| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/1174952 |
| Court | Mumbai High Court |
| Decided On | Aug-27-2014 |
| Case Number | Arbitration Petition No. 103 of 2011 |
| Judge | THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE ROSHAN DALVI |
| Appellant | Rolta India Ltd. |
| Respondent | Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation |
1. The petitioner has challenged the award of the learned sole Arbitrator dated 8th December, 2010 in this petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act). The Award has not granted specific performance of the agreement between the parties. It grants various damages. The Award has also granted a part of the compensation charges payable to the respondent. The Award has made provision for the grant of part costs of the arbitration by the respondent to the claimant.
2. The parties entered into an MOU with regard to the grant of certain premises to the petitioner herein upon certain conditions on 3rd March, 1999. The respondent has thereafter issued a letter of allotment to the petitioner on 13th April, 1999 which has been refuted by the petitioner. The petitioner claimed specific performance of the MOU which was stated to be the only agreement between the parties relied upon by them in the correspondence after the agreement as also after the allotment letter. The petitioner also claimed declaration that the termination of the MOU by the respondent was wrongful and illegal, an aspect stated to have not been considered in the Award. In the alternative to the prayers of specific performance of the MOU dated 3rd March, 1999, the petitioner claimed specific performance of the modified MOU if it was held that the MOU was modified. The petitioner further claimed various sums as damages for various aspects set out in the claim.
3. The learned Arbitrator has considered the MOU between the parties upon the intention of the parties executing it. The learned Arbitrator has not exercised her discretion in granting specific performance of the MOU dated 3rd March, 1999 or any modified MOU but has granted certain damages. It may, at once, be stated that the relief of specific performance is wholly discretionary even if it were to be granted by the Court. The view taken by the learned Arbitrator in exercising her discretion in not granting the specific performance will require to be seen alongside the interpretation of the MOU itself by this Court to appreciate the intention of the parties thereto. It would also have to be seen whether the grant of only certain damages in place of higher damages claimed to the exclusion of specific performance can be interfered with by the Court in a petition under Section 34 of the Act upon the narrow jurisdiction that the Court has.
4. Mr. Diwan took me through the provision of the MOU extensively. The MOU must first be considered.
(i) Clause 1 of the MOU states that the grantor (MIDC/respondent herein) was to set up an industrial area known as Millennium Business Park comprising of several modules.
(ii) Clause 2 of the MOU states that a building in the park was to be licensed to the licensee (the petitioner).
(iii) Under Clause 3(a) of the MOU the lease of the building admeasuring 80,000 sq. ft and a basement admeasuring 20,000 sq. ft. in the aggregate land area of 7435 sq. mtrs. as shown in the plan annexed to the MOU was stated to be collectively the demised premises. No plan has been shown to be annexed.
(iv) The schedule that is referred to in Clause 3(a) of the MOU also shows the building in the land.
(v) Under Clause 3(b) of the MOU the respondent agreed that the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of any additional FSI as per government policy and subject to MIDC policy.
(vi) Under Clause 5 of the MOU the lease was to be for the period of 95 years with yearly rent of Rs.100/-
(vii) Under Clause 7 the lease premium was to be paid in 4 installments of 5%, 5%, 10% and 80%. The first 5% being the earnest payable on the execution of the MOU itself was Rs.53 lacs.
(viii) Under Clause 6 of the MOU in addition to the yearly rent the petitioner had to pay lease premium of Rs.10.60 Cr.
(ix) Under Clause 9 of the MOU the respondent was to hand over possession of the demised premises to the petitioner within 8 months of the execution of the MOU after completing the construction of the building.
(x) Under Clause 12 of the MOU the parties were to finalize the terms and conditions of the lease deed in the demised premises as also the exact consideration payable by the petitioner. If the parties could not agree upon the terms and conditions of the lease, the petitioner was entitled to terminate the agreement and would be entitled to refund of Rs.53 lacs paid as an earnest without interest.
(xi) Under Clause 16 of the MOU the petitioner was entitled to demolish and reconstruct the building under the approved plan.
(xii) Under Clause 20 of the MOU the petitioner was to pay maintenance charges, electricity and water charges, taxes, rates and other outgoings.
(xiii) Under Clause 21 of the MOU it was recited that the petitioner had another land of 25000 sq. mtrs. out of which 7435 sq. mtrs was surrendered to the respondent.
(xiv) Under Clause 21A of the MOU, in consideration of the respondent taking up additional 20000 sq. ft. of built up area in the basement of the building, the respondent was to make efforts to facilitate the sale of the remaining 17565 sq. mtrs. of the land of the petitioner at a specified price before handing over the possession of the two buildings to the petitioner. (Despite the specific assurance in Clause 21A, the respondent failed to sell the remaining plot of the land.)
(xv) Under Clause 21B of the MOU the respondent was to initiate necessary steps for the sale.
(xvi) Under Clause 21C of the MOU the parties recited that the grant of additional area of 20000 sq. ft. would mean extra pressure of cash flow on the resources of the petitioner.
(xvii) Under Clause 25 of the MOU the lease could be renewed for a further period of 95 years subject to MIDC policy. If any concession or rebate is given by the respondent to any other purchaser, the petitioner also would be entitled to the same benefit in respect of the demised premises before the final payment.
(xviii)Clause 27 of the MOU permitted the respondent to terminate the agreement only for non payment of rent.
5. The petitioner would contend that the MOU represented the agreement between the parties. It was complete in all respects. The further agreement between the parties was to be a lease deed. Hence it was in the nature of an agreement to lease. The petitioner would contend that the agreement contemplated the lease of the building as also the land to the extent of 7435 sq. mtrs. This was because the petitioner surrendered 7435 sq. mtrs. of its land at another place which it had from the land admeasuring 25,000 sq. mtrs. with it under the exchange scheme of the respondent. Consequently the petitioner was entitled to the building as also the land surrendered.
6. The respondent would claim that the petitioner was entitled to the built up area in the form of a building upon the land such as would be capable of having a built up area thereupon. It is argued on behalf of the respondent that at the relevant time the FSI being one, the land area of 7435 sq. mtrs. would support a building of 80000 sq. ft. Further area of 20000 sq. ft. was to be given for the basement to the petitioner in consideration of the petitioner making an effort to sell out the remaining 17565 sq. mtrs. of land of the petitioner to generate funds for the payment of lease premium specified in Clause 6 of the agreement. It is the contention of the respondent that the respondent owned the Millennium Business Park. It was an industrial area. It had various buildings constructed by the respondent thereon. Each of the buildings constitutes a part of the whole park. There is no demarcation of plots. Each party is entitled to the lease of the building, the land remaining with the respondent.
7. It is this contention of the parties which would have to be tested in interpreting the agreement. For that purpose the intention of the parties would have to be seen from the clauses of the agreement as also the acts of the parties as is the usual mode of interpretation of contracts read as a whole.
8. Under Clause 1 there is no mention of the lease of land. Clause 1 shows the area by the specified name which the respondent âis in the process of setting up at its own expensesâ.
9. Clause 2 makes reference to the building but not the land. That is in respect of request made by the petitioner to the respondent for the grant of the license. Clause 3 speaks of the lease of the building but not the land and describes the building in the land. It refers to the 2nd schedule which also describes the building in the land. Nevertheless the demises premises is shown to be referred âcollectivelyâ. The petitioner would contend that this expression would denote land and building in view of the petitioner having transferred its land of an equivalent area which it claims must be granted, the built up area that such land could support also being granted notwithstanding. The respondent would contend that Clauses 1, 2 and 3(a) read together contemplate license/lease of only the building and not the land as that would represent the supportable area of the land granted to the petitioner in the park with various modules un-demarcated by boundaries.
10. Clause 3(b) speaks of additional FSI. It would be material to see when the additional FSI was contemplated to be used. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that FSI never pertains to a building. FSI is always in respect of the land. The entitlement of FSI would impliedly mean that what was sought to be licensed/leased was the land and not the building. If that is so there need have been no requirement of the respondent constructing the building for the petitioner; it could have only granted land to the petitioner leaving it to construct its own building thereupon. Such land could not have been demarcated as the respondent owns the entire park area with various modules. It must be remembered that the building bears a direct nexus with the FSI 7435 sq. mtrs of the land which would support precisely 80000 sq. ft. of built up area in a building. However if at the relevant time or thereabouts an additional FSI was made available by the government (the municipality), the petitioner would have the benefit of any such additional FSI. Hence at the time the building was to be constructed grant of additional FSI under the law would require the respondent to construct the building of more than 80000 sq. ft. depending upon the FSI. The petitioner would contend that Clause 3(b) relating to FSI would apply in future forever because under the agreement the petitioner was âalwaysâ to be entitled to the benefit of additional FSI. This is the aspect with which the parties have been at variance.
11. Indeed FSI cannot be relatable to a building. It is always relatable to land. The extent of the building is what the FSI would support. The extent of the building that was to be constructed by the respondent was precisely in terms of the land area surrendered by the petitioner in another land. It appears that the building has been built such as to be on land admeasuring 4263 sq. mtrs. instead of 7435 sq. mtrs. Since the extent of the FSI was one, no building could have ever been constructed having an area of precisely 7435 sq. mtrs. underneath it. That would be arithmetically impossible. A building would otherwise require compulsory open spaces around it. It is the extent of the land area which can be built up which has to be seen. It may be built in whatever fashion. It may take up a smaller or larger land area for the built up construction called building. Once the petitioner gets a built up area equivalent to its land upon the FSI of one, the obligation of the respondent would be sufficiently complied. The reciprocal promise of the respondent would be performed. The consideration under contract would be appropriate. The contention of the petitioner that because the building is on 4263 sq. mtrs. of land, leaving a shortfall of 3172 sq. mtrs of land, that much land has to be provided appears to be misconceived. The petitioner would be entitled to have the open space around its building for its easementary rights even if that space is not demarcated and bounded by a compound wall because it is a part of industrial area known as the Millennium Business Park belonging to the respondent. The provision for the additional FSI, therefore, cannot be meant to be the FSI that the petitioner would get on further 3172 sq. mtrs. of land in eternity; it would be the FSI allowable at the time of construction of the building on the area of another land surrendered by the petitioner at the time of the agreement. Of course, if the FSI is increased under the law, the petitioner would be entitled to such additional FSI of the land which supports its building in future also subject, of course, to the MIDC policy.
12. There is a dichotomy in Clauses 5, 6, 16 and 25 relating to the rent also. The lease period is for 95 years. There is to be a further renewal for further 95 years. This could be only the lease of the land. No building would be expected to outlive 190 years of its construction. Indeed the construction of the MIDC is shown by the petitioner to be so dismal as to have various defects of cracks, leakages etc. even prior to the petitioner taking possession of the building which shall be considered presently. Further Clause 16 would allow the petitioner to demolish the entire building and reconstruct it. A building which was expected to stand for 190 years would not merit the contemplation of its demolition at the time of the execution of the MOU and even prior to the execution of the lease deed between the parties. Indeed Clause 16 shows a rather obnoxious national waste allowed by a public body in demolition and reconstruction of a building. It would demonstrate the quality of the construction of the building from the inception. Further the yearly rent in Clause 5 is Rs.100/-. That would be expected to be only of the land. In addition to the yearly rent (of Rs.100/- for the land) there is an additional lease premium for the building which is shown to be by its built up area in Clause 6 and which aggregates Rs.10.60 Cr. Indeed if the rent was to be of the building itself, it would be forming the aggregate total mentioned in Clause 6. The rent of Rs.100/- aside from the lease premium of Rs.10.60 Cr. would show that the former is for the land and later is for the building. However the rent of Rs.100/- for the land for the period of the lease of 95 years could be as much for 4263 sq. mtrs. of land as it would be for 7435 sq. mtrs. Indeed nominal rent itself shows that the essential lease premium is only of the building.
13. The parties were to execute a lease deed. The parties would have to finalize its terms with regard to the amenities, specifications and facilities. This was to be the lease deed in the demised premises. The clause is not happily worded. Every MOU would be followed by the lease deed. The MOU is nevertheless binding. However the parties may decide to finalize certain terms later in the lease deed itself. That would, of course, not mean that the agreement was not finalized and the MOU was not binding upon the parties. The lease deed would have to be in terms of the agreement for whatever was agreed upon in the MOU or the agreement of lease. There would, therefore, be the lease of the building as specified in Clause 3(a) in the aggregate land.
14. Clause 21 read with Clause 21 (A), (B) and (C) are in the nature of recitals though drafted into the MOU. These show that the petitioner had 25000 sq. mtrs. of land elsewhere. The petitioner surrendered 7435 sq. mtrs. of land to the respondent. That was equivalent to 80000 sq. ft. of built up construction. The petitioner agreed to lease not only 80000 sq. ft. but further 20000 sq. ft. The respondent, in consideration thereto agreed to sell the remaining part of the petitioner's land of 17565 sq. mtrs. To generate funds and to have extra cash flow so that the petitioner could pay the lease premium for 80000 sq. ft. as also for 20000 sq. ft. The consideration for 80000 sq. ft of built up area was the land that would support it. The consideration for further 20000 area was the sale of the remaining land of the petitioner by the respondent.
15. The petitioner would contend that the sale of 17567 sq. mtrs. would show that the remaining land 7435 sq. mtrs. to be used by and between the parties in the manner aforesaid. If that was not to be so used, the petitioner would be entitled to sell also 7435 sq. mtrs. The petitioner would be entitled to FSI of the entire 7435 sq. mtrs. The consideration payable to the petitioner upon the sale of the land would take into account such FSI. Hence the petitioner would claim such FSI under Clause 3(b) of the contract for the future. The respondent would contend that once 7435 sq. mtrs of the land has been surrendered and the petitioner has been given the equivalent 80000 sq. ft. of built up area which was to the extent of the land, that part of the transaction between the parties would be over. Upon such land the petitioner may get additional FSI. But additional FSI could not be upon any part of the land on which the building is not built. That is the part of the land which does not support the equivalent built up area.
16. The MOU which is, of course, final and upon which the lease deed had to be executed was, therefore, seen by the parties differently. The parties, therefore, did not agree to the same thing in the same sense. The parties were consequently not ad idem as the terms and stipulations in the contract were not certain and hence specific performance could not be granted because the Court (or the arbitrator) could not have directed the respondent as the party in default to do what the petitioner stated it had contracted to do.
17. The learned Arbitrator has held so. That is a very plausible view. Of course, the learned Arbitrator has held that all aspects of the contract between the parties were not finalized in the MOU from Clause 12 thereof and hence the parties were not ad idem. Non finalization of certain aspects which may be considered in the lease deed later would, of course, not show that the parties were at variance with any aspect of the contract. A contract would have to be entered into by and between the parties if they were to be ad idem. Unless there is a finalized contract between the parties, the parties cannot be stated not to have agreed upon the same thing in the same sense.
18. What is ad idem would, therefore, have to be considered.
Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition at page 43 defines the term thus:
ad idem â to the same point or matter; of the same mind .19. Hence ad idem is that the parties have agreed to the same thing in the same sense.
The expression consensus ad idem is also explained thus:
consensus ad idem â An agreement of parties to the same thing; a meeting of minds.
20. In the Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon the expression consensus ad idem is explained thus:
âAgreement by two or more persons upon the same thing in the same sense.â
Common consent is, therefore, necessary for the binding contract. This consent should be on each aspect of the contract.
21. In the case of Raffles Vs. Wichelhaus (1964) 2 H and C 906 which has been the authority on the point since the last century and a half the parties in India and England contracted for sale of cotton from Surat to London by the vessel m. v. Peerless. There were two ships by the same name. One was to sail in October and the other in December. Whereas the party in London expected the goods to arrive on board m. v. Peerless in October, the party in Surat understood that the goods were to be dispatched in the ship of that name which would be sailing from India in December. Since the goods did not arrive in October the buyer refused delivery when the goods arrived ultimately in December. It was held that the parties did not mean the same thing in the same sense when they contracted to dispatch the goods on board m. v. Peerless and hence the parties were not bound by the contract so that the buyer was not bound to accept delivery.
22. In the case of ITC Ltd Vs. George Joseph Fernandes 1989 (2) SCC 1 the Supreme Court considered the case of a common mistake and a mutual mistake of the contracting parties. A common mistake would render the contract void under Section 20 of the Contract Act. This case is not concerned with such mistake and it has not been the case of either of the parties that the contract was rendered void. A mutual mistake of parties would render them not ad idem. That has been considered thus:
Where the parties make mutual mistake misunderstanding each other and are at cross purposes, there is no real correspondence of offer and acceptance and the parties are not really consensus ad idem. There is thus no agreement at all; and the contract is also void.
Where each party is mistaken as to the other's intention, though neither realises that the respective promises have been misunderstood, there is mutual mistake. The illustration in Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract is, if B were to offer to sell his Ford Cortina car to A and A were to accept in the belief that the offer related to a Ford Zephyr. In such a case, no doubt, if the minds of the parties could be probed, genuine consent would be found wanting. But the question is not what the parties had in their minds, but what reasonable third parties would infer from their words or conduct. The court has to ascertain âthe sense of the promisesâ. In other words, it decides whether a sensible third party would take the agreement to mean what A understood it to mean or what B understood it to mean, or whether indeed any meaning can be attributed to it at all.
Citing from the judgment of Lord Denning in the case of Solle Vs. Butcher 1950 1 KB 671-691 the Court observed:
There is no doubt that the application of the doctrine of mutual mistake depends upon the true construction of the contract made between the parties.
23. This case has been followed in the case of All India Management Association Vs. UOI MANU/DEL/1431/2008 the contracting party was to receive interest on a stipulated amount, if there was no audit objection. A bonafide mistake on the part of the respondent was held to have resulted in there being no consensus ad idem between the contracting parties.
24. The parties exchanged draft agreement of lease/lease deed. The parties could not arrive at a definitive lease deed to be executed. What was sought by the petitioner in the draft of the lease-deed forwarded by it to the respondent was not accepted by the respondent. The learned arbitrator held that hence, even at that stage, the parties were not ad idem.
25. Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon edited by Justice C. K. Thakker, Second Edition at Page 140 and Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fourteenth Edition at page 25 explained and defined the term ad idem to mean âat the same point.â It shows that when the negotiating parties are agreed, a binding contract can be made between them. So long as any new term is put forward by one party and not accepted by the other, this cannot be. Parties to the contract would be ad idem when each of them has a distinct intention in common with the other contracting party or parties. In the absence of such consensus ad idem there can be no contract.
26. The case of Mayawanti Vs. Kaushalya Devi (1990) 3 SCC 1 is on all fours the facts of this case. The Court had to see whether there was consensus ad idem for grant of specific performance. The Court held that the jurisdiction to order specific performance was based upon facts and circumstances of the case and enforceable contract and when that is not made, the Court will not make a contract for the parties. Upon the disputes between the parties the Court sought to examine the contract itself. Upon seeing the correspondence between the parties, the Court observed that the offer and acceptance did not correspond. The intention of the offeree to accept the offer must be expressed without leaving room for doubt as to the fact of acceptance or to the coincidence of the terms of acceptance with those of the offer. The Court observed:
âthe acceptance must be absolute, and must correspond with the terms of the offer. If the two minds were not ad idem in respect of the property to be sold, there cannot be said to have been a contract for specific performance.â
In that case the plaintiff understood the terms to have included the building; the defendant understood it to have excluded the building and the MOU did not mention the building. The Court held that there was no contract for specific performance.
27. The interpretation of the contract would require the Court to consider whether land and building were intended by the parties to be meant as the subject matter of the contract. From a reading of the contract this conclusion would require to be arrived at. In view of the fact that the expression building in land has been used on more than one occasion, the interpretation sought to be put by Mr. Diwan cannot be accepted. The case of Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi Vs. Hamdard Dawakhana, Delhi AIR 1960 PUNJAB 219 may be a pointer to such interpretation. Relying upon the cases of R. V. Shurmer, (1886) 17 QBD 323; Murch Vs. Loosemore, (1906) 1 Ch 692; Hughes Vs. The Coed Talon Colliery Co. Ltd., 190-91 KB 957 the Court held that when the statute requires only notice to be given it can be given orally or in writing; when it requires notice to be served it contemplated a notice in writing even without further specific direction with regard to the service.
When the parties used the expression building in land it could well be used as a building described in what would be in the land of MIDC. Unless the parties specify that what was to be granted to the petitioner in exchange of land was a building of the equivalent area and the land of the same area also, it had to be expressed to be understood as such. Failing such understanding there can be no consensus ad idem.
28. In the case of Mrs. Aliakutty Paul Vs. The State of Kerala AIR 1995 KERALA 291 the petitioner was to obtain a lease of forest land. Initially the contemplation of the parties was for a lease of 99 years. Under Section 22 of the Indian Forest Act a right in land could be acquired only under a grant or contract in writing made on behalf of the government. A draft lease deed for a lease of 40 years with conditions sent by the government to the petitioner's husband was not accepted by him. It was held that there was no contract and the alleged contract was void as there was no consensus ad idem. The Court held that the plaintiff cannot claim the lease of land for 99 years on the basis of original contract. In this case since there were exchanges of the draft lease-deed not agreed upon by the parties to have resulted in a duly executed lease-deed, the petitioner cannot insist upon specific performance of the earlier MOU when the land as well as the building were not expressly mentioned therein. This subsequent act of the parties lends further credence to the fact that they were not ad idem. The contention of Mr. Diwan that the fact of the parties not being ad idem is a question of fact which must be pleaded and proved as held in the case of B. Leelavathi Vs. Honnamma (2005) 11 SCC 115 as must be accepted as it is writ large upon admitted facts and can be construed for the MOU admittedly entered into by the parties. An admitted document on record would show facts thereunder on record. They are thus pleaded.
29. Mr. Diwan argued that the words âbuildingsâ, âbuildings in landâ, which were collectively referred to as âthe demised premisesâ would mean different things in the agreement. He relied upon the case of Madalsa International Ltd. Vs. Central Bank of India 1998(4) Bom.C.R. 124 @ 134 in which the Court observed that, when two different words, although practically synonymous in ordinary use, are employed in different parts of the same regulation dealing with the same topic, they are intended to have some different meaning. In fact, that is precisely why in this case the parties were seen to be not ad idem. They really intended different meanings for the expression âbuildingâ and âthe demised premisesâ.
30. Mr. Diwan has relied upon other judgments with regard to the interpretation of clauses in agreements. Indeed the interpretation must be inclusive and effect must be given to all clauses such that it would not negate any clause. Each clause must be reconciled. (See. Radha Sundar Dutta Vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim AIR 1959 SC 24).
31. The reliance upon the rule laid down by the Supreme in the case of Smt. Bina Das Gupta Vs. Sachindra Mohan Das Gupta AIR 1968 SC 39 from an earlier decision relating to construction of an exception out of a grant for the benefit of the grantor to be construed in favour of the grantee also would not apply in this case for accepting the interpretation of the petitioner which was wholly different from the interpretation placed by the respondent at the time of the execution of the MOU.
32. The most fundamental basis is the status of the parties. It has to be seen from the fact that specific performance which is a discretionary relief is refused and part of the damages claimed are granted. In the limited jurisdiction that the Court exercises under Section 34 of the Act this decision cannot be questioned and that is precisely because the reading of the MOU would certainly be capable of the interpretation put by the petitioner as much as it would be capable of the interpretation put by the respondent thereon. Consequently when the parties contracted they did not consider the surrender of a piece of land and the acquisition of built up area in the same sense.
33. It has been argued that much later on 13th April, 1999 an allotment order was unilaterally issued by respondent containing different terms and conditions which were contrary to those in the MOU. The petitioner did not produce the said order initially. The petitioner later accepted that it was served and contended that it was not acted upon by the parties and the subsequent correspondence as also the act of the parties in exchanging draft for executing the lease deed shows that reliance is placed only upon the MOU. Mr. Diwan argued that the subsequent conduct of the parties would show the intent of the parties. He has not pointed out the conduct by which the land of 7435 sq. mtrs. was agreed to be leased subsequently by the respondent. Consequently reliance upon T. S. Ramabadra Odayar Vs. T. S. Gopalaswami AIR 1931 Madras 404 and The Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. Vs. The State of Gujarat AIR 1975 SC 32 in this case is misplaced. The allotment, in fact, does not make any reference to the land. That is because, the respondent claims, that the building was only to be allotted. The total premium that was mentioned in the allotment letter was in terms of Clause 6 of the MOU. That was for the entire building. Though the lease rent of Rs.100/- was payable for the land, that did not form a part of the allotment and the building itself was allotted.
34. Indeed the MOU would have to be followed by the lease deed. Since the MOU has been accepted by the parties and interpreted by the Court and the meeting of minds of the parties has been seen to be not upon the same matter (building or land and building), the consideration of the letter of allotment, later correspondence and further drafts of the lease deed exchanged by the parties become wholly inconsequential.
35. The learned Arbitrator has framed as many as 26 points of determination. The Award of grant of damages and refusal of specific performance is most material aspect to be considered by the Court. Reading of the Award shows each of those aspects to have been considered except, of course, the question of termination of the MOU by the respondent which was challenged by the petitioner. The respondent could not terminate the agreement and the lease deed except for non payment of rent under Clause 27 of the MOU. The respondent has terminated the agreement as the parties never reached a consensus about what property was to be leased. The respondent constructed the building customized to the requirement of the petitioner. The construction was grossly poor. Whilst the parties negotiated and did not reach a consensus the construction gave way. Various defects were noticed. These were pointed to the respondent. They were not remedied. The petitioner refused to accept building. The learned Arbitrator has not faulted the petitioner on that score. The counter-claim of the respondent has accordingly largely not been accepted.
36. Mr. Diwan on behalf of the petitioner contended that the question of termination has not been considered at all and that the termination was invalid. Mr. Diwan would argue that when the Arbitrator did not give the finding upon the validity of the termination of the agreement by the respondent the Award would have to be set aside upon the parameters set out in the case of Suresh Prabhu Vs. Bombay Mercantile Co-op. Bank Ltd. 2007(5) Bom. C. R. 205 and Geojit Financial Services Ltd. Vs. Kritika Nagpal in Appeal 35 of 2013 of Bombay High Court dated 25th June, 2013. If that was so, it was for the petitioner to apply under Section 33 of the Act for passing an additional award on that aspect. That has not been done. The learned Arbitrator has considered the aspect of the requirement of grant specific performance or damages. The challenge to that is within the parameters of Section 34 of the Act. The question of termination is seen to be secondary â in fact there was no agreement at all and none to terminate.
37. Mr. Diwan also argued that the Award was contrary to the terms of the contract and would be against the public policy of India and would fall within the mischief of the law laid down in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. SAW Pipes Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 2629.
38. Mr. Bharucha contended that specific performance could not be granted because the petitioner has not averred its readiness and willingness of performing its part of the contract as required under the judgment in the case of M/s. Bharat Barrel and Drum MFG. Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. AIR 1989 Bombay 170. Aside from the fact that it would be a secondary consideration, the averment in para 24 of the claim under the subtitle âsubmissionsâ shows that the claimant has offered that it has been ready and willing to perform the MOU with such modification as the Hon'ble Tribunal determined to be binding. This would be in compliance with the requirement set out in the case of M/s. Bharat Barrel (supra).
39. Mr. Bharucha also argued that Clause 12 of the MOU under which the parties were to finalize the terms of the lease deed and consequently enter into another agreement would not justify the grant of the relief of specific performance. (See. Speech and Software Technologies Vs. Neos Interactive Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 475).
40. It can be easily seen that the contract of the nature in this case is not specifically enforceable.
41. In place of the 5 money claims made, the learned Arbitrator has granted 3 distinct damages. The earnest amount of Rs.53 lacs paid by the petitioner to the respondent has been directed to be returned with interest at 9% thereon from the date of MOU until payment. This would be adequate compensation to put the petitioner in the same position as he would have been had the contract not been entered into. The building was to be customized as per the requirement of the petitioner. The petitioner had to pay additional charges for the customization. Out of the finalized charges of Rs.85 lacs, the petitioner paid Rs.6.23 lacs. The balance was payable at the time handing over possession. Possession was refused to be taken. That has not been faulted. Refund of the earnest amount is, therefore, necessitated. The learned Arbitrator has directed refund Rs.6.23 lacs with interest at 9% p. a. from 18.03.2001, the date of the payment by the petitioner until the payment would be made by the respondent.
Under Clause 21A of the Contract, the respondent agreed to sell the remaining land of 17565 sq. mtrs. of the petitioner to a third party. The respondent did not do so. The petitioner sold the remaining land at a much lower price which it could get. That was @ Rs.1992/- per sq. mtr. The petitioner claimed that it was constrained to sell it a low price after much time when the prices fell in the absence of the assistance of the respondent in selling the land. The petitioner claimed that the price of the land fetched earlier was Rs.2500/- per sq. mtr. which the petitioner failed to obtain. The petitioner claimed damages thereon. It is for this shortfall of 3172 sq. mtrs. that the petitioner has claimed compensation @ Rs.2500/- per sq. mtr. Whilst the learned Arbitrator has rejected that compensation on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to additional land in the Millennium Business Park, the learned Arbitrator has granted the petitioner the price of Rs.2500/- per sq. mtr. for 7435 sq. mtrs. of land which was surrendered by the petitioner to the respondent upon the contract that did not materialize. This is also granted with interest at 9% p. a. from the date of termination i.e. 16th April, 2004.
42. Thus the learned Arbitrator has passed a reasoned Award granting the refund of the earnest amount, refund of the amount paid for customization as also the value of the land surrendered at the price as it was at the time it was surrendered all with interest thereon from the respective dates until payment. This would put the petitioner in the same position as it would have been had the contract not been entered into. The other claims for damages for failure to hand over building, damages for the difference of the price of the land at the time of surrender and the sale of remaining part of the land and damages in respect of premium collected by the respondent from the third party upon the transfer of the land surrendered by the petitioner have been rejected.
43. With regard to the counter-claim of the respondent which has been dismissed except for a small claim with regard to the maintenance having been granted, the learned Arbitrator has considered that the buildings were so hopelessly defective in construction as not to merit any payment for maintenance thereof when possession also was not taken by the petitioner. However with regard to the minimum maintenance which was payable, the learned Arbitrator has granted maintenance only @ Rs.0.10 per sq. ft. p.m. to the respondent. The petitioner would argue that when possession of the building was not taken, which was because of defective nature of work, and the lease having not been executed, there was no question of the petitioner having been required to pay any maintenance, even the minimum maintenance. Nevertheless it has been seen that the learned Arbitrator has considered the entire dispute between the parties including the agreement with regard to the payment of maintenance and upon the reasoning of minimum maintenance granted a small part of the respondent's claim.
44. Mr. Diwan would argue that the learned Arbitrator has decided the case not pleaded by the parties whereupon no issue was framed and no evidence was led and failed to decide the case pleaded. Hence the impugned Award was in excess of her jurisdiction, in violation of principles of natural justice, on the basis of inconsistent findings and without application of mind. In fact, the learned Arbitrator has exercised her discretion in putting the petitioner in the same position even without the grant of specific performance.
45. The learned Arbitrator's view is very plausible view in a reasoned award which cannot be interfered with in a petition under Section 34 of the Act. (See. Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. Vs. Dewan Chand Ram Saran (2012) 5 SCC 306).
46. Hence the petition is dismissed.
47. The statement made on 22nd December, 2010 which was to continue until further orders under the order dated 24th March, 2011 inter alia in this petition shall continue for the period of two weeks.