| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/1177408 |
| Court | Karnataka Kalaburagi High Court |
| Decided On | Oct-08-2015 |
| Case Number | Regular Second Appeal No. 200304 of 2015 |
| Judge | A.V. CHANDRASHEKARA |
| Appellant | Abdul Hamed |
| Respondent | Bilkishbanu and Others |
(Prayer: This Regular Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of CPC, against the judgment and decree dated: 05.09.2015 passed in R.A. No.33/2012 on the file of the Prl. Senior Civil Judge, Vijayapur, dismissing the appeal and confirming the Judgment and Decree dated: 11.04.2012 passed in O.S. No.147/2008 on the file of the Prl. Civil Judge At Vijayapura.)
1. The first defendant of an original suit in O.S.144/08 which was pending on the file of Principal Civil Judge, Vijayapura, has filed this appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. challenging the concurrent judgments passed against him. Respondents 1 to 4 are plaintiffs in the said suit. The 2nd defendant who is the father of the 1st defendant, died during the pendency of the appeal filed before the Senior Civil Judge, Vijayapura. Since appellant is his legal heir, he has filed this appeal.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the present suit in O.S.144/08 and the present appeal are as follows:
a) The suit schedule property bearing CTS No.458 is a residential house in Ward No.5 of Vijayapura city. It belonged to Mohamed Shafi Inamdar who was the husband of the 1st plaintiff and father of plaintiffs 2 to 4. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the appellant-1st defendant-Abdul Hameed was inducted as tenant and he was paying rent at the rate of Rs.1,000/- p.m. After the death of Shafi Inamdar, his wife and children inherited the property.
b) Defendants are closely related to the plaintiffs. Somehow they managed to get their names entered in CTS records on the basis of an alleged oral gift (Hiba)stated to have been executed by deceased Mohamed Shafi Inamdar in favour of the 1st defendant. Hence 1st plaintiff chose to file a suit in O.S.97/93 before the Munsiff Court at Vijayapura seeking a declaration to the effect that the entry of 1st defendant's name in the CTSextracts were illegal and for continuing the name of the 1st plaintiff in the records as Khatedar. The present appellant who was defendant in the suit had filed a detailed written statement setting up the plea of Hiba claiming absolute title.
c) The said suit came to be dismissed after contest and hence the 1st plaintiff chose to file an appeal under Section 96, C.P.C. before the Principal Civil Judge, Vijayapura. The said appeal was allowed as against which defendants filed regular second appeal before this court in R.S.A.2304/05 which came to be dismissed at the stage of admission.
d) After dismissal of R.S.A.2304/05, plaintiffs got issued a legal notice calling upon the defendants to vacate and hand over possession of the suit property as they were in illegal occupation. Defendants, according to the plaintiffs, instead of complying with the demand made, got issued a reply through their advocate stating that they have been in possession as owners under the alleged gift deed executed by Mohamed Shafi Inamdar. Hence a suit was filed seeking the relief of declaration to the effect that plaintiffs are the owners of the suit schedule property and for possession and damages of Rs.36,000/- at the rate of Rs.1,000/- p.m. for 3 years prior to the filing of the suit, and also to award future mesne profits.
e) The said suit was contested by the defendants denying all material averments. The averment that the 2nd defendant had been inducted by deceased husband of the plaintiff as tenant and he had agreed to pay rent of Rs.1,000/- p.m. at Rs.1,000/- p.m. is specifically denied. The averment that the plaintiffs are owners of the schedule property is also specifically denied. It is averred that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and it hit by Order II Rule 2, C.P.C. since the plaintiff did not seek the relief of possession when the earlier suit was filed in O.S.97/93. It is his case that he has perfected his title by adverse possession being in possession for more than 12 years adversely to the interest and openly to the knowledge of the original owner.
f) On the basis of the above pleadings, the following issues were framed by the trial court:
1) Whether plaintiffs prove that they are the owner of CTS No.458 situated in ward no. V of Bijapur?
2) Whether plaintiffs prove that defendants are in illegal possession over the eastern half portion of CTS no.458?
3) Whether the defendants prove that suit is not maintainable in view of Order II Rule 2, C.P.C.?
4) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages as claimed?
5) Whether plaintiffs are entitled for mesne profits?
6) Whether plaintiffs are entitled for the relief sought?
7) What order or decree?
ADDITIONAL ISSUES:
1) Whether defendant no.1 proves that he is an absolute owner and in possession and enjoyment of the suit property by virtue of the Hiba (gift deed) made by deceased husband of plaintiff on 22.10.1990?
2) Whether defendant no.1 proves that he is in possession and he perfected his title over the suit property by way of adverse possession since 22.10.1990?
PRELIMINARY ISSUE:
Whether suit of plaintiff is barred by Section 3 of Limitation Act for lapse of 12 years?
The 1st plaintiff is examined as PW1 and 9 exhibits are got marked. The 1st defendant-Abdul Hameed got examined himself as DW1 and one witness as DW2 and in all 94 exhibits are got marked. Ultimately the suit came to be decreed after contest answering issue nos.1, 2, 4 and 6 in the affirmative and additional issues 1 and 2, issue no.3 and preliminary issue in the negative. Against the said judgment, appeal was filed by both the defendants under Section 96, C.P.C. before the Senior Civil Judge, Vijayapura, in R.A.33/12. The said appeal is dismissed after contest on 5.9.2015 by framing the following points for consideration, as found in paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment:
1) Whether the defendants have established that the trial court has committed an error by decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs only on the basis of the findings given in RA.157/02, which was confirmed in RSA.2304/05?
2) Whether the defendants established that the judgment and decree of the trial court is capricious, perverse, illegal and contrary to the law?
3) What order?
Both the points are answered in the negative. Hence the present appeal is filed under Section 100, C.P.C.
3. What is argued before this court by the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.Ameetkumar Deshpande is that the suit in O.S.144/08 was hit by Order II Rule 2, C.P.C. since plaintiffs had not sought the relief of possession when the earlier suit was filed for the relief of declaration to the effect that incorporation of the name of the defendants in CTS records was illegal and incorrect. It is further argued that the defendants had not only denied title of the plaintiffs on the basis of Hiba executed by the deceased husband in favour of the 1st defendant, but had even emphatically denied their title. Therefore, it is argued that the suit so filed in the year 2008 was specifically barred by time and that a specific assertion was made by the defendants in the written statement filed in O.S.97/93 on 4.1.1995 not only denying title of the plaintiff, but also asserting their own title on the basis of Hiba. It is further argued that the plea of adverse possession starts from 22.10.1990.
4. Sri Ameetkumar Deshpande has relied upon Volume 19 of the I Edition of Halsbury's Laws of England at page 113 to contend that possession under an invalid deed continuing for more than 12 years would ripen into adverse possession and therefore, the trial court and first appellate court have not looked into this material aspect. It is argued that both the courts have adopted wrong approach to the real state of affairs and the evidence placed on record has not been tested on the touchstone of intrinsic probabilities. In page 113 it is held as follows:
If a person enters into possession of land under a lease which is absolutely void and pays no rent, this is discontinuance by the owner of the land and the statute will run against the owner from the time that possession or lease begins.'
Reliance is placed on this proposition on the basis of the decision reported in the case of PRESIDENT AND GOVERNORS OF MAGDALAN HOSPITAL .v. KNOTTS (1879).4.APP).
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs Sri.Ambekar has argued that 1st plaintiff was left with no other option except to get the false entry removed from CTS records. He has argued that the plea of Hiba once again taken in the written statement filed in the year 2008 is hit by the principles of res judicata. It is argued that the plea of adverse possession was set up for the first time in the suit of 2008 and even in the reply notice got issued by the defendants, no such plea was taken. It is argued that the plea of adverse possession was never taken by the defendants even in the written statement filed before the trial court, but was added after amendment was allowed to that effect only in the year 2009.
6. Sri D.P. Ambekar has argued that as per the facts of the case in the case of MAGDALAN HOSPITAL (supra), execution of an invalid deed had been accepted. But in the present case the alleged Hiba relied on by the defendants had been emphatically denied and defendants had suffered a negative finding in the earlier round of litigation. To this effect, the attention of this court is drawn to the final observation made by the first appellate court in R.A.157/02 (Ex.P3). It is argued that the date of the alleged Hiba is 22.10.1990 and for the first time defendants got their name entered in the year 1993 in collusion with CTS authorities and therefore, immediately the 1st plaintiff filed the suit in the year 1993 itself to remove their name. It is argued that the Hiba was not executed by deceased Mohamed Shafi Inamdar. Hence it is argued that the plea of adverse possession is not tenable and the same has been rightly rejected by the trial court and first appellate court, and this court being the second appellate court under Section 100, C.P.C. cannot interfere with such factual finding.
7. It is argued by Sri D.P. Ambekar that the prohibition found under Order II Rule 2, C.P.C. is not applicable to the facts of this case since the 1st plaint was interested only in getting the cloud cast on her title cleared, and she got it removed by filing an appropriate suit. Hence there was no occasion for the plaintiff to seek possession and non-seeking of that relief will not come within Order II Rule 2, C.P.C. He has further argued that his allegation was mainly against the CTS authorities in colluding with the defendants in the manner of entering their names as Khatedars without there being any valid transfer of title from the original owner. It is argued that possession so asserted by the defendants is unlawful and in the light of their inability to prove the plea of adverse possession. The trial court is justified in granting the relief of possession and the first appellate court is also justified in confirming such finding is his contention. Hence, he requests the court to dismiss the appeal on the ground of adverse possession.
8. Sri Ameetkumar Deshpande has relied on a decision of the Hon'ble apex court in the case of ANATHULLA SUDHAKAR .v. BUCHI REDDY (DEAD) BY L.Rs. (AIR 2008 SC 2033) to contend that in the earlier suit, cause of action had arisen to the 1st plaintiff to seek the relief of declaration of title and possession and in the light of non-seeking of such relief, suit is hit by the principles of Order II Rule 2, C.P.C.
REASONS:
9. Admittedly, the property in question belonged to Sri Md. Shafi Inamdar i.e. the deceased husband of first plaintiff the father of plaintiff Nos.2 to 4. Both the defendants had got their names entered in CTS records on the basis of an oral Hiba stated to have been executed by Md. Shafi in favour of first defendant Abdul Hameed on 22.10.1990. Since the defendants set up their own independent title to the property on the basis of the Hiba and consequential incorporation of their names in the CTS records, Smt. Bilkishbanu chose to file a suit for the relief of declaration to the effect that the incorporation of the names of defendants in the CTS records was illegal and void and for removal of the same. Said suit was filed in O.S.No.97/1993 before the then Munsiff Court at Vijayapur. The said suit was contested by both the defendants. The defendants therein had mainly admitted the ownership of the deceased Md.Shafi Inamdar; but had asserted their title on the basis of Hiba. The issues framed in O.S.No.97/1993 are found in Ex.D8 framed by the Principal Munsiff Court at Vijayapur on 03.02.1996 are as follows;
1. Whether the plaintiff proves that herself and her children are the owners of the property bearing RTS No.458 in Ward-5 of Bijapur City?
2. Whether the plaintiff proves that defendant No.1 is the tenant of the suit disputed property bearing CTS No.458?
3. Whether the plaintiff proves that entry of the name of defendant No.1 in the CTS records of the suit property is illegal and void?
4. Whether the defendants prove that gift of 3 rooms situated towards the eastern side of CTS No.458 in favour of defendant No.1 on 22.10.1990 as alleged at para-7B of the written statement?
5. Whether the defendant No.1 and 2 prove that in pursuance of the said oral gift defendant No.1 came in possession of the said three rooms as a owner having accepted the gift so offered by husband of plaintiff?
6. Whether the defendants-1 and 2 prove the due execution of the acknowledging the execution of oral gift by the husband of plaintiff, and its validity?
7. Whether the defendant-1 and 2 prove that by virtue of the acceptance of the said oral gift it is defendant-1 to became the absolute owner of the said three rooms of the property bearing CTS No.458?
8. Whether the defendants-1 and 2 prove that suit of the plaintiff is false and vexatious and hence they are entitle for compensatory cost as claimed?
9. Whether the plaintiff proves the correctness of the discription of the suit property?
10. To what reliefs the plaintiff is entitle for?
11. What order and Decree?
10. It was contested and ultimately suit was dismissed. Against the said judgment and decree of dismissal, plaintiff Bilkishbanu chose to file an appeal in terms of Section 96 of CPC before the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge at Vijayapur in R.A.No.157/2002. The said appeal was allowed in its entirety and the suit filed in O.S.No.97/1993 was decreed as prayed for and the incorporation of the names of the defendants therein in CTS records was set aside. The said appeal was allowed on 31.08.2005. The certified copy of the judgment passed in RA No.157/2002 is found in Ex.P2 and Ex.P3 is the certified copy of the decree in R.A.No.157/2002. Following is the order passed by the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.157/2002 in the operative portions is as follows:
The appeal filed by the Appellant-Plaintiff is allowed.
The judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is hereby set aside.
It is declared that the entry of the name of defendant No.1 in property card of CTS No.458 of Ward No.V of Bijapur is set aside and cancelled, since it is illegal and void.
The defendants do pay the costs throughout ?.
11. Against the said divergent judgment and decree passed in R.A.No.157/2002, both the defendants of O.S.No.97/1993, chose to file a second appeal before this Court under Section 100 of CPC in RSA No.2304/2005. The certified copy of the judgment passed by this Court at the time of admission is found in Ex.P4. The said second appeal came to be dismissed at the time of admission itself holding that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
12. It had been contended before this Court also that plaintiff/Smt. Bilkishbanu was not in possession and hence the relief of substituting the entries could not have been granted. The said contention is not accepted by this Court while dismissing the second appeal at the time of admission. In Paragraph No.6 of Ex.P4, the judgment passed by this Court, it is held that the question of not asking relief of declaratory under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, need not be gone into.
13. In paragraph No.26 at page No.13 of the judgment passed in R.A.No.157/2002, the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court has held as follows:
All the activities of the defendants and the ADLR are based on the documents at Ex.D3, D18 and D19, as discussed above the documents referred above are fabricated and illegal and do not bear the signature of deceased Mohammad Shafi. The entries and actions taken on Ex.D3, D.18, and D19 are doubtful and therefore not acceptable. Thus my humble opinion the deceased Mohammad Shafi at no time had gifted away the property in favour of defendant No.1. Thus, in my opinion, the order passed by the Trial Court is illegal, perverse, capricious and contrary to law and hence it is liable to be set aside ?.
14. Reliance is placed upon a decision of this Court in the case of Laxmibai V/s Thoreppa reported in AIR 1982 KAR 248. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 relating to adverse possession is discussed in the said decision. What is held in Laxmibai's case is that, possession held by a person even under an inadmissible document becomes adverse to true owner. As per the facts of the said case, the sale deed had an endorsement to the effect that the suit houses were sold to defendant for of Rs.200/-. It is no doubt true that the endorsement should have been registered and hence it was not admissible in evidence. But possession under an inadmissible document becomes adverse to the true owner. That endorsement was made in the year 1937 and hence this Court, as per the evidence placed on record, held that adverse possession commenced from that year and in the absence of evidence to show that thereafter the defendants paid rent to the owner, the defendants would be deemed to have perfected his title by adverse possession.
15. In the instant case, the very Hiba relied upon by the defendants in the earlier suit is not only held to be not proved but also it is held to be a fabricated and an illegal document and that it does not bear the signature of deceased Mohammad Shafi at all. In the present case the plaintiffs have not admitted the documents marked as Ex.D3, D18, D19 referred to in the earlier suit bearing O.S.No.97/1993. Therefore, the decision rendered in the case of Laxmibai's case is clearly distinguishable on facts and hence it is not applicable to the present case.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Anathula Sudhakar V/s P.Buchi Reddy (Dead) By Lrs And Others reported in (2008) 4 SCC 594, wherein Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, has been dealt at length by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The scope of Section 100 of CPC, in regard to the power of High Court to interfere with the concurrent findings is also dealt with at length. What exactly should be the approach when the defendant emphatically denies the title of the plaintiff relating to the immovable property, was the subject matter. Summarizing the position in regard to the suit for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraph No.21 of Anathula Sudhakar's case is as follows:
21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under:
(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.
(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.
(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the Court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the Court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.
(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the Court may decided upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts or the case.
17. The case of the plaintiffs is that the defendants attempted to create a cloud on their title and therefore first plaintiff had to file a suit seeking the relief on declaration to the effect that the CTS entries based on oral Hiba were illegal and void. The suit was filed in O.S.No.97/1993 was dismissed as against which an appeal was filed and the said appeal came to be allowed. Consequentially, suit came to be decreed. It was not just a mere declaration to hold that CTS entries were illegal but it was in essence a suit filed for the relief of declaration to the effect that the alleged Hiba relied upon by the defendants for getting their names incorporated in CTS records was held on an illegal and fabricated document. Thus the defendants had thoroughly failed to setup their own title in the earlier round of litigation initiated by the first plaintiff.
18. What is argued before this Court by the learned counsel for the appellant is that, the present suit is hit by the principles of Order 2 Rule II in as much as no relief of possession was sought in the earlier round of litigation in spite of the specific denial of title of the plaintiff, was taken in the written statement filed in the year 1995, during the first round of litigation. This Court is unable to accept the same for the simple reason that the said aspect should have been urged in the earlier round of litigation.
19. What is argued before this Court is that, the case of the plaintiffs is that the deceased/second defendant was inducted into the property as a tenant and therefore they are expected to make out a clear case of the existence of jural relationship of landlord and tenant and the termination of tenancy to seek ejectment. On the other hand, the defendants had emphatically denied the title of plaintiff in the earlier round of litigation setting up the plea of oral Hiba and as already discussed, that has been negatived by the First Appellate Court in the earlier round of litigation.
20. The defendants have now taken up the plea of adverse possession and additional issues are framed to that effect. Whoever takes plea of adverse possession must admit the title of the adversary. Parties seeking to set up the plea of adverse possession must prove that he or she has had been in possession of the property of the adversary for over a period of 12 years openly to the knowledge and adversely to the interest of original owner. A plea to this effect was taken up by the defendants for the first time in the written statement was filed in O.S.No.147/2008. The plaintiffs had got issued a legal notice terminating the tenancy and seeking possession of the suit property. Ex.P5 is the legal notice got issued by the plaintiffs through their advocate on 07.01.2008 and Ex.P-8 is the reply got issued by the defendants through their advocate on 16.01.2008. Even in the reply notice issued by Ex.P8 plea of adverse possession is not setup. Apart from this, plaintiffs and defendants are closely related to each other. Deceased Mohammad Shafi, the husband of first plaintiff Bilkishbanu, was the brother of the wife of deceased defendant No.2. Plea of adverse possession is a weak plea especially amongst close relatives.
21. In the light of defendants having asserted their own title to the property on the basis of Hiba in the earlier round of litigation and having thoroughly failed to prove not only the Hiba but also their possession on the basis of adverse possession, it is to be held that they are in unlawful possession and therefore plaintiffs, being the owners of the property, are entitled to seek possession. Therefore the trial Court has granted the decree of possession and First Appellate Court has confirmed the same. No legal infirmity is found in the approach adopted by both the courts.
22. From the documents placed on record, it can be said that first plaintiff was very much interested in getting the cloud removed by filing a suit for cancellation of the CTS entries under which names of the defendants had been incorporated. The plaintiffs have never admitted the execution of alleged Hiba and therefore, as already discussed, the decision rendered in the case of Laxmibai V/s Thoreppa reported in AIR 1982 KAR 248, is not applicable to the facts of this case.
23. Non-seeking of possession in the said suit did not disentitle them to seek possession by filing a suit at a later point of time as their title was perfect. An attempt is made by the defendants to deny the title of the plaintiffs on an altogether new ground without any basis and therefore both the Courts have not countenanced the approach of the defendants as either illegal or proper.
24. Necessary pleadings in regard to the clear title of the plaintiffs are forthcoming in the plaint. The relief of possession is only incidental to the establishment of title. As already discussed, plaintiffs were able to establish their title in the earlier round of litigation and therefore setting up of an altogether new plea in the next round of litigation will not disentitle the plaintiffs to seek possession based on title, especially, in the light of the inability of the defendants to prove the special plea of adverse possession.
25. What is held in Anathula Sudharkar's case in paragraph No.21 (a) is that Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Hence the above decision is not helpful to the appellant herein and is clearly distinguishable on facts. On the other hand the said decision is helpful to the case of plaintiffs.
26. In this view of the matter, the approach adopted by the plaintiffs to seek the relief of possession based on the declaration of their title in the earlier round of litigation is just and proper.
27. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of P.K. Ramachandran V/s State of Kerala and Another, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276, to contend that Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Observation made in paragraph No.6 at 2277 of the said decision is referred to and the same is as follows;
6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper not judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.
28. Question of extending the period of limitation on equitable grounds does not arise in this case. Plaintiffs have already established their title in the earlier round of litigation and the defendants who are closely related to the plaintiffs have already suffered an adverse finding. Defendant has attempted to deny the plaintiff's title on the basis of a new ground in the later round of litigation and has thoroughly failed.
29. Evidence adduced has been assessed on the touch stone of intrinsic probabilities by both the courts. No perversity or illegality is found in the approach adopted by both the Courts in regard to this appeal. Both the courts have adopted right approach to the real state of affairs. Questions of law framed proposed by the appellant in this appeal memo, are not substantial questions of law within the purview of Section 100 of CPC to admit the present appeal. Even otherwise, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. Accordingly appeal is liable to be dismissed as unfit for admission.
ORDER
Accordingly, appeal is dismissed as unfit for admission, with costs.
The defendants have been litigating unsuccessfully on one ground or the other and have been squatting over the property without any valid title. As such, they are liable to vacate the property, within a reasonable time.
Six (six) months time is granted to the appellant to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property by maintaining the same state of things as they exist today till possession is handed over.