SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/1112803 |
Court | Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission SCDRC New Delhi |
Decided On | Aug-25-2003 |
Case Number | Appeal No. A-1145 of 2003 |
Judge | LOKESHWAR PRASAD, PRESIDENT; MS. RUMNITA MITTAL MEMBER & MR. MAHESH CHANDRA, MEMBER |
Appellant | Chief Post Master, General Post Office, Parliament Street |
Respondent | Bishan Seth |
Lokeshwar Prasad, President:
1. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as âthe Act), is directed against order dated 20.12.2002 passed by District Forum, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi in Complaint Case No. OC/844/2001 entitled Shri Bishan Seth v. The Chief Post Master, GPO, Parliament Street, New Delhi.
2. The facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent Shri Bishan Seth had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum averring therein that he, in his capacity as Karta of Bishan Seth HUF, had purchased National Savings Certificates VIIIth issue (for short the Certificates) on 17.12.1994 for Rs. 50,000/- under registration No. 45279 of even date. It was stated in the complaint, filed by the respondent, before the District Forum that when he presented the above Certificates for encashment after the date of maturity, the payment in respect thereof was denied to the respondent by the appellant on the ground that HUF was not entitled for the issuance of those certificates and the same had not been issued properly and legally as per provisions of the issue. It was stated that neither at the time of the purchase/issue of those certificates nor during the currency of the validity of those certificates the respondent was ever informed that the same had not been properly issued. When the appellant did not encash those certificates after maturity the respondent, alleging deficiency in service on the part of the appellant, had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum.
3. However, after filing of the complaint by the respondent, the appellant had paid maturity value of the certificates to the respondent on 26.7.2002. After receiving the maturity value the respondent in the complaint, filed by him, had claimed interest only for the delayed payment.
4. The claim of the respondent in the District Forum was resisted by the appellant and in the reply/written version, filed on behalf of the appellant, it was stated that the certificates in question were issued by the appellant by oversight and there was no negligence on the part of the appellant while issuing those certificates. Other allegations levelled by the respondent in the complaint were denied and it was stated that the mistake on the part of the appellant was bona fide which occurred due to rush of work.
5. The learned District Forum vide impugned order has held that there was sheer negligence on the part of the appellant and on the basis of the above finding has directed the appellant to pay to the respondent interest @ 9% p.a. on the amount of Rs. 1,00,750/- from 17.12.2001 to 26.7.2002. It has further been directed that the amount of interest shall carry interest at the same rate till realization. The learned District Forum has also awarded cost of litigation, amounting to Rs. 3,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the respondent.
6. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act.
7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person, aggrieved by an order, made by the District Forum, can prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the above said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was âsufficient cause for not filing the same within the above said period. The words âsufficient cause occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression âsufficient cause, though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords âsufficient cause in a given case, yet, again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is âsufficient cause. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied.
8. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days because the order being impugned in the present proceedings was passed by the learned District Forum on 20.12.2002 and the present appeal has been filed by the appellant on 14.8.2003. Therefore, the question requiring consideration at the very threshold is as to whether the appellant has shown âsufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act.
9. The appellant, along with the appeal has also filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. The reasons for not filing the appeal in time have been stated in para 2 of the above said application which reads as under:
â2. That the District Consumer Forum sent the order dated 20.12.2002 on 25.1.2003 and it was delivered to the Parliament Street Head Post Office, New Delhi-1 on 27.1.2003. The Parliament Street Head Post Office, New Delhi-1 forwarded the order dated 20.12.2002 to the Chief Post Master, GPO on 17.2.2003 and GPO received it on 18.2.2003. Thereafter, the Department sought Advocates opinion and after that the opinion was forwarded to the Ministry of Law for approval of filing of appeal. The approval was received in the month of April. After the approval of the Ministry the file was sent to the Superintendent (Legal), Litigation Section for appointment of Government Counsel. The delay is because of the circumstances mentioned above and was not intentional.â
10. On a perusal of the contents of the above para it is apparent that certified true copy of the order being impugned in the present proceedings was received by the appellant on 27.1.2002 and if the period of limitation for filing the appeal is to be computed as commencing from the date of communication of the order, as has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in case Housing Board, Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association and Others, reported as III (1995) CPJ 28 (SC), the present appeal should have been filed by 27.2.2003. The same, as already stated, has been filed much beyond the prescribed period of limitation on 14.8.2003.
11. On a bare perusal of the contents of the above said para of the application, filed on behalf of the appellant, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal it is apparent that after 18.2.2003 till the date of filing the appeal i.e., 14.8.2003 no details have been given excepting a bald statement stating that the department sought Advocates opinion and after that the opinion was forwarded to the Ministry of Law for approval and after the receipt of the approval the file was sent to Superintendent (Legal) for appointment of Government Counsel. No details have been given as to on which date the Advocates opinion was sought for and on which date the same was received and when the file was forwarded to the Ministry of Law. It is stated that approval from the Law Ministry was received in the month of April. Even thereafter the appellant has taken practically four months in filing the appeal without giving any details.
12. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in case P.K. Ram Chandran v. State of Kerala and Another, reported as AIR 1998 (SC), have held:
âLaw of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained.â
13. Moreover, delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity. Proof of âsufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of such discretion by the Appellate Authority. In our above views we stand fortified by a decision of the Honble National Commission in case Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 CONSUMER 2731 (NS). In the above said decision the Honble National Commission has held:
âThe appeal by DDA has been filed delayed by 38 days and is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay supported by an affidavit. It is stated therein that the copy of the order dated 10.3.1993 does not appear to have been received by DDA and so a copy of the order was obtained on 8.4.1993. The grounds for delay are given because the order had to be examined from all aspects and at various levels before a decision to file this appeal could be given. In our views this does not constitute a valid and sufficient cause for the exercise of our discretion to condone the delay. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion, it was the duty of the DDA to establish as to how the matter was dealt with at all levels and each days delay had to be satisfactorily explained. Inter-office consultation for prolonged periods cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity because the process of working in DDA has resulted in the delay. The application for condonation of delay is dismissed and consequently the appeal is dismissed as barred by time.â   (Emphasis supplied)
14. The Honble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Smt. Ram Kali, reported as AIR 1987 Jammu and Kashmir 71, while considering the question whether the norms for condonation of delay should be different for Government or a Statutory Body as compared to an individual, has held:
âThe delay in this case has accrued as the matter was referred to the Law Department and the office of the Executive Engineer, Chenani Hydel Project who is dealing with the case and the Government Office such as, Law Department, etc. were also at Srinagar and the matter being in rotation through proper channels took time.
In our opinion, the above said explanation without mentioning the specific days and the reason for delay explaining each day of delay is no cause at all much less a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the revision or an appeal within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We are, therefore, in full agreement with the ratio of authority of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, AIR 1973 AP 43 (supra) and hold that no exception is made for the Government in the matter of condonation of delay which is not satisfactorily explained in terms of the Act.â    (Emphasis supplied)
15. On similar grounds for condonation of delay, as stated in the condonation application in the present case, we have in our earlier decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. R.C. Jain, reported as I (2000) CPJ 141, relying upon the decision of National Commission in the case of Maria Francis Ajija and Another v. Rev. Fr. R. Ratichagar, reported as II (1994) CPJ 108 (NC), held that mere procedural delay does not constitute sufficient cause in order to exercise our discretion.
16. In the presence of the above facts and the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words âsufficient cause it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence on the part of the appellant. In our opinion, as a matter of fact, the appellant has miserably failed to show âsufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal and, therefore, the application filed on behalf of the appellant for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal is hereby rejected.
17. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation is also devoid of substance on merits because on the basis of documents/material on record it is not in dispute that the certificates in question were issued due to sheer negligence on the part of the functionaries of the appellant who neither at the time of issue of the certificates nor thereafter during the currency of the validity of those certificates, before maturity, at any time, informed the respondent that the same had not been properly issued. It was only at the time when the same were presented by the respondent for encashment that the respondent was informed that the same had not been issued properly though, thereafter, the respondent, after he had filed a complaint before the District Forum, had been paid maturity value on 26.7.2002 whereas the amount due and payable to him should have been paid on 17.12.2001, i.e., the date of the maturity of those certificates. Thus, the respondent, for no fault on his part, had been deprived of the use of the money which was legally due to him for the period from 17.12.2001 to 26.7.2002. In the given facts the learned District Forum was fully justified in awarding interest for the above said period. The learned District Forum has awarded interest for the above said period and thereafter also interest on interest at the same rate till realization which cannot be stated to be higher or exorbitant. The same, as a matter of fact, is reasonable in the given facts.
18. Thus, viewed from all angles, the above mentioned appeal, filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.