Sunil Sikri Vs. the Management Committee of Guru Harkrishan Public - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/1118629
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided OnJan-10-2014
JudgeRAJIV SHAKDHER
AppellantSunil Sikri
RespondentThe Management Committee of Guru Harkrishan Public
Excerpt:
$~22 * in the high court of delhi at new delhi % judgment delivered on:10. 01.2014 + w.p.(c) 191/2014 sunil sikri ..... petitioner versus the management committee of guru harkrishan public school and anr ..... respondents advocates who appeared in this case: for the petitioner: mr sanjeev ralli & mr m. parashar, advocates for the respondents: coram: hon'ble mr. justice rajiv shakdher rajiv shakdher, j cm no.340/2014 (exemption) 1. allowed subject to just exceptions. wp(c) no.191/2014 & cm no.339/2014 (stay) 2. this writ petition is directed against a resolution dated 21.11.2013 passed by respondent no.1 as also the memorandum and article of charges dated 17.12.2013 issued by respondent no.2.3. a perusal of the petition would show that the petitioner appears to have tendered his.....
Judgment:

$~22 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment delivered on:

10. 01.2014 + W.P.(C) 191/2014 SUNIL SIKRI ..... Petitioner versus THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF GURU HARKRISHAN PUBLIC SCHOOL AND ANR ..... Respondents Advocates who appeared in this case: For the petitioner: Mr Sanjeev Ralli & Mr M. Parashar, Advocates For the respondents: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER RAJIV SHAKDHER, J CM No.340/2014 (Exemption) 1. Allowed subject to just exceptions. WP(C) No.191/2014 & CM No.339/2014 (Stay) 2. This writ petition is directed against a resolution dated 21.11.2013 passed by respondent no.1 as also the memorandum and article of charges dated 17.12.2013 issued by respondent no.2.

3. A perusal of the petition would show that the petitioner appears to have tendered his resignation on 22.01.1994. The said resignation letter was, apparently, withdrawn by the petitioner on 23.01.1994. The issue as to whether the resignation was validly withdrawn was agitated before the concerned tribunal which delivered its judgment on 18.08.2011. 3.1 A perusal of the order of the tribunal suggests that one of the contentions raised by respondent no.1 was that there was a complaint against the petitioner, which was dated 22.01.1994, for alleged molestation. 3.2 The tribunal, however, came to the conclusion that, the complaint of alleged molestation was not relevant for the purposes of determining the issues raised in the appeal by the petitioner. Accordingly, in its order of 18.08.2011, the tribunal held, that the, relieving order dated 22.01.1994, which was passed pursuant to the resignation letter of the petitioner of even date, i.e., 22.01.1994, was illegal, unfair and unjust and hence not sustainable in the eyes of law. A consequential direction was also issued by the tribunal, in the very same order, for payment of 50% of backwages with all consequential benefits.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner informs me that the petitioner, pursuant to the order of the tribunal, has been reinstated. The question with regard to payment of 50% of the back wages and consequential benefits is pending in this court in another writ petition, being: WP(C) No.8058/2011. There is much history as to why this petition is pending, however, for the moment, I need not go into it.

5. Broadly, there are two issues raised in this writ petition on the basis of which intercession of this court is sought at this stage. First, that the resurrection of the complaint of alleged molestation dated 22.01.1994, after nearly two decades, is uncalled for and illegal. Second, that the committee constituted pursuant to the resolution dated 21.11.2013 is not in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder.

6. Mr Ralli, learned counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously argued that the respondents herein despite a reply filed by the petitioner to the show cause notice dated 13.09.2013, have not determined these aspects.

7. To be noted, the petitioner filed his reply to the show cause notice on 23.09.2013.

8. With regard to the second aspect referred to hereinabove, Mr Ralli says that Section 15 of the aforesaid Act makes it clear that for unaided minority schools the mechanism of a disciplinary proceeding has to be provided in the contract executed between the petitioner and the concerned school. It is his contention that Rule 118, which has been triggered in the present case for constitution of the committee, is not applicable to an unaided minority school. It is thus his contention that the constitution of the committee is flawed and the proceedings are clearly not maintainable given the time span of nearly two decades. 8.1 In so far as the aspect of constitution is concerned, Mr Ralli has relied upon clause 7 of the contract obtaining between the petitioner and respondent no.1; which in my view does not advert to any mechanism. All that clause 7 says, is that, they will frame appropriate rules in that regard. Mr Ralli says that respondent no.1, has not framed any rules.

9. Having regard to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the view that both these contentions, which have been raised in the reply to the show cause notice, filed by the petitioner, need determination by the concerned committee, in the first instance. It is not as if the committee is bereft of jurisdiction to determine the aspects referred to above. I hold accordingly. Having said so, the determination is to be made, necessarily, by way of a reasoned order, after giving due opportunity to the petitioner, in that behalf.

11. Accordingly, respondents are directed to, inter alia, determine two aspects, referred to hereinabove, prior to proceeding with the merit of the complaint, of alleged, molestation. The respondents will do the needful, and in that behalf give due notice to the petitioner for making a representation before the concerned committee, on the issues adverted to above. The committee will hear and decide, as expeditiously as possible, though not later than three months from today.

12. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid directions.

13. A copy of this order will be sent by the registry to the respondents; albeit without process fee.

14. Dasti. RAJIV SHAKDHER, J JANUARY10 2014 kk