| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/1184448 |
| Court | Mumbai Nagpur High Court |
| Decided On | Jun-09-2016 |
| Case Number | Writ Petition Nos. 527 of 2016 & 528 of 2016 |
| Judge | S.B. Shukre |
| Appellant | M.I.D.C. Prakalpgrast Majur Kamgar and Another |
| Respondent | Amravati District Labour Co-operative Society's Union Ltd. and Another |
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties.
2. By these writ petitions the petitioners have challenged the legality and correctness of the order dated 11.1.2016 passed by the District Co-operative Election Officer-cum-District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Amravati. Both the petitioners are the Co-operative Societies registered under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (in short, Act, 1960 ) and the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 (in short, Rules, 1961 ). They are classified as producer societies in view of the Rule 10(1) of the Rules 1961. The respondent No.1, in both the writ petitions, is a Federal Society to which the petitioners-Societies are affiliated and respondent No.2, in both the writ petitions, is the Election Officer appointed for conducting the elections of respondent No.1-Society.
3. On 1st September, 2009, there was an election of respondent No.1 Society in which the existing executive body of respondent No.1 was got elected. It's term, however, expired on 31st August, 2014, it being for a period of 5 years as per the bye-laws of respondent No.1-Society. But, no elections were proposed and held immediately or within reasonable time thereafter. On 19.12.2015, the respondent No.2 declared a temporary election programme in which provisional voters list dated 31.10.2014 was referred to. On going through the provisional voters list dated 31.10.2014 the petitioners learnt that only 14 members out of 96 were included therein as the voters and the petitioners did not find their names mentioned in the voters list. The reason for exclusion of their names from the voters list learnt to be that both the petitioners-societies were considered as defaulters. Therefore, the petitioners in Writ Petition No.527 and petitioner in Writ Petition No.528/2016 filed written objections with the respondent No.2 on 29.12.2015 respectively. They also prayed for inclusion of their names as voters in the voters list.
4. Pursuant to the objections taken by both the petitioners, the respondent No.2 by notice dated 5.1.2016 called upon both the petitioners to remain present for hearing before him on 11.1.2016 along with receipts showing payment of arrears of dues of respondent No.1, relevant proceeding books, no dues certificate issued by the respondent No.1 and other necessary documents.
5. After hearing all the petitioners, the respondent No.2 by common order passed on 12th January, 2016 rejected the objections on the ground that the petitioners were defaulters in clearing the arrears of the society within the meaning of Section 27(2) read with Section 73CA(1) of the Act, 1960 and Rule 6 of the Maharashtra Co-operative (Election to Committee) Rules 2014 (in short, Rules, 2014 ). It is this order which has been challenged in both these writ petitions and it being a common order both these writ petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment.
6. I have heard Shri Chitaley, learned counsel for both the petitioners, Shri A.M. Ghare, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and Shri S.B. Ahirkar along with Ms. T.H. Udeshi, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.2. With their assistance, I have carefully gone through the paper book of both the petitions including the impugned order.
7. Shri Chitaley, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners in order to attract the provision of Section 27(10) of the Act, 1960 should have been the loan defaulters and even if it is assumed just for the sake of argument, that both the petitioners were defaulters as contemplated under Section 27(10) still the provisions of Section 73CA(1) together with Rule 58 of the Rules, 1961 would require that a notice is given to the concerned members regarding non-payment of their arrears, before order of cessation of membership is issued by the Registrar. He submits, relying upon the Full Bench Judgment in the case of Narayan s/o. Gujabrao bhoyar vs. Yeotmal Zilla Parishad Karmachari Sahakari Pat Sanstha Maryadit, Yeotmal and another, reported in 2009(6) ALL MR 674, that issuance of such notice of hearing before passing an order of cessation of membership is a must and Section 73CA (1) cannot interpreted to mean that disqualification from being a voter is incurred automatically. He further submits that there cannot be any automatic disqualification and order to that effect must be passed after granting hearing to the affected parties. He further submits that there is a difference between knowledge of default and grant of opportunity of hearing. He also relies upon the case of Dadan Ram and others vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 2008 SC 588.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that even on facts the impugned order cannot be sustained as alleged notice given by the respondent No.1-Federal Society dated 7.12.2015 was not received by the petitioners and there is no credible proof placed on record by the respondent No.1 regarding receipt of said notice by the petitioners. He also submits that this notice, on the face of it, is of doubtful nature as there are some overwritings on it.
9. Learned counsel also submits that after said notice dated 5.12.2015, the petitioners were allotted some works by the respondent No.1 and this fact itself would show that the petitioners were not in arrears of any dues to the respondent No.1 or otherwise the respondent No.1 would not have allotted any works to the petitioners after December 2015. He also submits that exclusion of voting right of the petitioners amounts to loss of membership of a Federal Society and, therefore, a declaration as defaulter by following the proper procedure by the competent authority is necessary, which has not been done in the present case. Thus, he submits that the impugned order is bad in law, requiring interference by this Court and granting of consequential benefits to the petitioners.
10. Shri A.M. Ghare, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 Federal Society in both the petitions submits that the contesting election is a statutory right and not a fundamental right. He further submits that both the petitioners were defaulters as contemplated under Section 27(10) of the Act, 1960. He further submits that even the reply filed by the petitioners only mentioned that they were active members with no loan having been taken by them and that they were ready to pay dues, if any. He submits that the petitioners, however, did not produce any no dues certificates and did not prove the fact that there were no arrears of respondent No.1-Society due and payable to it by them. He submits that after publication of provisional voters list on 19.12.2016, as per the election programme, the petitioners had ample time till the date of filing of nomination papers, which was 25.1.2016, to pay the dues which they did not fruitfully utilized.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 further submits that under Section 26 of the Act, 1960 rights and duties of members are prescribed and it is laid down that a member shall be entitled to exercise such rights as are provided in the Act and shall be obliged to perform such duties as are mentioned in Subsection (2). He further submits that under Section 27, the voting powers of the members of a Society are regulated and in it's sub-Section (10), it is specifically prescribed that if a member is a defaulter as provided in the explanation to clause (i) of Section 73CA (1), such member shall have no right to vote in the affairs of the society. He submits that since this is a case wherein the petitioners, the members of respondent No.1-Federal Society, have not lost their membership of the respondent No.1-So ciety but have only lost their voting powers, the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners would not be applicable to the facts of this case and according to him, those cases deal with a post election disqualification scenario. He submits that even otherwise, opportunity of hearing is built in where a case falls under Section 27(10) of the Act, 1960, and the same is available three times, at preparation of provisional voters list, at preparation of final voters list and at the time of filing of nomination papers, which was not availed of by the petitioners.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 further submits that even on facts, the submissions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners are incorrect. He submits that both the petitioners knew that there were some arrears of respondent No.1-Society which were required to be cleared by both the petitioners and this could be ascertained from their balance-sheets. He also submits that their own bye-laws would show that in case of default, there would not be available any voting right. He further submits that alternate remedy under Section 91 of the Act, 1960 being available to the petitioners, must be resorted in this case by them. Thus, according to him, there is no merit in these petitions.
13. Shri S.B. Ahirkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent No.2 submits that now almost entire process of the elections has been completed with the declaration of results of elections and as such there is no scope for any interference. He also submits that the petitioners are not remedyless as Section 91 provides adequate and effective remedy for redressal of their grievances.
14. The impugned order rejecting the objections taken by both the petitioners has been passed by invoking the provisions of Section 27(10) of the Act, 1960 read with Rule 6 of the Rules, 2014. Section 27 is about voting powers of the members and its sub-Section (10) takes away the voting right if the member commits default in repayment of loan. Sub-Section (10) of Section 27 reads as follows:
If a member has taken a loan from the society, such member shall, whenever he is a defaulter, as provided in the Explanation to clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 73CA have no right to vote in the affairs of the society.
15. It is clear from the above provision of law that a member would have no right to vote if he commits default in repayment of the loan taken from the Society. The petitioners are the members of the respondent No.1 Federal Society and, therefore, as per this provision of law, they would have no right to vote if it is found that they have taken loan from the respondent No.1-Society and committed default in repayment of the same. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, neither of the petitioners has taken any loan from the respondent No.1-Society and, therefore, there is no question of committing any default in repaying the same. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 as well as learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.2 do not agree. They submit that the term loan used in sub-section (10) of Section 27 is wide enough to include any debt in the nature of supervision charges for the services availed of by any member from the respondent No.1-Society. I think learned counsel for respondent No.1 and learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.2 are right in making the said submission. The concept of default in repaying the loan propounded by Section 27(10) has wide amplitude. It involves all kinds of debts incurred by a member towards his or it's Society. This is because of the fact that sub-Section (10) clarifies as to who is a defaulter and uses for it only clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 73CA. It must be emphasised here that the use has been made only of clause (i) of Section 73CA (1) and not the entire Section 73CA (1). Clause (i) provides for inclusive definition of the said term by giving a detailed explanation containing clauses (a) to (f). All these clauses refer to various situations giving rise to acquisition by the member f the attributes of a defaulter. Some of the situations are failure to repay the crop loan of a primary agricultural credit Society [clause (a)], failure to pay any of the installments of loan taken from a term lending Society [clause (b)], failure to repay the advance or failure to pay purchase price of any goods or commodity or charges for availing of any services taken from any other Society [clause (c)], failure to pay any of the installments of loan taken from non-agricultural credit Society [clause (d)] and so on and so forth. In this case, the charge is that the petitioners failed to pay the supervision charges of the respondent No.1-Federal Society for the services availed of by them from the respondent No.1 and, therefore, clause (c)(ii) of the Explanation would be relevant, which reads thus:
a member who has purchased any goods or commodities on credit or availed himself of any services from the society for which charges are payable; and fails to repay the full amount of such anamat or advance or pay the price of such goods or commodities or charges for such service, after receipt of notice of demand by him from the concerned society or within thirty days from the date of withdrawal of anamat or advance by him or from the date of delivery of goods to him or availing of services by him whichever is earlier;
16. It is clear from the above Explanation that a member ualifies himself or itself to be termed the defaulter if the member, after having availed of any services from the Society for which charges are payable, fails to pay the charges therefor within 30 days from the date of availing of the services or immediately upon receipt of the demand notice, whichever is earlier. It is also clear that once a member avails of any service from the Society which is chargeable, such member is liable to pay the charges immediately on demand or on his or it's own within 30 days from the date of availing of the service, whichever is earlier. A member cannot say that unless and until a demand notice is received by him or it, the charges for the service availed of need not be paid. A statutory duty has been cast upon the member to pay the service charges even without waiting for a demand notice to be received, within a maximum period of 30 days from the availment of the service. This Explanation thus widens the amplitude of the term defaulter and consequently also broadens the connotation of the word loan by laying down that any failure to pay either the loan or price of the goods or the service charges, would take the member within the category defaulter . Section 27(10), therefore, would have to be understood as referring to all debts incurred in repayment of anything of which is covered by the Explanation to clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 73CA and it cannot be restricted to only the amount which is borrowed by a member from the Society. The word loan is inextricably linked with the term defaulter which is defined in widest possible range in Explanation to clause (i) of Section 73CA (1) covering all kinds of debts and situations giving rise to indebtness to society as specifically and particularly stated therein. Therefore, I find no substance in the argument that the words loan and defaulter used in Section 27(10) have a very narrow meaning restricted only to the traditional concepts of loan and defaulter of loan wherein there is borrowing of an amount and failure to repay it.
17. In this case, it is seen that the programme regarding finalizing provisional voters list prepared by respondent No.1 was published by respondent on 19.12.2015. As per this programme, the provisional voters list dated 31.10.2014 was to be published on 21.12.2015 and the objections on the provisional voters list were to be filed between 21.12.2015 and 13.12.2015. It is further seen that final voters list was to be published on 13.1.2016. As names of the petitioners were missing from the provisional voters list, the petitioners filed their objections with respondent No.2. The petitioner in Writ Petition No.527/2016 filed its objection on 29.12.2015 and petitioner in Writ Petition No.528/2016 filed its objection on 28.12.2015. In these objections, none of the petitioners specifically mentioned that they were not in arrears of dues to the respondent No.1-Federal Society. They also did not file along with the objections any receipts issued by respondent No.1-Society acknowledging receipt of payment of arrears including supervision charges by them. The petitioner in Writ Petition No.527/2016 contended that it did not take any loan from the respondent No.1 and that it was regularly paying the maintenance charges and so could not be considered as defaulter. It was also stated that the respondent No.1 did not make available to it any information regarding arrears of dues and if there were any, it had the capacity to clear the same. The petitioner in Writ Petition No.528/2016 in it's objection specifically stated that its proposed representative, Shri Anil Purushottam Tatte, was not the defaulter of the petitioners-Society and, therefore, said representative could not be denied voting right. As said earlier, this objection too did not state in a specific manner that the petitioner-Society was not in arrears of any dues to the respondent No.1-Society.
18. Even then, by the notice issued on 5.1.2016, the respondent No.2 called upon the petitioners to not only to remain present for hearing, but also to produce before him receipts showing making of payment of the arrears of respondent No.1-Society, no dues certificates issued by respondent No.1-Society and other relevant documents. Admittedly, neither such receipts nor any no dues certificates were produced by the petitioner-Societies. Therefore, respondent No.2, by invoking the provisions of Section 27(10) of the Act 1961 read with Rule 6, Rules 2014 passed the impugned order on 12.1.2016 rejecting the objections on the ground that the petitioner-Societies having not cleared the arrears of dues of respondent No.1-Society, were the defaulters and as such found that their names could not be included in the final voters list. 19. The above referred facts clearly establish on record that both the petitioner-Societies were given adequate hearing and sufficient opportunity to prove that they were not the defaulters, but the opportunity was not availed of by them. The right to vote is a creation of statute as observed in the case of Pandurang Laxman Kadam and others, reported in 2016(1) ABR 336 (paragraph 47) and would not be available unless the conditions stipulated in the statute are fulfilled. In the instant case, the provision of Section 27(10) imposes a prohibition upon the members right to vote. It lays down that if any member is a defaulter of a Society, he shall have no right to vote. This provision of law takes away the voting right on the happening of the event of commission of default in payment of dues of a society. If it is found that the event has taken place, the consequence of losing of voting right as provided in Section 27(10) follows merely on the happening of the event. There is no provision in Section 27 or anywhere in the Act 1961 that for losing a voting right upon happening of the event mentioned in sub-Section (10) of Section 27, a specific declaration by the Registrar of the Co-operative Society or any other competent Authority to that effect is required. All that is required is giving of adequate opportunity to the member to clear the arrears of dues. Such opportunity, as discussed earlier, has been given to the petitioner-Societies and the same was squandered by them. So, the fact established on record is that the petitioner-societies could not prove that they were not the defaulters or were not in arrears of dues of respondent No.1-Society.
20. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the notice regarding the outstanding dues was not received by both the petitioners though respondent No.1-Society submits that such notice was issued and received by both the petitioners. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the notices were of doubtful nature owing to some overwritings appearing therein. The copies of the notices issued by respondent No.1-Society are annexed to the respective petitions and they do not bear any endorsements regarding their being received by the petitioners. Therefore, only on the basis of copies of these notices it would be difficult to say with any certainty that notices regarding payment of outstanding amount were indeed received by the petitioners. However, the deficiency in this regard has been more than made up when notice dated 5.1.2016 was received by the petitioners. The copy of this notice is forming part of the paper book of both the petitions. By this notice, the petitioners were called upon to produce before the respondent No.2 receipts issued by respondent No.1-Society showing payment of its dues and also the no dues certificates issued by respondent No.1-Society. Even the objections taken by the petitioners sufficiently indicated that the petitioners did have the notice about the charge of default committed by them and that is the reason why the petitioners have mentioned in their respective replies that they should not be considered as defaulters. Therefore, I find no substance in the argument that the petitioners did not have any notice about the charge of commission of defaults by them and that no sufficient opportunity was given to them for clearing the arrears before finalizing the voters list. In fact, the minutes of hearing that took place on 11.1.2016 before the respondent No.2, a copy which has been produced before the Court during the course of hearing and which has been taken on record and marked X for the purpose of identification, shows that the petitioner-Societies, on their oral request, were given time till 4.00 p.m. on 12.1.2016 to clear the arrears of dues of respondent No.1-Society. The fact that the petitioners asked for time to clear the arrears of respondent No.1-Society is sufficient to conclude that the petitioners were conscious of the fact that there were some arrears of respondent No.1 which they were obliged to clear, if they were to retrieve their right to vote. Unfortunately the petitioners inspite of having been given further opportunity did not help themselves.
21. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 submits that the petitioners had knowledge about the outstanding amount of dues and it is reflected from their balance-sheets. The copies of the balance-sheets filed on record show that they relate to previous year and, therefore, do not really help us in reaching a conclusion that as on the date of finalizing of the voters list, the petitioners stood in arrears. However, other facts discussed earlier do establish such knowledge on the part of the petitioners.
22. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that disqualification of the petitioners resulting in deprivation of their voting rights is not automatic and has to be made by a formal declaration issued by the competent authority and it must be preceded by grant of adequate opportunity of hearing. He submits that principles of natural justice requires that such hearing is granted and there is a difference between knowledge about default and grant of hearing. He relies upon the cases of Narayan s/o. Gujabrao Bhoyar (supra) and Dadan Ram and others (supra). According to the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.2 both these cases do not have any application to the facts of the present case as they have been turned on different facts and different provisions of law.
23. In the case of Narayan s/o Gujabrao Bhoyar (supra), the facts were that the petitioner, an elected member of the Managing Committee of Yavatmal Zilla Parishad Karmachari Sahakari Sanstha, had failed to repay the advance taken by him from the Society within a specific period and, therefore, he incurred disqualification for continuing as member of the Managing Committee in terms of Section 73FF of the Act 1961, which Section has been renumbered as Section 73CA by the Maharashtra Act No.16 of 2013 with effect from 14.2.2013. On these facts, the Full Bench of this Court held that declaration of being a defaulter resulting in disqualification as contemplated under Section 73FF (1), now Section 73CA must be made by showing minimum compliance with the principles of natural justice, which will have to be read into the provisions of this Section and it would mean that the competent forum would have to issue a notice/intimation calling upon the member of the Committee to show cause as to why he be not declared as a defaulter. The facts of the instant case are entirely different. The issue involved in the instant case is not of incurring of disqualification for continuing as a member of a Committee as contemplated under Section 73CA (1) but is of not removing the prohibition or the disability imposed upon the voting right of a member under Section 27(10). If the prohibition is removed, and it can be removed by clearing the dues of the Society, the disability cast on the right to vote would stand removed automatically. The prohibition imposed by sub-section (10) of Section 27 works like an eclipse casting a dark shadow on the member's right to vote and once the eclipse goes away, the dark shadow also vanishes thereby bringing alive the right to vote. It is settled law that the right to vote is statutory and, therefore, it can be exercised only in accordance with the conditions prescribed in the statute. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the right to vote cannot be exercised. Therefore, the burden is cast upon the member whose voting right has been rendered lifeless to prove that he has fulfilled the conditions necessary for making his voting right come alive. For this purpose, the only requirements would be that the member should know the reason why he is not able to exercise the voting right and should be given an opportunity to remove that reason or cause. Therefore, the ratio of the case of Narayan s/o. Gujabrao Bhoyar, in my humble opinion, cannot be pressed into service in these cases by the petitioners.
24. Apart from the above, Section 73CA, I would say operates in a different field. As said earlier, the section is about incurring of disqualification for being appointed or nominated or elected or co-opted to be a member of a Committee or for continuing as a member of the Committee, which is basically a postelection scenario. Under sub-section (1) of Section 73CA, a member of the Committee incurs disqualification for continuing as a member of the Committee if he becomes defaulter of the Society. The consequence provided under Sub-section (1) of Section 73CA is far reaching in the sense that there is cessation of membership and, therefore, the Full Bench of this Court found that such a consequence cannot have its automatic effect, that there has to be a proper declaration made by a competent authority in that regard and that it must be preceded by an opportunity of hearing. Section 27, on the other hand, operates in entirely different arena. It does not speak about incurring of disqualification by a member of the Society. It does not touch in any manner the membership issue and what it does is only taking away of the voting right of the member, if the member becomes a defaulter of the Society, which is essentially a pre-election situation. If the member ceases to be a defaulter of the Society, the voting right is restored automatically. Such being the difference between the nature and scope of Section 73CA and Section 27(10), the case of Narayan s/o. Gujabrao Bhoyar in my respectful submission would have no application to the facts of the case.
25. Similarly, the argument that if the rules of natural justice are made applicable to a Section dealing with disqualification of a member for being continued as a member of the Committee, there is no reason why the principles of natural justice in their full force and effect could not be applied to a case involving denial of voting right also holds no water. The reason being that cessation of membership is something which is drastic in nature and has permanent effect. The legislative intent of making compliance with the principles of natural justice is also sufficiently indicated in Rule 58 of the Rules, 1961. For this reason, the Division Bench held that minimum compliance with the rules of natural justice and declaration by a competent authority in compliance with the provision of Rule 58 are necessary for cessation of the membership of a Committee. On the other hand, the consequences of Section 27(10) are not so drastic and do not have any permanent effect. A member does not lose his membership. He only loses his voting right and that to temporarily till he makes the repayment of dues of society. Then opportunity is also given to him to clear the dues. So in my humble opinion, the applicability of principles of natural justice in their full force and effect to Section 27(10) cannot be seen.
26. In the case of Dadan Ram and others (supra), it has been held that there is a difference between the knowledge of something having the force of law and complying with the requirements of natural justice. With due respect, I would say that while there cannot be any dispute about the principle of law so laid down, in the instant case, the ratio would have no application as I have found that basically the principles of natural justice in their full force do not have any application here, though they may apply only to the extent indicated earlier. Therefore, the said case of Dadan Ram would be of no assistance to the petitioners in the instant case.
27. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the case Shri Pandurang Baburao Lhase and others vs. The Returning Officer @ Co-operative Officer and others, and others, in Writ Petition No.1035/2015, decided on 20.2.2015 by the learned Single Judge of this Court. In the said case, the petitioners were declared as defaulters unilaterally without giving any opportunity to them to show that they were not the defaulters. In the instant case, I have already found that such opportunity was given to the petitioners and yet they did not avail of the same. Therefore, said case would be of no assistance to the petitioners.
28. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there was no default on the part of the petitioners, which is reflected from the giving of some works to the petitioners subsequently after issuing of the alleged notices in December 2015. The argument cannot be accepted for the reason that there is no ostensible relationship between commission of defaults and award of works or rendering of services by the Society to its members. There is no provision of law requiring that once a member is found to be the defaulter of the Society, further works or services cannot be allotted or rendered. The argument is, therefore, rejected.
29. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has pointed out to me the provision made in the bye-laws of the respondent No.1-Society regarding denial of voting right. Clause 28 prescribes that a defaulter and non-active member would have no voting right. There is no dispute about this provision made in the bye-laws of respondent No.1-Society. The petitioner-societies have not shown that they are not the defaulters of the respondent No.1-Society within the meaning of clause 28. Therefore, even by virtue of this clause, the petitioner-Societies could be said to be defaulters and, therefore, would have no voting right in terms of Section 27(10) of the Act 1961.
30. For all these reasons, I find that no fault could be noticed in the impugned order and so no interference with the same is warranted. Even otherwise, the election process is almost complete with the declaration of results of the elections during the pendency of these petitions. Due to this subsequent development, the only option left to the petitioners now would be to resort to appropriate remedy available under the law, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent No.2.
31. In the result, I am of the view that these writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. They stand dismissed accordingly.
32. The sealed envelope containing votes cast by the petitioner-Societies, if retained in this Court, shall be returned to the respondent No.2 for the purposes of his record only.
33. Rule stands discharged. No costs.