who   after   hearing   had announced the decision of acquittal. Draft judgment was also approved by one of the Judges who had, however, died before judgment could be delivered. Note appended in the judgment was 15 to the following effect: " NOTE SINHA, J.

When hearing of this appeal was finished last   week   by   a   Bench   consisting   of   three   of us,   B.P.   Sinha,   P.   Govinda   Menon   and   J.L. Kapur, JJ., we announced that we had come to the   conclusion   that   the   appellant   should   be acquitted. We also indicated that the judgment will   be   delivered   the   week   following.   The draft   of   the   judgment   was   sent   to   late   Mr. Justice Menon last week and he had approved of it. What we are now delivering are the reasons of the Judges who constituted the Bench; but it will be signed by two only of us on account of the unexpected death of Mr. Justice. Menon. K.S.B. Appeal allowed.”

21. In   the   above   case   judgment   was   pronounced   with   the concurrence of the three judges. When the hearing took place opinion   of   all   the   three   Judges   was   expressed   but   judgment could be signed  by two Judges since one of the Judges died. Although,   the   facts   of   the   above   case   was   little   different i.e. there was material to indicate that the third Judge who could not sign had also concurred with the opinion, but in the 16 present   case   there   is   no   pleading   of   third   member   whether agreeing or not agreeing with the decision.   For the present case, we proceed on the premise that the third member did not agree   with   the   decision.   For   the   decisions   of   this   Court, Article   145   sub­clause   (5)   of   the   Constitution   of   India provides that judge of this Court can deliver a judgment with the   concurrence   of   a   majority   of   the   Judges   present   at   the hearing of the case.

22. The   present   is   a  case  where   decision   by   a  multi­member body is to be taken in the meeting of the Committee as per the statutory   Rules.   There   being   no   such   majority   provided   for taking a decision, the decision by majority has to be accepted as the opinion of the State Transport Authority.

23. Two   more   cases,   which  were   relied  by   the   appellant   and noticed by the High Court need to be noted.  The Privy Council judgment   in  Gokal   Chand­   Jagan   Nath  Vs.  Nand   Ram   Das­   Atma Ram, AIR (1938) P.C. 292, is relevant for the present case. In the   appeal   before   the   Privy   Council,   judgment   of   the   High Court was assailed on the ground that the two Hon'ble Judges of   the   High   Court   heard   the   matter,   although,   both   judges concurred   with   the   judgment,   but   one   Judge   went   on   leave 17 before   signing   the   judgment,   which   was   signed   by   only   one Judge.     The   Privy   Council   repelled   the   contention   and   held that   signing   by   one   of   the   Judges   at   best   was   only irregularity, not affecting the merits of the case.  Following was laid down in Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8:­

“6.   A   further   point   was   raised   by   the appellants.   They   urged   that   the   judgment   of the High Court appealed from was not a valid judgment   because   it   failed   to   comply   with Order   XLI,   Rule   31,   of   the   Code   of   Civil Procedure.   The   relevant   facts   on   this   issue are   that   the   hearing   in   the   High   Court   was before   two   Judges,   Harrison   and   Agha   Haider JJ., and was actually delivered by the former Judge,   the   latter   agreeing.   The   judgment   was delivered on February 22, 1933.   But Harrison J. went on leave before signing the judgment, which was signed by Agha Haider J., the Deputy Registrar   appending   a   note   that   Harrison   J.

had gone on leave before signing the judgment he delivered.

7.   Order   XLI,   Rule   31   requires   that   the judgment   of   the   appellate   Court   shall   be   in writing   and   shall   state   various   matters,   and "shall   at   the   time   that   it   is   pronounced   be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein."  8.   The   Rule   does   not   say   that   if   its requirements   are   not   complied   with   the judgment   shall   be   a   nullity.   So   startling   a result   would   need   clear   and   precise   words. Indeed   the   Rule   does   not   even   state   any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled. The   time   is   left   to   be   defined   by   what   is reasonable. The Rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to   a   judgment.   It   is   intended   to   secure certainty   in   the   ascertainment   of   what   the 18 judgment   was.   It   is   a   rule   which   Judges   are required   to   comply   with   for   that   object.   No doubt in practice Judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. But accidents may happen. A   Judge   may   die   after   giving   judgment   but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign   it.   The   Court   must   have   inherent jurisdiction to supply such a defect. The case of   a   Judge   who   has   gone   on   leave   before signing   the   judgment   may   call   for   more comment,   but   even   so   the   convenience   of   the Court   and   the   interest   of   litigants   must prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity. But in truth the difficulty is disposed of by Sections   99   and   108   of   the   Civil   Procedure Code. Section 99 provides that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any   error,   defect   or   irregularity   in   any proceedings   in   the   suit,   not   affecting   the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. That Section conies in the part dealing with   appeals   from   original   decrees.   But Section   108   applies   the   same   provision   to appeals   from   appellate   decrees   and   it   is always in the discretion of the Board to apply the   principle   on   appeal   to   His   Majesty   in Council.   In   their   Lordships'   judgment,   the defect here was an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court, and is no ground for setting aside the decree. ”

24. Another judgment, which was cited by the appellant was A. Shanta Rao Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad & Ors., AIR 1985 A.P. 256.  In the above case, State Transport Appellate   Tribunal   consisting   of   Chairman   and   two   members heard the matter.  However, the order was issued only with the signature of Chairman.   The order was attacked on the ground that the other two members having not signed the order, the order   is   illegal.     Repelling   the   contention   following   was stated in Paragraph 9:­ 19 “9. On the  first  question,  I  am of the  view that once the minutes of the State Transport Authority   are   found   to   be   signed   by   all   the members including the Chairman, the mere fact that the final order is communicated under the signature   of   the   Chairman   alone   does   not amount to any illegality. The Court has to see the substance of the matter and not the mere form, and if it is clear that all the members of the Tribunal have applied their mind to the facts of the case and arrived at a conclusion, it   does   not   matter   if   the   communication   is made under the signature of the Chairman. ”  25. Although,   in   above   two   cases,   there   was   concurrence   of all the members of Court/Tribunal but all had not signed the order.     The   present   is   a   case   where   Chairperson   and   two members heard the application in meeting dated 16.10.2014 but order was subsequently pronounced on 15.12.2014 and signed by only Chairperson and one member.  The third member having been transferred in the meanwhile.   As noticed above, there is no pleading in the writ petition as to whether the third member, who was transferred had agreed with the proposed order or did not agree with the decision, which was to be delivered by the State   Transport   Authority.     Had   third   member   agreed,   there cannot be any debate in this matter, the issues being covered 20 by   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Ramaswamy   Nadar(supra)  and judgment   of   the   Privy   Council   in  Gokal   Chand   ­Jagan   Nath (supra). But there being neither any pleading nor any material to   come   to   the   conclusion   that   the   third   member   has   agreed with   the   opinion,   we   have   proceeded   to   examine   the   present case as if,   the third member did not agree with the order proposed.   We have already noticed the reason for coming to the conclusion that the order issued by the State Transport Authority, signed by the Chairperson and one member is a valid order having been issued with the majority opinion of two out of three, who heard the application on 16.10.2014.   Thus, in any view of the matter, no illegality can be attached with the order  dated  15.12.2014,  which  was  signed   by  the  Chairperson and one member.                      26. In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   we   are   of   the opinion   that   decision   dated   15.12.2014   issued   with   the signatures of Chairperson and one member was a valid decision in spite of the fact that one of the members who was present in the hearing when the meeting took place on 16.10.2014 and had been transferred in the meanwhile did not sign the order. The decision of the State Transport Authority dated 15.12.2014 was   fully   in   accordance   with   the   statutory   scheme   of   the Rules,   1994   and   both   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   Division Bench erred in holding the decision as invalid. We, thus, are of   the   view   that   judgments   of   learned   Single   Judge   and Division Bench do not express the correct view of the law. 21 27. In the result, the appeal is allowed and judgments of the High Court are set aside. ...............................J.

( A.K. SIKRI ) ...............................J.

( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 08, 2018.