Rajendra S/O Ramaji Mahisbadwe Vs. the Joint Commissioner and Vice Chairman Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee and Another - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/1104880
CourtMumbai Nagpur High Court
Decided OnMar-11-2013
Case NumberWrit Petition No. 5569 of 2012
JudgeB.P. DHARMADHIKARI & P.B. VARALE
AppellantRajendra S/O Ramaji Mahisbadwe
RespondentThe Joint Commissioner and Vice Chairman Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee and Another
Excerpt:
constitution of india - articles article 142 article 141 226, and 227 of the maharashtra sc,st castes de-notified tribes (vimukta jatis), nomadic tribes, other backward classes and special backward category (regulation of issuance and verification of) caste certificates act - section 10 – “cast certificate” - petitioner challenges the order of termination - scrutiny committee invalidated caste certificate – submitted that protection extended apex court under article 142 of the constitution of india - securing employment by wrongly claiming benefit of reservation - false certificate was produced - whether directions are issued in exercise of powers under article 142 of the constitution. (para 1,10 and 1) court held - constitution of india provides for protective.....b.p. dharmadhikari, j. by this petition filed under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of india, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order of termination dated 03.11.2009, passed by respondent no.2 – additional general manager/engineering lmd national aviation company of india limited. though in the petition, order dated 05.10.2012 passed by the scheduled tribe certificate scrutiny committee, nagpur division, nagpur, invalidating caste claim of the petitioner as belonging to halba scheduled tribe, has also been questioned, the petitioner has only claimed protection in employment and expressly restricted his challenge only to the order of termination and has given up the status as belonging to halba scheduled tribe. right to challenge order invalidating caste certificate is.....
Judgment:

B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.

By this petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order of termination dated 03.11.2009, passed by Respondent no.2 – Additional General Manager/Engineering LMD National Aviation Company of India Limited. Though in the petition, order dated 05.10.2012 passed by the Scheduled Tribe Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, invalidating caste claim of the petitioner as belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe, has also been questioned, the petitioner has only claimed protection in employment and expressly restricted his challenge only to the order of termination and has given up the status as belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe. Right to challenge order invalidating caste certificate is given up with knowledge that Respondent Employer as also Caste Scrutiny Committee are opposing the prayer for protection. This protection in service is being claimed on the basis of various judgments, particularly a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kavita Solunke .vrs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported at 2012 (5) Mh.L.J. 921, and judgments of Division Bench of this Bench dated 04.10.2012 in Writ Petition No. 2162/2012 (Devidas Vitthalral Bhonde vs. Divisional Controller MSRTC, Amravati) as also dated 08.10.2012 in Writ Petition No.4013/2012 (Pramod Krushnarao Bayaskar vs. The Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee and Ors.), a judgment dated 03.10.2012 in Writ Petition No.402/2012 (Tarachand Fukirchand Ninave .vrs. Joint Commissioner and Vice Chairman and others) is also pressed into service for said purpose.

2. It is in this background, we have heard Shri S.R. Narnaware, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Shri P.B. Patil, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1 Scrutiny Committee and Shri Sridhar K. Chari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.2 Employer. With their consent, the petition is taken up for final disposal by issuing Rule, making the same returnable forthwith.

3. Shri Narnaware, learned Counsel submits that the basic document namely Caste Certificate issued to the petitioner as belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe is not found obtained by playing any fraud and hence, is not a false caste certificate. The law as expounded in the case of KavitaSolunke .vrs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), and various other judgments of this Bench of Bombay High Court, therefore, must be applied and the order of termination must be set aside. He points out that Government of India has issued a notification/ Office Memorandum on 10.08.2010 protecting the services of employees like present petitioner. The said policy decision must be applied in present facts and order of termination must be quashed and set aside.

4. Shri P.B. Patil, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.1 Scrutiny Committee has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sunil Ingle vs. Zilla Parishad and Anr, reported at 2009(2) All MR 867, to submit that similar resolution dated 15.06.1995 issued by the State Government has been found invalid and the Division Bench has held that persons securing employment on the basis of a invalid caste certificate cannot seek protection of their service. He has invited attention to the findings recorded by the Scrutiny Committee in the impugned order to point out how the Vigilance Cell Authorities and the Scrutiny Committee has noted old Koshti documents. He contends that thus certificate obtained by the petitioner is false and fraudulent.

5. Shri S.K. Chari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.2 – Employer submits that in the light of previous petitions filed by the petitioner before the Principal Seat of this Court and at Nagpur, challenge to termination order dated 03.11.2009 is not open and is misconceived. The continuation in service was dependent upon obtaining validity and petitioner has acquiesced in the said judgment of this Court dated 16.07.2012. It is further contended that the Office Memorandum dated 10.08.2010 is not binding upon respondent no.2, and is not attracted in the present facts. In any case the said Office Memorandum cannot override provisions of Section 10 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificates Act, (Act No. 23 of 2001).

6. He has relied upon a judgment in the case of Union of India vs. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar and Ors., reported at (2008) 4 SCC 612 a judgment delivered by the Hon'ble 3 Judges of Apex Court to show how protection granted by the Constitution Bench in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and Ors., reported at (2001) 1 SCC 4, is found not applicable as "law" on uniform basis. The judgment in the case of Regional Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir and Ors., reported at JT 2008 (8) SC 265, is also relied upon by him to submit that such protection is not available in present matter. Lastly, he submits that the protection extended by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments is found to be under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, by the Full Bench of this Court in its judgment in the case of Ganesh Rambhau Khalale .vrs. State of Maharashtra and ors, reported at AIR 2009 Bom. 122. The judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of KavitaSolunke .vrs. State of Maharashtra and ors. (supra), does not therefore, carry petitioner's argument further and the Division Bench judgments of this Court at Nagpur extending protection are delivered in ignorance of the said Full Bench judgment. He also points out how this aspect has been considered by this Bench in Writ Petition No. 5836/2012 (Gajanan Narayan Gonnade .vrs. The State of Maharashtra and others) and Writ Petition No. 5812/2012 (Ravindra Khemraj Kumbhare .vrs. State of Maharashtra and others) on 03.01.2013. He therefore, prays for dismissal of Writ Petition.

7. We find that in Judgment of Hon'ble 2 Judges in the case of Regional Manager, Central Bank of India .vrs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir and others (supra), a plea of protection of employment due to long service was pressed and the Hon'ble Apex Court found that it was already rejected in series of its decisions. It has, therefore, found it not necessary to launch an exhaustive dissertation on principles. The Hon'ble Apex Court notes that in a few decisions, admission or appointment were not cancelled because of "peculiar factual matrix obtaining therein, the consensus of judicial opinion is found to be equity, sympathy or generosity has no place where the original appointment rests on a false caste certificate, such a person cannot plead equity, nor the Court is justified in exercising equity jurisdiction in his favour.” It has been observed that “an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something which is otherwise not due, tantamount to fraud”.

8. In Union of India .vrs. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar and others (supra), the Hon'ble 3 Judges have considered the Constitutional Bench judgment in case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind (supra), and noted that the said decision has no application to a case which does not relate to admission to an educational institution, but relates to securing employment by wrongly claiming benefit of reservation meant for Scheduled tribe. It has been laid down that proper course is to cancel the employment obtained on the basis of false certificate so that post may be filled up by a candidate who is entitled to benefit of reservation.

9. In Sunil Ingle vs. Zilla Parishad and another (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has considered this larger Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and also the Government Resolution dated 15.06.1995. By the said government resolution such persons securing employment, if found belonging to Special Backward Classes were given protection from termination. The Division Bench has found that it amounted to entry in service by backdoor and deprived other persons belonging to Special Backward Class, of their fundamental rights. The Division Bench has held “If the State does not have power to make legislation violating or abridging fundamental rights, obviously, it does not have power to issue government resolution which has a result of abridging fundamental rights. We find that this Government Resolution in terms violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the High Court will not be justified in issuing its writ for enforcement of such invalid and infirm Government Resolution.”

10. It is in this background, that the perusal of Full Bench judgment in case of GaneshRambhau Khalale .vrs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), becomes necessary. There the controversy was placed before the Full Bench because of two divergent views of coordinate Benches. In Union of India and Ors. vs. Deepak Y. Gotefode, reported at 2008(1) Mh.L.J. 790, the Division Bench has found that appointment was void since inception as it was obtained by playing fraud by producing false caste certificate. The protection in employment was, therefore, not granted. The later Division Bench judgment in the case of PrashantHaribhau Khawas vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported at 2008 (2) Mh.L.J. 322, considered similar situation and by drawing support of the same judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court i.e. State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and Ors., (supra), concluded that the protection granted therein to the appointments or admissions that have become final, was under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The question whether the observations or directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in said judgment declared law under Article 141 or were issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 came to be placed before the Full Bench. The Full Bench from para 5 onwards looks into various judgments. In para 5, there is reference to judgment in the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai vs. State of Kerala and Ors., reported at 2004 (2) SCC 105, delivered by the Hon'ble three Judges and Full Bench of High Court noted that there the larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court followed principle of protection in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and Ors. (supra). But then the finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court that such person cannot be said to be holding the civil post within the meaning of Article 311 are also noted. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Madhusudan Punekar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2002 (2) Mh. L.J. 300, where though the High Court had decided question of law against the appellant, the protection was accorded to the services of the appellant is also noted. Then the judgment looked into is in the case of Central Warehouse Corporation vs. Jagdish Kumar, SLP (Civil) 25644 of 2004 and as facts there warranted grant of protection, the Hon'ble Apex Court accordingly extended it to the employee. In para 8 of its judgment, Full Bench looks into judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Anr. vs. Vilas s/o Govindrao Bokade and Anr., reported at 2007 (3) Mh.L.J. 805, and noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court had found that situation of Vilas was not different than in Milind (supra) and, therefore, the High Court justified in extending protection to the services of Vilas.

11. From Para 9A onwards, the judgments taking a views of Courts to the contrary are looked into by the Full Bench of this Court. The judgment in the case of Bank of India vs. Avinash Mandvikar, reported at AIR 2005 SCC 3395, is looked into and observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 6 are noted. The employee there had put in three decades of service and three more years were left for his retirement. In spite of this, the Hon'ble Apex allowed the appeal of Bank of India and held that employee was not permitted or entitled to the benefits of appointment secured by illegitimate means. In para 10, the judgment in the case of BHEL Ltd. vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde, reported at 2007 (4) Mh. L.J. 1, is looked into and observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court that such employee is liable to be terminated are noted. Para 7 of BHEL Ltd. vs. Suresh considering the judgment of Constitution Bench in State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and Ors., (supra), has also noted with the finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court that law declared by the Constitution Bench does not at all lay down principle of law that where person secures appointment by producing a false caste certificate, his service can be protected by taking undertaking. This Supreme Court judgment in para 8 observes that after interpreting relevant constitution and statutory provisions and laying down law, it is open to the Court to mould the relief which may appear to be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Full Bench concluded that protection granted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind (supra), is thus found to be moulding of relief by the Hon'ble Apex Court in exercise of discretion under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

12. In para 11 GaneshRambhau Khalale .vrs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), considers a three Judges judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Dattatraya Namdeo Mendhekar and Ors., (supra), has been noted and appreciation of Constitution Bench judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and Ors., (supra) therein has been elaborately looked into. The moulding of relief in exercise of powers under Article 142 by the Constitution Bench is again highlighted. It is in this background that the Full Bench then proceeds to apply the law in para 12. In para 13, the following conclusions have been recorded.

“13. Having regard to the legal position that emerges from the above referred judgments we record the following conclusions and answer the question framed:

The observations / directions issued by the Supreme Court in para 36 of the judgment in the case of State vs. Milind, reported in 2001(1) Mah. LJ SC 1: (AIR 2001 SC 393) is not the 'law declared by the Supreme Court' under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.

The said observations/ directions are issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

The said observations/ directions have no application to the cases relating to appointments and are restricted to the cases relating to admissions.

The protection, if any, to be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case would depend upon the exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. As the powers under Article 142 are not available to the High Court, no protection can be granted by this Court even in cases relating to admissions.”

13. It is important to note here that when Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and Ors., (supra), it was not required to look into the provisions of the Act No. 23 of 2001, particularly the provisions of Section 10 which mandate cancellation of all benefits including admission, employment, once a certificate is invalidated by the Caste Scrutiny Committee. The issue of protection has been looked into by the Division Bench at Nagpur in the case of Shaileshs/o Krishnarao Kohad vs. Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur and Ors., reported at 2010 (1) Mh.L.J. 790, to which one of us (B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.) is a party. After following the above mentioned Full Bench of this Court, request for protection has been turned down. The perusal of para 25 of said judgment reveals that the effort made by the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Shailesh to urge that the directions issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court were not under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, has been turned down. The Division Bench of this Court very recently in the case of Apurvavs. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2013 (1) Mh.L.J. 139, has again reiterated the same position that too in the light of provisions of Section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001. Mention can also be made to the judgment of Division Bench taking similar view and the judgment in the case of GauriShekhar Telvane vs. Maharashtra University of Health Sciences, reported at 2012 (6) AIR Bom. Reports 750, and in the case of ShwetaKesarinath Shivdikar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported at 2010 (2) Mh. L.J. 490. In the case of PriyankaOmprakash Panwar vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., reported at 2009 (4) Mh. L.J. 847, the Division Bench of this Court has again adopted same line. The view expressed by this Court shows that as the reservation is a Constitutional provision, State Government is found not competent to extend any protection by treating persons so recruited as belonging to Special Backward Class. This can be gathered from para 12 of judgment which considers this aspect. The Division Bench in the case of Sunil Ingle vs. Zilla Parishad and Anr., (supra) has in para 3 expressly noted that when State does not have power to make legislation violating or abridging the fundamental right, such Government Resolution dated 15.06.1995 is invalid and infirm. The Scheduled Tribes are recognized in relation to the State and as held in MadhuriPatil vs, State of Maharashtra AIR 1995 SC 94, it is obligation of State to verify whether the certificate procured is genuine or not. Act No. 23 of 2001 in Maharashtra takes care of that duty of State of Maharashtra. The above observations of this Court in relation to 15.6.1995 circular also hold good in respect of the Office Memorandum dated 10.08.2010 though issued by the Government of India. A person not found belonging to either Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste in Maharashtra can not be continued as reserved category person even by the Central Government.

14. In the case of RajuRamsing Vasave vs. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar, reported at 2008 (9) SCC 54, particularly in paras 43, 48 and 49, the Hon'ble Apex Court has explained when a judgment can be accepted as a binding precedent, laying down a law. The reference can also be made to its judgment in the case of Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Workman, reported at 2007 (1) SCC 408, particularly paras 41 and 42. The perusal of all above judgments which have been looked into by Full Bench clearly show that on account of peculiar facts, the Hon'ble Apex Court has thought it proper to extend protection to the employee/ students, as the case may be. though caste certificate were found invalid. Thus, need felt by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its Constitution Bench judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and Ors., (supra), is also felt by the Hon'ble Apex Court in these subsequent judgments. The Hon'ble Apex Court, however, has not altered the law as laid down by Constitution Bench judgment in any way. The said law has been applied consistently by larger Benches in the case of Union of India vs. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar, (supra) and in R. Vishwanatha Pillai vs. State of Kerala and Ors., (supra). The effect of production of false and fraudulent certificate is looked into by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of RameshRambhauji Majrikar vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., reported at 2011 (6) BCR 501 and the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of RameshSuresh Kamble vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported at 2007 (1) Mh. L.J. 423. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of BharatiBalkrishna Dhongade vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2012 (1) SCC 566, considers the situation where burden of establishing caste claim is not discharged. In the case of ZillaParishad vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2010 (6) SCC 592, para 17, the Hon'ble Apex Court directs creation of supernumerary post for Special Backward Class candidate though the appointment is found to be valid but same is directed to be created as Special Backward Class status is proved.

15. Before proceeding further, we may refer to judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Government of West Bengal vs. Tarun K. Roy and Ors., reported at 2004 (1) SCC 347, where it has been concluded in para 26 that a later judgment delivered in ignorance of a binding precedent of a coordinate Bench needs to be treated as per incuriam and is not a binding law.

16. It is in this background that we have to look into the judgments on which the petitioner has placed reliance. The judgment in Writ Petition No. 2162 of 2012 delivered at Nagpur on 04.10.2012 refers only to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of KavitaSolunke vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (supra) and holds that the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken a view that in case of persons settled in employment, service needs to be protected. Because of these observations, the petition has been allowed and protection has been extended by clarifying that the petitioner would not be entitled for any promotion or any other benefit on the basis of his claim as belonging to Scheduled Tribe. In Writ Petition No. 4013 of 2012, the Division Bench at Nagpur on 08.10.2012, has noted the very same judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and judgment in the case of Dattus/o Namdeo Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at 2012 (1) SC 549 and allowed the petition and protected his services. The petitioner was directed to file an undertaking that neither he nor his progeny would be entitled to claim any benefits as belonging to Scheduled Tribe.

17. In Writ Petition No. 402 of 2012, this Court on 03.10.2012 has noted O.M. dated 10.08.2010 issued by the Government of India and extended its benefit to the petitioner subject to the petitioner or his progeny not claiming any benefits as ST candidate. All these judgments follow same line as are delivered by the same Hon'ble Judge of this Court as per assistance received. These judgments on which the petitioner has placed reliance do not refer to earlier Division Bench judgments of this Court where the Full Bench of this Court in GaneshRambhau Khalale vs. State of Maharashtra, (supra), has been consistently followed. The provisions of Section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 laying down consequences of invalidation of caste certificate are also not pointed out to the Division Benches at Nagpur. The attention of said Bench was invited only to the judgment in the case of KavitaSolunke vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (supra) and the judgment in the case of Dattuvs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (supra). The parties did not point out to this Court at that time that protection extended by the Hon'ble Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in its basic judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind (supra), was not under Article 141 of Constitution of India but was under Article 142 thereof. The question, therefore, whether High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction could have ignored or nullified the mandate of Section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 was also not required to be gone into by this Court in its judgments dated 04.10.2012, 08.10.2012 or 03.10.2012 (supra).

18. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of KavitaSolunke vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (supra), is delivered by a Bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges. The said Bench has looked into the Constitution Bench judgment and then various other judgments including two larger Bench judgments in the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai vs. State of Kerala and Ors. (supra) and Union of India vs. Dattatray Namdeo Mendhekar, (supra). Thus, the legal provisions which this Court has to keep in mind while exercising writ jurisdiction viz., Section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 were not required to be looked into in the said judgment. It is obvious that the Hon'ble Apex Court has exercised its jurisdiction to mould relief in peculiar facts and as that was being done under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the invalidation of caste claim by Scrutiny Committee was not determinative. The observations in para 15 of said judgment reveal that the question of extending the protection is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of Dattuvs. State of Maharashtra, (supra), the issue is looked into by the three Hon'ble Judges. Three Hon'ble Judges have looked into its earlier two orders. There the caste certificate issued was invalidated on the ground that they could not substantiate there case as belonging to Thakur – Scheduled Tribe and they also could not establish any affinity. That cancellation was upheld by High Court and then Special Leave Petition came to be filed before the Hon'ble Apex Court. In para 5, the Hon'ble Apex Court accepts the finding of Caste Scrutiny Committee as also findings of High Court but then holds that it cannot ignore various circumstances which intervened between issuance of caste certificate and cancellation thereof. In the light of those developments, the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Swativs. State of Maharashtra, in Civil Application No. 7411 of 2010 decided on 06.09.2010 was pressed into service before this larger Bench. There though a Special Leave Petition filed by Swati was dismissed, benefits already enjoyed and degree of B.D.S. obtained by Swati came to be protected. A direction was issued that she would not be entitled to any further benefits under the caste certificate. The Hon'ble larger Bench noted that facts in the case of Dattu before it were similar. It, therefore, proceeded to dismiss all three Special Leave Petitions but then preserved benefits, advantages till then derived by the holders of Caste certificate. It is also clarified by the Hon'ble larger Bench that the petitioner would not be entitled to take any further advantage in future either for studies or employment. The petitioner, however, was directed to make good the amount of concession enjoyed by way of reduction of fees. This judgment, therefore, again shows that consequences flowing from Section 10 of Act No. 23 of 2001 have not been found just and not permitted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the facts and circumstances of the matter before it though it dismissed the SLP as filed. Obviously, again the exercise is of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of GaneshRambhau Khalale vs. State of Maharashtra, (supra), therefore, cannot be said to have undergone any change because of these judgments.

19. In 2012 (11) LJSOFT 10 = 2013 (1) Mah.L.J. 139 - Apurva Ashok Gokhale Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, Division Bench has considered the aspect of protection after upholding the order of Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidating the caste certificate. This submission has not been accepted in view of an express provision of law enacted by the State legislature in the shape of Section 10 in Act no. 23 of 2001. Following observations and interpretation by a Division Bench of this Court in PriyankaOmprakash Panwar v. State of Maharashtra 2008 (3) LJSOFT 79 = 2008 (2) Bom.C.R. 100. have been relied upon:-

"The balance between the equitable consideration of protecting the interest of a student who has pursued his education and the public interest in protecting the reserved categories against the usurpation of their constitutional entitlements by imposters has now been made by the State Legislature. The Court in the exercise of the power of judicial review has due deference to legislative policy. The Court does not prescribe legislative policy nor does it enact law. The Court must assume that the legislature is cognizant of the needs and welfare of society. The legislature was also cognizant of the outlays publicly made on education and the investment made by the State in equipping students to become doctors, engineers and other professionals. The Legislature has expressly stipulated that a degree or diploma obtained on the basis of a caste claim which is invalidated shall stand cancelled. In the face of an express legislative provision, this Court shall not be justified in exercising its equitable jurisdiction. Considerations of equity that guide the Court in constitutional adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution must be in accordance with the law enacted by the Legislature. So long as the law continues to be valid, the High Court would not be justified in issuing directions which run contrary to the plain intendment of the Legislature. It is the constitutional duty and obligation of this Court to give a purposive meaning and interpretation to the provisions of the enactment made by the State Legislature in 2000. Stringent provisions have been made to protect the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other reserved categories. To dilute those provisions by importing equitable considerations for a candidate who has usurped benefits would be to defeat the law. The legislation was in this case conceived in the interests of protecting the constitutional scheme of reservations from usurpation by those who are not entitled. It is the plain duty of the constitutional Court to enforce the law. The doctrine of the separation of powers in a democracy demands no less."

20. In para 8 in ApurvaAshok Gokhale Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, Division Bench has further noted that though the Supreme Court had in certain cases issued directions to protect the admissions granted to a candidate despite the invalidation of the caste certificate having regard to the equities of the case, this was in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution. It also notes that this Division Bench judgment of this Court in Panwar's case has been subsequently followed by another Division Bench in Jagdevi Gurunath Khedgikar v. The Scheduled Tribe Certificate Security Committee Writ Petition 5624 of 2011 decided on 5 March 2012. Because of the specific statutory provisions which have been enacted by the State legislature, in Sections 10(1) and 10(3), the request to extend protection has not been accepted. This Bench has observed that the legislature has in its wisdom balanced two competing equities. The first equity is the equity of an individual student who has undergone a period of study albeit on the basis of a false caste certificate. The second equity which has been regarded as one of overriding or paramount importance in the legislation is the need to protect the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other categories for whom reservations are intended from the usurpation of benefits by imposters who claim a reserved seat in an educational institution on the basis of a false caste claim. The legislature has as a matter of principle specifically laid down in the form of sub sections (1) and (3) of Section 10 that despite the conferment of a degree or diploma, upon a subsequent invalidation of a caste claim based on a false caste certificate, the benefit which has accrued to the student shall stand withdrawn. This Court did not find any merit in the Petition.

21. On 16.4.2009 in 2009 (8) LJSOFT 66= 2009 (4) Mah.L.J. 847 while rejecting review in matter of PriyankaOmprakash Panwar Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors., the Division Bench mentions that the effect of the Act 23/2001 enacted by the State Legislature in the year 2000 has been considered in a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Sanjay K. Nimje, 2007 (3) LJSOFT (SC) 50 = (2007) 14 SCC 481. The Supreme Court referred to the provisions of Section 10 of the Act which entail the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Legislative enactment in this case, the Act 23 of 2001, would prevail over a Government Resolution to the contrary and in the light of the Constitutional provisions contained in Articles 341 and 342, statutory provisions cannot be diluted either by a Government Resolution or otherwise. Following observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Maharashtra vs. Raviprakash Babulalsing Parmar, 2006 (12) LJSOFT (SC) 31 = (2007) 1 SCC 80 are quoted by it in this review judgment:-

"The Constitution of India provides for protective discrimination and reservation so as to enable the disadvantaged group to come on the same platform as that of the forward community. If and when a person takes an undue advantage of the said beneficent provision of the Constitution by obtaining the benefits of reservation and other benefits provided under the Presidential Order although he is not entitled thereto, he not only plays a fraud on the society but in effect and substance plays a fraud on the Constitution. When, therefore, a certificate is granted to a person who is not otherwise entitled thereto, it is entirely incorrect to contend that the State shall be helpless spectator in the matter."

22. In Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 592, Hon'ble Two Judges of Apex Court notices in para 9 that in spite of the protection given by the Government, Respondent 2 was not reinstated in service. Therefore, he filed Writ Petition No. 1764 of 2003 challenging the order dated 4-5-1998 terminating his services. The Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench allowed it on 31-8-2004, giving rise to the appeal. From the record, Apex Court did not approve the stand of Respondent 1 i.e. the State of Maharashtra that Respondent 2 was entitled to the protection of Government Resolution dated 15-6-1995. The well-settled principle of law that once the certificate indicating that a person belongs to the Scheduled Tribe is invalidated by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, his appointment becomes void from the beginning is then quoted. It is held that the void appointment could not have been validated by the Government by addressing a communication to the appellant. Hon'ble Apex Court further finds that the Government had passed the Order on 6-2-2002 on the basis of certificate produced by Respondent 2, which indicated that he belonged to Special Backward Class. The record also showed that he had produced a certificate dated 12-6-2002 indicating that he belonged to Special Backward Class before the appointment, but the appellant had not taken any steps to get it verified through the Caste Scrutiny Committee. In view of the non availability of post belonging to the Special Backward Class category with the appellant, Supreme Court held that interest of justice would be served if the Government is directed to create supernumerary post in Appellant institution to accommodate Respondent 2 with liberty to get the said caste certificate verified through the Caste Scrutiny Committee. In LIC of India v. Sushil, (2006) 2 SCC 471, Hon'ble Two Judges state that filing of the undertaking was not to be treated as the ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of Maharashtra vs. Milind. In 2007 (1) LJSOFT 56 - 2007 (1) Mah.L.J. 423 – Ramesh Suresh Kamble Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Social Welfare Department and ors. , Full Bench of this Court has held that it is not necessary for the Caste Scrutiny Committee to record specifically that the Caste Certificate has been obtained by the applicant by making false claim or declaration. Once the Caste Certificate obtained by the candidate under section 4 from the Competent Authority is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee under section 7(1) of Maharashtra Act No. XXIII of 2001, the implicit inference is that such certificate has been obtained by making false claim or declaration because the power of the Scrutiny Committee to cancel the caste certificate is founded on such certificate having been obtained fraudulently.

23. In VemareddyKumaraswamy Reddy vs. State of A.P., reported at (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Hon'ble two judges have held that a statue is an edict of the Legislature and when words are very clear and there is no obscurity and ambiguity, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provision. The Hon'ble Apex Court has pointed out that there is a very thin line which separates the adjudication from legislation and cautioned that said line should not be crossed. We, therefore, can not overlook the mandate of Section 10 of Act no. 23 of 2001. We have to follow the full bench judgment of this Court in Ganesh Khalale (supra) and various other judgments of co-ordinate benches of this Court already pointed out above.

24. Even otherwise, the judgment dated 16.7.2012 delivered at Bombay in writ petition 7703/2010 filed by present petitioner Rajendra in operative order while remanding the matter back has already declared that if caste scrutiny committee rejected his caste claim, termination order dated 3.11.2009 shall revive and stand restored. It is apparent that termination order is restored because of earlier judgment of this Court which has attained finality. In this backdrop and situation, later petition seeking quashing of that termination or for protection of employment is obviously misconceived.

25. In this situation, we find that claim of the petitioner before this Court for protection on the strength of these later judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court or of the Division Bench of this Court is misconceived. No case is made out warranting interference. Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.