Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Court Judgment

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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1. rule. rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 2. by this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in civil misc. application no.30/2013 by adhoc district judge “ 1 (ftc), panaji. the petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in regular civil suit no.42/2011/c by civil judge junior division, panaji. 3. it was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in.....

Judgment:

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
		'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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		'court' => 'Mumbai Goa',
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		'decidedon' => '2014-04-10',
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		'judge' => 'S.B. SHUKRE',
		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.

2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge “ 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.

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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'id' => '1144387',
		'acts' => null,
		'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
		'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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		'court' => 'Mumbai Goa',
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		'decidedon' => '2014-04-10',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '1144387',
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		'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
		'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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		'court' => 'Mumbai Goa',
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		'decidedon' => '2014-04-10',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. reportedin 2010 ALL SCR 2321 and SoneraoSadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. reportedin AIR 1999 Bom. 235.

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of BalwantSing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. reported in 2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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10. In the case of Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.

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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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11. In the case of SoneraoSadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. (supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
	(int) 22 => ''
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1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '1144387',
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		'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
		'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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		'court' => 'Mumbai Goa',
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		'decidedon' => '2014-04-10',
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		'judge' => 'S.B. SHUKRE',
		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
	(int) 22 => ''
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5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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6. Injustice is to be removed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
		'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of œsufficient cause? and œliberal construction? in the case of BalwantSing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term œsufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of œreasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
	(int) 22 => ''
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12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of œfalsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
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		'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'court' => 'Mumbai Goa',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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$title_for_layout = 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
		'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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		'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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		'judge' => 'S.B. SHUKRE',
		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another - Citation 1144387 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '1144387',
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			'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 617 of 2013 ',
			'appellant' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others',
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			'casename' => 'Leela Fondu Mayekar and Others Vs. Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'judgement' => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.</p><p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.</p><p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.</p><p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.</p><p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:</p><p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?</p><p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.</p><p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.</p><p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.</p><p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.</p><p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:</p><p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;</p><p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;</p><p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;</p><p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;</p><p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;</p><p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.</p><p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.</p><p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.</p><p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.</p><p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).</p><p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.</p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Damodar Datta Zuwarkar and Another',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.<p> 2. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 1/07/2013 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.30/2013 by Adhoc District Judge &ldquo; 1 (FTC), Panaji. The petitioners filed an application for condonation of delay, which was of 400 days, which occurred in preferring an appeal against the order dated 30/11/2011, passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011/C by Civil Judge Junior Division, Panaji.',
	(int) 1 => '<p> 3. It was urged by the petitioners that petitioner no.4 was the only conversant party in the matter and as he suffered a paralytic stroke on 9/12/2011, i.e. immediately after passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, which was followed by a heart attack in March, 2012, for which ailments, the conversant party was on continuous medical treatment, he could not take a decision about preferring of the appeal. It was also submitted by him that having regard to his delicate health condition, his family members also avoided to speak to him about the litigations pending in the Courts of law. He submitted that as his health condition improved and stabilised he decided to prefer an appeal in the matter. The petitioner therefore submitted that the delay occurred in preferring of the appeal be condoned.',
	(int) 2 => '<p> 4. This application was strongly opposed by the respondents by filing reply. They submitted that the explanation given by the petitioners was false and misleading. They submitted that petitioner no.4 was not the only conversant party and that petitioner no.5 was also fully aware of the litigations and of the relevant facts pertaining to them. They submitted that petitioner no.1 was an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa and it was she who had verified and affirmed the verification clause as well as affidavit stating that the contents of the written statement were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. They also pointed out that subsequent to the passing of the order dated 30/11/2011, granting temporary injunction by the Trial Court, the respondents filed an application dated 29/10/2012 under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code on account of the petitioners' committing breach of the restraining order passed in Regular Civil Suit No.42/2011 on 30/11/2011. This application was registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012 and reply filed to this application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the petitioner no.5. Respondents also denied the contention of sickness of the petitioner no.4.',
	(int) 3 => '<p> 5. After hearing both sides, the learned Adhoc District Judge by her order passed on 1/07/2013 dismissed the application. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this petition.',
	(int) 4 => '<p> 6. I have heard Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Shri A.D. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and the paper book of this Writ Petition, with the assistance of both sides. The only point that comes up for my consideration in this petition is:',
	(int) 5 => '<p> Whether the impugned order refusing to exercise discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable?',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order discloses complete non-application of mind, inasmuch as, the learned District Judge has failed to take into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various decisions, that while deciding application for condonation of delay, it is not necessary to examine as to whether or not delay has been accounted for each day and every hour of the day and what should be seen by the Court is whether the explanation offered is reasonable and discloses the sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not. He has submitted that while deciding the delay condonation application, the Court must adopt a liberal approach as ultimately it has to be appreciated that interest of justice is served by allowing the parties to contest the matter on merits, rather than non-suiting them on some technicalities at the very threshold of the appeal proceedings and that too when the appeal is sought to be preferred under statutory provisions. He also submits that the appeal sought to be preferred in the instant case was in the nature of First Appeal and, therefore, the concept of liberal approach was all the more applicable in condoning the delay. He has also submitted that there were no malafides shown in the conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, as a normal rule the delay should have been condoned.',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 8. In reliance of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to me the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>2010 ALL SCR 2321 </strong>and <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>reportedin <strong>AIR 1999 Bom. 235</strong>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the aspects of liberal approach, sufficient cause and absence of malafides have already been sufficiently dealt with by the learned District Judge and by following the principles laid down in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>reported in <strong>2010 (6) ALL MR 480 (S.C.), </strong>the learned District Judge has found that although the sickness of petitioner no.4 has been proved by medical papers produced on record, the stand taken by the petitioners that it was only petitioner no.4, who was conversant with the matter was incorrect and even disclosed malafides on their part. He has taken me through the observations made by the learned District Judge and particularly in paragraph 5 of the impugned order to show as to how the impugned order cannot be termed to be unreasonable or arbitrary or absolutely illegal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the petition is liable to be dismissed.',
	(int) 9 => '<p> 10. In the case of <strong>Improvement Trust V/s. Ujagar Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering the application for condonation of delay no straight jacket formula can be prescribed to enable the Courts to come to a conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not and that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which party acts and behaves. With theses observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a principle that if it is seen from the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicants that they have not been absolutely careless and negligent in prosecuting the matter and no malafides can be attributed to them, the delay should be condoned as a normal rule.',
	(int) 10 => '<p> 11. In the case of <strong>Sonerao</strong><strong>Sadashivrao Patil and Anr. V/s. Laxmansingh Gahirewar and Ors. </strong>(supra), learned Singled Judge of this Court has laid down the guide lines which should be borne in mind while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. The guidelines read as under:',
	(int) 11 => '<p> 1. Litigant does not stand benefitted by lodging an appeal late;',
	(int) 12 => '<p> 2. Refusal to condone may result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated;',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 3. In the matter of explanation of every day's delay, pedantic approach should be avoided. Rational common sense pragmatic approach should be invariably adopted;',
	(int) 14 => '<p> 4. Substantial justice is to be preferred against technical flaws;',
	(int) 15 => '<p> 5. There is no presumption that delay is always deliberate;',
	(int) 16 => '<p> 6. Injustice is to be removed.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> There is no dispute about the above referred principles which must be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay as enunciated in the above referred case. I must say, these principles of law, must be seen as clarified by the exposition of concepts of &oelig;sufficient cause? and &oelig;liberal construction? in the case of <strong>Balwant</strong><strong>Sing (dead) V/s. Jagdish Singh and Ors. </strong>(supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that even if the term &oelig;sufficient cause? has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. It has further held that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce concept of &oelig;reasonableness? as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the rights and obligations of parties that arise in the matter. Therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that if a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. This is also because justice must be done to both parties equally and then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 12. Thus, it has to be seen as to whether or not there has been any negligence or malafides or default or inaction on the part of the petitioners in not prosecuting the remedy available to them in law. The learned District Judge has found that the ground of sickness of the petitioner no.4 was factually correct and has found the ground that appeal could not be preferred in time because petitioner no.4 being the only conversant party in the matter was prevented from doing so because of his sickness, was patently false and clearly smacked of &oelig;falsity and malafides?. Particular reasons for this finding are stated in paragraph 5 of the order impugned herein.',
	(int) 19 => '<p> 13. The reasons stated in the said paragraph 5 show that petitioner no.5 being an Assistant Manager working in the legal cell of Economic Development Corporation of Goa was not only well equipped to take necessary steps regarding filing of the appeal, but was actually actively involved in pursuing the litigation before the Courts as was evident from her signing and verifying the written statement as well as signing and verifying the reply to the application of the respondents filed under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A registered as Civil Misc. Application No.35/2012. These reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be said to be perverse. They are very much rooted in the facts established in this case. They show that apart from petitioner no.4, if the claim of petitioner no.4 regarding his being well acquainted with the facts of the matter is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, petitioner no.5 was also equally well conversant with the matter and sufficiently equipped to take decision regarding filing of the appeal. If there were no malafides on the part of the petitioners, there was at least negligence and unexplained inaction on their part, which could have been avoided by putting to use the knowledge about the matter of the petitioner no.5.',
	(int) 20 => '<p> 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that petitioner no.5 being wife of petitioner no.4 was all the while concentrating her energies on attending to her ailing husband and therefore there was nothing wrong if she too did not take any timely steps in the matter. But, that does not seem to be the case of the petitioners as seen from the grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay (page 99).',
	(int) 21 => '<p> 15. Thus, I see no merit in this Writ Petition. The discretion exercised by the learned District Judge in rejecting the application for condonation cannot be said to be the result of any arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The point is answered as in the negative. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs.',
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