Simtaz Khan Vs. State of Jharkhand - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/110463
CourtJharkhand High Court
Decided OnJul-11-2017
AppellantSimtaz Khan
RespondentState of Jharkhand
Excerpt:
        criminal revision no. 139 of 2011 (against the judgment dated 07.07.2010 passed by learned additional sessions judge, fast tract court, koderma in cr. appeal no.36 of 2008 affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.07.2008 passed by sub­divisional judicial magistrate, koderma in connection with jai nagar p.s. case no.27 of 2002 g.r. case no.143 of 2002) ­­­­­­ simtaz khan, son of imtiyaz khan, resident of kaithadih, p.o. & p.s. jai nagar, district­koderma. .... …. petitioner                           versus 1. the state of jharkhand 2. shama khatoon, daughter of md. iliyas, resident of      village­kathadih, p.o. & p.s. jainagar, district­koderma .... … opp. parties      for the petitioner : mr. anil kumar sinha, adv.  for the state : mr. nehru mahto, a.p.p. for the opp. party no.2: mr. ram lakhan yadav, adv.      present        hon'ble mr. justice anil kumar choudhary   c.a.v. on 09/06/2017    pronounced on 11/07/2017 a.k. choudhary, j.  this   revision   application   is   directed   against   the   judgment dated 07.07.2010 passed by additional sessions judge, fast track court, koderma   in   cr.   appeal   no.36   of   2008   affirming   the   judgment   of conviction   and   order   of   sentence   dated   11.06.2008   passed   by   sub­ divisional judicial magistrate, koderma in g.r. case    no.143 of 2002 trial no.143 of 2008, whereby and whereunder the petitioner on being found guilty for the offence punishable under section 498a i.p.c. was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment   for one year and to pay fine   of   rs.1000/­.   the   petitioner   has   also   been   found   guilty   for   the offence punishable under section 4 of dowry prohibition act, 1961 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.  2. the   case   of   the   prosecution   is   that   the   informant   married   the petitioner as per the muslim rights and rituals about four years prior to the   occurrence.   sometime   after   her   marriage,   she   was   assaulted   in connection with the demand of a t.v. and a motorcycle. her father paid certain amount to pacify the matter. on 05.03.2002, at about 2 p.m. the petitioner   took   the   informant   near   the   well   while   assaulting   her   and attempted to throw her inside the well. on hue and cry being raised by the informant, she was saved. on the basis of written report submitted by the informant jai nagar p.s. case no.27 of 2002 was registered for the offence punishable under section 498a/341/342/323 of the indian penal code and section 3/4 of dowry prohibition act, 1961.3. on submission of charge­sheet, the petitioner along with her family members were put on trial. they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.  4. in   course   of   trial,   the   prosecution   in   order   to   bring   home   the charges   examined   six   witnesses.   p.w.­1   rahis   khan,   p.w.­2   niyamat khan, p.w.­4 hasina khatoon, p.w.­5 moin khan, p.w.­6 md. faruque have   inter­alia   stated   about   the   marriage,   demand   of   dowry   and   the assault by the petitioner. p.w.­3 shama khatoon is the informant. she has corroborated the averments made in her written report in para­10 of her  cross­examination.   she   has stated  that   the   petitioner  divorced  her prior to occurrence. in his defence, the petitioner has examined md. nain khan as d.w.­1.5. the learned magistrate after the trial convicted the petitioner only for the offences punishable under section 498­a i.p.c. and section 4 of dowry prohibition act, 1961 but acquitted all the co­accused persons of this revision petitioner.6. the   said   judgment   of   conviction   and   order   of   sentence   was challenged before the appellate court and appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court.  7. at the time of hearing, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that as admitted by the informant victim in her cross­examination, since no valid marriage was subsisting between the petitioner­convict and the informant­victim, at the time of occurrence, hence the petitioner was not the husband of the informant at the time of occurrence so no offence punishable   under   section   498­a   i.p.c.   is   made   out.   further   it   was submitted that the materials available in the record is insufficient to bring home   the   charges   for   the   offence   punishable   under   section   4   of   the dowry prohibition act, 1961. hence, it is submitted that the judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside.8. learned additional public prosecutor on the other hand defended the impugned judgment passed  by the trial court  as well as the appellate court   and   submitted   that   there   is   no   illegality   or   impropriety   in   the finding of conviction recorded by the trial court or the appellate court hence, this revision application being without any merit be dismissed.9. so far as the contention of the petitioner that no valid marriage was subsisting at the time of commission of alleged occurrence is concerned, the same was raised by the petitioner both in the trial court as well as in the appellate court.10. the trial court in para­8 of the judgment did not accept the said contention   of  the   petitioner   by   observing   that   though   the   witness   has stated   that   her   husband   divorced   her,   yet,   the   offence   of   torture   in connection of demand of dowry being a continuing offence will not come to an end by the divorce.  11. the   appellate   court   in   para­11   of   the   impugned   judgment   dealt with this contention of the petitioner by discussing that the mother of the victim and the witness niyamat khan have stated that the  petitioner has not divorced the victim. further, it was observed by the appellate court that the demand of dowry made by the petitioner after one month of the marriage was a continuing one.  12. now the point of law to be decided is whether a former/divorcee husband can be held liable for the offence punishable under section 498­ a of the indian penal code. to seek answer to the above question, it will be relevant to quote  section 498­a of indian penal code, 1860 (i.p.c.) which reads as under:­ 498­a.  husband   or   relative   of   husband   of   a woman subjecting her to cruelty­ “whoever , being the   husband   or   the   relative   of   the   husband   of   a woman,   subjects   such  woman  to   cruelty   shall   be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.” explanation­for the purpose of this section, “cruelty means­ (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely   to drive  the  woman to commit  suicide or  to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)   harassment   of   the   woman   where   such harassment   is   with   a   view   to   coercing   her   or   any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. (emphasis given by me)  13. section   198­a   code   of   criminal   procedure,   1973   (cr.p.c.)   is also relevant in this context which reads as under :­ 198­a.   prosecution   of   offences   under   section 498­a of the indian penal code­  no court shall take   cognizance   of   an   offence   punishable   under section 498­a of the indian penal code (45 of 1860) except upon a police report of facts which constitute such   offence   or  upon   a   complaint   made   by   the person   aggrieved   by   the   offence  or   by   her   father, mother, brother, sister or by her father's or mother's brother or sister or, with the leave of the court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption. (emphasis given by me) 14. section 498­a i.p.c. envisages that if a person ‘being the husband’ or the ‘relative of the husband' of a women subjects her to cruelty, he can be held guilty for the offence under the said section. 'being the husband' obviously   means   that   the   accused   is   the   husband   at   the   time   of occurrence.   so   in   order   to   bring   home   the   charge   for   the   offence punishable   under   section   498­a   i.p.c.,   the   prosecution   has   to   prove subsistence of a valid marriage at the time of commission of the offence. if   at   the   time   of   commission  of  offence,  a  valid   marriage   subsists  but subsequently, before institution of the case, marriage dissolves still the offence punishable under section 498­a would be made out as because section  498­a also envisages that 'the person aggrieved by the offence' is 'women' but not 'wife'. from this it is evident that the law requires that, to set the law in motion for an offence punishable under section 498­a i.p.c., it is not a sine­qua­non that the victim has to be the wife. again this interpretation also finds force from the recital of section 198­a of the code of criminal procedure where also the victim is referred to as 'the person aggrieved   by the offence' and not the 'wife'. so section 198­a cr.p.c. also provides that a divorced wife can also proceed against her former husband for the offence committed by him during subsistence of the marriage between them. thus, conjoint reading of the section 498­a i.p.c. and section 198­a cr.p.c. reveals that the legislature was clear in its   mind   that   an   accused   should   not   be   allowed   to   escape   from   the liability   under   section   498­a   i.p.c.   by   divorcing   his   wife,   after committing   the   offence   during   the   period   when   a   valid   marriage   was subsisting between the victim and the accused.15. in view of the above interpretation as  discussed, now coming to the question “whether the former husband can be held liable for the offence punishable   under   section   498­a   i.p.c.   for   the   alleged   act   of   cruelty committed by him on his divorced wife, after the divorce?” is concerned, simple reading of section 498­a i.p.c. indicates that the former husband cannot   be   held   guilty   for   such   offence   because   section   498­a   i.p.c. requires that to bring home the charge for the said offence, it has to be established that the act of cruelty is done by the accused in his marital status   as   the   husband.   obviously,   after   divorce,   the   male   person   to   a marriage ceases to be the husband, hence an act of subjecting the victim ex­wife to cruelty by the offender ex­husband after the divorce will not constitute the offence punishable under section 498­a i.p.c.16. in   forming  such   an  opinion,  i  am  persuaded  by  the   order  dated 12.01.2005 passed by the kerela high court in crl. mc case no.8601 of 2002 (reported in 2005 scc online ker 19 : (2005) 3 klt 468).17. now coming to the facts of the case, the victim who is main witness of  the  prosecution,  herself in para­10 has categorically stated  that she was   divorced   by   her   husband   prior   to   the   occurrence.   there   is   no material in the record to dis­believe her said testimony. hence, the trial court rightly believed her testimony. but in view of the interpretation of section   498a   i.p.c.   made   in   the   foregoing   paragraphs,   the   reasoning given by the trial court to convict the petitioner on the ground that the offence   punishable   under   section   498a   is   a   continuing   offence   is   not sustainable. in this backdrop, i have no hesitation in holding that as no valid marriage was subsisting between the victim and the petitioner of this revision application at the time of the commission of the offence, hence, the conviction of the petitioner for the offence punishable under section 498­a i.p.c. is indefensible, hence the same is set­aside.18. now coming to the second offence punishable under section 4 of dowry prohibition act, 1961 is concerned, the same reads as under :  4. penalty for demanding dowry­ if any person demands,   directly   or   indirectly,   from   the   parents   or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the  case   may   be,  any  dowry,  he  shall   be  punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and   with   fine   which   may   extend   to   ten   thousand rupees: provided   that   the   court   may,   for   adequate   and special   reasons   to   be   mentioned   in   the   judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.19. in   the   course   of   trial,   the   witnesses   of   prosecution   have categorically stated about the dowry demand of one t.v. and motorcycle. p.w.s­1 to 4 have categorically deposed about the said dowry demand. the   same   has  not   been  demolished in   any  manner and both  the   trial court   and   the   appellate   court   have   held   that   the   prosecution   has succeeded   in   establishing   the   charge   punishable   under   section   4   of dowry prohibition act, 1961.20. i am conscious of the restrictions for interference by the revisional court   with   the   concurrent   finding   of   facts   by   the   trial   court   and   the appellate court, as it is settled principle of law as has been held by the hon'ble   supreme   court   in   the   case   of  state   vs.   uppa   balu(1993) cr.l.j.129 sc. that  ‘ordinarily   it   is   not   open   for   a   court   to interfere with the concurrent finding of the court below  specially by  re­appreciating  the  evidence in its revisional jurisdiction.’  21. having gone through the records and keeping in view the principle of scope of interference in revision by high court in case of concurrent finding of conviction by the trial and appellate court, i do not find any illegality or impropriety with the said finding of the trial court or by the appellate court. hence, the said conviction of the revision petitioner for the offence punishable under section 4 of dowry prohibition act, 1961 does   not   warrant   any   interference   of   this   court   in   exercise   of   its revisional   jurisdiction,   but   so   far   as   the   sentence   for   the   said   offence punishable   under   section   4   of   the   dowry   prohibition   act,   1961   is concerned,   the   trial   court   has   sentenced   the   petitioner   to   undergo rigorous   imprisonment   for   6   months   which   has   been   affirmed   by   the appellate court. perusal of the record reveals that the revision petitioner has   been   in   custody   for   more   than   5   months   from   06.03.2002   to 10.06.2002 and from 04.02.2011 to 27.04.2011, (when he was granted bail by this court in this revision). the occurrence took place more than a decade and half back in the year 2002. since already there has been a “talak”,   there   is   no   chance   of   the   petitioner   committing   similar   crime again. this is a case where if the sentence is maintained the petitioner has to undergo imprisonment for only a few more days. the accused has suffered   a   lot   of   agony   of   protracted   litigation.   these   facts   and circumstances of this case as mentioned above constitute adequate and special reason to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of a few days less than six months. thus, this is a fit case where the sentence for the offence punishable under section 4 of dowry prohibition act, 1961 be reduced to the period of sentence already undergone by the revision petitioner as mentioned above.22. hence the conviction of the revision petitioner simtaz khan made by the judgment dated 07.07.2010 by the appellate court affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.06.2008 passed by the trial court,  so far as it relates to the conviction of the revision petitioner   for   the   offence   punishable   under   section   498­a   is   set­aside while   the   conviction   of   revision   petitioner   for   the   offence   punishable under section 4 of dowry prohibition act, 1961 is maintained but the sentence is modified to the period in custody already undergone by the revision petitioner. in view of the modification of sentence as indicated above, the petitioner is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds, this revision is disposed of accordingly.      (anil kumar choudhary, j.) high court of jharkhand, ranchi the 11 day of  july, 2017 nafr/gunjan
Judgment:

        Criminal Revision No. 139 of 2011 (Against the judgment dated 07.07.2010 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Tract Court, Koderma in Cr. Appeal No.36 of 2008 affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.07.2008 passed by Sub­Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Koderma in connection with Jai Nagar P.S. Case No.27 of 2002 G.R. Case No.143 of 2002) ­­­­­­ Simtaz Khan, son of Imtiyaz Khan, Resident of Kaithadih, P.O. & P.S. Jai Nagar, District­Koderma. .... …. Petitioner                           Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Shama Khatoon, daughter of Md. Iliyas, Resident of      Village­Kathadih, P.O. & P.S. Jainagar, District­Koderma .... … Opp. Parties      For the Petitioner : Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Adv.  For the State : Mr. Nehru Mahto, A.P.P. For the Opp. Party No.2: Mr. Ram Lakhan Yadav, Adv.      PRESENT        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY   C.A.V. ON 09/06/2017    PRONOUNCED ON 11/07/2017 A.K. Choudhary, J.

  This   revision   application   is   directed   against   the   judgment dated 07.07.2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Koderma   in   Cr.   Appeal   No.36   of   2008   affirming   the   judgment   of conviction   and   order   of   sentence   dated   11.06.2008   passed   by   Sub­ Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Koderma in G.R. Case    No.143 of 2002 Trial No.143 of 2008, whereby and whereunder the petitioner on being found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment   for one year and to pay fine   of   Rs.1000/­.   The   petitioner   has   also   been   found   guilty   for   the offence punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.  2. The   case   of   the   prosecution   is   that   the   informant   married   the petitioner as per the Muslim Rights and Rituals about four years prior to the   occurrence.   Sometime   after   her   marriage,   she   was   assaulted   in connection with the demand of a T.V. and a motorcycle. Her father paid certain amount to pacify the matter. On 05.03.2002, at about 2 p.m. the petitioner   took   the   informant   near   the   well   while   assaulting   her   and attempted to throw her inside the well. On hue and cry being raised by the informant, she was saved. On the basis of written report submitted by the informant Jai Nagar P.S. Case No.27 of 2002 was registered for the offence punishable under section 498A/341/342/323 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

3. On submission of charge­sheet, the petitioner along with her family members were put on trial. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.  4. In   course   of   trial,   the   prosecution   in   order   to   bring   home   the charges   examined   six   witnesses.   P.W.­1   Rahis   Khan,   P.W.­2   Niyamat Khan, P.W.­4 Hasina Khatoon, P.W.­5 Moin Khan, P.W.­6 Md. Faruque have   inter­alia   stated   about   the   marriage,   demand   of   dowry   and   the assault by the petitioner. P.W.­3 Shama Khatoon is the informant. She has corroborated the averments made in her written report in para­10 of her  cross­examination.   She   has stated  that   the   petitioner  divorced  her prior to occurrence. In his defence, the petitioner has examined Md. Nain Khan as D.W.­1.

5. The learned Magistrate after the trial convicted the petitioner only for the offences punishable under Section 498­A I.P.C. and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 but acquitted all the co­accused persons of this revision petitioner.

6. The   said   judgment   of   conviction   and   order   of   sentence   was challenged before the appellate court and appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court.  7. At the time of hearing, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that as admitted by the informant victim in her cross­examination, since no valid marriage was subsisting between the petitioner­convict and the informant­victim, at the time of occurrence, hence the petitioner was not the husband of the informant at the time of occurrence so no offence punishable   under   Section   498­A   I.P.C.   is   made   out.   Further   it   was submitted that the materials available in the record is insufficient to bring home   the   charges   for   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   4   of   the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Hence, it is submitted that the judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside.

8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the other hand defended the impugned judgment passed  by the trial court  as well as the appellate court   and   submitted   that   there   is   no   illegality   or   impropriety   in   the finding of conviction recorded by the trial court or the appellate court hence, this revision application being without any merit be dismissed.

9. So far as the contention of the petitioner that no valid marriage was subsisting at the time of commission of alleged occurrence is concerned, the same was raised by the petitioner both in the trial court as well as in the appellate court.

10. The trial court in para­8 of the judgment did not accept the said contention   of  the   petitioner   by   observing   that   though   the   witness   has stated   that   her   husband   divorced   her,   yet,   the   offence   of   torture   in connection of demand of dowry being a continuing offence will not come to an end by the divorce.  11. The   appellate   court   in   para­11   of   the   impugned   judgment   dealt with this contention of the petitioner by discussing that the mother of the victim and the witness Niyamat Khan have stated that the  petitioner has not divorced the victim. Further, it was observed by the appellate court that the demand of dowry made by the petitioner after one month of the marriage was a continuing one.  12. Now the point of law to be decided is whether a former/divorcee husband can be held liable for the offence punishable under Section 498­ A of the Indian Penal Code. To seek answer to the above question, it will be relevant to quote  Section 498­A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (I.P.C.) which reads as under:­ 498­A.  Husband   or   relative   of   husband   of   a woman subjecting her to cruelty­ “Whoever , being the   husband   or   the   relative   of   the   husband   of   a woman,   subjects   such  woman  to   cruelty   shall   be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.” Explanation­For the purpose of this section, “cruelty means­ (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely   to drive  the  woman to commit  suicide or  to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)   harassment   of   the   woman   where   such harassment   is   with   a   view   to   coercing   her   or   any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. (Emphasis given by me)  13. Section   198­A   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (Cr.P.C.)   is also relevant in this context which reads as under :­ 198­A.   Prosecution   of   offences   under   section 498­A of the Indian Penal Code­  No Court shall take   cognizance   of   an   offence   punishable   under section 498­A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a police report of facts which constitute such   offence   or  upon   a   complaint   made   by   the person   aggrieved   by   the   offence  or   by   her   father, mother, brother, sister or by her father's or mother's brother or sister or, with the leave of the Court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption. (Emphasis given by me) 14. Section 498­A I.P.C. envisages that if a person ‘being the husband’ or the ‘relative of the husband' of a women subjects her to cruelty, he can be held guilty for the offence under the said section. 'Being the husband' obviously   means   that   the   accused   is   the   husband   at   the   time   of occurrence.   So   in   order   to   bring   home   the   charge   for   the   offence punishable   under   Section   498­A   I.P.C.,   the   prosecution   has   to   prove subsistence of a valid marriage at the time of commission of the offence. If   at   the   time   of   commission  of  offence,  a  valid   marriage   subsists  but subsequently, before institution of the case, marriage dissolves still the offence punishable under Section 498­A would be made out as because Section  498­A also envisages that 'the person aggrieved by the offence' is 'women' but not 'wife'. From this it is evident that the law requires that, to set the law in motion for an offence punishable under Section 498­A I.P.C., it is not a sine­qua­non that the victim has to be the wife. Again this interpretation also finds force from the recital of Section 198­A of the Code of Criminal Procedure where also the victim is referred to as 'the person aggrieved   by the offence' and not the 'wife'. So Section 198­A Cr.P.C. also provides that a divorced wife can also proceed against her former husband for the offence committed by him during subsistence of the marriage between them. Thus, conjoint reading of the Section 498­A I.P.C. and Section 198­A Cr.P.C. reveals that the legislature was clear in its   mind   that   an   accused   should   not   be   allowed   to   escape   from   the liability   under   Section   498­A   I.P.C.   by   divorcing   his   wife,   after committing   the   offence   during   the   period   when   a   valid   marriage   was subsisting between the victim and the accused.

15. In view of the above interpretation as  discussed, now coming to the question “Whether the former husband can be held liable for the offence punishable   under   Section   498­A   I.P.C.   for   the   alleged   act   of   cruelty committed by him on his divorced wife, after the divorce?” is concerned, simple reading of Section 498­A I.P.C. indicates that the former husband cannot   be   held   guilty   for   such   offence   because   Section   498­A   I.P.C. requires that to bring home the charge for the said offence, it has to be established that the act of cruelty is done by the accused in his marital status   as   the   husband.   Obviously,   after   divorce,   the   male   person   to   a marriage ceases to be the husband, hence an act of subjecting the victim ex­wife to cruelty by the offender ex­husband after the divorce will not constitute the offence punishable under Section 498­A I.P.C.

16. In   forming  such   an  opinion,  I  am  persuaded  by  the   order  dated 12.01.2005 passed by the Kerela High Court in Crl. MC Case No.8601 of 2002 (reported in 2005 SCC Online Ker 19 : (2005) 3 KLT 468).

17. Now coming to the facts of the case, the victim who is main witness of  the  prosecution,  herself in para­10 has categorically stated  that she was   divorced   by   her   husband   prior   to   the   occurrence.   There   is   no material in the record to dis­believe her said testimony. Hence, the trial court rightly believed her testimony. But in view of the interpretation of Section   498A   I.P.C.   made   in   the   foregoing   paragraphs,   the   reasoning given by the trial court to convict the petitioner on the ground that the offence   punishable   under   Section   498A   is   a   continuing   offence   is   not sustainable. In this backdrop, I have no hesitation in holding that as no valid marriage was subsisting between the victim and the petitioner of this revision application at the time of the commission of the offence, hence, the conviction of the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 498­A I.P.C. is indefensible, hence the same is set­aside.

18. Now coming to the second offence punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is concerned, the same reads as under :  4. Penalty for demanding dowry­ If any person demands,   directly   or   indirectly,   from   the   parents   or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the  case   may   be,  any  dowry,  he  shall   be  punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and   with   fine   which   may   extend   to   ten   thousand rupees: Provided   that   the   Court   may,   for   adequate   and special   reasons   to   be   mentioned   in   the   judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.

19. In   the   course   of   trial,   the   witnesses   of   prosecution   have categorically stated about the dowry demand of one T.V. and motorcycle. P.W.s­1 to 4 have categorically deposed about the said dowry demand. The   same   has  not   been  demolished in   any  manner and both  the   trial court   and   the   appellate   court   have   held   that   the   prosecution   has succeeded   in   establishing   the   charge   punishable   under   Section   4   of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

20. I am conscious of the restrictions for interference by the revisional court   with   the   concurrent   finding   of   facts   by   the   trial   court   and   the appellate court, as it is settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of  State   Vs.   Uppa   Balu(1993) Cr.L.J.129 SC. that  ‘Ordinarily   it   is   not   open   for   a   Court   to interfere with the concurrent finding of the court below  specially by  re­appreciating  the  evidence in its revisional jurisdiction.’  21. Having gone through the records and keeping in view the principle of scope of interference in revision by high Court in case of concurrent finding of conviction by the trial and appellate court, I do not find any illegality or impropriety with the said finding of the trial court or by the appellate court. Hence, the said conviction of the revision petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does   not   warrant   any   interference   of   this   Court   in   exercise   of   its revisional   jurisdiction,   but   so   far   as   the   sentence   for   the   said   offence punishable   under   Section   4   of   the   Dowry   Prohibition   Act,   1961   is concerned,   the   trial   court   has   sentenced   the   petitioner   to   undergo rigorous   imprisonment   for   6   months   which   has   been   affirmed   by   the appellate court. Perusal of the record reveals that the revision petitioner has   been   in   custody   for   more   than   5   months   from   06.03.2002   to 10.06.2002 and from 04.02.2011 to 27.04.2011, (when he was granted bail by this Court in this revision). The occurrence took place more than a decade and half back in the year 2002. Since already there has been a “talak”,   there   is   no   chance   of   the   petitioner   committing   similar   crime again. This is a case where if the sentence is maintained the petitioner has to undergo imprisonment for only a few more days. The accused has suffered   a   lot   of   agony   of   protracted   litigation.   These   facts   and circumstances of this case as mentioned above constitute adequate and special reason to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of a few days less than six months. Thus, this is a fit case where the sentence for the offence punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 be reduced to the period of sentence already undergone by the revision petitioner as mentioned above.

22. Hence the conviction of the revision petitioner Simtaz Khan made by the judgment dated 07.07.2010 by the appellate court affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.06.2008 passed by the trial court,  so far as it relates to the conviction of the revision petitioner   for   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   498­A   is   set­aside while   the   conviction   of   revision   petitioner   for   the   offence   punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is maintained but the sentence is modified to the period in custody already undergone by the revision petitioner. In view of the modification of sentence as indicated above, the petitioner is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds, this revision is disposed of accordingly.      (Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi The 11 day of  July, 2017 NAFR/Gunjan