Mithilesh Kumar Sah Vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/110361
CourtJharkhand High Court
Decided OnJun-14-2017
AppellantMithilesh Kumar Sah
RespondentState of Jharkhand and Ors.
Excerpt:
w.p.(s) no. 1703 of 2008 ( in the matter of an application under article 226 of the constitution of india) ----- mithilesh kumar sah son of late bishwanath sah, presently residing at shradhanand road, upper bazar, po & ps- kotwali, district- ranchi …. .… petitioner --versus-- 1. the state of jharkhand 2. the secretary, water resources department, government of jharkhand, ranchi 3. the under secretary, water resources department, government of jharkhand, ranchi …. …. respondents for the petitioner : m/s. rajendra krishna & amit sinha, advocates for the state-respondent: mrs. rakhi rani, j.c. to g.a.-iv present hon’ble mr. justice rajesh shankar ----- by court : heard learned counsel for the parties.2. the present writ petition has been filed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of punishment contained in memo no. 2590 dated 23.06.2005 (annexure-6 to the writ petition) and also for quashing the part of the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001 (annexure-3 to the writ petition).3. the factual matrix of the case is that while the petitioner was posted as junior engineer in agnu sub-division (presently in the state of bihar), he was issued memo of charge alleging inter alia that he released 200 bags of cement in a single day to the contractors irrespective of the fact that there was no arrangement for keeping the aforesaid bags at the site and hence he facilitated black marketing of the said cement bags. initially, one harihar mandal and after his superannuation, deo chandra jha, superintending engineer and finally birendra kumar singh was appointed as inquiry officer, who recorded his finding in the inquiry report submitted on 19.07.2001. thereafter, a second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner vide letter no. 1405 dated 13.11.2002 disclosing the proposed punishment. the petitioner also filed his reply to the said second 2 show-cause, which was received on 01.12.2002 (annexure-5 to the writ petition). in the meantime, the cadre of the petitioner was allocated to the state of jharkhand and at the time of filing of the writ petition, he was posted at ground water division, ranchi, department of water resources (minor irrigation), government of jharkhand, ranchi. the government of jharkhand, vide order contained in memo no. 2590 dated 23.06.2005 issued under the signature of the under secretary to the government of jharkhand, imposed the following punishments upon the petitioner : (i) censure for the year 1999-2000; (ii) restriction on promotion for five years and (iii) restriction on posting in the field for five years. the said order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 is under challenge in the present writ petition.4. learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 has been issued by the government of jharkhand without considering the reply to the second show-cause notice submitted by the petitioner on 01.12.2002. it is further submitted that on perusal of the memo of charge and inquiry report, it would be evident that there was only one charge against the petitioner that he, by releasing 200 bags of cement on a single day to the contractors facilitated black marketing of the said cement bags. however, the inquiry officer came to a finding that except few works, no such proof was found from the spot account verification that the contractors were released 200 bags of cement on a single day. during the inquiry, it was also found that so far as accounts of concerned works were concerned, the same used to be maintained by another junior engineer of the sub-division namely janardan singh. resultantly, the inquiry officer reached a conclusion that so far as charge of black marketing is concerned, no material was available on record in support of the same and thus, the charge of black marketing could not be proved against the petitioner. irrespective of the said fact, the inquiry officer, in the inquiry report, 3 made his remark that keeping the cement bags in private houses was not justified and if it was not possible to store the cement bags at the construction site, the cement bags should have been released on daily basis as per the requirement of the work. after making the said remark, the inquiry officer observed in the inquiry report that it attracts collective responsibility.5. learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001 submits that the inquiry officer did not have any evidence on record in support of the fact that there was any mandatory provision for construction of godown at the construction site so as to keep the construction materials at the said site and in absence of any such provision, the finding of the inquiry officer can be said to be merely based on conjecture and surmises. moreover, the remark of the inquiry officer that it was the collective responsibility of all the concerned officers cannot be said to be a finding against the petitioner so as to suggest that the charge levelled against him was found proved during the inquiry. if, at all, it was a case of collective responsibility of officers, the petitioner should not have been singled out by holding that charge against the petitioner has been proved. in fact, on perusal of the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001, it would be evident that there was no material available before the inquiry officer in support of the charge and, therefore, the finding of the inquiry officer is perverse.6. learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:- (i) air1964s.c. 364; (ii) (2009) 2 s.c.c. 570; (iii) (2008) 3 s.c.c. 484 ; (iv) (2005) 12 s.c.c. 256 7. per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the state of jharkhand submits that the department of water resources, government of bihar, issued direction to the flying squad to enquire into the irregularities committed in pucca works under irrigation 4 division, daudnagar. on receipt of the report of the flying squad, it was gathered that no cement store was built on the work site to keep cement safely for construction work. it was also observed that bogus estimates were also prepared in the name of rehabilitation work and as such, the petitioner along with seven others were found responsible for the said irregularities. the department of water resources, bihar, initiated a departmental proceeding against the petitioner for his alleged involvement in the above mentioned irregularities. the water resources department, government of bihar did not take final decision because at that time, the petitioner was under the administrative control of state of jharkhand. the file relating to the above departmental proceeding was sent to the state of jharkhand for the necessary action. the state of jharkhand examined the enquiry report of flying squad, report of conducting officer and the second show cause reply submitted by the petitioner and thereafter, vide order dated 23.06.2005, the petitioner has been awarded with the punishment of censure for the year 1999-2000, restriction on promotion for five years and restriction on posting for five years in the field. it is apparent from the aforesaid facts that after conducting departmental proceeding against the petitioner and also after giving opportunity of hearing to him, the order of punishment was passed and, therefore, there is no illegality in issuing the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2005.8. having heard learned counsel for the parties and on consideration of relevant documents placed on record, it appears that on 01.06.2000, the memo of charge was issued to the petitioner. on the same day, the inquiry officer was appointed and after conclusion of the inquiry proceeding, the inquiry report was submitted on 19.07.2001. thereafter, on 13.11.2002, second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority and, thereafter on 01.12.2002, reply to the second show-cause notice was also submitted by the petitioner. however, in the meantime, the petitioner’s cadre was allocated to the state of jharkhand. after lapse 5 of about two and half years, the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 was issued to the petitioner inflicting the punishment of censure for the year 1999-2000, restriction on his promotion for five years and restriction on his posting for five years in the field. on perusal of the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001, it appears that the solitary charge of facilitating black marketing of cement was not proved against the petitioner. however, the inquiry officer made a remark that storing of cement in residential houses was not proper and if there was no provision for storing the cement at the construction site, the cement bags should have been issued every day as per the requirement. the inquiry officer, thereafter, observed that it was a case of collective responsibility.9. on careful consideration of the inquiry report, it appears that no document in the form of any government order, circular or departmental instruction was available with the inquiry officer so as to prove the charge that there was a mandatory requirement of construction of godown/storage for keeping the cement bags at the construction site. moreover, no government order, circular or any departmental instruction was available on record so as to suggest that 200 numbers of cement bags could have been issued in a single day. the remark of the inquiry officer that the alleged lapses attracted joint responsibility of the officers is of no consequence and for the said remark, the petitioner could not have been singled out vis-à-vis the other officers/officials involved in the said construction work. the hon’ble supreme court in the case of roop singh negi vs. punjab national bank and others reported in (2009) 2 scc570 in paragraph-14, has held as under :-“14. indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial function. the inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. the charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. the inquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. the purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in 6 the disciplinary proceeding. no witness was examined to prove the said documents. the management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. reliance, inter alia, was placed by the inquiry officer on the fir which could not have been treated as evidence. ”10. the hon’ble supreme court in the case of m.v. bijlani vs. union of india and others reported in (2006) 5 scc88has discussed the role and responsibility of the inquiry officer as under:-“25. it is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidences to prove the charge. although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analyzing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. while doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. he cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. he cannot shift the burden of proof. he cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. he cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officers had not been charged with. ”11. at the strength of the aforesaid judgments rendered by the hon’ble apex court, it can be safely construed that the inquiry officer while performing a quasi-judicial function is required to arrive at an appropriate conclusion after analyzing the documents placed during the inquiry proceeding. the inquiry officer is neither expected to take into consideration any irrelevant fact nor he can refuse to consider the relevant facts. in the present case, the very basis of charge levelled against the petitioner being absent in the inquiry proceeding, the part of the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001 to the extent the charge against the petitioner has been found to be proved, cannot be legally sustained.12. now coming to the issue of order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 passed by the disciplinary authority, it appears that the said order of punishment though refers to the receipt of the second 7 show-cause reply submitted by the petitioner, yet not a single point raised by the petitioner in the said reply has been considered by the disciplinary authority. it was the duty of the disciplinary authority to consider all the relevant points raised by the petitioner in his second show-cause reply. on perusal of the second show-cause reply submitted by the petitioner (annexure-5 to the writ petition), it would be evident that several points were raised by the petitioner in support of his defence. however, not a single point raised by the petitioner was taken note of by the disciplinary authority while passing the order of punishment dated 23.06.2005.13. the hon’ble apex court in the case of managing director, ecil, hyderabad and others vs. b. karunakar and others reported in (1993) 4 scc727 in paragraph-28, while discussing the requirement of reasonable opportunity to be given to the charged officer against the finding of the inquiry officer, has held as under:-“28. the position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. the findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. what is further, when the proviso to the said article states that “where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee’s reply to the enquiry officer’s report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. the second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty……” 8 14. the aforesaid principles laid down in the case of b. karunakar (supra) has been followed in the case of union of india vs. bishamber das dogra reported in (2009) 13 scc102 paragraph- 14 of the said judgment reads as under:“14. it is settled legal position that an order is required to be examined on the touchstone of doctrine of prejudice. a constitution bench of this court in ecil v. b. karunakar , considered the issue at length and after taking into consideration its earlier judgment in union of india v. mohd. ramzan khan, came to the conclusion that (b. karunakar case, scc p. 755, para28) furnishing the copy of the inquiry report and consideration of the employee’s reply to the same by the disciplinary authority constitute an integral part of the inquiry.” in view of the aforesaid discussions and settled legal proposition, the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 also cannot be legally sustained.15. resultantly, the impugned inquiry report dated 19.07.2001 to the extent the charge against the petitioner has been found to be proved and the order of punishment by the disciplinary authority dated 23.06.2005 are hereby quashed and set aside.16. the writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and disposed of. (rajesh shankar, j.) jharkhand high court, ranchi dated:14. 06.2017 ritesh/a.f.r.
Judgment:

W.P.(S) No. 1703 of 2008 ( In the matter of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India) ----- Mithilesh Kumar Sah Son of Late Bishwanath Sah, presently residing at Shradhanand Road, Upper Bazar, PO & PS- Kotwali, District- Ranchi …. .… Petitioner --Versus-- 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi 3. The Under Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi …. …. Respondents For the petitioner : M/s. Rajendra Krishna & Amit Sinha, Advocates For the State-respondent: Mrs. Rakhi Rani, J.C. to G.A.-IV PRESENT HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- By Court : Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of punishment contained in Memo no. 2590 dated 23.06.2005 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) and also for quashing the part of the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition).

3. The factual matrix of the case is that while the petitioner was posted as Junior Engineer in Agnu Sub-Division (presently in the State of Bihar), he was issued memo of charge alleging inter alia that he released 200 bags of cement in a single day to the contractors irrespective of the fact that there was no arrangement for keeping the aforesaid bags at the site and hence he facilitated black marketing of the said cement bags. Initially, one Harihar Mandal and after his superannuation, Deo Chandra Jha, Superintending Engineer and finally Birendra Kumar Singh was appointed as Inquiry Officer, who recorded his finding in the inquiry report submitted on 19.07.2001. Thereafter, a second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner vide Letter no. 1405 dated 13.11.2002 disclosing the proposed punishment. The petitioner also filed his reply to the said second 2 show-cause, which was received on 01.12.2002 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition). In the meantime, the cadre of the petitioner was allocated to the State of Jharkhand and at the time of filing of the writ petition, he was posted at Ground Water Division, Ranchi, Department of Water Resources (Minor Irrigation), Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi. The Government of Jharkhand, vide order contained in Memo No. 2590 dated 23.06.2005 issued under the signature of the Under Secretary to the Government of Jharkhand, imposed the following punishments upon the petitioner : (i) Censure for the year 1999-2000; (ii) Restriction on promotion for five years and (iii) Restriction on posting in the field for five years. The said order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 is under challenge in the present writ petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 has been issued by the Government of Jharkhand without considering the reply to the second show-cause notice submitted by the petitioner on 01.12.2002. It is further submitted that on perusal of the memo of charge and inquiry report, it would be evident that there was only one charge against the petitioner that he, by releasing 200 bags of cement on a single day to the contractors facilitated black marketing of the said cement bags. However, the Inquiry Officer came to a finding that except few works, no such proof was found from the spot account verification that the contractors were released 200 bags of cement on a single day. During the inquiry, it was also found that so far as accounts of concerned works were concerned, the same used to be maintained by another Junior Engineer of the Sub-Division namely Janardan Singh. Resultantly, the Inquiry Officer reached a conclusion that so far as charge of black marketing is concerned, no material was available on record in support of the same and thus, the charge of black marketing could not be proved against the petitioner. Irrespective of the said fact, the Inquiry Officer, in the inquiry report, 3 made his remark that keeping the cement bags in private houses was not justified and if it was not possible to store the cement bags at the construction site, the cement bags should have been released on daily basis as per the requirement of the work. After making the said remark, the Inquiry Officer observed in the inquiry report that it attracts collective responsibility.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001 submits that the Inquiry Officer did not have any evidence on record in support of the fact that there was any mandatory provision for construction of godown at the construction site so as to keep the construction materials at the said site and in absence of any such provision, the finding of the Inquiry Officer can be said to be merely based on conjecture and surmises. Moreover, the remark of the Inquiry Officer that it was the collective responsibility of all the concerned officers cannot be said to be a finding against the petitioner so as to suggest that the charge levelled against him was found proved during the inquiry. If, at all, it was a case of collective responsibility of officers, the petitioner should not have been singled out by holding that charge against the petitioner has been proved. In fact, on perusal of the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001, it would be evident that there was no material available before the Inquiry Officer in support of the charge and, therefore, the finding of the Inquiry Officer is perverse.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:- (i) AIR1964S.C. 364; (ii) (2009) 2 S.C.C. 570; (iii) (2008) 3 S.C.C. 484 ; (iv) (2005) 12 S.C.C. 256 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Jharkhand submits that the Department of Water Resources, Government of Bihar, issued direction to the flying squad to enquire into the irregularities committed in Pucca Works under Irrigation 4 Division, Daudnagar. On receipt of the report of the flying squad, it was gathered that no cement store was built on the work site to keep cement safely for construction work. It was also observed that bogus estimates were also prepared in the name of rehabilitation work and as such, the petitioner along with seven others were found responsible for the said irregularities. The Department of Water Resources, Bihar, initiated a departmental proceeding against the petitioner for his alleged involvement in the above mentioned irregularities. The Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar did not take final decision because at that time, the petitioner was under the administrative control of State of Jharkhand. The file relating to the above departmental proceeding was sent to the State of Jharkhand for the necessary action. The State of Jharkhand examined the enquiry report of flying squad, report of conducting officer and the second show cause reply submitted by the petitioner and thereafter, vide order dated 23.06.2005, the petitioner has been awarded with the punishment of censure for the year 1999-2000, restriction on promotion for five years and restriction on posting for five years in the field. It is apparent from the aforesaid facts that after conducting departmental proceeding against the petitioner and also after giving opportunity of hearing to him, the order of punishment was passed and, therefore, there is no illegality in issuing the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2005.

8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on consideration of relevant documents placed on record, it appears that on 01.06.2000, the memo of charge was issued to the petitioner. On the same day, the Inquiry Officer was appointed and after conclusion of the inquiry proceeding, the inquiry report was submitted on 19.07.2001. Thereafter, on 13.11.2002, second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority and, thereafter on 01.12.2002, reply to the second show-cause notice was also submitted by the petitioner. However, in the meantime, the petitioner’s cadre was allocated to the State of Jharkhand. After lapse 5 of about two and half years, the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 was issued to the petitioner inflicting the punishment of censure for the year 1999-2000, restriction on his promotion for five years and restriction on his posting for five years in the field. On perusal of the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001, it appears that the solitary charge of facilitating black marketing of cement was not proved against the petitioner. However, the Inquiry Officer made a remark that storing of cement in residential houses was not proper and if there was no provision for storing the cement at the construction site, the cement bags should have been issued every day as per the requirement. The Inquiry Officer, thereafter, observed that it was a case of collective responsibility.

9. On careful consideration of the inquiry report, it appears that no document in the form of any government order, circular or departmental instruction was available with the Inquiry Officer so as to prove the charge that there was a mandatory requirement of construction of godown/storage for keeping the cement bags at the construction site. Moreover, no government order, circular or any departmental instruction was available on record so as to suggest that 200 numbers of cement bags could have been issued in a single day. The remark of the Inquiry Officer that the alleged lapses attracted joint responsibility of the officers is of no consequence and for the said remark, the petitioner could not have been singled out vis-à-vis the other officers/officials involved in the said construction work. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others reported in (2009) 2 SCC570 in paragraph-14, has held as under :-

“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial function. The inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The inquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in 6 the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the inquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. ”

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2006) 5 SCC88has discussed the role and responsibility of the Inquiry Officer as under:-

“25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidences to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Inquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analyzing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officers had not been charged with. ”

11. At the strength of the aforesaid judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it can be safely construed that the Inquiry Officer while performing a quasi-judicial function is required to arrive at an appropriate conclusion after analyzing the documents placed during the inquiry proceeding. The Inquiry Officer is neither expected to take into consideration any irrelevant fact nor he can refuse to consider the relevant facts. In the present case, the very basis of charge levelled against the petitioner being absent in the inquiry proceeding, the part of the inquiry report dated 19.07.2001 to the extent the charge against the petitioner has been found to be proved, cannot be legally sustained.

12. Now coming to the issue of order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, it appears that the said order of punishment though refers to the receipt of the second 7 show-cause reply submitted by the petitioner, yet not a single point raised by the petitioner in the said reply has been considered by the Disciplinary Authority. It was the duty of the Disciplinary Authority to consider all the relevant points raised by the petitioner in his second show-cause reply. On perusal of the second show-cause reply submitted by the petitioner (Annexure-5 to the writ petition), it would be evident that several points were raised by the petitioner in support of his defence. However, not a single point raised by the petitioner was taken note of by the disciplinary authority while passing the order of punishment dated 23.06.2005.

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others Vs. B. Karunakar and others reported in (1993) 4 SCC727 in paragraph-28, while discussing the requirement of reasonable opportunity to be given to the charged officer against the finding of the Inquiry Officer, has held as under:-

“28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that “where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee’s reply to the enquiry officer’s report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty……” 8 14. The aforesaid principles laid down in the case of B. Karunakar (supra) has been followed in the case of Union of India Vs. Bishamber Das Dogra reported in (2009) 13 SCC102 Paragraph- 14 of the said judgment reads as under:

“14. It is settled legal position that an order is required to be examined on the touchstone of doctrine of prejudice. A Constitution Bench of this Court in ECIL v. B. Karunakar , considered the issue at length and after taking into consideration its earlier judgment in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, came to the conclusion that (B. Karunakar case, SCC p. 755, para

28) furnishing the copy of the inquiry report and consideration of the employee’s reply to the same by the disciplinary authority constitute an integral part of the inquiry.” In view of the aforesaid discussions and settled legal proposition, the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2005 also cannot be legally sustained.

15. Resultantly, the impugned inquiry report dated 19.07.2001 to the extent the charge against the petitioner has been found to be proved and the order of punishment by the Disciplinary Authority dated 23.06.2005 are hereby quashed and set aside.

16. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and disposed of. (Rajesh Shankar, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated:

14. 06.2017 Ritesh/A.F.R.