Young Women's Christian Association and Anr. Vs. Ld. Second Labour Court - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/1143782
CourtKolkata High Court
Decided OnJun-09-2014
JudgeSOUMEN SEN
AppellantYoung Women's Christian Association and Anr.
RespondentLd. Second Labour Court
Excerpt:
order wp no.1971 of 2003 in the high court at calcutta constitutional writ jurisdiction original side young women's christian association & anr. versus ld. second labour court before: the hon'ble justice soumen sen date: 9th june 2014. appearance: mr.nayan rakshit, advocate mr.arijit basu, advocate ...for the petitioners.mr.ranjay de, advocate ...for respondent no.3. court: in this writ petition the petitioners have challenged the award passed by the 2nd labour court, west bengal in case no.25/2000 directing reinstatement of the respondent no.3 with back wages. the said proceeding arose out of an application filed by the respondent no.3 under section 10(1b) of the industrial disputes act, 1947. the respondent no.3 contended in the said proceeding that she was appointed by the writ petitioners on 1st july, 1998 and the said post was permanent in nature. however, by letter dated 30th june, 1999 on the plea that the said appointment was only for a period of one year, the joint secretary of the petitioner- association terminated the service of the respondent no.3 illegally. on the basis of the pleadings and the documents disclosed in the proceeding, the labour court has framed the following issues: 1. is the case maintainable u/s 10(1b)(d) of the i.d.act 1947?.”2. was the applicant terminated from her service, if so was the termination in question valid and justified?.”3. is the applicant entitled to get the relief as prayed for?. in the said proceeding, two sets of appointment letters were produced by the respective parties. both the letters are 1st july, 1998. the firs.paragraph of the letter dated 1st july, 1998 produced by the respondent no.3 reads as follows: “this is to confirm the terms upon which you are offered employment with the ywca of calcutta from 1 july 1998.”:“ the letter of appointment produced by the management in the said proceeding has additions beyond 1st july 1998 and the firs.paragraph reads as follows: “you are offered a contract with the ywca of calcutta, from 1 july 1998 to 30 june 1999 on which date your contract will lapse until further renewed on the following terms:” the respondent no.3 contended before the labour court that these additions after 1st july 1998 are clear afterthought and an embellishment introduced to the original letter issued by the said establishment with an ulterior motive. the additions to the letter produced by the management should be discarded. the tribunal noticed the discrepancies existing between the two letters and on the basis of the analysis of the evidence and materials on record held that the letter of appointment produced by the respondent no.3 should be accepted and the letter produced by the management is to be discarded. the tribunal has also noticed certain unusual features of the letter produced by the management in support of its contention that the said service was only contractual with a limited duration of one year. the writ court is not sitting as a court of appeal over the findings arrived at by the tribunal since the tribunal is a factfinding authority. the conclusion arrived at by the tribunal on the basis of the materials evidence should not be on record and appreciation of ordinarily interfered with unless the it appears to be pervers.or suffers from total non-application of mind leading to miscarriage of justice. the letter of appointment produced by the respondent no.3, in my view, is required to be read and understood in the context of what has been stated before the tribunal in the written statement filed by the management. the written statement filed by the management before the tribunal shows that the respondent no.3 had been working with the said organization which would be evident from paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of the said written statement which are reproduced hereunder: “(a) the applicant offered herself for a job to the opposite party by her letter dated 4.6.98 and the opposite party ywca, on compassionate grounds offered to the applicant by its letter dated 1.7.98 a contract with ywca from 1st july, 1998 to 20th june 1999 on which date the contract would lapse until further renewed and on other terms stipulated therein which was duly accepted by the applicant. copies of those two letters dated 4.6.98 and 1st july 1998 are annexed hereto marked with the letter “a” and “b” respectively. (b) in this connection it is stated that as per standing of this organization the application dated 4.6.98 of the applicant was duly considered by the personnel committee meeting held on 23rd june 1998 and decided to give her a year’s contract service and further decided to give her full facilities since she had served this organisation earlier” (emphasis supplied).the aforesaid averments clearly show that she was not a newcomer to the said establishment and she had been working in the said establishment even prior to the said letter of appointment. since she had been serving the organization earlier as stated in the said written statement, it explains why the letter produced by the respondent no.3 does not refer to the duration of her appointment. the letter of appointment also speaks about incentive to which she would be entitled to on expiry of each period of 11 months service. accordingly, this court is also of the view that the findings arrived at by the tribunal with regard to the letter of appointment relied upon by the respondent no.3 is the correct one. once the aforesaid conclusion is reached, it was no more open for the management to terminate the service in the manner in which termination is sought to be done by the letter of 30th june 1999. since the said appointment is not for a period of one year, the question of renewing the said service could not and does not arise. the tribunal has, in my view, on proper appreciation of facts and law, returned its findings in favour of the respondent no.3. however, the observation with regard to initiation of a criminal proceeding against the executive director of the petitioners is set aside since in my view that was not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. the award is upheld excepting the portion which has been set aside by this order. the writ petition accordingly stands disposed of with the aforesaid modification of the award. there shall however be no order as to costs. (soumen sen, j.) s. kumar a.r.(cr)
Judgment:

ORDER

WP No.1971 of 2003 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction ORIGINAL SIDE YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION & ANR.

Versus LD.

SECOND LABOUR COURT BEFORE: The Hon'ble JUSTICE SOUMEN SEN Date: 9th June 2014.

Appearance: Mr.Nayan Rakshit, Advocate Mr.Arijit Basu, Advocate ...for the petitioneRs.Mr.Ranjay De, Advocate ...for respondent No.3.

Court: In this writ petition the petitioners have challenged the award passed by the 2nd Labour Court, West Bengal in case No.25/2000 directing reinstatement of the respondent No.3 with back wages.

The said proceeding arose out of an application filed by the respondent No.3 under Section 10(1B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The respondent No.3 contended in the said proceeding that she was appointed by the writ petitioners on 1st July, 1998 and the said post was permanent in nature.

However, by letter dated 30th June, 1999 on the plea that the said appointment was only for a period of one year, the Joint Secretary of the petitioner- association terminated the service of the respondent No.3 illegally.

On the basis of the pleadings and the documents disclosed in the proceeding, the Labour Court has framed the following issues: 1.

Is the case maintainable u/s 10(1B)(d) of the I.D.Act 1947?.”

2. Was the applicant terminated from her service, if so was the termination in question valid and justified?.”

3. Is the applicant entitled to get the relief as prayed for?.

In the said proceeding, two sets of appointment letters were produced by the respective parties.

Both the letters are 1st July, 1998.

The fiRs.paragraph of the letter dated 1st July, 1998 produced by the respondent No.3 reads as follows: “This is to confirm the terms upon which you are offered employment with the YWCA of Calcutta from 1 July 1998.”:“ The letter of appointment produced by the management in the said proceeding has additions beyond 1st July 1998 and the fiRs.paragraph reads as follows: “You are offered a contract with the YWCA of Calcutta, from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 on which date your contract will lapse until further renewed on the following terms:” The respondent No.3 contended before the Labour Court that these additions after 1st July 1998 are clear afterthought and an embellishment introduced to the original letter issued by the said establishment with an ulterior motive.

The additions to the letter produced by the management should be discarded.

The tribunal noticed the discrepancies existing between the two letters and on the basis of the analysis of the evidence and materials on record held that the letter of appointment produced by the respondent No.3 should be accepted and the letter produced by the management is to be discarded.

The tribunal has also noticed certain unusual features of the letter produced by the management in support of its contention that the said service was only contractual with a limited duration of one year.

The writ court is not sitting as a court of appeal over the findings arrived at by the tribunal since the tribunal is a factfinding authority.

The conclusion arrived at by the tribunal on the basis of the materials evidence should not be on record and appreciation of ordinarily interfered with unless the it appears to be perveRs.or suffers from total non-application of mind leading to miscarriage of justice.

The letter of appointment produced by the respondent No.3, in my view, is required to be read and understood in the context of what has been stated before the tribunal in the written statement filed by the management.

The written statement filed by the management before the tribunal shows that the respondent No.3 had been working with the said organization which would be evident from paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of the said written statement which are reproduced hereunder: “(a) The applicant offered herself for a job to the opposite party by her letter dated 4.6.98 and the opposite party YWCA, on compassionate grounds offered to the applicant by its letter dated 1.7.98 a contract with YWCA from 1st July, 1998 to 20th June 1999 on which date the contract would lapse until further renewed and on other terms stipulated therein which was duly accepted by the applicant.

Copies of those two letters dated 4.6.98 and 1st July 1998 are annexed hereto marked with the letter “A” and “B” respectively.

(b) In this connection it is stated that as per standing of this organization the application dated 4.6.98 of the applicant was duly considered by the Personnel Committee Meeting held on 23rd June 1998 and decided to give her a year’s contract service and further decided to give her full facilities since she had served this organisation earlier” (emphasis supplied).The aforesaid averments clearly show that she was not a newcomer to the said establishment and she had been working in the said establishment even prior to the said letter of appointment.

Since she had been serving the organization earlier as stated in the said written statement, it explains why the letter produced by the respondent No.3 does not refer to the duration of her appointment.

The letter of appointment also speaks about incentive to which she would be entitled to on expiry of each period of 11 months service.

Accordingly, this court is also of the view that the findings arrived at by the tribunal with regard to the letter of appointment relied upon by the respondent No.3 is the correct one.

Once the aforesaid conclusion is reached, it was no more open for the management to terminate the service in the manner in which termination is sought to be done by the letter of 30th June 1999.

Since the said appointment is not for a period of one year, the question of renewing the said service could not and does not arise.

The tribunal has, in my view, on proper appreciation of facts and law, returned its findings in favour of the respondent No.3.

However, the observation with regard to initiation of a criminal proceeding against the executive director of the petitioners is set aside since in my view that was not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case.

The award is upheld excepting the portion which has been set aside by this order.

The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of with the aforesaid modification of the award.

There shall however be no order as to costs.

(SOUMEN SEN, J.) S.

Kumar A.R.(CR)